

Does state repression motivate anti-state violence?

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Abstract

The question of whether state repression mitigates or promotes anti-state violence has been central in the literatures of state repression, regime survival, and civil war. However, we know remarkably little about how citizens themselves react to state repression. We conducted three survey experiments in non-democratic states characterized by considerable levels of repression: Belarus, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Nicaragua and Venezuela experienced political violence during the surveys, allowing us to obtain observational data on actual participation in anti-state violence. Our research design exploits experimental manipulation and participants' presence in their natural setting, strengthening the internal and ecological validity of our findings. Our analyses show that experience and recall of repression strongly motivates individual support for, willingness to participate, and actual (self-reported) participation in anti-state violence. The observational results are further replicated across 34 African countries, enhancing external validity. We discuss the implications of these findings for research on the repression–dissent nexus, authoritarian survival, and civil conflict.

Introduction

How do citizens react to state repression? Despite five decades of repression research (for comprehensive reviews, see Davenport, 2007a; Davenport and Inman, 2012; deMeritt, 2016; also Chenoweth, Perkoski, and Kang, 2017), we know surprisingly little about this elementary question. Scholars have typically focused on “why and how political authorities use coercive power” against domestic opposition (Davenport, 2007, p. 1).¹ The question of why and how the opposition responds to such coercion has been researched to a lesser extent, with existing studies reporting highly inconsistent results.² In his 2007 review, Davenport labeled this the “punishment puzzle”:

By far the most long-standing and stable influence on state repression concerns political conflict...every statistical investigation of the subject has found a positive influence...[But] when the causal arrow is reversed and one considers research that investigates the influence of repressive behavior on dissent...the results are highly inconsistent. Sometimes the impact of repression on dissent is negative...sometimes it is positive...sometimes it is represented by an inverted U-shape...sometimes it is alternatively negative or positive...and sometimes it is nonexistent. Both findings viewed together I refer to as the “Punishment Puzzle” (2007a, p. 7–8).

In another review—ten years later—deMeritt concluded that state of the art on the subject remains essentially the same: “There was a need to solve this ‘punishment puzzle’... then, and that need remains today” (2016, p. 3; see also Davenport and Inman, 2012, p. 624).

¹Examples include Carey, 2006; 2010; Conrad and Moore, 2010; Davenport, 1995; 1996; 2000; 2007b; Davenport and Armstrong, 2004; deMeritt, 2012; 2015; Fariss and Schnakenberg, 2014; Fein, 1995; Gartner and Regan, 1996; Gurr and Luchbach, 1986; Hathaway, 2002; Henderson, 1991; King, 1998; Mitchell and McCormick, 1988; Moore, 2000; Pierskalla, 2010; Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe et al. 2000; Regan and Henderson, 2002; Ritter, 2014; Shellman, 2006; and Zanger, 2000.

²See Carey, 2006; Davenport, 2015; Francisco, 1995; 1996; Gupta, Singh, and Sprague, 1993; Hibbs, 1973; Lichbach, 1987; Moore, 1998, Opp, 1994; Opp and Roehl, 1990; Rasler, 1996; Ritter and Conrad, 2016; Siegel, 2011; Sullivan, Loyle, and Davenport, 2012; Tilly, 1978; and White 1989.

The present paper addresses the punishment puzzle by examining its most basic aspect: motivations of individuals who have experienced repression themselves. Research on the repression–dissent nexus has typically assumed that state coercion produces grievances that can motivate anti-state violence. However, this assumption remains under-theorized and largely untested against individual-level data. While invoking theories of individual motivations, research on the repression–dissent nexus has typically focused on states or groups as units of analysis (for notable exceptions, see Opp, 1994; White, 1989). Hence, the basic assumption—underlying much of repression research—remains a largely unsubstantiated claim.

The broader subject of the repression-dissent nexus is composed of two main parts: (i) whether repression motivates or deters violence; and (ii) whether repression facilitates or impedes violence. The second part concerns the feasibility of anti-state violence, i.e., whether repression (e.g., detention of the opposition leaders) increases or decreases opportunities for violent mobilization. The first concerns psychological processes, specifically, motivations of individuals who have experienced repression. Here, we primarily focus on the latter.

We see two likely effects of state repression on human psychology. First, state repression may decrease motivations to engage in anti-state violence. This is the core reason why state authorities use repression in the first place: To incentivize obedience to the regime by imposing significant costs on those engaged in dissent. This expectation is consistent with some individual-level research. Economic games suggest that cost-imposition or punishment, particularly in small groups, motivates immediate compliance (e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 2000). Psychological research highlights how political violence can generate psychological distress and lead to disorders (e.g., Canetti-Nissim et al. 2009), such as depression (e.g., Hobfoll, Canetti-Nisim, and Johnson, 2006) and post-traumatic stress disorder (e.g., Johnson and Thompson, 2008). These disorders are associated with apathy and inactivity, and so potentially decreased participation in politics, including political violence (see also Benard, 1994; Wood, 2006). This expectation is also consistent with some repression and victimization research showing how state coercion can reduce political participation (Balcells, 2012; Zhukov and Talibova, 2018) and anti-state violence (Lyall, 2009).

Second, state repression may increase motivations to engage in anti-state vio-

lence. This expectation is consistent with an emerging literature across the behavioral sciences on the psychology operating behind feelings of revenge. Revenge is A's imposition of costs on B following B's imposition of costs on A. Theoretically, psychologists and biologists understand revenge as a tool for the negotiation of social relationships and argue that it is specifically designed to up-regulate the weight of the avenger's welfare in the social decisions of others (McCullough et al. 2013; Petersen et al. 2012). By imposing costs on individuals who put too little weight on the punisher's welfare, revenge disincentives such behavior in the immediate target as well as among bystanders. Over evolutionary history, organisms that could not defend their fitness interests in this way would face significant disadvantages; therefore, today we see revenge behavior not only among humans but virtually across all social species (Clutton-Brock and Parker, 1995). As such, the psychology regulating revenge is ancient and exert powerful influences on behavioral intentions (De Quervain et al. 2004).

Evolved strategies such as revenge utilize evolved tools. In the case of cost imposition, humans have a large response repertoire, including the curtailing of cooperative relationships and withholding expected benefits. But the most zoologically widespread tool for cost-imposition are physical actions with the goal of inflicting tissue damage; that is, violence. Consistent with this, psychological research has documented a tight link between physical force and revenge motivations such that, for example, physically stronger men and individuals with higher testosterone levels are more likely to seek revenge (Ronay and Galinsky, 2011; Sell et al. 2009).

While the suggestion that experience of repression activates motivations for violence might seem counter-intuitive (or, at least, that repression defeats its purpose), the psychological study of revenge provides credence to the prediction that repression activates psychological systems for revenge-seeking and that these mechanisms, in turn, activate motivations to engage in political violence.

Further, while some economic games suggest that punishment can induce immediate compliance, there is evidence that punishment that is perceived as unfair can decrease it (e.g., Bøggild and Petersen, 2016; Tyler, 2006). Similarly, consistent with psychological research on revenge motivations, some studies on wartime victimization suggests that exposure to violence during civil wars can lead to in-

creased support for and joining dissidents (e.g., Wood, 2003), as well as increased political participation in the aftermath of wars (e.g., Bellows and Miguel, 2006; 2008; Blattman, 2009; Lupu and Peisakhin, 2017; Shewfelt, 2009).

Below, we present an empirical test of these two opposing expectations, i.e., that state repression deters anti-state violence (H1), and that state repression motivates anti-state violence (H2). In addition, we tested how different forms of state repression influence motivations for political violence. Specifically, we contrasted repression by the target of repression (other individuals, friends and family, and self) and intensity (high-intensity vs. low-intensity; or violence and intimidation vs. restrictions of civil liberties; see, e.g., Davenport 2007a, b).

Research Design

The individual-level study of the repression-dissent link faces several inherent constraints. First, our key independent variable, the experience of state repression, cannot be experimentally administered. Hence, the analysis of the influence of the experienced repression on anti-state violence can typically only take a correlational form (e.g., we can obtain self-reports of repression and correlate them with attitudes toward anti-state violence) (although, see Zhukov and Talibova, 2018). However, although state repression cannot be experimentally administered, it can be experimentally recalled. Hence, in our studies we used “repression primes”, with intended effect of recalling (or considering) state repression. These primes draw on emotion-induction paradigms, commonly used in psychology to study, for example, the effects of fear on judgment (e.g., Lerner and Keitner, 2001; Lerner et al. 2003). We did not focus on any specific emotion induced by state repression; the target effect of our priming was simply the recall or consideration of state repression. This experimental manipulation taps into a scenario, where (for example) an opposition leader in a speech refers to state repression to mobilize anti-state violence.

