

The cooperation leak:

How lobbying coalitions redistribute resources and conditionally affect lobbying success

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Abstract

Coalition building is a commonly used influence strategy by lobbyists. Nevertheless, research on lobbying success typically focuses on single groups and overlooks active cooperation between them. This focus potentially limits our understanding of drivers of success, including economic resources. This article adds to resource exchange theory, firstly, that active cooperation with others to gather information, optimise strategies and jointly signal a position can substitute for economic resources spent by the individual actor. Secondly, due to collective action problems, some actors will disproportionately carry the costs of cooperation, thus subsidising activities benefitting the common goal. These exchanges are expected to dilute the impact of both individual resources and active cooperation in the aggregate. Using new survey data on 50 policy issues in five European countries, the article shows that the effect of cooperation on lobbying success is conditional on the level of individual economic resources, and vice versa. These findings have important methodological and normative implications for the role of lobbyists in changing policy.

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Lobbying is a collective enterprise (Klüver, 2013a) and coalition lobbying is one of the most frequently used influence strategies by interest groups (Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Kimball, & Leech, 2009: 180; Hojnacki, Kimball, Baumgartner, Berry, & Leech, 2012: 389; Nelson & Yackee, 2012: 339). As Schlozman and Tierney (1986: 306) stressed three decades ago, political structures ‘no longer permit even the most resourceful of organized interests to press a policy issue singlehandedly’. However, this prominence of active lobbying coalitions in practice has not been met with equal attention in the literature on lobbying success. In examining the important questions of whether, when and how lobbyists affect specific policy outcomes (for a summary see: Leech, 2010), scholars tend to focus on the success of single interest groups and rarely include active cooperation between them. Sometimes the term ‘coalition’ is used for positional camps of actors promoting the same policy outcome on an issue (Klüver, 2011, 2013a), yet, as Mahoney and Baumgartner (2015: 205) stress, these actors on the same side ‘may be working hand in hand, or they may not even know the other is working on the issue’.

Importantly, as this article argues, the relative neglect of *active cooperation* between actors trying to promote or prevent policy change can have profound consequences for our understanding of lobbying. In particular, one puzzling finding in the literature is that higher economic resources (i.e. financial or staff resources) of individual advocates do not increase their lobbying success (Baumgartner et al., 2009: 190-214; Klüver, 2011; Mahoney, 2007a). In contrast, higher aggregated resources of an actor’s positional camp relative to the other camp increase success (Baumgartner et al., 2009; Klüver, 2013b; Mahoney & Baumgartner, 2015). By including active cooperation activities in models of lobbying success, this article sheds light on a potential explanation for these findings: It proposes that active cooperation dilutes the effect of individual economic resources on lobbying success, because it redistributes resources that are pooled between resource-richer and resource-poorer partners working actively towards the same goal.

Based on the literature on coalition formation (Hojnacki, 1997; Holyoke, 2009; Hula, 1999) the article identifies issue-specific cooperation activities, through which active interaction is expected to enhance lobbying success: information transmission, strategy coordination and concerted signalling of support. Yet it argues that positive effects of these activities on lobbying success are unlikely to be found in the aggregate (cf. Haider-Markel, 2006; Mahoney & Baumgartner, 2004; Nelson & Yackee, 2012), because they vary for actors spending different levels of economic resources on the issue themselves to build up informational and support resources. Essentially, the article adds to resource exchange approaches on lobbying by arguing, firstly, that active cooperation with others to gather information and optimise strategies can *substitute* for economic resources spent by the individual actor. Secondly, due to collective action and freeriding problems (Olson, 1965), the costs of cooperation will disproportionately be carried by some actors, who *subsidise* cooperation activities benefitting the common goal. These exchanges are expected to dilute the impact of both individual economic resources and active cooperation in the aggregate. In interaction, however, both factors are expected to help explain lobbying success. Specifically, higher active cooperation is expected to increase lobbying success for advocates who spent low economic resources themselves (enjoying a ‘substitution’). Conversely, economic resources are expected to be beneficial for actors who are not actively cooperating with others (not ‘subsiding’ others).

Empirically, the theory is tested across a sample of 50 specific policy issues in five European countries, namely Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Information on active cooperation and economic resources was gathered in an online survey completed by 478 advocates¹. The analysis compares two operationalisations of lobbying success: preference attainment and self-perceived influence on the policy issue (Dür, 2008; Lowery,

¹ The term ‘advocate’ denotes non-state actors who try to influence policy discussions and/or policy outcomes on an issue. It includes economic interests, non-economic interests and specialised actors.

2013). The findings provide support for the proposed theory by revealing a negative interaction between an advocate's economic resources on an issue and the level of active cooperation under both of these operationalisations of lobbying success. The marginal effects of higher cooperation on preference attainment differ significantly between advocates with low and high economic resources on the issue. For advocates with high resources on the issue, higher cooperation is, in fact, associated with a significant negative effect on preference attainment, suggesting that they disproportionately carry collective action costs. In contrast, advocates with low economic resources can benefit from active cooperation: there is a significant positive effect of higher cooperation on their perceived impact on policy. The flipside of this is that higher economic resources have a significant positive effect on perceived influence at low levels of active cooperation with others, but this effect is diluted as active cooperation increases.

By comparing two operationalisations of lobbying success and including measures of active cooperation, the article speaks in novel ways to longstanding debates about lobbying influence. Essentially, its findings reveal that our understanding of lobbying needs to move beyond individual advocates. Resources and cooperation should not be evaluated in isolation from each other, as this might lead us to underestimate their effect and, hence, effects of lobbying on policy in general. Moreover, the findings have implications for understanding forms of lobbying power: Cooperation networks may act as an alternative currency to financial resources spent on persuasion strategies on specific policy issues. The unequal distribution of costs of such cooperation may, in fact, be seen as a redistribution mechanism within positional camps of lobbyists. This might also be why there is little evidence for the common fear that there is capture by resourceful advocates (Schattschneider, 1960; Schlozman, 1984), but why the resources brought together by lobbying camps are crucial.

Theory: Cooperation and resources

A large share of the literature on lobbying coalitions has focussed on the motivations for and constraints to cooperating with others. As Hojnacki (1997: 61) argues, coalition formation can be theorised as a cost-benefit calculation, where groups ‘estimate whether an alliance is likely to improve their chances for success relative to working alone’. Indeed, the cost aspect of this equation tends to be emphasised by traditional scholars. As Sorurbakhsh (2016: 209) summarises, the existing literature depicts coalitions as costly arrangements, which groups avoid if they face sympathetic policy makers on their own. Such costs include, for instance, the loss of flexibility and ability to respond to members (Holyoke, 2009; Holyoke, 2014) and potential negative impacts on reputation or even survival. Nevertheless, since cooperation between advocates is a widely used lobbying strategy (Baumgartner et al., 2009: 180; Hojnacki et al., 2012: 389), we can infer that the costs imposed by cooperating can be outweighed by expected benefits, such as, potentially, an expected increase in lobbying success when actively uniting forces.

A study which captures such effects is conducted by Box-Steffensmeier, Christenson, and Hitt (2013) who use a network approach to show that cooperation with others increases the likelihood to influence votes of United States (US) Supreme Court justices. Heaney and Lorenz (2013) provide evidence beyond the judicial venue by analysing cooperation networks for the case of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 in the US. They find that the position of an advocate within the overall network of coalitions affects her influence over the policy process. Unfortunately, the collection of data on active cooperation is highly demanding, which is why few studies have assessed its effects on a larger number of issues. Moreover, while highly insightful, network approaches usually do not include more ‘classical’ variables explaining lobbying success, such as actor type, resources, or issue characteristics (cf. Baumgartner et al., 2009; Hojnacki et al., 2012;

Klüver, 2011; Mahoney, 2007a). This makes it harder to understand how cooperation activities relate to, and potentially interact with, these organisation-level or issue-level factors.

Only very few studies have incorporated coalition behaviour in more classical models of lobbying success. Nelson and Yackee (2012) study the effects of coalitions on 19 rulemaking procedures involving seven US federal agencies. They show that coalition participants have higher preference attainment in regulatory policymaking, especially where there is consensus across the messages sent from the coalition and where coalitions are larger. Hence they demonstrate that, ‘groups employing coalition lobbying—under certain conditions—can, and do, affect the content of government policy’. However, their study does not include other advocate characteristics than coalitions, so it is not clear if findings might be affected by omitted variable bias, such as advocate resources or type. Previous quantitative studies, namely Haider-Markel (2006) on interest group coalitions working on hate crimes, Mahoney and Baumgartner (2004) on the presence and size of formal coalitions on 98 issues in the US, and Bunea (2013) on the numbers of ties between European Union (EU) level organisations, include such actor-level factors alongside measures of cooperation. Yet, perhaps surprisingly, these studies point to no or even a negative effect of cooperation or ties on preference attainment. There are several potential reasons for these findings. Firstly, relatively broad and openly phrased definitions of ‘coalitions’ typically employed in the research may have decreased comparability of the gathered coalitions. Secondly, there might be endogeneity problems if advocates decide to cooperate with others based on their low likelihood to succeed alone, which makes adequate controls that predict lobbying success all the more necessary. Thirdly, the effects of active cooperation may be conditional (cf. Nelson & Yackee, 2012) on actor or issue characteristics, meaning aggregate effects are misleading and we need theories to explain how and for whom cooperation is beneficial. The article attends to the first and second methodological problems in the research design. Its theoretical innovation lies in developing a

resource perspective on active cooperation arguing that the effects of cooperation on lobbying success depend on the economic resources spent by the individual advocate on the issue.

