Dead or alive?
A study of survival in the Danish interest group population 1976-2010


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Introduction

Interest groups are important players in modern democracies. Depending on one’s perspective, they can be seen as democracy’s heroes that give citizens democratic competencies, contribute to a varied public debate, and channel citizens’ communication to and control with decision makers. However, they may also be seen as democracy’s scoundrels pushing forward narrow special interests at the expense of other more legitimate interests (Halpin, 2010; Warren, 2001). No matter which view is taken, most scholars agree that interest groups are important and several studies have investigated how and to what degree they influence public policy (Binderkrantz, 2008; Dür and De Bièvre, 2007; Mahoney, 2007).

As a consequence of this, one of the core questions in political science is whose interests and ideas are represented, articulated in the public debate, and possibly incorporated in policymaking (Grossmann, 2012: 4). This question has been at the heart of both the broader political science literature as well as the interest group literature and has been formulated in different ways by famous scholars. Lasswell (1958) asked “Who gets what, when and how?” Dahl (1961) phrased his question “who governs?” and Schattschneider (1960) focused on the mobilization of bias or what accents the heavenly chorus. Both in theory and in practice political scientists have long tried to solve the puzzle about why some political factions succeed and others fail (Grossmann, 2012: 5). As Schlozman (2010: 426) puts it “Organized interests are such an essential part of the process by which policymakers in a democracy learn about the preferences and needs of citizens that barriers to entry into the political fray have potential consequences for representation – and, in particular, for the equal representation of citizens.” The shape of the interest group system has important implications for democracy.

To investigate the question about why interest group systems are shaped as they are many classical studies of interest groups, such as Truman (1951) and Olson (1965) have paid much attention to the formation of interest groups and thereby to the potential bias of interest group systems. Truman (1951) assumed that groups would emerge rather automatic when interests were threatened. Olson (1965) challenged this assumption. He argued that interest groups should provide selective incentives to potential members in exchange for membership to avoid free-riding. However, both Truman and Olson implicitly assumed that once an interest group was formed it would go on surviving.

I will argue that the emergence of groups is only one side of the mechanism that shapes interest group systems. The other side is the disbandment of groups. Not all groups that emerge survive. To engage in public policy interest groups need to survive as organizations. In this way, not only formation, but also the vulnerability of groups to disbandment shapes the contours of the interest group system and thereby which interests are represented (Halpin and Thomas, 2012: 217). The concept of disbandment is just as critical as the concept of formation when it comes to the dynamics of interest group systems. The
degree of volatility and change of an interest group system is partly determined by the emergence of groups and partly by the disbandment. Therefore, we should not limit the attention to the question about interest group emergence. The questions about interest group survival and disbandment also deserves attention. These concepts can tell us something about which interests are represented - the shape of the interest group system -, but also how persistent the groups in the system is and how volatile the system is.

This paper will investigate the development and volatility of an interest groups system by focusing on whether groups survive or die. The development of all interest groups in a system is studied in the very long run (three decades) and in a shorter run (17 years). It is investigated how the interest groups develop and which factors explain whether the interest groups survive or disband.

Many earlier studies such as Truman (1951), Olson (1965), Walker (1983), and Berry (1999) have been occupied with the emergence of interest groups. Some studies have also been concerned with interest group maintenance (Moe, 1981; Nownes and Neeley, 1996; Rothenberg, 1988) However, only very few studies have been occupied with interest group disbandment, even though this is equally important for the shape of the interest group system. A newer stream of interest group studies have begun to focus more explicit on the dynamics within interest group systems, and therefore also on the groups that disbands (Gray and Lowery, 1996b; Halpin and Jordan, 2012). Many of these studies use the concept interest group population. An interest group population is defined as all interest groups in existence in a system at a specific time.

Gray and Lowery (1997) were the first to develop an explicit model that focused on the association between group characteristics and survival. However, they do not investigate actual survival but “mortality anxiety”. Mortality anxiety is defined as group entrepreneurs’ perceptions of the future prospects for their group (Gray and Lowery, 1997: 26). Gray and Lowery’s (1997) model contains multiple factors that may influence the level of mortality anxiety among interest groups. The factors are population-level competition, group resources and organizational traits. Halpin and Thomas (2012) have made a similar analysis.

As both Gray and Lowery (1997) and Halpin and Thomas (2012) investigate mortality anxiety they approach the question about interest group survival and death in an indirect manner. Both studies focus on groups’ perception of their own security and not whether groups actually survive or die. A study that investigates interest group death is Nownes and Lipinsky (2005). They test the theory of density dependence on the population of gay and lesbian rights groups in the US. Their main hypothesis is that the survival prospects of the groups are related non-monotonically to the number of groups in the population
(the density). Therefore, their focus is on the aggregated level counting the number of groups that die. They do not focus on the characteristics of the individual groups\(^1\).

The discussed studies have two different approaches to the question about interest group survival and provide parts of the answer. However, I will argue that a combination of the two approaches will allow us to get closer to the mechanisms of interest group development and survival. Nownes and Lipinsky (2005) have real survival data but no information about the characteristics of the individual groups. Conversely, Lowery and Gray (1997), and Halpin and Thomas (2012) have the group characteristics to explain survival but no data on actual death and survival. This paper will combine the two approaches to get closer to the mechanism of group survival. Inspired by the literature on interest group formation, maintenance and the population studies, I develop a model to explain the development of the interest groups in a population in the very long run (34 years) and the shorter run (17 years). The dependent variable of the study is the interest groups’ development. Which groups survive and which groups die? To investigate this in the very long run, the development of all groups in a population of interest groups from 1976 is tracked till 2010, and it is coded what happened to them. To investigate the shorter run the same is done for all groups in a population from 1993 till 2010. By doing this it is possible to see the development and volatility of an interest group system both in the long and shorter run. The independent variables are various characteristics of the interest groups. The models are tested on the population of Danish interest groups in 1976 and 1993. I use two unique data sources that contain information about the interest groups in the two populations.

