# Posts and Violence: Elite Social Media Strategy and Riots in India

Anton Kronborg[1], Sebastian Schutte[2]

[1]University of Oslo (UiO)
[2]Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)

*To mobilize co-ethnic voters and win elections, ethno-nationalist politicians in India push narratives that incite violence among Hindus and Muslims (Bulutgil and Prasad 2023). While patterns of communal violence and elections support this assertion, whether politicians actively encourage ethnic division to ignite violence before elections has not been tested. Since the argument was introduced to political science (Wilkinson 2004), the advent of social media has added a new dimension to political communication and discourse—a dimension that lends itself to analysis at scale. Concurrently, India has undergone a distinct period of autocratization as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has risen to enter government. In this paper, we plan to leverage data from the Indian social media platform Koo, endorsed by Prime Minister Modi after a dispute with Twitter in 2021, to test whether governing BJP members engage in ethno-centric messaging on social media when electoral incentives predict that they should. We also plan on testing whether this messaging contributes to real-world violence.*

## Introduction

Findings from India suggest that competitive elections bring violence and that politicians are implicated in the production of this violence (Wilkinson 2004; Bulutgil and Prasad 2023). Over the past twenty years, the rise of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and President Modi has coincided with a period of backsliding in the country often referred to as "the worlds most populous democracy". The party has successfully realigned voters by putting forth a "new form of ethno-political majoritarianism" more appealing to lower castes than religious Hindu nationalism (Chhibber and Verma 2019). Still, this

1

electoral strategy has effectively pitted Hindus against minorities, particularly Muslims towards whom violence has intensified in BJP controlled areas (Sardesai 2019; Heath 2020). On his way to becoming president, Modi allowed wide-scale violence against Muslims as Chief Minister in Gujarat, presenting peace-prone politicians with an unappetizing recipe for success. To better understand the rise of the BJP, religious polarization and the connection between elections and violence more generally, we study the direct communication of governing politicians in India with varying electoral incentives and test whether fomenting violence is a deliberate and systematically employed electoral strategy.

The implications of the findings weigh heavy, since the size of India makes it a crucial case for understanding democracy in non-Western contexts. Moreover, the institutional incentives that Indian politicians face are similar to those in the multitude of other Westminster systems. Consequently, insofar as electoral incentives explain elite discourse, the findings may travel to all contexts with similar first-past-the-post systems and ethnic or religious cleavages. Meanwhile, changes in Hindu-Muslim relations within India can have major repercussions for international politics considering the relation to Pakistan and other neighboring Muslim-majority countries. For these reasons, understanding the actions and motivations of politicians in India is important.

Meanwhile, research on the actions of political elites and their determining incentives has gained a dimension with the advent of social media. Not only does it provide a direct channel between politicians and voters, it provides scholars with a data source (when they have access). The discourse found on social media may reflect aspects of political communication that are already familiar to the literature, like credit claiming or blame avoidance, serving as a new tool to answer long-standing questions. Further, social media platforms have and are changing the political landscape, creating new dynamics and (dis)placing power between the different actors. Indeed, these communication platforms bring both promises and pitfalls (Tucker et al. 2017), and political agents increasingly seek to control the platforms, even launching their own as in the case of Donald Trump's Truth Social. The story of Koo in India and the endorsement by BJP bears some resemblance to the politics of social media in the US but it is interesting in its own right, as we will argue.

Based on this intersection between communal violence, competitive elections and elite social media strategy in India, we design our study to answer the two following questions. Firstly, do BJP politicians send ethno-centric messages on social media to win elections in places with Hindu majorities? And secondly, does ethno-centric messaging by BJP politicians on social media lead to increased attacks on minorities? First, we use a triple-differences (TD) design to measure the effect of elections on ethno-centric messaging in posts on the Indian social media platform Koo. Then, in a second part of the analysis, we test whether ethno-centric messaging from politicians leads to more communal violence. Thereby, we contribute to different strands of literature: First, we provide the first quantitative test of whether politicians actively foment violence to the literature on riots in India. Second, the study contributes a new dataset of political elites' social media activity and insights from an understudied and linguistically diverse context. Third, these activities are part of the BJPs grander scheme to retain power and that makes for a case contribution the research field on elections and legislatures in regimes outside the liberal democratic West. Lastly, we add a causal study to the broader literature on the determinants of political violence.