Second, our key outcome, anti-state political violence, cannot be typically naturalistically observed. While we can measure changes in attitudes toward violence due to repression recall, we can hardly observe whether individuals subsequently engage in real-world political violence. Thus, in addition to attitudinal outcome

measures (e.g., support for political violence) we used intentional (or action tendency) measures that focus on willingness to participate in anti-state violence. Psychological research suggests that expressed willingness to engage in collective actions predicts actual participation (e.g., De Weer and Klandermans, 1999). Unlike attitudes, which can be idealistic, intentions consider practical limitations and opportunities (e.g., Ajzen and Fishbein, 1977). We thus assumed that individuals who report a willingness to participate in violence will more likely take part in such violence once a chance arises, *ceteris paribus*. For correlational analyses, in addition to attitudinal and intentional measures, we also aimed to obtain behavioral self-reports of actual participation in violence. We predicted some of our samples to generate sufficiently large numbers of participants in political violence (see Studies 2 and 3).

Third, we were aware of the fact that conducting a survey about state repression and anti-state violence may not be welcomed by governments of repressive states. Due to security and logistical concerns, research on complex and politically sensitive issues often turns to convenience samples (e.g., undergraduates) and uses vignettes with hypothetical scenarios (e.g., Asal and Lemieux, 2008; Johnson et al. 2012) or experimental games (e.g., Johnson et al. 2006; McDermott and Cowden, 2001; 2008; McDermott et al. 2002; 2007; McIntyre et al. 2007; Johnson et al. 2006) simulating some aspect of the research subject. Individuals exposed to such simulations typically have no or little experience with the analyzed phenomena. In our case, such a simulation would probably involve individuals who have little experience with repression and political violence, and hence little realistic grasp of the dynamics involved in anti-state violence against repressive regimes. Therefore, we still looked for opportunities to sample individuals from repressive states experiencing political violence. While our experimental vignettes involved hypothetical scenarios (as we discuss below, we did not ask questions about actual violence against existing governments), these scenarios closely resembled real-world events that interviewees recently experienced/observed in their natural setting. In this way, we aimed to maximize experimental realism and ecological validity our our studies.

Finally, given the sensitive nature of our research subject, we faced likely reporting problems: “Even if individuals can remember what occurred, it is unclear

why they would talk about what they did, especially in the case of government actions” (Davenport, 2007a, p. 6). While we focused on the opposition actions, the reporting problems likely remained, since interviewees could underreport violence due to fears of state reprisals in case of compromised anonymity of the survey. Given this, our questionnaires utilized the following measures. First, in addition to the standard anonymity precautions (and explicit options throughout the questionnaires to refuse answering questions), none of our questions about political violence referred to the actual target of violence. These questions either left the target of violence unspecified (e.g., “violence for a political cause”), or concerned hypothetical governments or people working for governments described in experimental vignettes. Second, we measured willingness to participate in violence via list experiments (Glynn, 2013), which gauged intent to use anti-state violence without asking interviewees to explicitly indicate this.

Altogether, we thus aimed to generate: (i) observational data on the association between experienced repression, on the one hand, and attitudes, intentions, and behaviors pertaining to anti-state violence on the other; (ii) experimental data on the effects of repression recall on intentions to engage in violence, while (iii) sampling from populations that have experience with state repression and political violence, and (iv) minimizing reporting problems.

Research of such nature also calls for a consideration of ethical issues. If H2 is correct, one could argue that our experimental manipulation might predispose interviewees to violence, and so our research may contribute to political violence in the surveyed countries. We do not see this as critical ethical concern: Interviewees who have experienced state repression in the past are likely to recall/consider such repression on a frequent basis, especially under the conditions of open confrontation with the state. Hence, our repression primes in the questionnaires are unlikely to motivate actual participation in violence beyond the motivation for violence due to actual experienced repression. In addition, the effects of experimental manipulations embedded in survey vignettes are typically short-lasting ([REFERENCE]).

Furthermore, the completed questionnaires, if intercepted by state authorities, could expose our interviewees to likely state reprisals. All completed pen-and-paper questionnaires (Study 1), which lack any identifying information, were suc-

cessfully collected in the presence of one of the authors and then archived. The online questionnaires (Study 2 and Study 3) were collected via a system that anonymizes interviewees via random numbers, rendering identification of individual interviewees impossible.³ Study 4 used publicly available data collected by Afrobarometer (2015).

Study 1

Sample. Study 1 interviewed citizens of Belarus, a non-democratic state with a robust security apparatus, where violent anti-regime opposition is potentially very costly. Previous instances of open anti-regime opposition have been effectively crushed without regime concessions. Study 1 thus interviewed individuals well aware of the risks and dynamics involved in violence against a strong autocratic regime. Based on our discussions with area experts, conducting a survey about anti-regime violence in Belarus was unfeasible; therefore, we used a survey to interview citizens of Belarus in neighboring Lithuania. Lithuania hosts the European Humanities University (EHU), relocated from Belarus after a forced closure in 2004. The interviewees were students who either permanently reside in Belarus and visit EHU twice a year for exams or reside in Lithuania for the whole study period. Note, therefore, that the sample in this study over-represents those who are young, educated, and have anti-regime views. Typical to humanities programs in Eastern Europe, the sample also over-represents females. The survey was administered in Russian in February and March 2017. Partly completed surveys were returned by 386 interviewees (EHU hosts approximately 800 students).

Outcome variables. Study 1 only included attitudinal and intentional measures of political violence (i.e., it did not ask questions about actual behavior).

Support for political violence. One item asked about the likelihood that the interviewee would suggest to a friend that political violence is justified (“Tell a friend that, in some circumstances, it is justified to use violence for a political cause”, answered on a 7-point Likert-type scale from 0 = “would never do this” to 6 = “would certainly do this”).

³[Explain in detail]

Willingness to participate in political violence. Another item asked about the likelihood that the interviewee would use violence for a political cause (“Use force or violence for a political cause”, answered on a 7-point Likert-type scale from 0 = “would never do this” to 6 = “would certainly do this”). Willingness to participate in political violence was strongly correlated with support for political violence (Cronbach’s $\alpha = 0.79$); therefore we also computed a combined average score of these two items.

Dehumanization. In addition to questions about political violence, we also included a measure of dehumanization by Bastian, Denson, and Haslam (2013). Research suggests that dehumanization correlates with willingness to use violence (e.g., Viki, Osgood, and Phillips, 2013). The questionnaire included a text describing a hypothetical situation of conflict between government supporters and opposition. Following this text, the interviewees indicated agreement with eight statements composing the dehumanization scale (e.g., “The supporters of the government of Belarus are mechanical and cold, like a robot” and “The supporters of the government of Belarus lack self-restraint, like an animal” rated on a 7-point scale from 0 = “strongly disagree” to 6 = “strongly agree”, Cronbach’s $\alpha = .65$).

As discussed above, the questionnaire also included an indirect measure of willingness to participate in political violence, derived from a list experiment (Glynn, 2013). The analysis of this measure is still in progress and is not reported here.

Predictors. The following text preceded the questions about state repression: “In some countries, the government (or people working for government) might use intimidation or violence against citizens. The government (or people working for the government) might use intimidation or violence to stop people from participating in certain activities or having certain political views”. The survey then asked 39 repression questions, subdivided into three batteries: (1) beliefs about the repression of typical people; (2) experience of repression among friends and family; (3) and personal experience of repression.

First followed a list of 13 events for which we asked the following question: “Below are several things that may or may not happen to a person. Please indicate how often a **typical person** in Belarus would experience things below” (with four answer options: 0 = “never”, 1 = “rarely”, 2 = “sometimes”, 3 = “often”). The 13 events were based on the definition and examples of state repression presented

in Davenport (2007a). We also consulted with area experts to include examples of state repression that might have happened to individuals in the sample population.

Four of the listed events involved the threat or use of violence (i.e., high-intensity repression): (a) “intimidated by someone working for a government institution”; (b) “beaten up by police (or by other people working for the government)”; (c) “short-term detainment (for example, taken away by police for participating in a peaceful protest)”; (d) “imprisonment without fair trial”.

The remaining nine listed events involving restriction of civil liberties (i.e., low-intensity repression): (e) “government surveillance (for example, being followed, mail opened)”; (f) “fired from job or kicked out of school/university because of political views”; (g) “censorship (for example, unable to use certain websites, not allowed to read certain newspapers)”; (h) “restricted movement (restricted domestic and foreign travel)”; (i) “restricted political rights (for example, not able to vote in free and fair elections)”; (j) “private property confiscated by police (for example, police take away PC or phone)”; (k) “restricted freedom of speech (for example, being afraid to express political views)”; (l) “not allowed to join an association or non-governmental organization (for example, not allowed to join an independent trade union)”; (m) “not allowed to strike (for example, not allowed to stop work and negotiate for better working conditions)”.