**Explaining interest group survival**

Whether an interest group survives or not seems like a straight forward concept. However, there is an important difference in the way the concept is used in the literature. Some studies investigate entries and exits from interest group populations rather than organizational survival and disbandment. This is studies as for instance Anderson et al. (2004), Berkhout and Lowery (2011), and Hanegraaff et al. (2012). These studies all use lobby registration data, and the concept they investigate is therefore exit and entries from the population rather than organizational survival and disbandment. A group is considered dead when it is no longer registered to lobby, and not when it disbands as an organization. Contrary to this, I focus on organizational survival and disbandment. This difference between entry and exit, and emergence and death is important to be aware of as it has important implications for the results. The studies mentioned all find a high level of volatility within the interest group populations they study. The degree of volatility will probably be lower when organizational emergence and disbandment is investigated as it must be expected

\(^1\) Except for group age which they also include as an explanation of group disbandment.
to be more frequent that groups enter and exit pressure politics than new groups are created and existing groups disband. Schlozman (2010: 447) has found some evidence for this claim. She finds that “when organizations exit the pressure system they leave politics but are very unlikely to go out of business entirely”. Summing up, exit and entries from the political scene seems to be a very different concept than organizational survival and death.

The studies mentioned above all give some very good overviews of how the populations shift as groups go in and out of politics. However, they do not answer the questions about which factors help groups survive, and which factors make groups disband. A large literature has discussed both the formation and maintenance of groups. Especially maintenance is closely connected to the concept of survival and therefore some of the mechanism can be expected to be similar. Browne (1977), Moe (1981), Rothenberg (1988), and Walker (1983) argue that the maintenance of interest groups is as important as formation. However, they have different views about how interest groups best maintain themselves. Browne (1977) states that Olson (1965) was right in arguing that interest groups need to exchange actual services for membership to maintain themselves. So does Moe (1981) even though he moderates this statement and argue that there are exceptions to Olson’s logic of collective action. Sometimes political goals are sufficient to get people to join groups and to maintain groups. The key to maintenance rests on provision of an appropriate mix of political and nonpolitical inducements (Moe, 1981: 540). Rothenberg (1988) focus more on the members of groups, and more specifically why members continue to be members as this is pivotal for organizational maintenance. Walker (1983) argues that even though members are important for maintenance funding from other sources such as patrons has bigger impact on group maintenance. The literature on maintenance will be integrated in the theoretical expectations developed below.

Even though there is not a large literature about interest group survival and disbandment some studies, such as Gray and Lowery (1997), and Halpin and Thomas (2012) have begun to use micro-level data to investigate interest groups deaths. However, they do this in a very indirect manner, as they investigate what causes mortality anxiety and not which groups actually die. Gray and Lowery explains this indirect approach with the availability of data: “We cannot yet answer these questions directly since data on resource use and the vital rates of organizations within multiple interest communities do not exist” (Gray and Lowery, 1997: 26).

This paper will explore these mechanism in depth and investigate how the groups in a population develop and which factors may explain the survival and disbandment of interest groups. As this paper utilizes two unique data source from 1976 and 1993 it has been possible to track all the interest groups in existence in 1976 and 1993 to determine what happened to them: did they survive or did they die? In this way, the characteristics of the Danish interest groups in existence in 1976 and 1993 can be
coupled with information about their development up until 2010. First, some theoretical expectations to which factors increase the likelihood that groups survive are discussed.

**Population level competition**

The thread in the interest group literature that sets up the most explicit expectations about interest group survival and disbandment is the population studies (Gray and Lowery, 1996b; Gray and Lowery, 1997; Halpin and Thomas, 2012; Halpin and Jordan, 2012). One of the most fundamental assumptions in the population studies is that interest groups will compete for scarce resources in order to survive (Gray and Lowery, 1996a; 1996b; Nownes, 2004). The basic argument is that groups work in an environment where the resources that are critical for survival are scarce. Therefore, groups compete for these resources. High levels of competition provide a feedback mechanism that prevents new groups from forming and extinguishes already existing groups. Gray and Lowery (1997) suggest that both diffuse and direct competition may matter for survival. Direct competition is groups’ own perception of competition while diffuse competition is the number of similar groups in the environment. Nownes and Lipinsky (2005) found evidence for the mechanism of diffuse competition in their study of gay and lesbian rights interest groups. They found a non-monotonic relationship between density (number of similar groups) and death-rates. When density is low increases in density does not necessarily mean increased competition. But after a certain threshold further increases in density means higher competition and increases in mortality rates. Therefore, the competition argument is tested with two different measures of competition.

Hypothesis 1a: *The higher the level of competition from similar groups a group perceives the lower is the probability that the group survives.*

Hypothesis 1b: *After a certain threshold, higher levels of density of similar groups will lower the probability that a group survives.*

**Group resources**

Much of the literature on group maintenance focuses on the role of interest group resources. These resources come in different shapes. First, as discussed above, members are an important resource for groups especially in regard to maintenance. Nownes and Cigler (1996) argue that patrons are crucial for the initial mobilization, but a large membership base is important for the maintenance or survival of groups. The ability to attract members and hold on to existing members is therefore important for groups’
development and survival chances (Rothenberg, 1988). First, members may be the primary source of funding and may therefore be important for the groups’ income. But members may also be valuable in other ways. Groups with high numbers of members may have a high degree of political legitimacy as they represent a large constituency and thereby have a high degree of societal support. In this way a large membership can also give the groups political weight as the group may articulate members’ demands to decision makers and even restrain these demands. Last, members may help the group overcome potential threats by offering various kinds of support in times of crises. This is especially the groups that offer their members a social network such as patient groups that arrange social events for members.