A resource perspective on active cooperation

The theory extends resource exchange approaches on lobbying (for a summary see: Berkhout, 2013) by adding that active cooperation can act as a substitute for individual resources. In fact, the effect of economic resources on lobbying success itself is empirically hard to document (Baumgartner et al., 2009: 190-214) and related proxies such as lobbying staff typically reveal no significant effect on success (Klüver, 2011; Mahoney, 2007a). Theoretically, one would probably not even expect that economic resources can *directly* be exchanged for political influence in modern democracies. They can, however, be seen as a universal currency to finance various strategies to reach and persuade policy makers of a desired policy outcome. Other important resources such as information and expertise, political support and (media) attention can be acquired by spending economic resources on an issue, such as by writing or commissioning studies (i.e. gather informational resources), or starting media or supporter campaigns (i.e. mobilise support and attract attention). From an exchange perspective, these informational and support resources are valuable for gaining access and influence in the policy process (Berkhout, 2013; Bernhagen, 2013; Bouwen, 2004), so economic resources spent on an issue to acquire them should increase the likelihood of lobbying success.

Importantly, however, spending *one's own* economic resources to implement persuasion strategies will not be the only way to gather informational and support resources. Crucially, cooperation activities between advocates can fulfil similar functions for the advocate as spending economic resources individually. The existing literature on lobbying coalitions points to different benefits of active cooperation, namely gathering information and aggregating political intelligence

(Heaney, 2006; Heaney & Lorenz, 2013; Hula, 1999; Phinney, 2017: 13), more efficient goal attainment by coordinating strategies (Baumgartner et al., 2009; Hula, 1999; Mahoney, 2007b), and attracting symbolic benefits and signalling support to policymakers (Hula, 1999; Mahoney, 2007b; Nelson & Yackee, 2012; Phinney, 2017: 13). These three roles of cooperation have the potential to increase lobbying success by increasing informational and support resources available to the individual advocate. Specifically, the first role stresses the function of coalitions as channels for information transmission between advocates: exchanging relevant information on a policy issue can improve the quantity and quality of technical and/or political information available to the advocate and, hence, improve the actor's exchange position vis-à-vis policymakers (cf. Bernhagen, 2013). Secondly, strategy coordination goes beyond mere exchange of information, but involves harmonising activities to use resources optimally for a common cause, such as by dividing labour between different venues (Sorurbakhsh, 2016: 207). This can be expected to increase lobbying success by finding the best strategy across actors. Thirdly, the signalling function of coalitions requires explicit public union, meaning concerted action as a formal coalition on an issue, jointly approaching policy makers or the public. Mahoney (2007b: 368) and Nelson and Yackee (2012: 342) apply Kollman's (1998) concept of 'signalling' salience and support to coalitions. From this perspective, concerted action in an explicit coalition can draw attention and weight to an actor's signal and, therefore, be expected to increase the likelihood of success.

Arguably, these three roles of cooperation are not mutually exclusive, but can be conceptualised as entailing different levels of cooperation activities: Information exchange can be seen as the most minimal form of active cooperation, and a precondition for the other forms, whereas strategy coordination and joint signalling with coalition partners involve increasingly more cooperation, especially as the number of partners increases. Yet, put generally, a higher level of active cooperation in these three respects should increase informational and support resources and,

thereby, have the potential to increase lobbying success of actor. In this way, active cooperation is, in fact, theorised to benefit lobbying success in a similar way to spending more economic resources on individual lobbying strategies on an issue. Phinney (2017) exemplifies this in her rich case study of the role of coalitions in context of the US Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. She argues, similarly to the above argument, that cooperation pools (informational) resources and signals support to policy makers. Thereby, as she writes, collaborative strategies can be an alternative influence strategy to relying on the resources of an individual organisation (Phinney, 2017: 8). Strolovitch (2014: 175-205) makes a related argument in her book on the representation of disadvantaged groups in national politics, arguing that coalitions can be a ‘remedy’ for scarce material resources available to organise these interests. Given these expected relationships of active cooperation in coalitions working as an alternative success strategy to using individual resources, it is important to consider a potential substitution effect between the two that might confound the effect of active cooperation and economic resources individually.

Unequal benefits: Resource substitution effects of active cooperation activities

This article argues that the beneficial effect of active cooperation on an actor’s lobbying success is highest for actors with low economic resources on the issue, because cooperation substitutes for individual resources spent on the issue. Where higher individual resources are employed to afford persuasion strategies, such as gathering and spreading information and mobilising and signalling support, the additional effect of actively cooperating should decrease. Underlying this argument is the assumption of a ceiling effect after which additional resources entail diminishing returns, or do not have a beneficial effect any longer.

Put differently, resourceful advocates on the issue are less dependent on intensifying their strategies by joining forces with others. They are less dependent on other advocates to obtain information, as they have capacities to build up expertise themselves. So, the gains from more frequent informational cooperation with other advocates should be lower for them, compared to less resourceful actor on the issues. Similarly, strategy coordination with others should be less beneficial for advocates with high economic resources on an issue, compared to advocates that are more constrained in their individual strategy choice because of low resources on the issue. Thirdly, one can expect that high individual economic resources make it easier to attract attention and signal the importance of a position to policymakers. Therefore, more resourceful advocates are expected to benefit comparatively less from active cooperation in explicit lobbying coalitions who jointly advocate their position. For these reasons, the expectation is that as economic resources of an actor increase, the beneficial effect of more intense cooperation activities on lobbying success decreases.

Unequal Costs: Resource subsidy effects of active cooperation activities

Importantly, the flipside of assessing the distribution of benefits of cooperation activities is to take into account their costs (Hojnacki, 1997; Holyoke, 2009; Holyoke, 2014; Sorurbakhsh, 2016) and contributions within a coalition to the common effort (Heaney & Leifeld, 2018). Given collective action problems, such as free riding (Olson, 1965), one can expect these to be distributed unequally. In sharing information, for instance, some actors will incur higher costs of obtaining information in the first place, such as by conducting a study, while others get to be more passive recipients of information. Similarly, costs of strategy coordination will likely be unequally distributed, meaning that some actors implement a larger share of strategies at their own cost. Finally, even in cohesive coalitions that concertedly approach policy makers, some actors will contribute more, such as coalition leaders taking a central role (Heaney & Leifeld, 2018). In

essence, for all three cooperation activities it is expected that some actors disproportionately carry their costs by spending higher economic resources on information gathering, strategy implementation and/or leadership on the issue. In this way, they *subsidise* the common effort, by pooling, and effectively sharing, their resources with other actors. This could, for instance, aid additional actors to mobilise in the camp, or ensure consistent strategy use, and thereby increase lobbying success for all actors in the lobbying camp (cf. Junk & Rasmussen, 2018; Klüver, 2013a). Analyses of the effects of both cooperation and economic resources on lobbying success at the individual level are likely to be affected by such transfers, because they overlook the unequal distribution of resource costs and benefits of cooperation between actors.

In sum, as Table 1 summarizes, these are expected to be related to the level of economic resources an advocate spends on an issue. Due to an expected *substitution* effect, the benefits of cooperation are expected to be higher for advocates with lower economic resources on the issue and decrease with the actor’s own economic resources spent on the issue. At the same time, actors with higher resources are expected to disproportionately carry the costs of cooperation, *subsidising* the joint effort with their resources on the issue, compared to actors spending a lower level of resources.

Table 1: Unequal distribution of cost and benefits of cooperation

	Low economic resources	High economic resources
Resource Gains of Cooperation	Benefits ↑	Benefits ↓
	<i>Substitution effect</i>	
Resource Contributions to Cooperation	Costs ↓	Costs ↑
	<i>Subsidy effect</i>	

Based on these varying costs and benefits of active cooperation, its effect on lobbying success is expected to vary depending on the level of resources an actor spends on an issue: with higher

individual resources, the effect of cooperation on lobbying success is expected to decrease, because benefits of cooperation decrease and its costs increase. Hypothesis 1 summarizes this main expectation of a negative interaction between an actor's individual economic resources on an issue and active cooperation with others.

Hypothesis 1: As the level of economic resources spent by an advocate on an issue increases, the positive effect of higher active cooperation on the actor's lobbying success decreases.

Additionally, two further implications of the theory will be tested to assess how each factor works when it is not confounded by substitution and subsidy effects. Firstly, one would expect the effect of cooperation to be positive *for actors spending low resources themselves*. Secondly, the effect of resources is expected to be positive *for actors with low cooperation*. Hypotheses 2a and 2b summarize these expectations.

Hypothesis 2a: At low levels of economic resources spent by an advocate on an issue, higher active cooperation with others increases the actor's lobbying success.

Hypothesis 2b: At low levels of active cooperation with others on an issue, the advocate's economic resources on the issue increase the actor's lobbying success.

The next section describes the method and data used to test these hypotheses.

Method

Understanding effects of active cooperation between groups requires data that is issue specific (Hojnacki, 1997; Nelson & Yackee, 2012; Phinney, 2017: 13), i.e. capturing cooperation activities

on specific policy issues. To do so, all active advocates, including interest associations, companies and experts, on a sample of 50 issues were surveyed about cooperation on the respective issue. More specifically, the sample of issues in the GovLis² project included 10 issues per country in five Western European countries, namely Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom (UK). These countries vary in size and their corporatist versus pluralist interest group system (Schmitter, 1977). Including such variation ensures that findings will not be limited to only one country context. Fixed effects for country control for potential differences.

Sampling of issues and advocates

The sample of issues was drawn as a stratified random sample³ from the universe of national policy issues on which public opinion surveys were conducted between 2005-2010 and which indicate an opinion on desired, future policy change. While polling in public opinion surveys requires a minimum threshold regarding societal salience, the present sample has the upside of selecting issues irrespective of legislative action or actual policy change. Hence, the sample is fit to assess how coalitions promote desired policy change or prevent unwanted policy change (cf. Nelson & Yackee, 2012) on issues that are on the public agenda. Issues are so diverse as to include, for instance, building a third runway at Heathrow airport (UK), banning smoking in restaurants (NL), granting asylum to families among rejected Iraqi asylum seekers (DK), cutting coal subsidies (GE), and introducing a language test for obtaining Swedish citizenship (SE). A list of all sampled issues can be found in Appendix A in the supplementary material to this dissertation (see: Appendix to Article 2).