Subsequently, the interviewees were asked to answer the same 13 questions considering their friends and family (“Please indicate how often **people you care about (your friends and family)** have experienced the things below”), and themselves personally (“Please indicate how often **you personally** have experienced the things below”).

We computed four main repression variables: REPRESSION (the average response over all 39 items; $\alpha = .94$); REPRESSIONTYPICAL (the average response over the 13 items about a typical person; $\alpha = .91$); REPRESSIONFRIENDS (the average response over the 13 items about friends and family; $\alpha = .90$) and REPRESSIONSELF (the average response over the 13 items about interviewees own experience of repression; $\alpha = .86$).

We computed eight additional variables specifically reflecting experiences with high-intensity or low-intensity repression: HIREPRESSION ($\alpha = .84$); HIREPRESSIONTYPICAL ($\alpha = .80$); HIREPRESSIONFRIENDS ($\alpha = .81$); HIREPRESSIONSELF

($\alpha = .74$); LI`REPRESSION` ($\alpha = .92$); LI`REPRESSIONTYPICAL` ($\alpha = .85$); LI`REPRESSIONFRIENDS` ($\alpha = .87$); LI`REPRESSIONSELF` ($\alpha = .82$).

Control variables. The survey also included measures of age, sex (0 = female, 1 = male), subjective social class, and democratic values. Subjective social class was measured with a verbal version of the MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status (Operario et al. 2004). Interviewees were asked to think of a ladder with ten steps that represents where people stand in Belarusian society, where the highest step represent the people who are best off, and the lowest step represents the people who are worst off. Interviewees were then asked to indicate on which step they were placed. Democratic values were measured with 10 statements that have been used in previous research. For each statement, interviewees indicated their agreement on a 7-point scale (0 = “strongly disagree”, 6 = “strongly agree”). We included 6 items from Canetti-Nisim (2004) and 4 items from Miklikowska (2012). Five items reflected support for democratic principles (e.g., “The state must provide equal social and political rights to all citizens, regardless of religion, race or gender”) and five items reflecting opposition to democratic principles (e.g., “Public participation of the people is not necessary if decision making is left in the hands of a few trusted leaders” [reverse-scored]).

Experimental manipulation. The experimental intervention immediately followed the repression questions. The experiment involved two between-subject conditions in which we asked participants to write down their thoughts about a particular event. Asking individuals to write about their thoughts or experiences is a standard method in social psychology research to increase salience of particular thoughts (e.g., Dunn and Schweitzer, 2005; Lerner and Keltner, 2001; Strack, Schwarx, and Gschneidinger, 1985). In the experimental condition, participants were asked to take a moment and “Think about a way in which the government of Belarus has repressed people like you. Please take a few minutes to describe specific examples of such repression”. Below the instruction was a box in which participants could write a few sentences. The control condition was different only in the instruction for what to write in the box: “Think about the government of Belarus. Please take a few minutes to describe the House of Representatives of Belarus. (For example, how many members are in the house? From what parties are the members?)”. The box was immediately followed by questions about

political violence.

Results. We first analyzed observational data (see Tables 2–4 below; for descriptive statistics on reported levels of repression, see Table 1). To aid interpretation, we re-scaled all variables—outcomes, predictors, and controls—to $[0, 1]$. Controlling for the covariates introduced above, the aggregate measure of REPRESSION positively and significantly predicted all four outcome measures (unstandardized regression coefficients, bs , ranged from 0.15 to 0.26, $ps < 0.05$; see Models 4, 8, 12, and 16; Table 2). Subsequently, we examined the sub-types of repression by the target of repression (REPRESSIONTYPICAL, REPRESSIONFRIENDS, and REPRESSIONSELF). All three were positively associated with all four outcome measures; however, the coefficient of REPRESSIONTYPICAL was only significant in the model of dehumanization (Models 1, 5, 9, and 13). In the models of support for and willingness to participate in political violence (Models 1–12), the coefficients of REPRESSIONSELF were the largest and the coefficients of REPRESSIONTYPICAL were the smallest. In the models of dehumanization (Models 13–16), this pattern was reversed, with the coefficients of REPRESSIONTYPICAL being the largest and the coefficients of REPRESSIONSELF being the smallest.

Subsequently, we analyzed high-intensity repression and low-intensity repression (Tables 3 and 4), first using the aggregate measures of repression (i.e., not differentiating by the target of repression). High-intensity repression, compared to low-intensity repression, was a stronger predictor of all four outcome measures ($bs = [0.19, 0.30]$, $ps < 0.01$ compared to $bs = [0.12, 0.21]$, $ps < 0.05$). The same pattern was found when using the three sub-types of high-intensity repression and the three sub-types of low-intensity repression differentiated by the target of repression (see Tables 3 and 4).

Overall, the correlational analysis of the Belarussian sample suggested that repression significantly relates to individual support for and willingness to participate in anti-state violence, and that high-intensity repression, experienced individually, is a stronger predictor of anti-state violence than low-intensity repression, observed in other individuals.

The structure of our questionnaire and the question formulations allowed us to rule out recursive effects: Reporting support for or willingness to participate in violence cannot influence (past) experience of repression (and reporting of such

experience, since repression questions preceded violence). However, this does not entirely rule out endogeneity concerns: Individuals prone to anti-state violence are more likely to be state-repressed, and so our observed association between repression and political violence may in fact reflect the effect of proneness to political violence evoking repression. The analysis above is also vulnerable to omitted variable bias: While we have controlled for a number of likely confounders, some unobserved factors may be associated with both our measured predictors and outcomes, leading to biased parameter estimates (which can over- or underestimate the effects of repression on violence).

To address these concerns, we turned to analysis of experimental data. However, experimental analysis failed to corroborate the above findings. The repression prime slightly reduced support for political violence ($b = -0.001$) and slightly increased willingness to participate in political violence ($b = 0.010$); yet, both coefficients were insignificant ($ps = 0.97$ and 0.75).

One interpretation of these null effects is that the above observed association between repression and violence is spurious, with some unobservables causing both repression and violence (or because repression is endogenous to violence). Another interpretation is that the experimental manipulation failed to induce the desired treatment effect (i.e., recall of repression). We found that 48% of participants in the control condition, and 58% participants in the experimental condition left the description boxes blank—a large noncompliance rate (although, blank boxes may not necessarily indicate noncompliance, because participants could follow the instructions to recall repression without writing about them). The treatment effect among the compliers—or, more accurately, among those who did not leave the description boxes blank—were similar to the above estimates ($b = 0.008$, $p = 0.89$ and $b = 0.017$, $p = 0.71$ respectively).

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the priming task in the questionnaire immediately succeeded the three batteries of detailed repression questions, which themselves likely induced repression recall. Hence, the participants, both in the control and experimental conditions, were “pre-treated” with essentially the same prime. If the treatment effects of the two primes are not additive, or the first prime (i.e., repression questions) induced a ceiling effect, the second prime could no longer induce any additional increase in the treatment effect (see Gaines, Kuklinski,

and Quirk, 2007, p. 11–12). This effectively left the control and experimental groups equally exposed to the treatment. Thus, in more technical terms, we have not estimated the average treatment effect, but “the average marginal effect of additional treatment” (Gaines and Kuklinski, 2011, p. 450), and in our case this effect was negligible.

If the latter explanation is true, the upside is that in our next study we can use repression questions themselves as the repression prime. Given that marking reply options is a less demanding task than writing about given events, using repression questions for priming might also lead to lower noncompliance rates. We explored these possibilities in Studies 2 and 3.

Study 2

Sample. Study 2 interviewed citizens of Venezuela, a non-democratic country experiencing mass anti-government protests during the survey period. Several million Venezuelans took part in the protests across the country in 2017, resulting in several hundred deaths and tens of thousands injured. We expected this sample to generate sufficient number of participants in political violence. Given the open, mass confrontation with the regime, we also expected the interviewees not to under-report participation in or willingness to participate in political violence. The survey was administered online in Spanish in September 2017 via the survey agency YouGov, and was quota-sampled for age, sex, and geography to obtain an approximately nationally representative sample of online population. 4.5% of interviewees (45 of 1,000) reported participation in political violence.

Outcome variables. Study 2 included attitudinal, intentional, and behavioral measures of political violence.