The next section is a brief review of these strands of literature. What follows is a description of the study's context before a section detailing the data collected and coded to capture ethno-centric messaging on Koo and discriminatory violence across India. [*Lastly, we present the results and a series of robustness tests and conclude the paper with implications for future research.*]

## Literature

The theory that politicians in India instrumentally push narratives of irreconcilability between Hindus and Muslims only to serve their own electoral fortunes is well-established. It builds on findings that connect incidents of violence to elections where incumbents who stand to gain crucial votes from ethnic violence and choose not to deploy forces (Wilkinson 2004). Most recently, it is supported by the finding that these circumstances arise in electoral districts with low between-group inequality and high within-group inequality, arguing that when ethnicity is just one of several cleavages, ethno-

nationalist politicians will try to win the decisive votes from co-ethnics by profiling out-groups as a threat (Bulutgil and Prasad 2023). Berenschot (2020) finds that electoral violence in Gujarat is facilitated through patronage networks and that these well-established networks also strengthen the incentive for politicians to fuel violence in the first place. On the other side of Indian politics, Nellis, Weaver, and Rosenzweig (2016) find that violence is systematically less likely to occur under the Congress party's rule, as they work actively to prevent violence against religious minorities to maintain the secularism that the party was founded on. In addition, survey research proves that narratives condoning ethnic violence work in the sense that they increase co-ethnic support and strengthen partisanship among the Hindu majority (Daxecker and Prasad 2023; Fjelde and Daxecker 2019). Still, whether Indian politicians with an electoral incentive to promote ethno-religious conflict systematically choose to do so has not been tested before.

In a different type of argument, adding nuance to the theory above, Brass (2003) proposes that whether electoral competition produces violence or if its violence that feeds into election campaigns is hardly distinguishable. While most appropriately thought of as a continuum ranging from "political rivalry [leading] to communal riots to communal riots [leading] to intensified political rivalry", the author finds the latter to be most prevalent in the city of Aligarh (Brass 2003, 220). In this paper, however, we are able to test both the extent to which violence predicts political rivalry in ethnic terms and the extent to which this type of campaigning predicts incidents of violence.

We are able to test the relationship both ways because we are detecting politician's ethno-centric messaging on social media with time-stamps for every post. By relying on social media data, the paper forms a contribution to the literature on political elites' social media strategies. The strategies available to governments looking to minimize opposition on social media have developed over three "generations" as described by Deibert et al. (2010). Firstly, governments can simply restrict access to the internet. The second, less crude, strategy is to censor content specifically threatening to the regime (King, Pan, and Roberts 2013). Lastly, and most recently, regimes field coordinated information campaigns on social media to uphold and strengthen their hold on power. For instance, during the

2014 protests in Venezuela in another non-Western case of social unrest, incumbent politicians flooded Twitter with posts diverging the discourse from protests and criticism while opposition politicians leveraged popular dissatisfaction in the bargain with the governing party (Munger et al. 2019). In the same manner, we track state-level politicians' ethno-centric messaging on the Indian platform Koo as state legislature elections approach.

By definition, only authoritarian governments will use undemocratic means to drown out opposition and criticism on social media. In India, however, democratic elections creates the incentive for politicians to promote the violence most often targeting the Muslim minority (Sardesai 2019). This friction between competitive elections and liberal values is found in the majority of the world's countries, all characterized by the combination of elected legislatures and authoritarian politics (Miller 2015; Gandhi, Noble, and Svolik 2020; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009). In India, the tension between high-stakes elections and democratic decline under BJP rule—a key driver of recent global decline (Michael Coppedge et al. 2023)—makes it a central case contribution to the literature on the micro-foundations of elections in regimes that are neither entrenched democracies nor stark autocracies, that is, the majority of regimes worldwide.