An online survey was conducted to gather information on coalition activities and economic resources of advocates active on the 50 issues. This sample of actors included all advocates that

² <http://govlis.eu/>

³ This varied media salience, policy type, and the level of public support for policy change, as these dimensions may affect lobbying success.

were coded as active on the sampled issues in three separate data gathering efforts, which should jointly capture active advocates in different venues. Firstly, media coverage on each issue was hand coded to identify advocates that made positional statements on the specific policy issue in the media venue. Two media sources per country (centre-left, centre-right⁴) were coded for an observation period that starts with the public opinion item and ends four years after, or when the surveyed policy change occurred before this. Secondly, desk research was conducted relying on information from formal tools used by national parliaments or governments to interact with external stakeholders. All actors participating in public and stakeholder consultations or advisory boards on questions related to the sampled issues during the observation period were captured here. Thirdly, interviews with policy makers on 82 per cent of the issues helped gather additional actors, active in inside lobbying during the observation period⁵. These strategies to identify active actors resulted in a sample of 1667 unique actors active on an issue in the five countries. Gathering of contact information was successful for 1410 of these actors, which comprise the final sample for sending the online survey. This was open from 6th December 2016 to 29th May 2017.

The surveys in the five countries have an overall completion rate of 33.9 per cent, that is 478 respondents completed the survey to the end. This ranks in the range of 25 to 45 per cent response rate that interest group surveys typically produce (Marchetti, 2015). Appendix B shows how response rates vary by country (Table B.1) and actor type (Table B.2) and assesses non-response bias. Comparing the completion rates among successful and unsuccessful advocates in our total sample does not give evidence that non-response bias is systematically related to the dependent variable of preference attainment (Table B.3).

⁴ List of newspapers in Appendix Online E. Codebook available at: <http://govlis.eu/codebooks-and-data/>

⁵ On nine issues no interview partners could be mobilised. However, the two other sampling methods gathered actors on all issues.

Dependent variables: Success as preference attainment and as perceived influence

Making plausible strictly causal influence is notoriously difficult (Dür, 2008; Lowery, 2013). Therefore two contrasting operationalisation of lobbying success are used to gauge the effects of active cooperation and economic resources and their hypothesized interaction. Firstly, lobbying success is measured in terms of preference attainment as a binary variable noting whether the resulting policy at the end of the observation period is in line with the previously voiced position of the advocate. This measure has the advantage of being comparable across actors, but the downside of measuring success from a winner-takes-it-all standpoint, meaning that smaller successes, such as delaying a policy or securing exceptions to it, are overlooked. Secondly, success is measured as perceived influence on a scale of 0-10 in terms of how high the advocate ranks her own impact on political decisions on the issue in the survey. This operationalisation has the downside of being more subjective. Its upside is, however, that it can reflect smaller successes, although an undesired policy passes. Jointly these contrasting measures can speak more powerfully to the formulated hypotheses on lobbying success.

To do so, the measure of preference attainment is constructed for all actors who have voiced a clear position in favour or against policy change according to our data collection⁶. The policy position of the actor is related to the policy change that did or did not take place on the issue. The policy outcomes on all issues were gathered by desk research and cross-validated by the interviews that were conducted with policy makers. The measure of preference attainment relates the advocate's voiced position to the policy outcome on the issue that pertained at the end of our observation period. The value 1 denotes preference attainment, meaning that an advocate supported policy change that was implemented, or opposed a change that did not take place, whereas 0 means

⁶ The position coded in our other data gathering is included if this had a clear (non-neutral and non-contradicting) coding and the response on the actor's position is missing in the survey.

that the final policy outcome runs counter to the advocate's voiced preference. The self-perceived measure of influence is gathered in the advocate survey (see Appendix C for question wording) and used in the analysis as a linear scale from 0-10, where 0 denotes 'no impact' and 10 denotes 'extremely high impact'.

Independent variables: Levels of active cooperation and economic resources

A potential problem existing studies of coalitions face is that many work with relatively broad, and sometimes only implicit, definitions of a 'coalition' (Haider-Markel, 2006; Mahoney & Baumgartner, 2004; Nelson & Yackee, 2012). So, it is unclear how comparable these forms of cooperation are. In practice, active cooperation between groups can take a variety of forms and levels (cf. Heaney, 2014). For this reason, the online survey included three distinct items on cooperation activities paralleling the discussion in the theory section, namely in terms of: 1) the frequency of information exchange on the issue with other non-state actors (ranked on a five point scale), 2) the number of likeminded non-state actors the advocate coordinated strategies with (ranging from 0-9, reported by the respondent⁷) and 3) the number of members in a formal coalition, acting concertedly on the issue (ranging from 0-9, reported by the respondent). The survey questions used to measure these cooperation activities were posed along with concrete explanations and examples in order to avoid ambiguity (see Appendix C). Importantly, the questions asked about cooperation *on the specific policy issue* at hand, and can thus relate issue-specific cooperation activities to lobbying success on the issue.

⁷ The respondent was asked to enter names of cooperation partners both for strategy cooperation and formal coalitions. Manual data cleaning involved excluding entries on parties or members of parliament (MPs). Where partners were entered in plural, e.g. 'unions', a conservative rule was applied that this means two partners. The measures range to a maximum of 9, given this was the number of text boxes in which actors entered information. This artificial ceiling is not ideal, but arguably less problematic for the analysis, because this maximum was entered relatively rarely, namely 9 times for strategy partners and 12 times for formal coalition members in the final sample.

Mapping these three measures of cooperation shows that coalition activity is a common strategy. Overall, 74 per cent of respondents answered that they shared information with other advocates on the issue ‘sometimes’, ‘often’, or ‘very often’. Roughly 50 per cent of respondents reported to have cooperated strategies with other advocates on the issue, and 36 per cent reported to have been in a signalling coalition. Most cooperation involves between 1 and 5 partners, and it occurs across all levels of economic resources⁸. Given relatively high correlations between the three forms of cooperation activities ($0.50 < r < 0.61$)⁹, indexes with different weights are constructed to measure the intensity of cooperation activities on the issue. *Cooperation Index 1* simply sums the number of named partners, as well as a 0-4 rating of information exchange. Index 1 ranges from 0 (no information exchange, no partners) to 22 (most frequent information exchange, nine strategy and nine signalling partners), thus giving more weight to the number of strategy and formal coalition partners than to information exchange. *Cooperation Index 2* rescales the number of partners in both strategy coordination and the concerted action from 0-1, as well as the information exchange rating and sums these three scales, so it ranges from 0-3, and thus gives a higher weight to information exchange compared to index 1. Additionally, Appendix G shows results for the three individual items of active cooperation and logged variations of the indexes (also see robustness section).

Finally, individual *Economic Resources* on the issue are measured based on a survey question asking the respondent to rank, on a five point scale, how strongly she agrees that her organisation spent a high level of economic resources on the issue. The relative measure ranging from 0 to 4 has advantages compared to using staff numbers as a proxy for resources (cf. Mahoney, 2007b). Firstly, staff numbers are a limited indicator of the financial resources spent, for instance because not all lobbying is done by in-house staff and because full-time equivalent staff numbers

⁸ See Tables D.3, D.4, and D.5 in Appendix D.

⁹ See Table D.6.

can be hard to estimate. A ranking of economic resources spent is arguably more encompassing (of staff and monetary spending) and cognitively easier to assess. However, it is less comparable between actors than an absolute measure and may be best interpreted as a ranking of resources spent relative to the organisation's general resource endowment. Importantly, our survey captured both measures and the number of missing values on concrete numbers of staff are much higher (roughly cutting the N in half). For these reasons, the relative measure is used in the analysis. However, Appendix G shows findings using the alternative measure of staff resources (also see robustness section).

Control Variables

The following control variables are included in the analysis at the level of individual advocates: Firstly, the analysis distinguishes between actor types because these may be related to lobbying success, resources and strategies (Bunea, 2013; Dür & Mateo, 2013; Hojnacki, 1997; Mahoney, 2007a). The analysis distinguishes actors that represent *economic interests*, namely business associations, firms, occupational associations and trade unions, and those representing *non-economic interests* namely public interest, hobby and identity groups, as well as *other specialised actors* which might foster both economic and non-economic purposes, namely experts, think tanks, and institutional associations. Secondly, as previous findings on camp strength show, the share of an actor's camp (Klüver, 2013a), or absolute numbers of allies and opposition (Mahoney & Baumgartner, 2015) affect lobbying success of individual advocates. At the same time, advocates may be more likely to join forces if their camp is relatively weaker (Hojnacki, 1997). The control *Camp share* is operationalised as the total number of advocates on the issue with the same position as the actor, divided by the total sum of active actors with a non-neutral position on the issue. Thirdly, to avoid a status quo bias affecting the analysis, a binary control includes whether or not

the actor favours policy change or the status quo (Baumgartner et al., 2009). If actors join forces to try to change the cemented status quo, this plausibly relates to the use of active cooperation. The variable *Actor pro change* takes the value 1, if the actor favours change of the status quo, and 0 otherwise. Fourthly, it matters for preference attainment whether an advocate has public opinion on its side (Rasmussen, Mäder, & Reher, 2018) and coalitions plausibly mobilise in reaction to public support. Therefore, the control *Share of Public Support* includes the share of the public (out of all respondents) favouring the same position as the advocate is included as a control. Furthermore, the salience the issue has to the advocate is held constant, as it might affect strategies such as coalition behaviour, and the level of resources spent, and may not be unrelated to the likelihood of success. *Importance to the advocate* is measured based on a survey question asking how important the issue was to the advocate on a five point scale.

Moreover, at issue level the analysis controls for the total number of actors (logged) in both camps on the issue, so all actors trying to influence policy makers. This can be seen as a measure of the level of *Issue Mobilization* in the advocacy community, which may affect resource demands of policy makers and, thus, both the success of an average advocate, as well as cooperation with others (Hojnacki, 1997: 85). Other unobserved heterogeneity between issues is captured by random intercepts for the 50 policy issues, but not estimated by including further predictors to avoid over-specification. Finally, the national context in which the advocate is operating is taken into account (Hojnacki, 1997; Mahoney, 2007b) by including fixed effects for the five countries.

Appendix D provides summary statistics of all included variables (Table D.1) and a full correlation matrix see (Table D.2). Note that all pairwise correlations of different variables included in the same models lie below $r < |0.4|$.