Participation in political violence. Participation in political violence was measured following Afrobarometer (2015): “Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance?” The list of actions included “used force or violence for a political cause” (answer options: “no, would never do this”, “no, but would do if had the chance”, “yes, once or twice”, “yes, several times”, “yes, often”). Responses were

coded on a binary scale with 0 = no and 1 = yes.

Willingness to participate in political violence. For respondents who answered “no” the question about participation in political violence we coded their no-responses for whether they were willing to participate in political violence if they had the chance: 0 = “no, would never do this” and 1 = “no, but would do if had the chance”.

Radicalism Intention Scale. As an alternative measure of willingness to participate in political violence we included the Radicalism Intention Scale (RIS) (Moskalenko and McCauley, 2009). This scale consists of four items (e.g., “I would participate in a public protest against oppression of my group even if I thought the protest might turn violent”) that were rated on a 7-point scale (0 = “very unlikely”, 6 = “very likely”; Cronbach’s $\alpha = .81$).

Dehumanization. During the survey, Venezuela experienced food shortages. The questionnaire included a text describing a situation of conflict between (hypothetical, newly-elected) government and opposition, during which the government destroyed food supplies sent by an aid organization. The interviewees were asked to indicate agreement with the eight items composing the dehumanization scale (analogous to Study 1; e.g., “The supporters of the new government of Venezuela are mechanical and cold, like a robot”; $\alpha = .87$).

Support for political violence (famine). Following the dehumanization scale, interviewees indicated agreement with “It is justifiable to use violence against people who take food away from those who need it” (0 = “strongly disagree”, 6 = “strongly agree”).

General support for political violence. General support for political violence was measured by an adjusted 5-item Pro-violence subscale of the Militant Extremism Mind-Set scale (Stankov et al. 2010) (e.g., “The only way to teach a lesson to our enemies is to threaten their lives and make them suffer”; $\alpha = .76$).

Willingness to participate in political violence (protestor). The questionnaire included another text, describing a conflict between (hypothetical, newly-elected) government and opposition, during which a protester was killed by police. The text was followed by four items that served as an alternative measure of willingness to participate in political violence. The interviewees were asked to indicate willingness to respond to the killing in four ways: “Tell a friend that it is justified

to use violence to oppose the new president”; “help members of a violent political movement that opposes the new president”; “join a violent political movement that opposes the new president”; “use force or violence as part of fighting the new president”. All items were rated on a 7-point scale from 0 = “very unlikely” to 6 = “very likely” ($\alpha = .94$).

As Study 1, the questionnaire also included an indirect measure of willingness to participate in political violence, derived from a list experiment (Glynn, 2013). The analysis of this measure is also in progress and is not reported here.

Predictors. Perception and experience of repression was measured as in Study 1, resulting in the same 12 variables: REPRESSION ($\alpha = .97$); REPRESSIONTYPICAL ($\alpha = .95$); REPRESSIONFRIENDS ($\alpha = .96$); REPRESSIONSELF ($\alpha = .94$); HI REPRESSION ($\alpha = .92$); HI REPRESSIONTYPICAL ($\alpha = .90$); HI REPRESSIONFRIENDS ($\alpha = .91$); HI REPRESSIONSELF ($\alpha = .88$); LI REPRESSION ($\alpha = .97$); LI REPRESSIONTYPICAL ($\alpha = .92$); LI REPRESSIONFRIENDS ($\alpha = .94$); LI REPRESSIONSELF ($\alpha = .92$).

Control variables. The same control variables were included as in Study 1, with the addition of education. Education was measured with the following answer options: 1 = “no formal schooling”, 2 = “incomplete primary school”, 3 = “complete primary school”, 4 = “incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type”; 5 = “complete secondary school: technical/vocational type”; 6 = “incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type”; 7 = “complete secondary school: university-preparatory type”; 8 = “some university-level education, without degree”; 9 = “university-level education, with degree”; and “prefer not to state” (not scored).

Experimental manipulation. In Study 2, we used the repression questions as the repression prime. We expected that answering the 39 questions about various forms of state repression would induce the intended repression recall/consideration. Thus, half of the participants first received repression items (experimental condition), immediately followed by questions about political violence, and the other half first received questions about political violence (followed by the rest of the questionnaire items).

Results. As above, we first examined observational data (Tables 6–11; Table 5 reports descriptive statistics). We also re-scaled all variables to $[0, 1]$. Similar to

Study 1, the aggregate measure of REPRESSION positively and significantly predicted all outcome measures, besides dehumanization ($b = -0.03, p = 0.48$; Model 64, Table 6). Odds ratios (*ORs*) of participation and willingness to participate in violence amounted to 34.23 ($p < 0.0001$) and 14.21 ($p < 0.0001$) respectively (Models 52 and 56). An individual scoring 0.89 (90th percentile) on the aggregate repression measure is almost 15 times more likely to report participation in violence, and more than five times more likely to report willingness to do so than an individual scoring 0.11 (10th percentile) (10.35% vs. 0.73%; and 34.51% vs. 6.51%, respectively).

Analysis of the sub-types of repression by the target of repression revealed that—as in Study 1—all three measures were positively and significantly (at $p < 0.0001$) associated with all outcome measures, besides dehumanization (see Tables 6 and 7). However, in contrast to Study 1, in all models the coefficients of REPRESSIONTYPICAL were larger than the coefficients of REPRESSIONFRIENDS and REPRESSIONSELF.

Similarly, in contrast to Study 2, we found no evidence that high-intensity repression, compared to low-intensity repression, was a stronger predictor of violence (see Tables 8–11). While in the model of participation in political violence high intensity repression considerably outperformed low-intensity repression (compare Models 80 and 108), the two categories of repression equally well predicted all other outcomes (at $p < 0.0001$). The patterns were the same when using the three sub-types of high-intensity repression and the three sub-types of low-intensity repression.

Overall, this analysis substantiates Study 1, suggesting that repression significantly relates to individual support for and willingness to participate in anti-state violence. Furthermore, Study 2 found that repression also predicts actual (self-reported) participation in political violence. In contrast to Study 1, however, Study 2 found little difference in the associations of different types of repression, besides the finding that the perceived repression targeting other individuals is a better predictor of violence than the personally experienced repression.

We now turn to analysis of experimental data. As discussed above, we have randomly manipulated the question order in the questionnaire, with half the participants first seeing repression questions and the other half first seeing violence

questions. The experimental group received two questions about political violence immediately after the repression questions: Afrobarometer-based measure of willingness to participate in political violence and RIS. The analysis indicated that the experimental group scored higher on both outcome measures ($OR_{willingness} = 1.50$, $p = 0.017$ and $b_{willingnessRIS} = 0.058$, $p = 0.001$). Substantively, priming with repression increased willingness to participate in political violence by roughly 1/3 (from 15.6% to 21.8%), and willingness to participate in political violence indexed by RIS by approximately 17% (from 0.289 to 0.348).

Study 3

Sample. Study 3 interviewed citizens of Nicaragua, experiencing mass anti-government protests during the survey period. Several hundred thousands of Nicaraguans took part in the protests across the country in 2018, resulting in several hundred deaths and thousands injured. We expected this sample, like Venezuelan, to generate sufficient number of participants in political violence. Similarly, given the open, mass confrontation with the regime, we also expected the interviewees not to under-report participation in or willingness to participate in political violence. The survey was administered online in Spanish in October 2018 via the survey agency YouGov, and was quota-sampled for age, sex, and geography to obtain an approximately nationally representative sample of online population ($N = 2,000$). Study 3 aimed to replicate experimental results obtained in Study 2. Therefore, Study 3 used nearly identical questionnaire as Study 2 (thus outcome variables, predictors, controls, and experimental manipulation remain the same).

Results. [HB: No results yet; YouGov is still collecting data; we expect to have the results in a week; Study 3 includes an additional experimental priming with an intended effect of making participants consider risks (e.g., injury, imprisonment) involved in political violence prior to answering questions about political violence]

Study 4

Sample. Studies 1–3 indicate considerable variation in the effects of repression on political violence. To assess external validity of our findings we conducted a multinational analysis using Round 5 Afrobarometer Data (2015). The Afrobarometer is a large-scale, multinational project that surveys nationally representative samples of citizens of voting age on topics related to governance, civil society, public services, and living standards. Round 5 included 34 African countries with a sample size of 1,200 or 2,400 per country (total $N = 51,587$). The surveys used clustered, stratified, multi-stage probability sampling, where random selection with a probability proportionate to the population size was applied at every stage.

Outcome variables. *Participation in political violence* and *Willingness to participate in political violence* were proxied with the same Afrobarometer questions as indicated above in Studies 2 and 3.