In relation to members several scholars have suggested that the capability of delivering selective incentives is an important resource for groups. Since Olson (1965) stated his theory of collective action group scholars have paid attention to the selective incentives groups provide to their members. According to Olson groups must deliver selective incentives to their members if they want to avoid free riding. In his study of municipal interest groups Browne (1977) finds that the organizations are maintained by providing direct services and assistance to members.

The last relevant group resource is financial resources. Groups need these to sustain themselves. Financial resources are necessary in regard to attract and retain members. This can be done by organizing campaigns to attract new members and by delivering services to existing members. Also in regard to influencing the political process financial resources are important to monitor policy processes and to keep regular contact with policymakers. Fraussen et al. (forthcoming) stress the importance of upholding a regular presence among policymakers and this exhausts organizational resources. Therefore groups with many resources are less likely to go out of business. I use the number of full time employees as a proxy for organizational resources. This is considered the best measure for financial resources when the goal is to establish the financial resources’ effect on the probability for survival. Other measures as e.g. income would be more difficult to compare as different group types may spend their income differently. To sum up, the hypothesis regarding group resources are:

Hypothesis 2a: The more members a group has the higher is the probability that the group survives.

Hypothesis 2b: It is expected that the more selective incentives groups offer their members the higher is the probability that the group survives.

Hypothesis 2c: The more employees a group has the higher is the probability that the group survives.
**Relations to policy makers**

Interest groups’ relations to the state have played a large role in the interest group literature. The relationship is often described as one of resource dependency, where groups supply information and support from members in exchange for access to policy venues and maybe even influence (Bouwen, 2004; Öberg et al., 2011). However, relations to the state may also have important implications for the maintenance and survival of interest groups. The state may not only provide access but also financial support and legal recognition (Fraussen, forthcoming). Walker (1983) argues that patronage from the state is important for both group emergence and maintenance. Fraussen (forthcoming) shows in his study of an environmental peak association how the group’s link with public authorities was critical for its organizational development.

Some different expectations can be set up in regard to the interaction between the state and the interest groups and how this interaction affects the survival chances for groups. First, a privileged status in the policymaking process is expected to be crucial for survival chances (see Maloney et al., 1994 for a discussion of the concept of status). Groups that are policy insiders with seats in public boards or committees may have better chances for survival than policy outsider. Öberg et. al (2011: 366) argue that: “The position of selected partner is crucial when organizations recruit adherents”. Being an insider gives groups legitimacy and sends an important signal to potential and present members, and also to policy makers, that the group is an important player in the policy process. Privileged inclusion in the policy process is present in many kinds of political systems (Halpin and Binderkrantz, 2011; Maloney et al., 1994). However, it may be expected to play an especially large role for organizational survival in corporative systems such as the Danish. In corporative systems the interaction between the privileged interest groups and the decision makers is institutionalized. The privileged groups are involved in almost all phases of the policy process. In pluralist systems the involvement of interest groups is more unstructured and ad hoc (Binderkrantz, 2005 26-37; Christiansen and Nørgaard, 2003 13-14; Öberg et al., 2011). A privileged access to a corporative institution such as representation in a public board or committee may therefore be considered very valuable for group survival.

A privileged position is considered to be the most important aspect of relations to policymakers when it comes to interest group survival. However, the frequency of access to decision makers may also be of importance. Groups must approach decision makers on the issues they are concerned about if they want to justify themselves as political organizations. As Browne (1990) argues access to the policymaking process contributes to a group’s identity, and this is positive for a group’s survival chances. The more groups interact with policymakers the stronger they may be connected with the area they work on by policymakers and this may increase their chances of survival.
One last thing regarding the groups’ relations to policy maker may influence a group’s survival chances. This is whether groups spread their policy attention and seek access to decision makers on many different policy areas or they focus their attention to decision makers on a few policy areas. Both Browne (1990) and Halpin and Thomas (2012) argue that the groups that spread their attention will experience higher levels of competition for access which makes life more unsecure for the groups. Specialization may be a better strategy for group survival: “Motives for specialization are related to the question of group survival: partitioning off important resources needed to survive vis-a-vis competitors is achieved by becoming a specialist in a narrow issue niche.” (Halpin and Binderkrantz, 2011: 202). Besides this it may be a great advantage for groups to have a clear group identity as a blurred identity weakens the groups’ appeals to audiences (Heaney, 2004). Therefore, focusing on decision makers on a few policy areas may be a better strategy for survival than to spread the attention. The hypothesis regarding groups’ relations to decision makers are:

Hypothesis 3a: Groups that are represented in a board or a committee will have a higher probability of survival than groups that are not represented.

Hypothesis 3b: The more contact the group has to decision makers the higher is the probability that the group survives.

Hypothesis 3c: Groups that seek access to decision makers on many policy areas will have a lower probability of survival than groups that focus their attention and only seek access to decision makers on few policy areas.

Organizational traits

Last, some organizational traits of the groups may also affect their possibility of survival. A common hypothesis in the literature on organizational survival is the liability of newness hypothesis. This hypothesis states that young organizations have much greater risk of failure than older ones, as they have not yet legitimated their position (Carroll and Hannan, 2000: 3-4; Halpin and Thomas, 2012: 222).

Halpin and Thomas (2012) argue that it is standard practice to control for group type such as whether the group is a union, a public interest group, or a client group. However, as they point out, the literature does not give rise to any specific expectations regarding which group types have the highest
probability of survival. Therefore, no explicit expectations are set up, but it will be explored whether group type has an effect on the probability that groups survive.

Hypothesis 4a: Younger groups will have a lower probability of survival than older groups.