Analysis

This section presents the results of multi-level regressions employed to test Hypotheses 1 and 2ab. The models examine the impact of active cooperation on two operationalisations of lobbying success, namely as preference attainment (Models 1-4) and self-perceived influence (Models 5-8). All models include random intercepts for policy issues, because one can expect lobbying behaviour and success to be more alike within the same issue than across issues, so multi-level models where actors are nested in issues are adequate. The number of cases at issue level is 44, given that 6 policy issues attracted too few responses. The number of observations at level of individual advocates is 333 in the fully specified models¹⁰. Models 1-3 and 5-6 build the full Model using Cooperation Index 1 in steps. Models 4 and 8 check robustness with the rescaled Cooperation Index 2.

¹⁰ To compare model fit, this N was held constant in step-wise model building. Note that success, cooperation patterns and economic resources account for the vast majority of missing values: There are 55 observations without a measure of position, hence, preference attainment. On 94 other cases, there are missing values on the main independent variables. Table B.4 (Appendix) compares these cases to the total sample and gives no evidence of bias related to this dependent variable. Table B.5 shows that these cases are also spread out similarly across actor types compared to the full sample.

Table 2: Multilevel logistic and linear regressions of lobbying success
(Coefficients with SEs in parentheses)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Success as Preference Attainment				Success as Perceived Influence			
	Multi-level logistic				Multi-level linear			
Economic resources	0.00 (0.13)	0.29 (0.19)	0.33 (0.21)	0.40+ (0.24)	0.29* (0.13)	0.60** (0.19)	0.49* (0.20)	0.52* (0.22)
Cooperation Index 1	-0.01 (0.03)	0.06 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)		0.20*** (0.03)	0.33*** (0.07)	0.26*** (0.05)	
Cooperation Index 2				0.34 (0.39)				2.03*** (0.36)
Interactions								
Resources#Index1		-0.05* (0.02)	-0.06* (0.03)			-0.05* (0.03)	-0.05+ (0.02)	
Resources#Index2				-0.46* (0.20)				-0.34+ (0.18)
Controls								
Actor type (B ^a : Non-eco)								
Economic interests			0.07 (0.46)	0.05 (0.46)			0.19 (0.41)	0.22 (0.41)
Other specialised			-0.19 (0.46)	-0.22 (0.46)			0.22 (0.41)	0.31 (0.41)
Camp Share			3.36*** (0.89)	3.39*** (0.89)			-0.32 (0.70)	-0.46 (0.69)
Actor Pro Change			-1.67*** (0.35)	-1.66*** (0.35)			0.17 (0.29)	0.17 (0.29)
Support of Public Opinion			2.20** (0.79)	2.21** (0.79)			1.15 (0.73)	1.16 (0.72)
Importance to advocate			-0.28+ (0.15)	-0.27+ (0.15)			0.37** (0.14)	0.32* (0.13)
Issue mobilization			0.02 (0.48)	0.03 (0.48)			-0.46+ (0.26)	-0.45+ (0.26)
Country: (B: Germany)								
UK	-0.29 (0.94)	-0.38 (0.95)	-0.20 (0.93)	-0.18 (0.93)	-0.64 (0.61)	-0.75 (0.60)	-0.28 (0.62)	-0.33 (0.61)
Denmark	-0.49 (0.84)	-0.51 (0.85)	-1.04 (0.81)	-1.04 (0.81)	0.54 (0.55)	0.52 (0.54)	0.49 (0.53)	0.49 (0.53)
Sweden	0.56 (0.91)	0.64 (0.92)	0.32 (0.91)	0.30 (0.91)	0.60 (0.58)	0.67 (0.57)	0.80 (0.58)	0.81 (0.57)
Netherlands	-0.14 (0.86)	-0.20 (0.87)	-0.05 (0.84)	-0.05 (0.84)	1.06+ (0.56)	0.98+ (0.55)	0.95+ (0.55)	0.87 (0.54)
Constant	0.85 (0.73)	0.15 (0.81)	-1.07 (1.80)	-1.10 (1.80)	3.16*** (0.55)	2.38*** (0.66)	2.36* (1.18)	2.38* (1.17)
Policy Intercept variance	1.88* (0.75)	1.96* (0.78)	1.42* (0.63)	1.42* (0.63)	0.06* (0.20)	0.06* (0.20)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)
Number of Advocates	333	333	333	333	333	333	333	333
Number of Issues	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44
AIC	411	409	368	367	1607	1604	1604	1595
chi2	2	6	46***	47***	74***	80***	99***	110***

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

^aBaseline: Non-economic interests

Model 1 in Table 2 includes only the independent variables of economic resources and the level of active cooperation and shows no significant effect. Model 2 introduces the interaction (without controls). As hypothesised, this is significantly negative ($p=0.037$). Moreover, the constituent terms on both resources and active cooperation turn more positive, but not significantly positive. Adding the control variables (Model 3) keeps these relationships intact: there is a significant negative interaction effect ($p=0.018$). Using the second cooperation index, where information exchange carries the same weight as the other forms of cooperation, keeps these results intact as well (Model 4). Here the negative interaction effect is similarly significant ($p=0.020$), and the constituent term on resources turns significantly positive ($p=0.09$). To illustrate the sizes of the effects, predicted probabilities are calculated¹¹ based on Model 3. These reveal that an advocate with the lowest level of economic resources spent on the issue has a 57% predicted probability of attaining her preferences on this issue when not cooperating with others. Predicted preference attainment for this actor increases to 77% when increasing active cooperation to the maximum of the cooperation index, meaning very frequent information exchange with others, as well as strategy cooperation and joint signalling with at least nine partners. In contrast, for an advocate with the maximum level of economic resources on the issue, predicted preference attainment lies at 76% when working alone, but decreases to 15% as active cooperation is maximised, potentially indicating that these actors carry large cooperation costs compared to working alone. Figures 1 and 2 plot the interactions based on Model 3.

¹¹ In all calculations of marginal effects other covariates are held at their observed values in the dataset.

Figure 1: Marginal Effects of Cooperation

Figure 2: Marginal Effects of Resources

both with 95 CIs based on Model 3
Thin bars indicate the share of observations





Figure 1 shows the average marginal effect of active cooperation at different levels of economic resources on the issue. This is never significantly positive, so Hypothesis 2a on a positive effect of cooperation at low levels of resources cannot be supported where success is measured as preference attainment. The plot shows, however, that starting at medium level resources, there is a significant negative marginal effect of active cooperation on preference attainment. Moreover, there are significant differences between the marginal effects at lower and higher levels of resources, which is consistent with the theory that advocates spending higher resources on the issue themselves experience lower benefits but higher costs as their level of cooperation with others increases.

In addition, Figure 2 plots the reversed relationship: the marginal effect of economic resources as active cooperation increases. It tentatively suggests that actors that do not actively cooperate with others (Cooperation Index=0), might experience a positive marginal effect of their own resources on their individual preference attainment. This effect is at the borderline of significance with 90% confidence intervals. In any case, this potential positive effect of resources diminishes and turns negative as active cooperation increases, suggesting that increasing cooperation makes an advocate's own resources spent on the issue decreasingly helpful for her

individual preference attainment. In sum, given the significant differences between the marginal effects at lowest and highest levels of resources (Figure 1) and of cooperation (Figure 2), Hypothesis 1 is clearly supported. Support for Hypotheses 2b on a positive effect of economic resources on preference attainment at the lowest level of cooperation is weak.

When turning to a more fine-grained, but also more subjective, operationalisation of lobbying success as self-assessed perceived impact on the policy outcome (Models 5-8), the Models show more positive predicted effects of both economic resources spent on the issue and active cooperation. Model 5 shows that both resources and active cooperation have a significant positive effect on perceived influence in a model without interactions and controls ($p=0.028$ and $p=0.000$, respectively). Adding the interaction (Model 6), shows, however, that this is again significantly negative ($p=0.031$), thus providing further support for Hypothesis 1. When adding all controls (Model 7), both the significant constituent terms ($p=0.014$ and $p=0.000$) and the interaction effects remain intact, although the significance of the interaction term drops slightly ($p=0.058$). As Model 8 reveals, using the alternative Cooperation Index 2, confirms the same patterns ($p=0.018$, $p=0.000$ and $p=0.060$, respectively). To illustrate, predicted perceived influence based on Model 7 moves from 2.9 to 8.6 (on a 0-10 scale) as an advocate spending the lowest level of resources on an issue moves from no cooperation to the maximum level of active cooperation. In contrast, for an advocate with the highest resource rating, the prediction increases much less, namely from a 4.9 rating of perceived influence to 6.4, but this change is not significant. Figures 3 and 4 plot these relationships.

Figure 3: Marginal Effects of Cooperation **Figure 4: Marginal Effects of Resources**
 both with 95 CIs based on Model 7
 Thin bars indicate the share of observations




Figure 3 shows the average marginal effect of cooperation at different levels of economic resources on the issue. It shows a significant positive marginal effect of cooperation on perceived influence at lowest to high resources. Only at the maximum level of economic resources the effect turns insignificant. Therefore, Hypothesis 2a is supported that higher active cooperation has a positive effect on lobbying success at low levels of resources, with the caveat that this only holds when this is measured as perceived influence. In addition, Figure 4 provides support for Hypothesis 2b that higher individual economic resources have a positive effect on individual lobbying success, when there is low active cooperation with others. At a cooperation index of 5, which could, for instance, be equivalent to frequent information exchange with others and 2 strategy partners, this effect stops being significantly positive. As theorised, this could be because there are increasing subsidy effects and freeriding costs at the expense of the actor's higher resources, as cooperation with others increases. The difference between the marginal effects of resources at the lowest and highest levels of cooperation is significant with 90% confidence intervals

Turning to the controls in the models we see that where lobbying success is measured as preference attainment, several predictors have significant effects in the typically expected direction. Whereas actor type has no significant effect on preference attainment, actors in the relatively larger

lobbying camp are significantly more likely to attain their preferences ($p < 0.001$ in Models 3 and 4). This finding is in line with earlier findings by Klüver (2013a) at EU level, and Mahoney and Baumgartner (2015) in a US context. Moreover, there is a status-quo bias (Baumgartner et al., 2009), making it significantly harder for actors to change the status quo ($p < 0.001$). In addition, the share of the public that is on the same side as the actor significantly increases preference attainment ($p < 0.01$), confirming earlier findings by Rasmussen et al. (2018). Somewhat surprisingly, we see that self-assessed salience of an issue to the advocate is negatively related to success ($p < 0.1$), indicating perhaps that there is a cognitive effect of seeing issues that one has failed to succeed on as more important in hindsight. Finally, neither the level of advocate mobilisation on the issue, nor the fixed effects for countries reveal significant difference at the issue or country level, yet policy issue intercept variance is significantly different from zero, suggesting variation in preference attainment between issues. Notably, comparing model fit between Models 1-3 in terms of both the Wald chi2 and the Akaike information criterion (AIC) indicate that the full model is better fitted.