Predictors. The Afrobarometer questionnaire contains the following items pertaining to state-repression:

1. “In this country, how free are you: A. To say what you think; B. To join any political organization you want; C. To choose who to vote for without feeling pressured” (0 = “completely free”; 4 = “not at all free”);
2. “In your opinion, how often, in [country name] opposition parties or their supporters silenced by the government?” (0 = “never”; 3 = “always”);
3. “During election campaigns in [country name], how much do you personally fear becoming a victim of political intimidation or violence?” (0 = “not at all”; 3 = “a lot”);
4. “How likely do you think it is that powerful people can find out how you voted, even though there is supposed to be a secret ballot in [country name]?” (0 = “not at all likely”; 3 = “very likely”);
5. “In your opinion, how often, in [country name] people have to be careful of what they say about politics?” (0 = “never”; 3 = “always”).

We used the average response over these items to create an aggregate indicator of REPRESSIONAB ($\alpha = .65$)

Results. [HB: the reporting of the analysis of the Afrobarometer data is in progress; using country fixed-effects estimators and a range of individual-level controls, we find that REPRESSIONAB positively and significantly correlates with the two outcome measures, replicating observational results from Belarus and Venezuela]

Discussion

In four studies, we have examined the question of whether state repression motivates anti-state violence. In contrast to extant, macro-level research, we have focused on individual-level motivations. We tested two broad, alternative hypotheses: that state repression motivates anti-state violence and that state repression deters anti-state violence. Using a wide range of indicators, we have found robust correlational evidence that state repression strongly motivates anti-state violence. In one of the studies [HB: possibly two], we have also found experimental evidence that recall of repression causes willingness to participate in anti-state political violence. Finally, we have identified several patterns in the way different forms of repression relate to political violence. However, these patterns were inconsistent across the two studies, suggesting the importance of contextual factors in mediating the association between repression and political violence.

We have analyzed motivations of individuals who have first-hand experience with state-repression and political violence, i.e., individuals who likely have a realistic understanding of the dynamics involved in violence against repressive regimes. Our analyses not only included attitudinal or intentional measures of violence, but also self-reports of participation in political violence. While we are aware of potential reporting problems, we see our studies as contributing to the punishment puzzle with one important piece: analysis of motivations of individuals who have experienced repression—a subject that has been largely under-researched.

Combined, these results point to the following implications. Most importantly, state repression seems to result in strong revenge motivations. Individuals who report experience of repression or observe repression of other individuals, are considerably more likely to support and participate in political violence against the state.

[HB: In progress: Here we will discuss more specific implications for particular literatures]

References

[HB: In progress]

Table 1 Perceived and experienced repression (percentages) (Belarusian sample)

	Please indicate how often a typical person in Belarus would experience things below.				Please indicate how often people you care about (your friends and family) have experienced the things below.				Please indicate how often you personally have experienced the things below.			
	Never	Rarely	Some-times	Often	Never	Rarely	Some-times	Often	Never	Rarely	Some-times	Often
1. Intimidated by someone working for a government institution	9.21	24.12	40.92	25.75	40.80	28.53	25.60	5.07	71.96	15.08	9.52	3.44
2. Government surveillance (for example, being followed, mail opened)	4.34	13.01	37.13	45.53	28.76	24.19	30.11	16.94	48.12	24.19	17.20	10.48
3. Fired from job or kicked out of school/university because of political views	9.36	16.31	38.77	35.56	50.27	22.46	19.79	7.49	87.27	6.10	4.77	1.86
4. Censorship (for example, unable to use certain websites, not allowed to read certain newspapers)	7.20	14.93	35.20	42.67	31.27	23.72	24.26	20.75	41.64	23.08	22.55	12.73
5. Restricted movement (restricted domestic and foreign travel)	12.43	30.27	36.76	20.54	50.81	18.82	19.62	10.75	79.73	10.67	6.13	3.47
6. Restricted political rights (for example, not able to vote in free and fair elections)	12.81	20.44	25.89	40.87	42.01	20.05	18.70	19.24	66.22	11.17	8.24	14.36
7. Private property confiscated by police (for example, police take away PC or phone)	11.65	29.27	36.31	22.76	55.23	22.25	14.21	8.31	88.03	6.65	3.19	2.13
8. Beaten up by police (or by other people working for the government)	5.63	12.87	29.76	51.74	37.30	27.57	19.73	15.41	77.90	10.78	8.09	3.23
9. Restricted freedom of speech (for example, being afraid to express political views)	3.78	8.11	19.19	68.92	19.73	21.35	25.68	33.24	37.50	21.54	20.74	20.21
10. Not allowed to join an association or non-governmental organization (for example, not allowed to join an independent trade union)	11.26	27.20	38.19	23.35	53.66	23.85	11.65	10.84	75.94	12.30	5.88	5.88
11. Not allowed to strike (for example, not allowed to stop work and negotiate for better working conditions)	5.08	10.70	22.73	61.50	36.31	15.72	20.33	27.64	59.95	13.00	12.20	14.85
12. Short-term detainment (for example, taken away by police for participating in a peaceful protest)	5.90	9.65	25.20	59.25	46.88	21.14	19.24	12.74	85.11	7.45	5.05	2.39
13. Imprisonment without fair trial	11.89	17.84	36.76	33.51	68.92	14.05	8.11	8.92	95.21	1.86	1.33	1.60

Table 2 Repression and political violence by the target of repression (Belarusian sample)

	PVsup. (1)	PVsup. (2)	PVsup. (3)	PVsup. (4)	PVwil. (5)	PVwil. (6)	PVwil. (7)	PVwil. (8)	PVwil. /sup. (9)	PVwil. /sup. (10)	PVwil. /sup. (11)	PVwil. /sup. (12)	Dehum. (13)	Dehum. (14)	Dehum. (15)	Dehum. (16)
Repression (typical)	0.08 (0.07)				0.08 (0.06)				0.08 (0.06)				0.29**** (0.04)			
Repression (friends)		0.14* (0.06)				0.11* (0.04)				0.12** (0.05)				0.16**** (0.03)		
Repression (self)			0.17** (0.06)				0.14** (0.05)				0.15** (0.05)				0.12** (0.04)	
Repression (aggregate)				0.18* (0.07)				0.15** (0.05)				0.16** (0.06)				0.26**** (0.04)
Age	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.06)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.05)
Sex	0.14**** (0.04)	0.13*** (0.04)	0.13*** (0.04)	0.14*** (0.04)	0.16**** (0.03)	0.15**** (0.03)	0.14**** (0.03)	0.15**** (0.03)	0.15**** (0.03)	0.14**** (0.03)	0.13**** (0.03)	0.14**** (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)
Subjective social class	0.02 (0.07)	0.03 (0.07)	0.04 (0.07)	0.04 (0.07)	0.03 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	0.05 (0.06)	0.05 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.04)
Democratic values	-0.22** (0.08)	-0.23** (0.07)	-0.21** (0.07)	-0.24** (0.08)	-0.21*** (0.06)	-0.21*** (0.06)	-0.20*** (0.06)	-0.22*** (0.06)	-0.21** (0.06)	-0.21*** (0.06)	-0.20*** (0.06)	-0.22*** (0.06)	0.07 (0.05)	0.13** (0.05)	0.16*** (0.05)	0.10* (0.04)
Constant	0.27*** (0.07)	0.28**** (0.06)	0.28**** (0.06)	0.24*** (0.07)	0.15** (0.06)	0.18*** (0.05)	0.17*** (0.05)	0.14** (0.05)	0.21*** (0.06)	0.23**** (0.05)	0.23**** (0.05)	0.19*** (0.05)	0.37**** (0.04)	0.49**** (0.04)	0.50**** (0.04)	0.43**** (0.04)
Observations	345	344	345	346	344	343	344	345	345	344	345	346	346	345	346	347
R ²	0.064	0.076	0.078	0.076	0.113	0.124	0.128	0.127	0.095	0.107	0.111	0.110	0.175	0.117	0.086	0.153

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$

Table 3 Repression (high intensity) and political violence by the target of repression (Belarusian sample)