Hypothesis 4b: Group type influence the probability of survival

Research design and data

Approach and data

One difficulty in the investigation of interest group survival and disbandment is methodological. As discussed above the studies that investigate these concepts have either used rather indirect measures of survival, such as the groups’ own perception of their survival chances (Gray and Lowery, 1997; Halpin and Thomas, 2012), or have only looked at the survival question from the very aggregated population perspective (Nownes and Lipinski, 2005). A better strategy may be to follow individual groups over time to determine which groups survive and which groups disband and look at the characteristics of these groups. This is what I do in this paper. I rely on two previously conducted studies of all Danish interest groups, one from 1976 and one from 1993. The groups in these studies are traced up to 2010 to find out how the groups developed – did they die or did they survive? This is the dependent variable of the study. The two surveys from 1976 and 1993 are used as independent variables as they contain information about various characteristics of the groups.

Traditionally, Denmark has been considered among the most corporative countries, but since the 1980s corporatism has been in decline (Öberg et al., 2011). As this study investigates development in both the very long run, 1976-2010, and the shorter run, 1993-2010, it is possible to observe if the results differ due to the level of corporatism as Danish corporatism peaked in 1980 (Öberg et al., 2011: 373). The Danish interest group system has experienced a moderate growth both in terms of density and diversity in the last three decades (Binderkrantz, 2012; Fisker, 2013b). These scope conditions resemble those in many other western democracies, and therefore Denmark is considered a good case to test some general mechanisms of interest group development.

In this study, interest groups are defined as formal organizations with members who work at the national level and seek to influence public policy but who do not run for elections (Binderkrantz, 2005: 50; Buksti and Johansen, 1977b: 390). Both the 1976-study and the 1993-study use a similar definition of interest groups (Christiansen, 2012: 169). Buksti and Johansen (1983) conducted the study from 1976. They
used various sources to compile a population list of 1946 interest groups that all received a questionnaire. This was answered by approximately 1600 groups. The survey data was then supplemented by information about the groups found in their annual reports and similar sources. In the end their dataset contained information about 1843 groups. The 1993 study is conducted by Christensen et. al (1993). Their population list contained 1900 groups of which 1316 answered the questionnaire.

**Survivor, dead, or something in-between? Classification of interest group development**

In order to investigate what explain interest group survival a classification scheme for the interest groups’ development was developed (see appendix 3). The scheme has eight categories that describe how the group developed. Groups were classified as either: Unchanged / changed name / changed substantively in regard to purpose and member / merged / absorbed by other group / dead / divided in two / no longer interest group. These categories classified the development of all groups in the two datasets.

All groups contained in the surveys from 1976 and 1993 were traced to find out how the groups developed between 1976 and 2010 and 1993 and 2010. Some of the groups still existed in an unchanged form and was easy to classify by comparing the descriptions in the studies to present descriptions on the group’s web pages. Name changes, mergers and the like were more difficult to investigate. For the main part a web search of the group’s former name gave results that could help establish what had happened to the group through different historical records such as former member magazines, anniversary publications and similar sources. If this could not be found, a search in the Danish newspaper *Politiken’s* web archive was conducted and this often gave results (Politiken, 2013).

The groups that died between 1976 and 2010 or 1993 and 2010 were the most difficult ones to trace. Internet based searches were also conducted for these and sometimes it was mentioned on other groups’ webpages that these groups did not exist anymore. Sometime groups appeared in other historical records. For other groups information was found in *Politiken’s* web archives. Some groups were impossible to find information about even though several sources were used. These were also coded as death as it is unlikely that they still exist but do not appear in any of the sources discussed above or in specific internet searches for the groups. This procedure was used for approximately 200 groups from the 1976-study and xxx-groups from the 1993-study.

**Characteristics of the interest groups**

The hypotheses regarding which factors heighten or lower the probability of group survival all concern groups characteristics and therefore it is necessary to have data that captures these. Both the 1976 survey
and the 1993 survey contain data that measures these characteristics. By combining these historical data with the newly gathered development data it is possible to make an analysis of which factors can explain whether the groups survived or died.

Population level competition is measured in two ways to test hypothesis 1a-b. First, the groups’ own perception of whether they experience competition is measured with the question: “Is there competing organizations within the area/the group of people/companies/institutions which interests your organization seeks to represent?” Responses are restricted to yes/no. Second, I use a measure of the density of similar groups. The density measure is constructed as the number of groups active on the same policy area. It is most likely that groups on the same policy area will compete for the same resources. As a certain level of density is required before higher levels of density means higher competition, the relationship between density and probability of survival is expected to be non-monotonic. Therefore both a regular and a squared measure of density are included in the models.

To test hypothesis 2a-c regarding resources, members are measured as the number of members in the different categories: individuals, companies, regional organizations and national organizations. The measures of individual members and company members have been logarithmically transformed, as it seems most plausible that the effect of membership size on probability of survival is diminishing. To secure that the membership variables measure the number of members and not the type of members, dummy variables for membership type are also included in the analysis. A distribution of the dummy variables is shown in appendix 2. Selective incentives are measured on an additive scale (0-5) with five different types of incentives: professional guidance, economic guidance, legal guidance, social guidance, and other guidance. A score of 0 indicates that the group provides no selective incentives, and a score of 5 indicates that the group provides all five selective incentives. Halpin and Thomas (2012) use a similar measure of selective incentives. As discussed the groups’ financial resources are measured as the number of paid employees. This is considered the best measure for financial resources when the goal is to establish the financial resources’ effect on the probability for survival. Other measures as e.g. income would be more difficult to compare as different group types may spend their income differently. This variable is also logarithmically transformed, as the effect of more paid employees on survival may be diminishing after a certain number of employees.