In Models 5-8 where lobbying success is measured as self-assessed perceived influence, however, these controls look different. Here the importance of the issue to the advocate is significantly related to perceived influence ($p < 0.05$ or below), and the effect is positive. Moreover, the level of mobilisation in the advocate community has a significant negative effect on the actor's self-assessed impact on outcomes ($p < 0.1$) and there is slightly higher perceived influence in the Netherlands compared to Germany in some models ($p < 0.1$). In contrast, the support by the camp of advocates or the public has no significant effect on self-assessed influence, neither has favouring the status quo. One explanation for this could be that when asking about the actor's own impact on policy change, respondents (rightly) interpret the question *causally* with respect to their *own* impact, so these external factors are discarded, because they lie outside the advocate's control. Whereas these factors make preference attainment more likely, they do not necessarily make a causal effect

of the advocate on outcomes more likely (cf. Dür, 2008). In contrast, the independent variables of resources spent on the issue and the level of active cooperation relate to issue-specific strategies on the issue, so will arguably be more important for how a causal effect of their actions is perceived by actors themselves. Another alternative explanation is, however, that there is systematic bias in survey responses, such as an overestimation of individual impact. For this reason, Models 5-8 alone would give only tentative evidence for the proposed theory. In conjunction with Models 1-4 of binary preference attainment, however, they support evidence for an interaction effect between economic resources and active cooperation on an issue.

In sum, the analysis suggests that advocates with low resources on an issue benefit more from active cooperation with others than advocates with high resources, who seemingly carry higher costs of cooperation. In fact, the benefits of cooperation with others diminish at higher levels of resources and the marginal effect of cooperation on lobbying success may even turn negative, where success is measured as binary preference attainment.

Based on these findings, one needs to ask: (why) would resourceful advocates cooperate in the first place? Appendix F presents models of the three cooperation activities as dependent variables and shows that actors with higher economic resources on an issue are significantly *more* likely to use all three of these activities ($p < 0.05$ or below in all models). This, in fact, confirms earlier findings by Mahoney and Baumgartner (2004) in a US context, who suggest that less resourceful actors face higher barriers to cooperation. Importantly, the present analysis has added that although advocates with high economic resources are more likely to actively cooperate with others, this strategy has a less beneficial effect on their individual preference attainment than for advocates with lower economic resources on the issue. Crucially, this indicates that resourceful advocates might see other advantages in cooperating than directly increasing their own *individual* likelihood to succeed, compared to working alone. This could, for instance, be increasing the

effectiveness of their less resourceful cooperation partners, and thereby increasing the success of their entire lobbying camp. An alternative explanation could be that benefits of cooperation are not only issue-specific, but that more long-term resource exchanges through active cooperation help actors optimise their lobbying strategies and success *across issues*. Either way, the findings challenge the mostly individualistic approach research takes on lobbying by focusing on single actors and their lobbying success on individual issues in isolation from each other.

Robustness of findings

Appendix G presents robustness checks of the findings. Firstly, given potential problems regarding interaction effects in non-linear models, robustness of the results on preference attainment was checked in multi-level linear mixed effects version of Models 1-4 (Table G.1). The interactions effects remain significantly negative ($p < 0.05$), supporting Hypothesis 1. Secondly, Table G.2 presents results when using logged versions of both cooperation indexes, so assuming decreasing returns to increasing cooperation. In the models of preference attainment the negative interactions stay similarly significant ($p < 0.05$ in the full models), and the constituent term of resources turns significantly positive ($p < 0.1$). This further supports Hypotheses 1 and 2b. In the models of perceived influence the negative interactions terms turn (marginally) insignificant, but there remains support for Hypotheses 2a and 2b. Thirdly, Table G.3 shows results for the three separate items of active cooperation. These indicate that the negative interaction effect is more robust for the tighter forms of active cooperation, namely strategy coordination and concerted action ($p = 0.032$ and $p = 0.044$, in models of preference attainment), whereas it stays negative but becomes insignificant for mere information exchange on its own ($p = 0.139$). Where success is measured as perceived influence, we see significant positive constituent terms on resources ($p < 0.1$ or $p < 0.05$) and all three types of active cooperation ($p < 0.001$), supporting Hypotheses 2a and 2b. All interaction terms are negative, yet only significant for concerted action in signalling coalitions

($p=0.011$). Lastly, an alternative operationalisation of economic resources as the logged number of lobbying staff having worked on the issue provides an additional plausibility check. As Table G.4 shows, the number of cases is roughly halved ($n=163$), due to many missing values on this resource measure. All directions of effects stay as hypothesised in all models, yet the significance of the interaction terms drops ($0.1 < p < 0.2$ in the full models). Still the models of perceived influence (Models F6-F8) reveal significant positive constituent terms on both the staff measure ($p < 0.1$ or $p < 0.05$) and the indexes of cooperation ($p < 0.01$), thus further supporting Hypotheses 2a and 2b.

Conclusion: Lobbying as a collaborative enterprise

Already decades ago Scholzman and Tierney (1986: 148) found that 90 percent of interest groups in the US enter coalitions as a strategy to influence policy. While the use of active cooperation activities might be lower on specific issues (Baumgartner et al., 2009: 151; Phinney, 2017: 9-10), the prominence of active cooperation between advocates challenges our conception of *individual* lobbying success. With an atomistic view of single lobbyists, important resource exchanges that take place within camps of likeminded advocates are likely to be overlooked. As this article showed, a failure to include active cooperation patterns in analyses of lobbying success may profoundly limit our understanding of lobbying and the factors explaining its role in policy making, such as the effect of economic resources on lobbying success.

Specifically, the article formulated a resource exchange theory on the effects of active cooperation and argued that individual benefits and costs of cooperation are unequally distributed and depend on the advocate's individual economic resources on the issue. The analyses of lobbying on a diverse set of issues in five European countries showed that the marginal effects of cooperation on preference attainment vary significantly between actors with high and low economic resources on the issue themselves. Whereas higher cooperation is associated with no or negative effects on

individual lobbying success for actors with the highest level of individual resources, actors with low economic resources on an issue experience a significant positive effect of higher cooperation on their perceived impact on the issue. This finding may ease the fears of elitist forces in lobbying (Schattschneider, 1960; Schlozman, 1984), because resource-poorer advocates seem to have their unique way to increase their lobbying success, namely by joining forces.

The flipside of this interaction is that the effect of economic resources is not constant across advocates at different levels of cooperation. As hypothesised, the article showed that there is a positive effect of higher individual resources on perceived influence at low levels of active cooperation on the issue. Where success is measured as preference attainment this positive effect is at the borderline of significance. Based on these results, one can see active cooperation as a resource leak or redistribution mechanism between likeminded actors in a lobbying camp. Through active cooperation, resourceful advocates on the issue may subsidise tactics of their less resourceful partners, which may be the reason why it is hard to document the effect of individual financial and staff resources on lobbying success (Baumgartner et al., 2009: 190-214; Klüver, 2013a; Mahoney, 2007a).

These findings point to an urgent need to move away from understanding the success of lobbyists as independent from each other. The analysis has shown that for resourceful actors active cooperation leaves their own perceived influence unchanged, or even decreases *individual* predicted preference attainment, compared to working alone. Yet, given that advocates with high economic resources frequently cooperate with others (Appendix F; Mahoney & Baumgartner, 2004; Schlozman & Tierney, 1986: 306), it seems unlikely that the equation they are optimising is strictly that of their own *individual success on the issue*. If we assume that lobbyists are rational actors, it is likely that their calculations of success are less individualistic than research typically presumes when modelling lobbying success at the advocate level. One potential explanation is that these

models overlook *indirect* effects that an increased lobbying success of an actor's partner has on their own preference attainment by increasing the likelihood of success of all actors in the same lobbying camp. Such effects, however, are likely to be overlooked in traditional models of advocate-level lobbying success. An additional consideration is that actors may optimise lobbying success in cooperation with other actor *across issues*, so carrying higher costs on some issues, in exchange for lower burdens on others. Given the prominence of collaboration activities in practice, future research should assess lobbying success also at other levels of analysis, such as the coalition level (for a qualitative example see: Phinney, 2017), as well as consider exchanges across issues. This article seeks to move the field forward by providing evidence for truly collaborative dynamics in lobbying, which can help explain how lobbyists succeed in realising policy goals.