	PVsup. (17)	PVsup. (18)	PVsup. (19)	PVsup. (20)	PVwil. (21)	PVwil. (22)	PVwil. (23)	PVwil. (24)	PVwil. /sup. (25)	PVwil. /sup. (26)	PVwil. /sup. (27)	PVwil. /sup. (28)	Dehum. (29)	Dehum. (30)	Dehum. (31)	Dehum. (32)
Repression (typical, high int.)	0.08 (0.06)				0.07 (0.05)				0.07 (0.05)				0.25**** (0.04)			
Repression (friends, high int.)		0.12* (0.05)				0.10** (0.04)				0.11** (0.04)				0.15**** (0.03)		
Repression (self, high int.)			0.27*** (0.08)				0.25**** (0.06)				0.26**** (0.07)				0.15** (0.05)	
Repression (aggregate, high int.)				0.21** (0.07)				0.19*** (0.06)				0.19** (0.06)				0.30**** (0.04)
Age	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.04)
Sex	0.14**** (0.04)	0.13*** (0.04)	0.11** (0.04)	0.13*** (0.04)	0.16**** (0.03)	0.14**** (0.03)	0.12**** (0.03)	0.15**** (0.03)	0.15**** (0.03)	0.14**** (0.03)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.14**** (0.03)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)
Subjective social class	0.02 (0.07)	0.02 (0.07)	0.04 (0.07)	0.04 (0.07)	0.03 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	0.05 (0.06)	0.05 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.08 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.04)
Democratic values	-0.22** (0.08)	-0.22** (0.07)	-0.20** (0.07)	-0.23** (0.07)	-0.20*** (0.06)	-0.21*** (0.06)	-0.19*** (0.06)	-0.22*** (0.06)	-0.20** (0.06)	-0.21*** (0.06)	-0.19** (0.06)	-0.22*** (0.06)	0.08 (0.04)	0.13** (0.04)	0.17*** (0.05)	0.11* (0.04)
Constant	0.27*** (0.07)	0.29**** (0.06)	0.29**** (0.06)	0.24*** (0.07)	0.16** (0.05)	0.19*** (0.05)	0.18*** (0.05)	0.14** (0.05)	0.21*** (0.06)	0.24**** (0.05)	0.23**** (0.05)	0.19*** (0.05)	0.39**** (0.04)	0.50**** (0.04)	0.51**** (0.04)	0.43**** (0.04)
Observations	345	344	345	346	344	343	344	345	345	344	345	346	346	345	346	347
R ²	0.065	0.074	0.089	0.081	0.114	0.127	0.151	0.137	0.095	0.106	0.128	0.116	0.179	0.125	0.085	0.177

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$

Table 4 Repression (low intensity) and political violence by the target of repression (Belarusian sample)

	PVsup. (33)	PVsup. (34)	PVsup. (35)	PVsup. (36)	PVwil. (37)	PVwil. (38)	PVwil. (39)	PVwil. (40)	PVwil. /sup. (41)	PVwil. /sup. (42)	PVwil. /sup. (43)	PVwil. /sup. (44)	Dehum. (45)	Dehum. (46)	Dehum. (47)	Dehum. (48)
Repression (typical, low int.)	0.07 (0.07)				0.07 (0.06)				0.07 (0.06)				0.26**** (0.04)			
Repression (friends, low int.)		0.13* (0.06)				0.09* (0.04)				0.11* (0.04)				0.14**** (0.03)		
Repression (self, low int.)			0.13* (0.06)				0.10* (0.05)				0.11* (0.05)				0.10** (0.04)	
Repression (aggregate, low int.)				0.15* (0.07)				0.12* (0.05)				0.14* (0.06)				0.21**** (0.04)
Age	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.05)
Sex	0.14**** (0.04)	0.13*** (0.04)	0.13*** (0.04)	0.14**** (0.04)	0.16**** (0.03)	0.15**** (0.03)	0.15**** (0.03)	0.15**** (0.03)	0.15**** (0.03)	0.14**** (0.03)	0.14**** (0.03)	0.15**** (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
Subjective social class	0.02 (0.07)	0.04 (0.07)	0.04 (0.07)	0.04 (0.07)	0.03 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	0.05 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.04)
Democratic values	-0.21** (0.08)	-0.23** (0.07)	-0.21** (0.07)	-0.23** (0.08)	-0.20*** (0.06)	-0.21*** (0.06)	-0.19*** (0.06)	-0.21*** (0.06)	-0.20** (0.06)	-0.21*** (0.06)	-0.20** (0.06)	-0.21*** (0.06)	0.08 (0.05)	0.13** (0.05)	0.16*** (0.05)	0.11* (0.05)
Constant	0.28*** (0.07)	0.28**** (0.07)	0.28**** (0.06)	0.25*** (0.07)	0.16** (0.06)	0.18*** (0.05)	0.18*** (0.05)	0.15** (0.05)	0.22*** (0.06)	0.23**** (0.05)	0.23**** (0.05)	0.20*** (0.05)	0.39**** (0.04)	0.49**** (0.04)	0.50**** (0.04)	0.44**** (0.04)
Observations	345	344	345	346	344	343	344	345	345	344	345	346	346	345	346	347
R ²	0.063	0.075	0.071	0.073	0.112	0.121	0.119	0.121	0.093	0.105	0.103	0.105	0.154	0.104	0.082	0.131

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$

Table 5 Perceived and experienced repression (percentages) (Venezuelan sample)

	Please indicate how often a typical person in Belarus would experience things below.				Please indicate how often people you care about (your friends and family) have experienced the things below.				Please indicate how often you personally have experienced the things below.			
	Never	Rarely	Some-times	Often	Never	Rarely	Some-times	Often	Never	Rarely	Some-times	Often
1. Intimidated by someone working for a government institution	10.40	8.36	19.88	61.37	16.41	10.91	27.01	45.67	34.42	17.41	22.61	25.56
2. Government surveillance (for example, being followed, mail opened)	25.65	25.44	27.40	21.51	32.96	25.05	24.13	17.86	59.24	18.39	12.87	9.50
3. Fired from job or kicked out of school/university because of political views	15.26	6.51	19.02	59.21	18.96	12.33	24.36	44.34	56.81	13.31	12.18	17.71
4. Censorship (for example, unable to use certain websites, not allowed to read certain newspapers)	12.84	10.81	19.98	56.37	18.76	14.48	21.20	45.57	32.96	14.04	19.33	33.67
5. Restricted movement (restricted domestic and foreign travel)	16.05	14.31	28.22	41.41	24.23	19.61	25.56	30.60	46.60	16.46	17.49	19.44
6. Restricted political rights (for example, not able to vote in free and fair elections)	27.75	14.18	20.04	38.03	31.79	15.38	19.59	33.23	49.69	14.48	11.70	24.13
7. Private property confiscated by police (for example, police take away PC or phone)	18.37	11.22	22.96	47.45	24.59	16.60	23.16	35.66	62.00	12.87	9.37	15.76
8. Beaten up by police (or by other people working for the government)	13.92	9.62	27.43	49.03	21.38	14.87	27.70	36.05	65.44	13.80	8.38	12.37
9. Restricted freedom of speech (for example, being afraid to express political views)	11.31	7.03	19.78	61.88	16.16	9.25	22.05	52.54	27.28	12.88	20.18	39.66
10. Not allowed to join an association or non-governmental organization (for example, not allowed to join an independent trade union)	24.66	20.60	27.89	26.85	29.41	18.65	25.41	26.54	51.18	17.54	14.56	16.72
11. Not allowed to strike (for example, not allowed to stop work and negotiate for better working conditions)	15.42	12.54	23.23	48.82	20.29	11.52	22.32	45.87	40.14	12.90	16.41	30.55
12. Short-term detainment (for example, taken away by police for participating in a peaceful protest)	15.31	5.76	15.31	63.62	22.57	13.79	19.51	44.13	69.82	8.52	6.88	14.78
13. Imprisonment without fair trial	14.29	5.14	13.87	66.70	26.35	10.01	18.69	44.94	75.49	6.36	5.13	13.03

Table 6 Repression and political violence by the target of repression (Venezuelan sample)