Hypothesis 3a-c concerned the groups’ relations to decision makers. The measure of whether groups have privileged access to decision makers through representation in public boards of committees is a dichotomous variable (yes/no). The frequency of contact to decision makers is measured with an index indicating how often the groups have contact to: the parliament, parliamentary committees, parties, members of parliament, the government and ministries, departments and directorates. This is
measured on a scale from 0-5, where a score of 0 indicates no contact and a score of 5 indicates daily contact. Last, a measure of how many policy areas the group approach decision makers on is used.

Last, organizational traits are expected to affect survival in hypothesis 4a-b. Age is measured as the group’s age in 1976 and 1993 respectively (the number of years since formation). Group type is operationalized with the group type scheme from the Interarena project that divides group into eight main categories: trade unions, business groups, institutional associations, occupational association, identity groups, hobby groups, religious groups and public interest groups (see appendix 1). All groups were coded after group type using information from the surveys, from groups’ websites or internet based searches.
Analysis

To investigate the development and volatility in the population in the very long and the shorter run, the first part of the analysis provides an overview of the development of all interest groups between 1976-2010 and 1993-2010. After this two multivariate analyses are presented to examine which factors explain the development. The characteristics of the groups are used to explain whether the group survived or died between 1976-2010 and 1993-2010.

Overview of the development of the interest groups

An overview of how the groups developed between 1976 and 2010 is provided by table 2. Of the 1843 groups, 35 per cent or 653 groups were unchanged in 2010. They have the same name, represent the same kind of members, and have the same purpose in 2010 as in 1976. This number is high, but many groups may make an effort to stay unchanged, as it may be useful for groups to be persistent over time (Anderson et al., 2004). An example The Danish Haemophilia Society established in 1970. The Danish Haemophilia Society was, and still is, relatively small (220 members in 1976 and 670 members in 2010 (Buksti and Johansen, 1977a; The Danish Haemophilia Society, 2013). However, in the 1980s the group had a huge impact on the legislation regarding screening of blood products to hemophiliacs and blood donations (Albæk, 1997). Therefore, they established themselves as a small but strong group that managed to influence important legislation. It may be useful for the group to hold on to its name and identity, as this is associated with strength and persistency.

Table 2. Overview of development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unchanged</td>
<td>653</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name change</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changed substantively</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merged</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absorbed by other group</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dead</td>
<td>772</td>
<td>41.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divided</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No longer interest group</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,843</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Table with numbers for the development 1993-2010 – data still needs to be coded]
However, 11.4 per cent of the groups changed their name even though they did not change otherwise. This is groups as the Association of Cigar and Tobacco Manufacturers est. 20th of June 1875 that changed name to the shorter the Tobacco Industry. This was probably to signal that the group is a modern group.

A small number of groups – 0.9 per cent - changed substantively. The Danish Millers’ Association started out as a union for millers, but as the miller profession decreased, the group developed into a hobby association (Danish Millers' Association, 2013). This is a good example of a group that has outlived its purpose but is kept alive as it may fulfill other purposes as for instance a social platform for the members.

A relatively small part of the groups – 8.1 per cent - merged in the period. The Association of Danish Children’s Homes, the Association of Treatment Centers and the Association of 1916 all represented institutions for children. In 1976 new legislation was passed on the social area. This changed the landscape of the institutions for children as these became fewer and more homogenous. Therefore, the three groups that fitted the old structures on the area, merged into one new group: the Association of Danish 24-hour Care Centers in 1993 (Association of Danish 24-hour Care Centers, 2013). These three groups are considered equal players in the merger, and the result is a new group with new laws and a new name.

A merger is defined as an equal agreement between two groups. In contrast to this some small groups may also be absorbed by other larger groups. This happened for 1.7 per cent of the groups. The Association of Hearing-impaired Children’s Parents started out as an independent group, but developed into a subdivision of the larger group The Danish Association of the Hard of Hearing. This is not considered a merger. The Danish Association of the Hard of Hearing continued unchanged while the Association of Hearing-impaired Children’s Parents is now considered a subdivision in line with multiple other subdivisions (The Danish Association of the Hard of Hearing, 2013).

The main part of the groups - 42 per cent - died between 1976 and 2010. This is groups that no longer have a purpose as for instance the County Council's Association. This group has no members as the Danish counties were abolished in 2007. Some groups won their case as for instance the Organization for Information about Atomic Power. This group fought against the use of nuclear power in Denmark. The group disbanded in 2000, as the Danish parliament abandoned the plans about using nuclear power in 1985, and as the Swedish nuclear power plant Barsebäck was closed down (OOA, 2013).

Only four groups were divided. To fit into the divided category a group has to split up into two entirely new groups. The Cleaning and Security Companies’ Employers’ Association was split up into the Employers’ Association for the Service Industry and the Guard and Alarm Industries’ Employers Association in 1978. The constellation of a common group for employers from both the cleaning and the security industry did not seem very logical to begin with. It is plausible that both the cleaning and the security
industry grew along with the general growth in the Danish society in the 1970s. Therefore, two separate employer associations may have seemed more appropriate than a common one.

The last category in table 2 contains seven groups that developed from interest groups into other kinds of organizations. Senior Service started out as an interest group in 1970 with both members and a written statute. The purpose was to establish contact between the members and businesses on a non-profit base. Today this is no longer an interest group but a consultancy firm with expertise in recruitment.

**Statistical analysis**

The overview above describes how the groups developed between 1976 and 2010. But which factors may explain this development? Above a range of hypothesis were developed. These all regarded whether the group had survived or whether the group had died, as these are the most meaningful outcomes to develop expectations to. It can be seen in table 2 that a large majority of the groups either survived almost unchanged or died. Therefore, the dependent variable in the statistical analysis is dichotomous. The groups are divided into two categories: groups that died, were absorbed by another group, or are no longer interest groups are classified as dead. Groups that are unchanged, changed names, changed substantively, merged or were divided were classified as survived. Even though some of these changed substantively they all survived as organizations, while the groups in the death category did not. The variable takes the value 0 for dead and the value 1 for survival. In order to see the development in the long run and in the shorter run models are estimated for the development between 1976-2010 and for the development between 1993-2010 respectively [data for the 1993-2010 model still needs to be coded, but a similar model will be presented for the 1993-2010 data].