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Appendix to Article 2

Appendix A: List of Policy Issues

Country	Policy issue
Denmark	Building of a bridge for vehicles and trains across the Kattegat
	Reducing mortgage interest deduction from 33% to 25%
	Granting asylum to families with children among rejected Iraqi asylum seekers
	Reducing the unemployment benefit period by half from four to two years
	Strengthening the control of Danish agriculture in order to take action against misuse of antibiotics
	Controlled delivery of heroin for particularly vulnerable drug addicts at special clinics as a pilot scheme
	Introducing differentiated VAT
	Making schools' average test results public
	Cutting the allowances paid to young people between 25 and 29 years by half
	Creation of an equal pay commission
Germany	Financial support of Arcandor through public money
	Guaranteeing a pension above the poverty line for pensioners who have paid contributions for many years
	Supplying citizens with consumption vouchers to boost the economy
	Establishing a wealth tax
	State control of electricity prices
	Banning of computer games that glorify violence
	Cutting the tax exemption for night, Sunday, and holiday supplements
	Cutting coal subsidies
	Making it illegal to carry out a paternity test without the consent of the mother
	Cutting social benefits
Netherlands	Allowing all illegal immigrants who have lived in the Netherlands for a long time to stay
	Raising the retirement age to 67
	Abolishing the mortgage interest
	Spending more money on development aid
	Obligating stores to be closed on Sunday
	Ban of smoking in restaurants
	Banning embryonic stem cell research
	Allowing more asylum seekers
	Banning euthanasia
	Building new nuclear power plants
Sweden	Permanent introduction of a congestion charge in Stockholm
	Reinstating the wealth tax, which was abolished in 2007 and meant that anyone with a fortune of 1.5 million paid 1.5% in taxes
	Rescuing Saab through government funds
	Banning the construction of minarets in Sweden
	Reducing third-world aid
	Introducing a language test for Swedish citizenship
	Restricting the right to free abortion
	Making household and domestic services tax deductible
	Allowing free download of all films and music from the Internet
	Increasing the old age retirement age
UK	Giving amnesty to illegal immigrants who have spent ten years in Britain without getting into trouble with the police
	Scrapping ID cards
	Requiring food manufacturers to reduce the fat/salt content in their products
	Introducing a graduate tax, where graduates would pay an extra income tax on their income after graduating
	Allowing a third runway to be built at Heathrow Airport
	Reducing corporation tax
	Increasing Air Passenger Duty, to be paid by people taking both short-haul and long-haul flights
	Subsidising the building of new nuclear power stations
	Increasing the tax on large executive-style, estate, and 4x4 vehicles
	Downgrading 'ecstasy' from a class-A drug to a class-B drug

Appendix B: Response Rates and Potential Response Bias

There is considerable variation in the response rates across countries, with Denmark and the Netherlands reaching much higher shares, namely 54 and 49 per cent, Sweden located around the average with 36 per cent, and Germany and the United Kingdom reaching lower response rates, namely 22 and 18 per cent. There is also variation in the response rates between group types, with a higher response rate by non-economic interests (42 per cent) than economic actors (29 per cent). Previous major surveys, such as Binderkrantz and Rasmussen (2015), Dür and Mateo (2016), and Klüver (2013) have attained comparable response rates for associations, and have similarly found variations across European countries.

Table B.1: Number of actors and response rates across countries (in total numbers and per cent)

Country	Not Completed	Completed	Total Invited
Germany	175 77.78	50 22.22	225 100.00
UK	339 82.28	73 17.72	412 100.00
Denmark	114 45.97	134 54.03	248 100.00
Sweden	173 64.31	96 35.69	269 100.00
Netherlands	131 51.17	125 48.83	256 100.00
Total number	932	478	1410
Total rates (%)	66.10	33.90	100.00

Table B.2: Response rates across actor types (in total numbers and per cent)

Actor type	Not Completed	Completed	Total Invited
Non-economic	140 58.3	100 41.7	240 100.00
Economic	477 70.7	198 29.3	675 100.00
Other specialised	315 63.6	180 36.4	495 100.00
Total number	932	478	1410
Total rate (%)	66.1	33.9	100.00

Table B.3: Comparison of survey non-response across the binary dependent variable (in total numbers and per cent)

	Not Completed	Survey Completed	Invited
Unsuccessful	208 55.6	166 44.4	374 100.00
Successful	314 55.0	257 45.0	571 100.00
Total number	526	423	945
Total rate (%)	55.2	44.8	100.00

This comparison was possible for those observations in the total sample of survey recipients (945/1410) where a measure of preference attainment exists based on gathering advocate positions in the news media, interviews and desk research.

The similar completion rates in this sample across successful (44.4 per cent) and unsuccessful advocates (45.0 per cent) suggests that non-response bias is not systematically related to the dependent variable of preference attainment. Given the measures for active cooperation and resources are collected only in the survey, no such comparison is possible for the independent variables.

Note: All observations without missing values were used in the final analysis, even if the survey was not completed to the end.

Table B.4 Missing values on in the independent variables (IVs) based on non-response to specific survey questions, across preference attainment compared to full sample where a measure of preference attainment exists (in total numbers and per cent)

	Cases with missing values on IVs	Sample (with voiced policy preference)
Unsuccessful	35 37.2	374 39.6
Successful	59 62.8	571 60.4
Total number	94	945
Per cent	100.0	100.0

Table B.4 compares cases with missing values on the independent variables due to non-response to the specific survey questions on cooperation or economic resources to the total sample of invited advocates in terms of their preference attainment. It shows that the shares of unsuccessful advocates

is similar (37.2% versus 39.6%). Based on the dependent variable of preference attainment, there is no reason to expect that these missing values introduce a bias.

Additionally, Table B.5 shows similar shares of missing values on the independent variables (non-response to the survey questions on cooperation and resources) by the three actor types.

Table B.5 Missing values on in the independent variables (IVs) based on non-response to specific survey questions, across actor type compared to full sample (in total numbers and per cent)

Actor type	Cases with missing IVS	N in total sample	Share of total sample (%)
Non-economic	18	240	7.5
Economic interests	39	675	5.8
Other specialised	37	495	7.5
Total	94	1410	6.7

Appendix C: Wording of Survey Questions

This appendix lists the template questions of the survey. The actual survey was individualised, so actors received a version stating the specific policy issue (*policytitle*) and time frame (*period*) at hand. Furthermore, all questions were adjusted according to the advocate's specific actor type (*association/firm/expert*).

Perceived Influence

8. How would you rate your impact(*experts*)/the impact of your organisation(*associations*)/the impact of your company(*firms*) on political decisions on the issue of (*policytitleshort*) on a scale from 0 (no impact at all) to 10 (extremely high impact) (*periodlong*)?

(Scale displayed on screen to locate perceived influence on linear 0-10 scale)

Information exchange

How frequently did you(*experts*)/your organisation (*associations*)/ your company (*firms*) share information on the issue of (*policytitle*) with other non-state actors working towards the same ends as you (*period*)?

This means looser contacts with others to exchange information, for instance via Email, phone or personal meetings.

<i>Very often</i>	<i>Often</i>	<i>Sometimes</i>	<i>Rarely</i>	<i>Never</i>	<i>Don't know</i>
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Signalling and Strategy cooperation

Did you(*experts*)/your organisation (*associations*)/ your company (*firms*) actively cooperate with other non-state actors on the issue of (*policytitle*) (*period*) in any of the following ways?

Note that by non-state actors we refer to interest associations, companies and experts.

a - in a formal coalition on the issue

This means explicit agreements with others to join forces on the issue, for instance through a declared coalition, joint press releases, joint position papers, or jointly approaching policymakers.

Yes No

b - by informally coordinating strategies on the issue

This means agreements to align or complement strategies, for instance coordinating with other non-state actors, which activities are used and at whom they are targeted.

Yes No

(filter for yes answers)

Regarding the formal coalition, in which you participated on the issue of (*policytitle*), please list all the other non-state actors who were members.

Group abbreviations are sufficient.

(Text fields)

(filter for yes answers)

Regarding your participation in informal coordination of strategies on the issue of (*policytitle*), please list all non-state actors, which took part in this.

Group abbreviations are sufficient.

(Text fields)

Economic Resources on the Issue

Regarding the issue of (*policytitle*), please indicate whether you agree that you (*experts*)/ your organisation (*associations*), your company (*firms*) ...

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
...spent a high level of economic resources	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Staff Size

According to your estimate, what was the number of employees of your organisation (*associations*)/ your company (*firms*) engaged in political work on the issue of (*policytitle*) (*period*)?

This includes contacts with policymakers or the media and policy monitoring.

Please convert to full time.

_____(full-time staff)

Don't know

Salience to the advocate

How important was the issue of (*policytitle*) to you (*expert*)/your organisation (*interest associations*)/ your company (*firms*) compared to other policy-related issues you work on?

Much more important	<input type="radio"/>
More important	<input type="radio"/>
Equally important	<input type="radio"/>
Less important	<input type="radio"/>
Much less important	<input type="radio"/>
Don't know	<input type="radio"/>

Note: In the analysis, all actors who chose the 'don't know' option on a question are treated as missing.

Appendix D: Descriptive Statistics

Table D.1: Summary of independent variables and controls

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Cooperation Index 1	333	5.11	4.84	0	22
Cooperation Index 2	333	.89	.67	0	3
<i>Individual components</i>					
Information exchange	333	2.29	1.24	0	4
N strategy partners	333	1.61	2.21	0	9
N signalling partners	333	1.21	2.26	0	9
Economic resources	333	1.34	1.16	0	4
Staff on issue (log)	163	1.22	0.66	0.69	3.93
Actor type (B: non-economic)					
Economic interests	333	.42	.49	0	1
Other specialised	333	.35	.48	0	1
Camp share	333	.65	.22	.08	1
Actor pro change	333	.54	.50	0	1
Support of Public Opinion	333	.45	.21	.08	.88
Importance to advocate	333	3.36	1.16	1	5
Issue mobilization (log)	333	3.31	.62	1.94	4.88
Country (B: Germany)					
UK	333	.15	.36	0	1
Denmark	333	.29	.45	0	1
Sweden	333	.20	.40	0	1
Netherlands	333	.26	.44	0	1

Table D.2: Correlation matrix (Spearman's rho)

	Index 1	Index 2	Econ Reso.	Non-econ	Econ Interest	Other	Camp Share	Public Support	Pro Change	Importance	Mobilization
Index 1	1										
Index 2	<i>0.99</i>	1									
Economic Resources	0.29	0.29	1								
Actor type: Non- Econ	0.21	0.19	-0.10	1							
Econ	0.20	0.20	0.31	<i>-0.46</i>	1						
Other	-0.39	-0.37	-0.24	<i>-0.40</i>	<i>-0.63</i>	1					
Camp Share	0.11	0.13	0.14	0.09	0.08	-0.17	1				
Public Support	0.04	0.04	0.08	0.02	0.04	-0.05	0.18	1			
Pro change	0.02	0.02	-0.03	-0.00	-0.06	0.06	0.10	-0.04	1		
Importance	0.34	0.35	0.31	-0.06	0.23	-0.19	0.13	0.07	0.02	1	
Mobilization	0.06	0.06	0.12	-0.26	0.33	-0.12	0.03	-0.16	0.02	0.05	1

Note: All correlations $r < |0.4|$ except the two alternative Indexes and the dummies for actor type amongst each other (in italics).