	PVpar. (49)	PVpar. (50)	PVpar. (51)	PVpar. (52)	PVwil. (53)	PVwil. (54)	PVwil. (55)	PVwil. (56)	RIS (57)	RIS (58)	RIS (59)	RIS (60)	Dehum. (61)	Dehum. (62)	Dehum. (63)	Dehum. (64)
Repression (typical)	3.44*** (0.94)				2.64**** (0.42)				0.38**** (0.03)				0.04 (0.03)			
Repression (friends)		2.95**** (0.72)				1.93**** (0.32)			0.31**** (0.03)					-0.02 (0.03)		
Repression (self)			2.30**** (0.49)				1.73**** (0.28)				0.30**** (0.03)				-0.05 (0.03)	
Repression (aggregate)				3.58**** (0.77)				2.57**** (0.37)				0.41**** (0.03)				-0.02 (0.03)
Age	-1.61 (0.83)	-1.69* (0.82)	-1.42 (0.82)	-1.53 (0.82)	-0.27 (0.42)	-0.33 (0.42)	-0.09 (0.41)	-0.23 (0.42)	-0.08 (0.04)	-0.08* (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)
Sex	0.64* (0.33)	0.54 (0.33)	0.45 (0.33)	0.52 (0.33)	0.57** (0.18)	0.47** (0.18)	0.34 (0.18)	0.46* (0.18)	0.09**** (0.02)	0.08**** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.08**** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Education	-0.05 (0.96)	0.01 (0.95)	0.13 (0.95)	-0.04 (0.96)	-0.52 (0.50)	-0.42 (0.50)	-0.32 (0.50)	-0.48 (0.50)	0.00 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)
Subjective social class	0.46 (0.80)	0.39 (0.79)	0.30 (0.79)	0.35 (0.79)	-0.84 (0.46)	-0.93* (0.45)	-0.96* (0.45)	-0.95* (0.46)	-0.12** (0.04)	-0.13** (0.04)	-0.13** (0.04)	-0.13** (0.04)	-0.00 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.05)
Democratic values	2.34* (1.12)	2.22* (1.12)	1.74 (1.09)	2.01 (1.12)	0.68 (0.68)	0.64 (0.66)	0.46 (0.64)	0.60 (0.67)	0.23*** (0.06)	0.22*** (0.06)	0.18** (0.06)	0.21*** (0.06)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)
Constant	-7.07**** (1.45)	-6.35**** (1.34)	-5.17**** (1.24)	-6.44**** (1.32)	-3.02**** (0.74)	-2.25** (0.70)	-1.68* (0.67)	-2.46**** (0.71)	-0.02 (0.07)	0.07 (0.07)	0.16* (0.07)	0.04 (0.07)	0.62**** (0.07)	0.65**** (0.07)	0.65**** (0.07)	0.65**** (0.07)
Observations	925	927	928	928	882	884	885	885	933	934	935	935	906	908	908	908
R ²									0.170	0.150	0.134	0.180	0.005	0.004	0.007	0.004
Chi2	30.62	33.40	33.25	38.42	60.49	50.31	48.01	63.70								
Pseudo R ²	0.088	0.096	0.096	0.110	0.070	0.058	0.056	0.074								

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$

Table 7 Repression and political violence by the target of repression (Venezuelan sample)

	PVsup. fam. (65)	PVsup. fam. (66)	PVsup. fam. (67)	PVsup. fam. (68)	PVsup. war (69)	PVsup. war (70)	PVsup. war (71)	PVsup. war (72)	PVwil. pro. (73)	PVwil. pro. (74)	PVwil. pro. (75)	PVwil. pro. (76)
Repression (typical)	0.29**** (0.04)				0.19**** (0.02)				0.28**** (0.03)			
Repression (friends)		0.24**** (0.04)				0.17**** (0.02)				0.25**** (0.03)		
Repression (self)			0.22**** (0.04)				0.19**** (0.02)				0.26**** (0.03)	
Repression (aggregate)				0.31**** (0.04)				0.23**** (0.02)				0.32**** (0.03)
Age	-0.11 (0.06)	-0.11 (0.06)	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.10 (0.06)	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.09** (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.08* (0.03)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.08 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)
Sex	0.10**** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.07** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.07**** (0.01)	0.07**** (0.01)	0.05**** (0.01)	0.07**** (0.01)	0.08**** (0.02)	0.07**** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.07**** (0.02)
Subjective social class	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)
Democratic values	0.31*** (0.09)	0.30*** (0.09)	0.28** (0.09)	0.29*** (0.09)	0.29**** (0.05)	0.28**** (0.05)	0.25**** (0.05)	0.27**** (0.05)	0.30**** (0.06)	0.29**** (0.06)	0.26**** (0.06)	0.28**** (0.06)
Constant	0.02 (0.07)	0.10 (0.07)	0.17** (0.06)	0.07 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.20**** (0.05)	-0.13** (0.05)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.16**** (0.05)
Observations	925	927	927	927	938	940	941	941	929	931	932	932
R ²	0.072	0.064	0.056	0.073	0.116	0.116	0.128	0.136	0.119	0.117	0.123	0.140

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$

Table 8 Repression (high intensity) and political violence by the target of repression (Venezuelan sample)

	PVpar. (77)	PVpar. (78)	PVpar. (79)	PVpar. (80)	PVwil. (81)	PVwil. (82)	PVwil. (83)	PVwil. (84)	RIS (85)	RIS (86)	RIS (87)	RIS (88)	Dehum. (89)	Dehum. (90)	Dehum. (91)	Dehum. (92)
Repression (typical, high int.)	3.46** (1.07)				2.01*** (0.39)				0.28*** (0.03)				0.02 (0.03)			
Repression (friends, high int.)		2.76**** (0.69)				1.41**** (0.28)				0.25**** (0.03)				-0.02 (0.03)		
Repression (self, high int.)			2.26**** (0.43)				1.19**** (0.25)				0.26**** (0.03)				-0.05 (0.03)	
Repression (aggregate, high int.)				4.00**** (0.79)				2.10**** (0.35)				0.37**** (0.03)				-0.02 (0.03)
Age	-1.56 (0.81)	-1.65* (0.80)	-1.30 (0.82)	-1.41 (0.81)	-0.27 (0.41)	-0.31 (0.41)	-0.13 (0.41)	-0.22 (0.41)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)
Sex	0.65* (0.33)	0.51 (0.33)	0.36 (0.33)	0.45 (0.33)	0.55** (0.18)	0.44* (0.18)	0.32 (0.18)	0.42* (0.18)	0.09**** (0.02)	0.08**** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.07**** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Subjective social class	0.45 (0.81)	0.46 (0.79)	0.16 (0.80)	0.31 (0.80)	-0.83 (0.45)	-0.85 (0.44)	-0.96* (0.45)	-0.93* (0.45)	-0.12** (0.04)	-0.12** (0.04)	-0.14** (0.05)	-0.13** (0.04)	-0.00 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)
Democratic values	2.38* (1.13)	2.34* (1.11)	1.48 (1.10)	1.88 (1.13)	0.71 (0.67)	0.75 (0.65)	0.44 (0.63)	0.66 (0.66)	0.24*** (0.06)	0.23*** (0.06)	0.17** (0.06)	0.21*** (0.06)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.07)
Constant	-7.44**** (1.32)	-6.43**** (1.02)	-4.68**** (0.82)	-6.76**** (0.98)	-3.17**** (0.58)	-2.43**** (0.50)	-1.62*** (0.45)	-2.66**** (0.51)	0.03 (0.05)	0.10* (0.05)	0.23**** (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	0.58**** (0.05)	0.61**** (0.05)	0.60**** (0.05)	0.61**** (0.05)
Observations	925	928	927	929	882	885	884	886	932	935	934	936	905	909	907	909
R^2									0.118	0.124	0.113	0.155	0.003	0.003	0.006	0.003
Pseudo R^2	0.084	0.096	0.112	0.129	0.051	0.043	0.035	0.056								
chi2	29.29	33.53	38.91	44.94	44.12	36.90	30.32	48.20								

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$

Table 9 Repression (high intensity) and political violence by the target of repression (Venezuelan sample)

	PVsup. fam. (93)	PVsup. fam. (94)	PVsup. fam. (95)	PVsup. fam. (96)	PVsup. war (97)	PVsup. war (98)	PVsup. war (99)	PVsup. war (100)	PVwil. pro. (101)	PVwil. pro. (102)	PVwil. pro. (103)	PVwil. pro. (104)
Repression (typical, high int.)	0.26**** (0.04)				0.15**** (0.02)				0.21**** (0.03)			
Repression (friends, high int.)		0.22**** (0.03)				0.15**** (0.02)				0.19**** (0.02)		
Repression (self, high int.)			0.20**** (0.04)				0.17**** (0.02)				0.22**** (0.03)	
Repression (aggregate, high int.)				0.32**** (0.04)				0.22**** (0.02)				0.29**** (0.03)
Age	-0.11 (0.06)	-0.11 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.08* (0.03)	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.06 (0.03)	-0.08* (0.03)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)
Sex	0.10**** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.07** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.07**** (0.01)	0.06**** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.06**** (0.01)	0.08**** (0.02)	0.07**** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.07**** (0.02)
Subjective social class	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)
Democratic values	0.30*** (0.09)	0.31*** (0.09)	0.28** (0.09)	0.28** (0.09)	0.29**** (0.05)	0.29**** (0.05)	0.24**** (0.05)	0.27**** (0.05)	0.30**** (0.06)	0.30**** (0.06)	0.25**** (0.06)	0.28**** (0.06)
Constant	0.03 (0.07)	0.09 (0.07)	0.20** (0.06)	0.07 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.06 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.16** (0.05)	-0.12* (0.05)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.14** (0.05)
Observations	923	927	925	927	936	940	939	941	927	931	930	932
R ²	0.068	0.068	0.055	0.079	0.098	0.113	0.120	0.132	0.091	0.097	0.103	0.122