Lastly, in testing whether politicians' ethno-centric messaging precedes violence, the paper adds to the literature on the causes of political violence. Ethnic violence is most likely when politicians are able to capitalize on citizens fear and uncertainty about out-group intentions (Figueiredo and Weingast 1999; Daxecker 2020). Why violence breaks out between ethnic groups is a central puzzle in conflict studies generally: Given the major costs that violence inflicts on all involved parts, fighting over ethnic or cultural differences seems pointless. Fearon and Laitin (2003) famously argue that ethnicity is not a decisive factor in civil war onset but that conditions like poverty, political instability, the terrain and size of the population explains this type of violence. However, grievances created by poverty or relative deprivation often align with ethnicity (Stewart 2008; Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011), and is best explained with the concept of "horizontal inequality". Though there has been no civil wars in contemporary India, violence is most definitely ethnic. Riots are often preceded by tensions

between Hindus and Muslims. Nonetheless, inequality between Hindus and Muslims as a whole is not associated with more violence, according to the already mentioned findings by Bulutgil and Prasad (2023). Rather, violence is most likely when inequality between the two groups is low but inequality in among Hindus and Muslims, respectively, is low. Of the explanations offered in the literature, the most convincing one, the authors find, is the instrumental logic of ethno-nationalist politicians' mobilizing voters that would otherwise not vote for them, but for the perceived threat of the out-group created by riots. Our study investigates whether this logic plays out on social media, adding a novel empirical study to the literature on political violence and the active role of politicians facing different electoral incentives.

## Violence, elections and social media in India

In this section, we start by elaborating on the connection between violence and elections in India. This leads to a description of the formal rules of state elections before we focus on the social media platform Koo and its connection to the BJP.

Violence in India is notoriously communal. That is, violence erupts and remains within a town or neighborhood. However, the politicians who decide whether to deploy forces in order to stop communal riots, are elected at the state level. Across states in India, a few votes in a few districts may decide who gets the majority of seats in the state legislature. This type of competition explains why the cornerstone of the argument by Wilkinson (2004) is that governing politicians will tolerate violence at the local level when it can tip upcoming elections in their favor. In short, electoral incentives at the state level explain why riots are not prevented or suppressed at the communal level.

Indian politics and bureaucracy has many administrative levels (not surprisingly, given the country's size). Nonetheless, states are the largest regional units and the largest of them are comparable in size to some of the world's biggest countries with hundreds or tens of million inhabitants. Each of the 28 states has its own legislature for which elections follow first-past-the-post rules in single member districts. A member of a state legislative assembly (MLA) sits for maximum 5 years before new elections are

held and the constitution states that a state must have between 60 and 500 members.[1] Among these members, the Chief Minister is the de facto executive (though formally, it is the Governor), usually also leading the party with a majority of seats. Candidates have to file affidavits in due time ahead of elections, and it is increasingly common for these to feature social media credentials. With rapid expansion of affordable internet accessibility, politicians at all levels have more and more options to connect with voters.

At the national level, the politics of social media platforms are continuously contested: The recent blocking of X (formerly Twitter) accounts during the search for a Sikh separatist leader is only the latest development in the tug war between the platform and Modi's government (Sharma 2023). The government made similar demands in early 2021 when farmers were protesting outside Delhi. When Twitter, back then, refused to block the accounts supporting the protests, BJP endorsed the Indian social media start-up, Koo, announcing plans to make it the primary public channel of the government (Agarwal n.d.). The impact of the endorsement is undeniable, looking at the figure below where the blue dotted line marks the time of the government's initiation of Koo promotion with the gross number of activity (total impressions) on the platform on the y-axis. Koo resembles Twitter/X in almost every aspect but targets non-English speakers and prides itself on not moderating content. In respect to these features, Koo has been compared to Parler, where minimal regulation allows for extremist content and blatant encouragement for violence. Parler is a suitable comparison to Koo in the sense that Modi has yet to join Koo (like Trump never made it onto Parler before it was shut down), and may find it hard to leave X and his current 93.2 million followers who receive posts daily.

As we seek to test whether Indian politicians maintain a discourse that foments violence, Koo is the place to look. Though WhatsApp groups are the preferred media at the communal level, state-level legislators have to reach voters in the entire constituency. While the Koo platform does not impose restrictions on politicians posts, politicians are naturally restrained when making content public. Thus, we do not necessarily expect outright promotion of violence but a discourse of irreconcilability between

---

[1]The three smallest states, Goa, Sikkim and Mizoram, are exempted through acts of parliaments to have fewer seats.

Figure 1: Koo impressions over time, with a prominent spike right after the BJP endorsement of the platform (blue line). The decline on the right is an artifact of the data collection technique.