Table D.3: Distribution of informational coalitions across economic resource ranking

Frequency of info exchange	Economic Resources					Total
	Lowest	Low	Medium	High	Highest	
Never	18	11	8	2	2	41
Rarely	17	13	8	2	0	40
Sometimes	31	35	17	10	2	95
Often	21	24	24	25	3	97
Very often	10	19	13	12	6	60
Total	97	102	70	51	13	333

Table D.4: Distribution of the number of strategy partners across levels of economic resources

Number of strategy partners	Economic Resources					Total
	Lowest	Low	Medium	High	Highest	
0	63	53	31	15	2	164
1	10	11	9	8	2	40
2	9	13	15	7	1	45
3	2	10	5	5	3	25
4	3	6	3	6	0	18
5	6	4	2	5	4	21
6	0	1	2	2	0	5
7	1	1	0	1	1	4
8	1	0	1	0	0	2
9	2	3	2	2	0	9
Total	97	102	70	51	13	333

Table D.5: Distribution of number of signalling partners across levels of economic resources

Number of signalling partners	Economic Resource Ranking					Total
	Lowest	Low	Medium	High	Highest	
0	76	72	46	21	9	224
1	3	7	7	5	0	22
2	5	4	7	6	1	23
3	3	5	4	6	0	18
4	0	6	1	5	0	12
5	6	1	1	1	2	11
6	0	3	3	2	0	8
7	1	0	0	0	0	1
8	1	0	0	1	0	2
9	2	4	1	4	1	12
Total	96	101	71	49	13	333

Table D.6: Spearman's Rho for the measures of active cooperation in final sample (n=333)

Spearman's Rho			
	Informational cooperation	Log numbers of strategy partners	Log number of signalling partners
Informational cooperation	1		
Log numbers of strategy partners	0.60	1	
Log number of signalling partners	0.51	0.58	1

Appendix E: Newspapers

1) List of Newspapers:

Denmark: Politiken and Jyllands-Posten

Germany: Sueddeutsche Zeitung and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung

Netherlands: De Volkskrant and NRC Handelsblad

Sweden: Dagens Nyheter and Svenska Dagbladet

United Kingdom: The Guardian and The Telegraph

Appendix F: Cooperation Activities as Dependent Variables

Table F.1 presents regression results modelling the three issue-specific cooperation activities as dependent variables, namely the degree of information exchange with other advocates on the issue (five point scale, Models F1 and F2), the use of strategy coordination (binary, Models F3 and F4) and concerted lobbying in a ‘signalling coalition’ or alone (binary, Models F5 and F6). As predictors, the models include variables at advocate and issue level, paralleling the analysis in the main article, as well as fixed effects for country. This is in line with previous studies of coalition formation, which have hypothesized that the likelihood of joining forces with others varies depending on organisational and issue characteristics, as well as the institutional context (Hojnacki, 1997; Mahoney, 2007; Mahoney & Baumgartner, 2004).

Importantly, Table F1 shows that advocates are significantly *more* likely to cooperate as economic resources on the issue increase ($p < 0.05$ or below). Furthermore, active cooperation becomes more likely as the importance an actor places on the issue increases ($p < 0.05$ or below), and specialised actors (experts think tanks, institutional originations) are significantly less likely to cooperate than public, identity and hobby organizations ($p < 0.001$). Additionally, there is significantly more information exchange as the relative size of the actor’s camp increases ($p < 0.01$) and there are few significant differences at the country and issue-level.

Table F.1: Multilevel Logistic and Linear regressions of the three separate cooperation activities as Dependent Variables (Coefficients with SEs in parentheses)

	(F1) Freq. of info exchange (Linear)	(F2)	(F3) Strategy Cooperation (Logistic)	(F4) Cooperation (Logistic)	(F5) Signalling (Logistic)	(F6) Coalition (Logistic)
Economic resources	0.30*** (0.05)	0.14** (0.05)	0.66*** (0.10)	0.48*** (0.12)	0.43*** (0.09)	0.26* (0.11)
Salience to advocate		0.29*** (0.05)		0.50*** (0.11)		0.27* (0.11)
Actor type (B ^a : non-econ)						
Economic interests		-0.23 (0.16)		-0.29 (0.33)		-0.32 (0.30)
Other specialised		-0.63*** (0.15)		-1.68*** (0.33)		-1.59*** (0.32)
Support of Public Opinion		0.12 (0.29)		0.66 (0.62)		-0.43 (0.62)
Camp share		0.74** (0.28)		-0.03 (0.58)		0.47 (0.56)
Actor pro change		-0.01 (0.12)		0.28 (0.25)		-0.10 (0.24)
Issue mobilization		0.08 (0.13)		-0.42+ (0.23)		0.00 (0.21)
Country (B: Germany)		0.00		0.00		
UK	0.55+ (0.28)	0.39 (0.28)	0.99* (0.49)	1.23* (0.55)	0.37 (0.49)	0.03 (0.50)
Denmark	0.16 (0.25)	-0.10 (0.24)	-0.40 (0.42)	-0.65 (0.45)	-0.53 (0.44)	-0.63 (0.44)
Sweden	0.27 (0.27)	-0.12 (0.26)	-0.15 (0.44)	-0.63 (0.48)	-0.05 (0.46)	-0.55 (0.46)
Netherlands	0.79** (0.26)	0.43+ (0.25)	0.78+ (0.43)	0.50 (0.47)	0.66 (0.44)	0.39 (0.44)
Constant	2.16*** (0.23)	1.44** (0.51)	-1.64*** (0.41)	-0.93 (0.96)	-1.68*** (0.41)	-1.35 (0.91)
Policy Intercept variance	0.09* (0.05)	0.07* (0.04)	0.17 (0.16)	0.01 (0.12)	0.20 (0.17)	0.01 (0.11)
Number of Advocates (Issues)	435 (46)	385 (45)	470 (47)	415 (46)	470 (47)	415 (46)
AIC	1389	1160	591	469	591	504
chi2	50***	122***	53***	86***	29***	58***

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

^aBaseline: Non-economic interests

Appendix G: Robustness Checks with Alternative Specifications and Operationalisations

G1. Robustness Check with Linear Model

Given that special caution is in order when exploring interaction effects in non-linear models (Ai and Norton 2003), robustness of the results on preference attainment as a binary dependent variable was checked in multi-level linear mixed effects version of Models 1-5 (Wooldridge 2013). The interaction terms stay significant. Margins plots based on Model G3 (not shown) resemble Figures 1 and 2.

Table G.1: Multi-level linear Model of preference attainment (Coefficients with SEs in parentheses)

	(G1)	(G2)	(G3)	(G4)
Success as Preference attainment				
Economic resources	-0.00 (0.02)	0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.06+ (0.03)
Cooperation Index 1	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	
Cooperation Index 2				0.06 (0.06)
Interactions				
Resources # Index 1		-0.01* (0.00)	-0.01* (0.00)	
Resources # Index1				-0.07* (0.03)
Controls				
Actor type (B*: Non-econ)				
Economic interests			0.00 (0.07)	-0.00 (0.07)
Other specialised			-0.04 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.07)
Camp share			0.46*** (0.12)	0.46*** (0.12)
Actor pro change			-0.28*** (0.05)	-0.28*** (0.05)
Support of Public Opinion			0.40** (0.12)	0.40** (0.12)
Salience to advocate			-0.04* (0.02)	-0.04+ (0.02)
Issue mobilization			0.01 (0.07)	0.01 (0.07)
Country (B: Germany)				
UK	-0.07 (0.17)	-0.09 (0.17)	-0.03 (0.14)	-0.03 (0.14)
Denmark	-0.11 (0.15)	-0.11 (0.15)	-0.16 (0.13)	-0.16 (0.13)
Sweden	0.07 (0.16)	0.08 (0.16)	0.03 (0.14)	0.03 (0.14)
Netherlands	-0.04 (0.15)	-0.05 (0.15)	-0.01 (0.13)	-0.01 (0.13)
Constant	0.67*** (0.13)	0.54*** (0.14)	0.34 (0.27)	0.33 (0.27)
Policy Intercept variance	0.06* (0.02)	0.06* (0.02)	0.04* (0.01)	0.04* (0.01)
Number of Advocates (Issues)	333 (44)	333 (44)	333 (44)	333 (44)
AIC	432	430	383	383
chi2	2	6	75***	76***

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 ^aBaseline: Non-economic interests

G2. Robustness check with alternative operationalisations of cooperation: logged indexes¹²

These models test if results hold under the assumption that there are decreasing returns to cooperation.