Table 3 presents the results from the analysis of the long run (1976-2010). Four different models are presented. The number of observations differs quite a lot in the models (from 1631 groups in model 1 to 666 groups in model 2). This is due to missing observations on the independent variables.
Table 3. Logit regression. Multivariate analysis. Survival as dependent variable (1=survival)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.007 (0.002) ***</td>
<td>0.011 (0.003) ***</td>
<td>0.003 (0.002)</td>
<td>0.004 (0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group type (reference: unions)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>-0.610 (0.154) ***</td>
<td>-0.462 (0.254)</td>
<td>-0.120 (0.251)</td>
<td>0.010 (0.268)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>-0.131 (0.283)</td>
<td>-0.294 (0.389)</td>
<td>0.134 (0.393)</td>
<td>0.162 (0.418)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational</td>
<td>-0.145 (0.185)</td>
<td>-0.306 (0.326)</td>
<td>0.338 (0.245)</td>
<td>0.458 (0.258)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>0.141 (0.212)</td>
<td>0.117 (0.336)</td>
<td>0.221 (0.294)</td>
<td>0.362 (0.307)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hobby</td>
<td>0.949 (0.231) ***</td>
<td>0.986 (0.418) *</td>
<td>1.277 (0.319) ***</td>
<td>1.355 (0.329) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>0.290 (0.396)</td>
<td>0.450 (0.843)</td>
<td>-0.684 (0.555)</td>
<td>-0.605 (0.576)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>-0.156 (0.246)</td>
<td>-0.046 (0.366)</td>
<td>-0.164 (0.357)</td>
<td>-0.017 (0.379)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.257 (0.216)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density</td>
<td>0.011 (0.010)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density^2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual members (ln)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.114 (0.045) *</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company members (ln)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.207 (0.074) **</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional organization members</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.005 (0.003)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National organization members</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.033 (0.017) *</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership type (reference: only individual members)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only company members</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual members and company members</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other members</td>
<td>0.072 (0.334)</td>
<td>0.203 (0.363)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selective incentives</td>
<td>0.070 (0.057)</td>
<td>0.059 (0.061)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of paid employees (ln)</td>
<td>0.348 (0.087) ***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Represented in boards or committees (1=yes)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.619 (0.176) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of contact with decision makers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.139 (0.131)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of policy areas with contact to decision makers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.025 (0.050)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.221 (0.152)</td>
<td>0.060 (0.373)</td>
<td>-0.794 (0.341) *</td>
<td>-1.111 (0.369) **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R^2</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1631</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>1074</td>
<td>982</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***P<0.001, **P<0.01, *P<0.05, Standard errors in parentheses
Model 1 only includes the variables related to organizational traits. As expected age has a positive effect on survival. Older groups have a higher probability of survival than younger ones. Some group types also seem to have a higher probability of survival than others. In all models unions are used as the reference category. Business groups seem to have a lower probability of survival than unions in model 1 (however, the effect is not present in the other models controlling for other variables). Hobby groups also seem to have a higher probability of survival, and this effect is consistent through all models, and no matter which group type is used as reference category. Hobby groups have a higher probability of surviving compared to all other groups. Of the 118 hobby groups included in the analyses 96 groups or 81 per cent survived. It is not straightforward to explain why the hobby groups survive in higher numbers than other group types. One explanation could be that hobby groups are not closely tied to a specific policy program or a narrow issue agenda such as the client groups or public interest groups may be. Therefore, they do not win their case and go out of business as some of the public interest groups discussed above did. Second, the members may be very loyal to the hobby groups, as they may participate in social events. Members may have a strong interest in keeping the group alive, as it may be an important part of their social network. Similar results are not found by Halpin and Thomas (2012). They have a different classification of the group types, but a cautious comparison can be made. They find that group types comparable to this study’s client groups and public interest groups experience higher levels of mortality anxiety than others and conclude that these may be more vulnerable. This is not found in the present study.

Model 2 includes the variables related to competition. As discussed the competition mechanism is a key-stone assumption in the literature on interest group populations and hypothesis 1a and 1b expected that competition would have a negative effect on survival. However, competition does not seem to affect the probability of survival at all. The measure of direct competition and the measures of diffuse competition (density) is insignificant in model 2. The competition measures are not included in model 3 and 4. The measures of competition do not seem to have any effect on survival, and inclusion of these variables results in the loss of additional observations.

In model 3 the measures of group resources are included: members, selective incentives and employees. When the measures for resources are included in the model there is no independent effect of age. The age variable may have an indirect effect and work through the resource variables, or it may have worked as a proxy for the size of the groups in model 1. Hannan (2005: 63) argues that the organizational ecology studies that find significant age effects on mortality rates often fails to control for the size of the organization. There are mixed results regarding the age effect. Gray and Lowery (1997) find an effect in their study, but Halpin and Thomas do not. In the model controlling for group resources the effect of being a business group also disappears. Resources do seem to matter for group survival. Hypothesis 2a stated
that the number of members would affect the probability of survival positively. This expectation finds support in the data. The number of members has a positive effect on the probability for surviving for three of the member types. The more individual members, company members or national organization members a group has the higher is the probability for survival. The number of regional members has no effect. However, only 137 of the 1074 interest groups included in the analysis had regional members. To make sure that the member variables measure the effect of the number of members and not different membership types, dummy variables for different member types are also included in the analyses. All these are insignificant. This suggests that member type does not have an independent effect on the probability of survival.