Hindus and Muslims as described in (Brass 2003, chap. 7). With data from Koo and an [*extensive classification scheme*] presented in the next section, we offer a novel account of elite discourse and the Hindu-Muslim cleavage in India while tapping into the dynamics of social media in the world's most populous country based on a comprehensive dataset of legislators' social media activity.

## Data and identification strategy

The main data contribution of this paper lies in the identification of state-level politicians on Koo as an addition to the database constructed by Schutte, Karell, and Barrett (2023). Until public access was restricted on December 24, 2022, Koo data could be downloaded through an undocumented REST API as done by Singh et al. (2021), who published a list of 4.1 million user IDs. Schutte, Karell, and Barrett (2023) found and additional 1.1 million accounts among the followers of those previously identified and downloaded an estimated 80% of the entire Koo network, including profiles, posts and metadata, between September 1 2020 and February 13, 2022. Over this period, these users produced a total of 31,135,367 public posts, likes from 5,101,188 accounts. To find state legislature candidates' accounts, we firstly subset for users who have tagged themselves as a "politician". While there are certainly many accounts within this subset who are not in fact politicians (e.g., all of the 69 accounts under the name "Narendra Modi"), we assume that any official candidate in the elections using Koo would use the politician tag. As a first step, we ignore all accounts for which we have only one or no posts at all. Then, we fuzzy-match the names of candidates for state legislatures (Vidhan Sabha) in the relevant period from the TPCD-ID dataset on Indian elections with names in the Koo data. In the investigated period, 22,794 candidates took part in state election across 403 constituencies in 17 states. Furthermore, we seek to verify that these accounts actually belong to people running for election by searching their posts for the names of the relevant constituency and political party. Lastly, we visit the remaining sites to verify or refute the account. This leaves X,XXX politicians' accounts from X,XXX constituencies with at least one in each state and a total of XXX,XXX posts. The posts are mapped according to the constituency of the authoring candidate in Figure X below, showing the number of

posts per district.

[Plot with posts density across India]

By matching Koo accounts to the TPCD-ID dataset we know the party membership of the account owner and the effective number of parties in the candidate's district, both provided in TPCD-ID.

To construct the dependent variable, ethno-centric messaging, we estimate a structural topic model with K topics. This is merely an initial step to asses whether ethno-centric messaging is easily detectable and prevalent in the politicians' Koos. We find [*this*] and [*that*] topic with most predictive words and sentences listed in Appendix X. Both topics are quite clearly connected to our concept of interest and classification by topic serves as a robustness check for the more targeted classification the we eventually perform. Moreover, we retain the measure counting hashtags that are perceived to be connected to and found to be somewhat predictive of discriminatory violence in the dataset by Schutte, Karell, and Barrett (2023). This provides for another robustness check and build intuition for the final classification for which we combine human and machine coding with ChatGPT (*to be specified*). Though this process, we distinguish posts the depict Muslim and Hindu culture to so different in nature that they are irreconcilable—or rather, they deem Muslim culture uncivilized and unwelcome in Hindu India as expressed in the BJP Vice-President's thread below.

Among all the Koos posted by candidates for Vidhan Sabha, we find XXX ethno-centric Koos with XXX posted by BJP members. Party membership makes for one element in the independent main variable along with party system fractionalization measured as the effective number of parties (ENP), specifically whether that number is between 2 and 3.5 (see Nellis, Weaver, and Rosenzweig (2016)), and time until next election; a dummy switching on when the state legislature closes for campaigning. This is aggregated into a politician-month panel, enabling a TD regression framework, expressed in the three-way fixed effects specification as put forth and decomposed in a working paper by Strezhnev (2023):

The #FranceRiots are truly shocking, but not really surprising.
Books like "The Strange Death of Europe: Immigration, Identity, Islam" by Douglas Murray & "No Go Zones: How Sharia Law is Coming to a Neighbourhood Near You" by Raheem have extensively documented the vehement, determinedly isolationist lifestyle of certain immigrant communities.

**Baijayant 'Jay' Panda** ✅
@pandajay · Politician
1/2 · 30 Jun

21 Likes    5 Re-Koo

👍 21        💬 1        5        ☎        ↪

Write Your Comment...

**Baijayant 'Jay' Panda** ✅
@pandajay · Politician
2/2 · 30 Jun

Such clashes have been predicted unerringly, yet many global Liberals have simply been unable & unwilling to face reality.
THIS is why a #UniformCivilCode is a fundamental requirement in any nation, for laws must apply equally to all.