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$

Table 10 Repression (low intensity) and political violence by the target of repression (Venezuelan sample)

	PVpar. (105)	PVpar. (106)	PVpar. (107)	PVpar. (108)	PVwil. (109)	PVwil. (110)	PVwil. (111)	PVwil. (112)	RIS (113)	RIS (114)	RIS (115)	RIS (116)	Dehum. (117)	Dehum. (118)	Dehum. (119)	Dehum. (120)
Repression (typical, low int.)	2.93** (0.80)				2.50*** (0.39)				0.38**** (0.03)				0.03 (0.03)			
Repression (friends, low int.)		2.67**** (0.67)				1.95**** (0.32)				0.31**** (0.03)				-0.02 (0.03)		
Repression (self, low int.)			2.07**** (0.50)				1.81**** (0.28)				0.29**** (0.03)				-0.05 (0.03)	
Repression (aggregate, low int.)				3.08**** (0.71)				2.51**** (0.36)				0.40**** (0.03)				-0.02 (0.03)
Age	-1.62* (0.81)	-1.68* (0.81)	-1.49 (0.80)	-1.57 (0.80)	-0.34 (0.42)	-0.41 (0.41)	-0.19 (0.41)	-0.32 (0.41)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.08* (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)
Sex	0.63 (0.33)	0.56 (0.33)	0.50 (0.33)	0.55 (0.33)	0.57** (0.18)	0.50** (0.18)	0.40* (0.18)	0.49** (0.18)	0.09**** (0.02)	0.08**** (0.02)	0.07**** (0.02)	0.08**** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Subjective social class	0.47 (0.80)	0.37 (0.79)	0.36 (0.78)	0.39 (0.79)	-0.77 (0.45)	-0.89* (0.45)	-0.90* (0.45)	-0.88 (0.45)	-0.12** (0.04)	-0.13** (0.04)	-0.13** (0.04)	-0.13** (0.04)	0.00 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)
Democratic values	2.29* (1.10)	2.16 (1.10)	1.86 (1.08)	2.06 (1.11)	0.73 (0.67)	0.63 (0.66)	0.51 (0.65)	0.64 (0.67)	0.23*** (0.06)	0.22*** (0.06)	0.18** (0.06)	0.21*** (0.06)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)
Constant	-6.57**** (1.07)	-6.05**** (0.97)	-5.09**** (0.84)	-6.17**** (0.96)	-3.33**** (0.57)	-2.63**** (0.51)	-2.13**** (0.47)	-2.91**** (0.52)	-0.00 (0.05)	0.09 (0.05)	0.17**** (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	0.58**** (0.05)	0.61**** (0.05)	0.61**** (0.05)	0.61**** (0.05)
Observations	926	927	928	929	883	884	885	886	934	935	935	936	907	908	909	909
R^2									0.178	0.149	0.133	0.178	0.004	0.003	0.006	0.003
Pseudo R^2	0.082	0.089	0.082	0.096	0.070	0.060	0.062	0.076								
chi2	28.46	30.84	28.61	33.60	60.49	52.10	53.41	65.53								

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$

Table 11 Repression (low intensity) and political violence by the target of repression (Venezuelan sample)

	PVsup. fam. (120)	PVsup. fam. (121)	PVsup. fam. (122)	PVsup. fam. (123)	PVsup. War (124)	PVsup. War (125)	PVsup. War (126)	PVsup. War (127)	PVwil. pro. (128)	PVwil. pro. (129)	PVwil. pro. (130)	PVwil. pro. (131)
Repression (typical, low int.)	0.27*** (0.04)				0.19*** (0.02)				0.28*** (0.03)			
Repression (friends, low int.)		0.22**** (0.04)				0.16**** (0.02)				0.25**** (0.03)		
Repression (self, low int.)			0.20**** (0.04)				0.18**** (0.02)				0.25**** (0.03)	
Repression (aggregate, low int.)				0.28**** (0.04)				0.21**** (0.02)				0.31**** (0.03)
Age	-0.11 (0.06)	-0.11 (0.06)	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.10 (0.06)	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.09** (0.03)	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.08 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.04)
Sex	0.10**** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.08** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.07**** (0.01)	0.07**** (0.01)	0.06**** (0.01)	0.07**** (0.01)	0.08**** (0.02)	0.08**** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.07**** (0.02)
Subjective social class	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)
Democratic values	0.31*** (0.09)	0.30*** (0.09)	0.28** (0.09)	0.30*** (0.09)	0.29**** (0.05)	0.28**** (0.05)	0.26**** (0.05)	0.27**** (0.05)	0.31**** (0.06)	0.29**** (0.06)	0.26**** (0.06)	0.28**** (0.06)
Constant	0.04 (0.07)	0.11 (0.07)	0.16** (0.06)	0.09 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.19**** (0.05)	-0.13** (0.05)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.15*** (0.05)
Observations	925	926	926	927	938	940	940	941	929	930	931	932
R^2	0.068	0.058	0.054	0.067	0.118	0.111	0.125	0.132	0.124	0.119	0.123	0.140

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$

Table S1 Summary statistics for the main variables

	count	mean	p50	sd	min	max
PVsupport	370	.2202703	.1666667	.2560216	0	1
PVwillingness	369	.1246612	0	.2066163	0	1
PVwillingness, PVsupport combined	370	.1734234	.0833333	.213302	0	1
Dehumanization	367	.5733063	.5714286	.1620548	0	1
Repression (aggregate)	381	.4564262	.444079	.2002723	0	1
Repression (typical)	376	.6856702	.7435897	.2101783	0	1
Repression (friends)	376	.3571083	.3333333	.2421259	0	1
Repression (self)	378	.2135117	.1515152	.2127113	0	1
Repression (aggregate, high int.)	381	.3890632	.3844086	.1908979	0	1
Repression (typical, high int.)	376	.7010195	.75	.2435249	0	1
Repression (friends, high int.)	376	.3042258	.25	.2712308	0	1
Repression (self, high int.)	378	.0963404	0	.1714136	0	1
Repression (aggregate, low int.)	381	.463781	.4594595	.2082528	0	1
Repression (typical, low int.)	376	.6790041	.7407408	.2104513	0	1
Repression (friends, low int.)	376	.3814196	.3703704	.2513392	0	1
Repression (self, low int.)	378	.2451389	.1770833	.2289863	0	1
Age	372	.2245331	.1578947	.1774367	0	1
Sex	379	.1846966	0	.3885642	0	1
Subjective social class	364	.5100733	.5555556	.1868012	0	1
Democratic values	367	.5950223	.6046512	.1861476	1.11e-08	1

Table S2 Summary statistics for the main variables (Study 2)

	count	mean	p50	sd	min	max
PVparticipation (binary)	980	.0459184	0	.2094149	0	1
PVwillingness (binary)	935	.1860963	0	.3893926	0	1
Radicalism Intention Scale	984	.3181035	.25	.2864408	0	1
Dehumanization	953	.5529724	.5208333	.2703177	0	1
PVsupport (famine)	973	.3795821	.3333333	.3785772	0	1
MEM pro-violence	992	.2139701	.2	.215809	0	1
PVwillingness (protestor)	980	.1791667	0	.2694897	0	1
Repression (aggregate)	992	.5375772	.5726495	.2724052	0	1
Repression (typical)	989	.677451	.7692308	.2866876	0	1
Repression (friends)	991	.5899178	.6410256	.3170614	0	1
Repression (self)	991	.3486033	.2820513	.3033492	0	1
Repression (aggregate, high int.)	992	.5486323	.5833333	.2784689	0	1
Repression (typical, high int.)	987	.750197	.9166667	.3172128	0	1
Repression (friends, high int.)	991	.6228837	.75	.3509491	0	1
Repression (self, high int.)	989	.2758679	.1666667	.3184532	0	1
Repression (aggregate, low int.)	992	.5326216	.5639506	.2812879	0	1
Repression (typical, low int.)	989	.6451933	.7407408	.2913738	0	1
Repression (friends, low int.)	990	.5754819	.6296296	.3184885	0	1
Repression (self, low int.)	990	.3803171	.3333333	.3149903	0	1
Age	965	.3066831	.2711864	.2113528	0	1
Sex	1000	.516	1	.499994	0	1
Education	999	.9020687	1	.179537	0	1
Subjective social class	983	.5721714	.5555556	.1955933	0	1
Democratic values	1000	.5154429	.5	.1492016	0	1