The effects of the membership size are illustrated further in table 4 that show the predicted probabilities of surviving at different numbers of members. For the three member types shown, there are substantial effects of increasing the number of members. At the minimum number of individual members (zero members) the probability of surviving is 51 per cent. At the mean number of individual members (3.558 members) the probability of surviving rises to 73 per cent. At the maximum number of individual members (280.696 members) the probability of surviving rises to 81 per cent. The effects are similar for company members and national members.

| Table 4. Predicted probabilities of surviving for minimum, mean and maximum number of members |
|---------------------------------|------|------|------|
| Individual members              | 51%  | 73%  | 81%  |
| Company members                 | 55%  | 74%  | 89%  |
| National organization members   | 60%  | 61%  | 98%  |

It seems plausible that a large membership contributes to a group’s survival. A large number of members contribute to the group’s legitimacy, and payments from members may give the group a stable financial foundation. Members may also have strong interests in the group’s survival if they have a social engagement with other members. Therefore, they may help overcome some of the potential treats toward the group. This was the case with the Danish Millers’ Association as the group was reshaped from a union to a hobby group on the member’s initiative (Danish Millers’ Association, 2013). Gray and Lowery (1997) also find that membership size has a negative effect on mortality anxiety. Halpin and Thomas (2012) do not investigate the effect of membership size in itself, but they do investigate the effect of decreases in membership. They find a similar result – shrinking membership lists increase mortality anxiety.

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2 As some groups in the data has only company members or only national organizations as members, the minimum number of individual members can equal zero
The degree of selective incentives a group offers its members has no effect in the multivariate analysis. There is no support for hypothesis 2b. This is surprising as selective incentives have such a prominent role in the literature on group maintenance (Browne, 1977; Moe, 1981; Olson, 1965). However, neither Gray and Lowery (1997) nor Halpin and Thomas (2012) found an effect of selective incentives on mortality anxiety.

The last resource expected to affect survival chances is financial resources. The number of paid employees is considered a good proxy for financial resources and was therefore expected to have a positive effect on the probability of survival. The analysis supports the theoretical expectations. Table 3 shows that the coefficient for number of paid employees is positive and significant through all models. The more employees a group has, the better are the chances for survival. Table 5 shows the predicted probabilities of surviving at different numbers of paid employees.

Table 5. Predicted probabilities of surviving at different numbers of paid employees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of employees</th>
<th>Predicted probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 (minimum)</td>
<td>58 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6 (mean)</td>
<td>66 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>69 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>72 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>74 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>75 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>76 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>79 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>504 (maximum)</td>
<td>84 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The mean number of employees for the groups in the analysis is 5.6. At this number the probability of surviving is 66 per cent. This increases to 69 per cent when the number of employees almost doubles to 10 employees. There is an effect of additional employees, although it is small. It seems plausible that groups with few resources are more vulnerable than groups with many resources. In time of crisis small groups may simply have a harder time cutting back than larger groups. This can mean the difference between death and survival. Small groups, with only one or two employees, may have to shut down entirely if resources get fewer as they cannot reorganize or streamline the organization. This is easier for groups with more resources and employees. Halpin and Thomas (2012) also find that groups with many employees experience less mortality anxiety which indicates that they are less vulnerable.
As interest groups are defined as organizations with political goals, hypothesis 3a-c stated that relations to decision makers should also affect the probability of surviving. The measures of relations the decision makers are included in model 4. The expectations are partly confirmed. As expected, being a policy insider seems to be very important for survival. The measure of whether groups are represented in boards and committees is strongly significant and has a substantial effect on the probability of survival. The variable measuring representation is dichotomous as a group is either represented in a board or committee or not. Controlling for all other factors in the model, the predicted probability of surviving is 57 per cent for the groups that was not represented in a board or a committee and 70 per cent for the groups that was represented. As the overall survival rate is 61 per cent, this increase in the probability of surviving on 13 percentages points is substantial. Whether or not a group was a policy insider in 1976 is an important predictor for its survival. The frequency of contact to decision makers and the number of policy areas where groups interacted with decision makers on does not seem to be important for survival as these variables are insignificant. As all three measures are indicators for the relations to decision makers they are highly correlated (correlations from 0.54-0.76). Therefore, multivariate models were estimated with the three relations indicators separately. These gave the same results: the measure of representation in boards and committees was strongly significant, and the measures of frequency and number of policy areas where groups interacted with decision makers on were insignificant.

It seems very plausible that privileged access should matter for group survival. Especially in a corporative system such as the Danish. The relationship between groups and decision makers is often described as an exchange relationship where the state controls the public expenditures and the power of legislation and can privilege selected groups by giving them privileged access. In return the interest groups can provide detailed information about the issue under discussion as well as control over and support from the group’s members (Christiansen, 2013; Öberg et al., 2011). Therefore, the privileged position may have given the groups important influence on policy decisions, on the implementation process or on policy monitoring. This is for instance the case for the Danish unemployment funds where the unions play an important role in the implementation of the policies. Such positions may cement a group’s societal relevance, and this may be positive for the group’s survival chances. Taking part in the decision making process may also send a signal to current and potential members, that the interest group is an important political player and therefore worthwhile to engage in. In this way, a privileged position can be considered one of the most important resources for the Danish interest groups, and it is therefore also likely to be an important predictor of their survival chances.
Discussion and conclusion

[only conclusions for the 1976-results]

Interest group formation and maintenance have long been considered important concepts in the interest group literature as they influence which constituency is represented by groups or how the interest group system is shaped. However, what keeps an interest group alive is an equally important question. Therefore, this paper investigates how groups develop in the very long run and the shorter run, and which factors contribute to an interest group’s survival chances.