👍 15        💬        3        ☎        ↪

Figure 2: Example of ethno-centric messaging in a Koo.

$$Y_{it} = \tau D_{it} + \alpha_{s(i)r(i)} + \gamma_{s(i),t} + \delta_{r(i),t} + \epsilon_{it}$$

$Y_{it}$ is the number of ethno-centric messages posted by politician $i$ at time $t$. $D_{it}$ is an indicator for whether politician $i$ is under treatment in month $t$, where treatment status is determined by being a member of BJP, $s$, and competing for a seat in a district with an ENP between 2 and 3.5, $r$, essentially capturing the interaction between the BJP, ENP and upcoming election dummies. In other words, the two-by-two formed between BJP membership and party system fractionalization divide each politician into a given stratum. Using the concept of stratum, $\alpha_{s(i)r(i)}$ are joint politician-stratum-fixed effects and $\gamma_{s(i),t}$ are politician-month-fixed effects and $delta_{r(i),t}$ are stratum-month fixed effects. Finally, $\tau$ is the TD-estimator capturing the ATT. Despite the issues pertaining to TD estimation identified by Strezhnev (2023), we are confident that there are no invalid placebos since there are only one state election held for each district in the sampled period, meaning that districts with an ENP outside the defined range never receive treatment.

In the second part of the analysis, we test whether ethno-centric messaging actually leads to discriminatory violence. The hypothesized causal connections are illustrated with the DAG below.

To measure levels of violence at the district level we use the Documentation of the Oppressed (DOTO)[2] data scraped by Schutte, Karell, and Barrett (2023). DOTO is an India-based non-profit organization that keeps records of attacks on religious minorities. Though databases like GED, ACLED and SCAD are more widely used, they do not record the same range of non-lethal violence as DOTO which is why we opt for the latter. Table X, copied from Schutte, Karell, and Barrett (2023), shows the type and frequency of events in the DOTO dataset.

---

[2]Originally captured at dotodatabase.com. However, this site is currently out of service for reasons unknown to us.

**Election**

**Treated** → **ECM** → **Violence**

**BJP**

**ENP**

Figure 3: Causal DAG.

Table 1: Types and frequency of attacks against religious minorities from DOTO.

| Rank | Type | Count |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | Physical assault | 158 |
| 2 | Murder / Lynching | 84 |
| 3 | Communal tension / Violence / Riot | 82 |
| 4 | Attack on religious festivals or place of worship | 50 |
| 5 | Hate Speech / Slander | 44 |
| 6 | Threat | 44 |
| 7 | Harassment / Physical assault | 33 |
| 8 | Unlawful detention | 31 |
| 9 | Harassment | 26 |
| 10 | Other | 25 |

When testing whether ethno-centric messaging causes violence, we use a difference-in-differences framework to estimate whether districts in which politicians post these messages, regardless of party system fractionalization and party membership, experience more violence. In the few years that our data covers, we assume that no significant changes to the composition of people within districts have happened and that the TWFE therefore aptly control for potential confounding variables.

**References**

Agarwal, Shubham. n.d. "Koo, the 'Free Expression' Social Media App, Is the Indian Government's Latest Weapon in Its Standoff with Twitter. Business Insider." Accessed September 14, 2023. https://www.businessinsider.com/indias-farmers-protests-have-been-bad-for-twitter-but-good-for-koo-2021-2.

Berenschot, Ward. 2020. "Patterned Pogroms: Patronage Networks as Infrastructure for Electoral Violence in India and Indonesia." *Journal of Peace Research* 57 (1): 171–84. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343319889678.

Brass, Paul R. 2003. *The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India.* Jackson School Publications in International Studies. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Bulutgil, H Zeynep, and Neeraj Prasad. 2023. "Inequality, Elections, and Communal Riots in India." *Journal of Peace Research* 60 (4): 619–33. https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221091307.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Nils B. Weidmann, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2011. "Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison." *The American Political Science Review* 105 (3): 478–95. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41480853.

Chhibber, Pradeep, and Rahul Verma. 2019. "The Rise of the Second Dominant Party System in India: BJP's New Social Coalition in 2019." *Studies in Indian Politics* 7 (2): 131–48. https://doi.org/10.1177/2321023019874628.