Table G.2: Multilevel logistic and linear regressions of lobbying success with logged versions of cooperation indexes
(Coefficients with SEs in parentheses)

	(G5)	(G6)	(G7)	(G8)	(G9)	(G10)	(G11)	(G12)
	Success as Preference Attainment				Success as Perceived Influence			
	Multi-level logistic				Multi-level linear			
Economic resources	0.02 (0.13)	0.49+ (0.28)	0.50+ (0.30)	0.50+ (0.28)	0.21 (0.13)	0.51+ (0.27)	0.41 (0.28)	0.49+ (0.25)
Log Cooperation Index 1	-0.20 (0.18)	0.15 (0.26)	0.01 (0.31)		1.45*** (0.18)	1.69*** (0.27)	1.58*** (0.28)	
Log Cooperation Index 1				0.29 (0.75)				4.00*** (0.68)
Interactions								
Resources # Log Coop 1		-0.29+ (0.15)	-0.33* (0.17)			-0.18 (0.15)	-0.15 (0.15)	
Resources #Log Coop 2				-0.86* (0.39)				-0.51 (0.35)
Controls								
Actor type (B*: Non-econ)								
Economic interests			0.01 (0.46)	0.03 (0.46)			0.17 (0.40)	0.20 (0.40)
Other specialised			-0.33 (0.45)	-0.29 (0.46)			0.34 (0.41)	0.34 (0.40)
Camp Share			3.42*** (0.90)	3.44*** (0.90)			-0.62 (0.69)	-0.62 (0.69)
Actor Pro Change			-1.66*** (0.35)	-1.65*** (0.35)			0.15 (0.29)	0.15 (0.29)
Support of Public Opinion			2.27** (0.80)	2.24** (0.80)			1.11 (0.72)	1.14 (0.71)
Importance to advocate			-0.23 (0.15)	-0.24 (0.15)			0.32* (0.13)	0.30* (0.13)
Issue mobilization			0.05 (0.48)	0.04 (0.48)			-0.42+ (0.26)	-0.43+ (0.26)
Country (B: Germany)								
UK	-0.23 (0.94)	-0.32 (0.95)	-0.13 (0.92)	-0.15 (0.93)	-0.84 (0.61)	-0.90 (0.60)	-0.42 (0.61)	-0.40 (0.61)
Denmark	-0.49 (0.84)	-0.51 (0.85)	-1.05 (0.80)	-1.05 (0.81)	0.44 (0.54)	0.43 (0.54)	0.47 (0.52)	0.49 (0.52)
Sweden	0.57 (0.91)	0.60 (0.92)	0.22 (0.90)	0.25 (0.90)	0.50 (0.58)	0.52 (0.57)	0.76 (0.57)	0.79 (0.57)
Netherlands	-0.07 (0.86)	-0.15 (0.87)	0.02 (0.83)	-0.02 (0.84)	0.94+ (0.56)	0.88 (0.55)	0.90+ (0.54)	0.86 (0.54)
Constant	1.02 (0.71)	0.56 (0.76)	-0.61 (1.75)	-0.71 (1.76)	1.74*** (0.52)	1.43* (0.58)	1.44 (1.14)	1.57 (1.13)
Policy Intercept variance	1.88* (0.75)	1.95* (0.77)	1.35* (0.61)	1.39* (0.63)	0.12* (0.21)	0.09* (0.20)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)
N of Advocates (Issues)	333 (44)	333 (44)	333 (44)	333 (44)	333 (44)	333	333 (44)	333 (44)
AIC	410	409	367	366	1589	1589	1591	1589
chi2	3	6	47***	47***	96***	99***	117***	118***

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

^aBaseline: Non-economic interests

¹² Log(index+1) to ensure the value 0 is retained

G3. Alternative operationalisations of cooperation: three separate cooperation items

These models test if results hold for the three cooperation activities individually.

Table G.3: Multilevel Logistic and Linear regressions of Lobbying success with three separate cooperation activities
(Coefficients with SEs in parentheses)

	(G13)	(G14)	(G15)	(G16)	(G17)	(G18)
	Success as Preference attainment			Success as perceived influence		
Economic resources	0.40 (0.28)	0.26 (0.18)	0.11 (0.16)	0.48+ (0.26)	0.36* (0.16)	0.48** (0.16)
Information Exchange	0.00 (0.19)			1.00*** (0.17)		
Strategy Partners		0.16 (0.12)			0.47*** (0.11)	
Signaling Partners			0.15 (0.12)			0.42*** (0.11)
Interactions						
Resources#Info Exchange	-0.15 (0.10)			-0.09 (0.09)		
Resources#Strategy Partners		-0.13* (0.06)			-0.07 (0.05)	
Resources#Signaling Partners			-0.11* (0.06)			-0.13* (0.05)
Controls						
Actor type (B*: Non-econ.)						
Economic interest	-0.38 (0.41)	-0.20 (0.44)	0.05 (0.46)	0.24 (0.36)	0.34 (0.39)	0.02 (0.42)
Other specialised	-0.42 (0.41)	-0.14 (0.44)	-0.15 (0.45)	0.12 (0.36)	0.15 (0.39)	-0.18 (0.42)
Camp share	4.13*** (0.82)	3.43*** (0.83)	3.31*** (0.89)	-0.83 (0.63)	-0.02 (0.65)	-0.22 (0.72)
Actor pro change	-1.59*** (0.32)	-1.83*** (0.34)	-1.66*** (0.35)	0.20 (0.26)	0.01 (0.28)	0.13 (0.30)
Support of Public Opinion	2.10** (0.75)	2.21** (0.76)	2.18** (0.79)	1.19+ (0.67)	0.63 (0.70)	1.18 (0.75)
Salience to advocate	-0.31* (0.14)	-0.25+ (0.14)	-0.29* (0.15)	0.22+ (0.12)	0.43*** (0.13)	0.48*** (0.14)
Advocate mobilization	0.09 (0.44)	0.22 (0.47)	0.01 (0.48)	-0.52* (0.23)	-0.47+ (0.25)	-0.44 (0.27)
Country (B: Germany)						
UK	-0.12 (0.84)	0.34 (0.92)	-0.24 (0.92)	-0.25 (0.56)	-0.51 (0.60)	-0.18 (0.64)
Denmark	-0.94 (0.76)	-0.53 (0.78)	-1.05 (0.80)	0.16 (0.49)	0.14 (0.50)	0.34 (0.55)
Sweden	0.25 (0.82)	0.81 (0.88)	0.29 (0.89)	0.74 (0.52)	0.35 (0.54)	0.69 (0.59)
Netherlands	-0.00 (0.78)	0.53 (0.82)	-0.11 (0.83)	0.76 (0.49)	0.83 (0.52)	1.07+ (0.56)
Constant	-1.43 (1.81)	-1.99 (1.67)	-0.47 (1.72)	0.72 (1.26)	2.47* (1.08)	2.11+ (1.15)
Policy Intercept variance	1.23* (0.51)	1.46* (0.61)	1.36* (0.61)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)
Number of Advocates (Issues)	385 (45)	364 (45)	333 (44)	385 (45)	364 (45)	333 (44)
AIC	420	392	370	1824	1752	1622
chi2	55***	52***	46***	131***	98***	76***

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 ^aBaseline: Non-economic interests

G.4 Robustness Check with an alternative operationalisation of resources: Staff on the issue

Economic resources are here operationalized based on a survey question on full time equivalent staff that has worked on the issue (see Appendix C). This number is logged due to a skewed distribution. Due to many missing values, this reduces the number of observations to n=163 in the full models.

Table G.4: Multilevel Logistic and Linear regressions of Lobbying success with Staff Resources on the issue
(Coefficients with SEs in parentheses)

	(G19)	(G20)	(G21)	(G22)	(G23)	(G24)	(G25)	(G26)
	Success as preference attainment				Success as perceived influence			
Lobbying Staff on issue (log)	-0.13 (0.35)	0.34 (0.59)	0.47 (0.55)	0.64 (0.63)	0.66* (0.30)	1.01* (0.48)	0.94+ (0.50)	1.04+ (0.56)
Cooperation Index 1	0.01 (0.05)	0.09 (0.09)	0.07 (0.09)		0.15*** (0.04)	0.22** (0.08)	0.22** (0.08)	
Cooperation Index 2				0.51 (0.66)				1.73** (0.58)
Interactions								
Staff # Index1		-0.06 (0.06)	-0.08 (0.06)			-0.05 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)	
Staff #Index2				-0.62 (0.42)				-0.52 (0.39)
Controls								
Actor type (B*: Non-econ.)								
Economic interests			-0.08 (0.59)	-0.10 (0.59)			0.23 (0.53)	0.25 (0.52)
Other specialised			-1.28 (0.79)	-1.28 (0.78)			0.83 (0.69)	0.92 (0.68)
Camp share			4.19** (1.47)	4.23** (1.47)			-0.09 (0.96)	-0.17 (0.96)
Actor pro change			-0.10 (0.50)	-0.10 (0.50)			0.69 (0.42)	0.68 (0.42)
Support of Public Opinion			4.85*** (1.39)	4.88*** (1.39)			2.10* (1.06)	2.11* (1.06)
Salience to advocate			-0.03 (0.23)	-0.02 (0.23)			0.38+ (0.21)	0.35+ (0.21)
Advocate mobilization			0.90+ (0.53)	0.92+ (0.53)			-0.32 (0.38)	-0.32 (0.38)
Country (B: Germany)								
UK	-1.34 (1.37)	-1.20 (1.38)	-1.20 (1.10)	-1.16 (1.10)	-1.52+ (0.89)	-1.43 (0.90)	-1.20 (0.89)	-1.26 (0.89)
Denmark	-1.53 (1.23)	-1.36 (1.24)	-2.65* (1.03)	-2.61* (1.04)	-0.41 (0.77)	-0.29 (0.79)	-0.44 (0.78)	-0.44 (0.78)
Sweden	0.07 (1.32)	0.23 (1.34)	0.05 (1.10)	0.08 (1.10)	-0.47 (0.84)	-0.41 (0.85)	-0.13 (0.86)	-0.11 (0.85)
Netherlands	-0.99 (1.23)	-0.83 (1.24)	-0.83 (0.98)	-0.77 (0.98)	0.31 (0.79)	0.44 (0.81)	0.58 (0.80)	0.54 (0.80)
Constant	1.30 (1.12)	0.51 (1.35)	-6.46** (2.42)	-6.66** (2.44)	3.56*** (0.80)	2.99** (1.00)	1.35 (1.79)	1.24 (1.81)
Policy Intercept variance	3.22+ (1.76)	3.27+ (1.78)	0.84 (0.88)	0.82 (0.87)	0.24* (0.42)	0.26* (0.47)	0.00* (0.00)	0.01* (0.39)
Number of Advocates (Issues)	164 (40)	164 (40)	163 (40)	163 (40)	173 (40)	173 (40)	163 (40)	163 (40)
AIC	206	207	190	190	838	839	791	790
chi2	3	4	25*	26*	34***	35***	50***	52***

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

^aBaseline: Non-economic interests