An overview of how the groups in the Danish interest group population developed between 1976 and 2010 showed a relatively high degree of stability in the population. Half of the groups survived in an almost unchanged form, and 40 per cent of the groups died. A relatively small proportion of the groups changed form. This is probably because it is difficult for groups to transform, as it may damage the groups credibility to shift focus or constituency.

As no studies, to my knowledge, have conducted an analysis similar to this one it is difficult to compare the results to other studies. A cautious comparison could be made to the studies by Berkhout and Lowery (2011) and Anderson et al. (2004). Both studies investigate the death rates of populations, but they do it on the basis of lobby registration data. Therefore, a group is considered dead when it is no longer registered to lobby, and not when it disbands as an organization. Berkhout and Lowery (2011) investigates groups registered to lobby the EU between 2003 and 2009. Even though this is a very short time period they find a death rate as high as 25 per cent. Anderson et al. (2004) investigate organized interests registered to lobby state legislatures in the US between 1997 and 1999. They find that 35 per cent of the groups registered in 1997 had died in 1999. To compare these studies with the present study is difficult as the definitions of an interest group, the population and even death are different. Taking these problems into consideration it could still look like the Danish population is relatively stable compared to the EU population and the US population. One explanation of this may be the corporative structures of the Danish system. The institutionalized relationship between groups and decision makers in Denmark may make the interest group population more stable and ordered compared to pluralist population with no stabilizing structures such as the EU and US populations (see Fisker, 2013a for an elaboration of this argument).

The statistical models showed that especially three interest groups characteristics had positive effects on the interest groups’ survival chances. The number of members, the number of employees, and especially whether a group is represented in a board or committee affected the survival chances of the groups. Group type only played a limited role as only the hobby groups had a different probability of surviving compared to the other group types. This suggests that it is especially the factors referred to as group resources that may explain interest group survival.
That interest groups resources are the most important factors for survival corresponds well to the literature on interest group maintenance. Especially Rothenberg (1988) and Walker (1983) stress that members are important for group maintenance. It also corresponds to some of the findings from Gray and Lowery’s (1995: 108) study of niche theory. They investigate which resource dimensions interest groups share under the assumption that groups may share the resources most critical to their survival. They find that the interest groups especially share resources such as members and financial resources. Their interpretation of this finding is that members and financial resources are especially important for group survival. However, they also find that groups do not share resources such as access to decision makers, and argue that access to decision makers may be less important for group survival. Likewise, Halpin and Thomas (2012) find that resources such as membership size and financial resources affect mortality anxiety, while a privileged position in regard to decision makers has no effect on mortality anxiety.

The results from the present study also suggest that especially the number of members and the level of financial resources are important for group survival. However, this study also suggests that having a privileged position in the decision making process by being represented in a board or a committee is at least as important as members and finances when it comes to survival. One explanation on this difference seems plausible. The most pronounced difference between the studies is the system the interest groups operate in. Gray and Lowery’s (1995) case is the US interest group system, and Halpin and Thomas’ (2012) case is the Scottish interest group system. Both systems can be characterized as pluralist systems where the interaction between the interest groups and the decision makers is not institutionalized but rather ad hoc based. On the contrary this study’s case is the Danish system that is more characterized by corporatism. The interaction between groups and decision makers is more institutionalized as selected interest groups is privileged and incorporated in almost every part of the decision making process. Some of these privileged groups may even create positions for themselves as implementers or monitors of specific policies that may give them a high degree of security. Being an insider is therefore very valuable in the Danish corporative context, while this may be less important in a pluralist context. Therefore it may also be more important for the interest groups’ survival in a corporative system.

This difference between corporative and pluralist systems may also explain why competition does not seem to be important for survival in the Danish corporative system. One of the most fundamental assumptions in the studies of interest group populations is that interest groups will compete with similar groups for scarce resources in order to survive. This is the foundation for population theories as the niche theory (Gray and Lowery, 1996a), the density dependence theory (Nowes, 2004; 2010) and the ESA-model (Lowery and Gray, 1995). All these studies find that competition is an important population mechanism, and both Lowery and Gray (1997) and Halpin and Thomas (2012) find that groups who experience high
levels of competition also experience high levels of mortality anxiety. However, the present study did not find any effects of competition. This suggests that the competition mechanism is not important for interest group survival at least in a Danish context. As corporative interest group systems are more structured and ordered than pluralist ones, the corporative structures may suppress the competition mechanism. Fisker (2013) also find evidence for this claim in a study of the Danish patient group population. Where pluralist systems may be viewed as an ongoing food fight between interest groups where everyone competes for the sparse resources, corporative systems may be viewed as a supermarket where groups stand in line to exchange resources with decision makers. Therefore, the competition aspect may be less important for survival in corporative systems than in pluralist ones.
Appendix 1: Interest group categories from the Interarena project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unions</td>
<td>Associations of employees negotiating work-related terms and conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business groups</td>
<td>Associations of firms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional associations</td>
<td>Associations of public authorities or institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational associations</td>
<td>Associations of employees not negotiating terms and conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity groups</td>
<td>Associations where members/supporters have a selective interest in group goals (not work related)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hobby/leisure groups</td>
<td>Associations of people with a common sport/leisure interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious groups</td>
<td>Associations of people sharing a religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public interest groups</td>
<td>Associations where members/supports do not have a selective interest in group goals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: www.interarena.dk

Appendix 2: Distribution of groups on membership dummy variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of members</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only individual members</td>
<td>871</td>
<td>47,27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only company members</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>21,38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both individual and company members</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>9,98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other types of members</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>21,38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1843</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix 3: Coding scheme for group development

1: The group is unchanged
2: The group changed its name but is unchanged
3: The group changed substantively in regard to purpose and/or members
4: The group merged with another group and turned into a new group
5: The group was absorbed by another group
6: The group is dead
7: The group was divided into two new groups
8: The group still exists but is no longer an interest group
References