Daxecker, Ursula. 2020. "Unequal Votes, Unequal Violence: Malapportionment and Election Violence in India." *Journal of Peace Research* 57 (1): 156–70. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343319884985.

Daxecker, Ursula, and Neeraj Prasad. 2023. "Demanding Violence, Punishing Peace: Support for

14

Party Violence in India."

Deibert, Ronald, John Palfrey, Rafal Rohozinski, Jonathan Zittrain, and OpenNet Initiative, eds. 2010. *Access Controlled: The Shaping of Power, Rights, and Rule in Cyberspace.* Information Revolution and Global Politics. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.

Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. 2003. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." *The American Political Science Review* 97 (1): 75–90. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3118222.

Figueiredo, Rui de, and Barry R. Weingast. 1999. "The Rationality of Fear: Political Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict." In *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention*, edited by Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder, 261–302. New York: Columbia University Press.

Fjelde, Hanne, and Ursula Daxecker. 2019. "How Electoral Violence and Partisanship Affect Perceptions of Electoral Integrity: A Post-Election Survey Experiment in West Bengal." https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/JTRHB.

Gandhi, Jennifer, and Ellen Lust-Okar. 2009. "Elections Under Authoritarianism." *Annual Review of Political Science* 12 (1): 403–22. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.060106.095434.

Gandhi, Jennifer, Ben Noble, and Milan Svolik. 2020. "Legislatures and Legislative Politics Without Democracy." *Comparative Political Studies* 53 (9): 1359–79. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414020919930.

Heath, Oliver. 2020. "Communal Realignment and Support for the BJP, 2009–2019." *Contemporary South Asia* 28 (2): 195–208. https://doi.org/10.1080/09584935.2020.1765986.

King, Gary, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts. 2013. "How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression." *American Political Science Review* 107 (2): 326–43. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055413000014.

Michael Coppedge et al. 2023. "V-Dem Dataset V13." Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/VDEMDS23.

Miller, Michael K. 2015. "Democratic Pieces: Autocratic Elections and Democratic Development Since 1815." *British Journal of Political Science* 45 (3): 501–30. https://doi.org/10.1017/

S0007123413000446.

Munger, Kevin, Richard Bonneau, Jonathan Nagler, and Joshua A. Tucker. 2019. "Elites Tweet to Get Feet Off the Streets: Measuring Regime Social Media Strategies During Protest." *Political Science Research and Methods* 7 (4): 815–34. https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2018.3.

Nellis, Gareth, Michael Weaver, and Steven Rosenzweig. 2016. "Do Parties Matter for Ethnic Violence? Evidence from India." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 11 (October): 249–77. https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00015051.

Sardesai, Shreyas. 2019. "The Religious Divide in Voting Preferences and Attitudes in the 2019 Election." *Studies in Indian Politics* 7 (2): 161–75. https://doi.org/10.1177/2321023019874892.

Schutte, Sebastian, Daniel Karell, and Ryan Barrett. 2023. "Online Speech Predicts Religious Conflict in India."

Sharma, Yashraj. 2023. "Twitter Accused of Censorship in India as It Blocks Modi Critics." *The Guardian*, April. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/05/twitter-accused-of-censorship-in-india-as-it-blocks-modi-critics-elon-musk.

Singh, Asmit Kumar, Chirag Jain, Jivitesh Jain, Rishi Raj Jain, Shradha Sehgal, Tanisha Pandey, and Ponnurangam Kumaraguru. 2021. "What's Kooking? Characterizing India's Emerging Social Network, Koo." In *Proceedings of the 2021 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Advances in Social Networks Analysis and Mining*, 193–200. https://doi.org/10.1145/3487351.3488354.

Stewart, Frances, ed. 2008. *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict.* London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230582729.

Strezhnev, Anton. 2023. "Decomposing Triple-Differences Regression Under Staggered Adoption." arXiv. http://arxiv.org/abs/2307.02735.

Tucker, Joshua A., Yannis Theocharis, Margaret E. Roberts, and Pablo Barberá. 2017. "From Liberation to Turmoil: Social Media and Democracy." *Journal of Democracy* 28 (4): 46–59. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2017.0064.

Wilkinson, Steven I. 2004. *Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India.*

Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge: University Press.