Peter Munk Christiansen

Contribution to Oxford Handbook of Danish Politics

Kære alle

Nåede ikke langt, så her er blot nogle noter til en artikel, der end ikke star helt klar for forfatteren!

Det er så til gengæld en god anledning til at få kommentarer fra gode kolleger.

Venlig hilsen

Peter

**Exaggerated Death Rumors: The End of Danish Corporatism?**

**Introduction**

Danish – and Scandinavian – corporatism was a child of industrial society. Its birth and rise was closely related to the conflicts and problems related to the transformation from an agricultural society to the growth of urban industries. Consequently, it is tempting to see the alleged weakening of corporatism as a consequence of the advent of new societal structures, problems and issues related to the vanishing of industrial society and the advent of post-industrial society, whatever that may be.

This way of reasoning presupposes that corporatism is actually declining or have disappeared. Quite a number of scholars have questioned the extent to which corporatism is actually vanishing in Denmark and a number of other European countries.

The research question of this article is: To what extent is the death of corporatism exaggerated, and why does Danish corporatism seem to be more tenacious that many scholars have predicted?

**Varieties of Democracy: Corporatism defined**

Corporatism is a contested concept and phenomenon and has been defined in different ways. Part of the literature is occupied with corporatism as a way to coordinate the behavior of economic actors. This literature studies the effects on economic parameters and policy outcomes. In this meaning corporatism is a type of economic coordination and belong to the study of varieties of capitalism (e.g. Hall and Gingerich 2009).

Corporatism can also be seen as a way of organizing political and administrative decision-making processes. In this view corporatism is a way to coordinate political actors. It thus belong to the study of varieties of democracy. In this article the latter view on corporatism, which is defined as “…institutionalized and privileged integration of organized interests in the preparation and/or implementation of public policies” (Christiansen et al. 2010: 27) is applied.

*Institutionalized* integration implies that the access of interest groups to the policy process is regulated by formal rules as well as informal norms. This again implied that interest groups have very strong expectations to be involved in policy making and implementation when relevant. And relevance is defined by the expected effect of policies in being; if a group is to be affected by future political decisions, it expect to be heard if not directly involved in policy preparation.

*Privileged* integration means that some groups enjoy a more prominent position than others. Elected officials and civil servants cannot deliberate and negotiate with all relevant interest groups at an equal basis, if for no other reasons then for practical reasons. A privileged position is earned over some years during which the group has proved itself to be a credible and trustworthy partner in the exchange relation between groups and state actors. A privileged position will often, but not necessarily, be earned by the largest group within a sector.

**The origin of Danish corporatism**

Danish corporatism did not develop as a outcome of a grand design. It rather developed as a result of trials-and-errors:

* Labor market issues around the end of the 19th, beginning of the 20th Century. “The labour question”. Social unrest in the cities. Arbejderforsikringsrådet 1898. (Nørgaard 1997.
* 1899 labour market “Main Agreement”. (Due m.fl. (2000)
* Business policies: Urban industry and trade (Hertz, 1987)
* WW1. Den Overordentlige Kommission (Christiansen & Nørgaard, 2003)
* Economic crises. 1930’s. (Just 1992)

Preconditions for the establishment of strong corporatist structures:

* Some strength of organized interests, particularly in relation to labour maket and industrial groups
* Political parties’ interests in corporatism: political exchange-relations

**Declining corporatism?**

Hvad siger litteraturen gennem de senere år? Political exchange model som filter

* Allern m.fl. 2007Blom-Hansen 2000, 2001
* Binderkrantz og Christiansen 2015
* Christiansen 2014
* Christiansen and Rommetvedt 1999
* Christiansen et al., 2010
* Christiansen et al. 2018
* Klitgaard and Nørgaard 2013
* Rommetvedt et al., 2013
* Öberg et al. 2011

**Government White papers 1972-2017**

Artiklen vil indeholde en analyse af interesseorganisationers placering I Danske betænkninger 1972-2017.

**Why is corporatism more tenacious than some people believe?**

* Danmark har meget stærke interesseorganisationer på arbejdsmarkedet, I erhvervslivet, blandt offentlige institutioner ….. De sætter fortsat mange aftryk på offentlig poltik og former i høj grad samspillet mellem stat og organisationer, om end under lidt ændrede vilkår.
* Fortsat mange institutioner bygget op om korporative strukturer (fx erhvervsskolerne), selv om mange er under pres eller er radikalt ændret (beskæftigelsesforvaltningen.
* Regeringer efterspørger selektiv political exchange: Foghs forsøg på at reducere antallet af råd, nævn og udvalg, jævnt hen mislykket, fordi det er et godt og fleksibelt redskab for en regering.
* …..
* …..

**Conclusion**

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