Inclusive selectorates, unrepresentative candidate lists?

On inclusivity versus representativeness in candidate selection processes

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Abstract

Women are underrepresented in legislatures. Candidate selection procedures are often referred to for a better understanding of this representational problem. This study focuses on the role of party members, particularly relevant as inclusive candidate selection methods become more popular. Theory suggests a negative relationship between the inclusiveness of the selectorate and the representativeness of candidate lists due to 'representational' and 'coordination' problems. These mechanisms are tested with a ranked conjoint experiment among Dutch party members, exploring preferences for candidates varying according to gender, age, party involvement, and political experience. For the coordination problem, we find that lists in general are gender-balanced regardless of the role respondents who create it. The findings about the representational mechanisms reveal a preference for women candidates in general, but incumbency and party activity outweigh gender. Since both attributes are not evenly distributed among men and women in society, women party members still are held to a double bind, contributing to the representational problem in representative democracies.

Keywords: candidate selection; intra-party democracy; inclusivity; representation; gender; conjoint experiment

1. Introduction

Women are underrepresented in most legislatures in electoral, representative democracies. One major explanation for this underrepresentation focuses on the candidate recruitment chain: how do ordinary citizens become elected politicians (Bjarnegård, 2013; Kenny, 2013; Norris & Lovenduski, 1995)? And does this recruitment and selection process contain specific hurdles that are higher and harder to overcome for women than for men? In this context, particular attention is paid to the candidate selection procedure by which political parties select who will be on their candidate lists, and on which position. Studying candidate selection is essential since it generates insights into the antechamber of parliament (Hillebrand, 1992).

In the 21st century, candidate selection procedures have become more inclusive because of a democratization trend within parties. Individual party members now have a more influential role compared to three or more decades ago (e.g. Bille, 2001; Pennings & Hazan, 2001; Rahat & Hazan, 2001; Voerman, 2005). Theory suggests that such more inclusive selection procedures result in less representative candidate lists regarding gender (Hazan & Rahat, 2005), but studies find mixed empirical results regarding this relationship (e.g. Fortin-Rittberger & Rittberger, 2015; Rahat et al., 2008; Vandeleene, 2014). These inconclusive findings may be explained by the fact that, to date, the underlying mechanisms and dynamics impacting on the relation between inclusiveness and representativeness have not been comprehensively tested in the context of candidate selection procedures. This paper tries to contribute to this debate on women representation and fill this gap by empirically testing the coordination and representational mechanisms that are assumed to explain the trade-off between inclusivity and representativeness.

I examine how individual party members compile candidate lists via a rank conjoint experiment in the Dutch case. In the Netherlands, there is a large number of political parties (after the 2021 general elections, 17 parties were elected, out of 37 parties participating) and parties are relatively free to decide how to design their own candidate selection procedures (Louwerse & van Vonno, 2021; for an introduction to the Dutch party and electoral system, see Andeweg et al., 2020). Dutch parties have, like many other political parties, adopted a plethora of plebiscitary and assembly-based forms of intra-party democracy that have increased the inclusivity of the party (Poguntke et al., 2016; Voerman, 2005). Regarding candidate selection procedures, I will focus on the first form – i.e. plebiscitary intra-party democracy – where individual party members rank candidates on a list in a multi-stage primary. It is especially in these circumstances when party members can vote and rank many different candidates separate from other party members, that the key mechanisms will most likely be visible.

This article first addresses a gap in the existing literature by examining the decision-making processes of party members in candidate selection, particularly in the context of complex PR systems. While there is ample research on how voters evaluate and choose between two candidates (Schwarz

& Coppock, 2019; Teele et al., 2018), little is known about what exactly party members value in candidates (but see Berz & Jankowski, 2022; Jankowski & Rehmert, 2022; Rehmert, 2020). This study enriches our understanding of the evaluation process of party members, who have become main actors in intra-party decision-making.

Secondly, this paper unveils the presence of a subtle gender bias in inclusive forms of candidate selection. Although party members do not directly discriminate against women candidates, the study shows that party members highly value characteristics such as political and party experience. In a political world that for centuries is dominated by men, this dynamic creates a 'double bind' (Teele et al., 2018), as these resources are often less accessible to women.

Thirdly, this article presents an innovative methodological approach to test decision-making of party members by a rank-conjoint design. This experiment serves as a valuable step forward in discovering how we measure and operationalize the underlying mechanisms in party members' decision-making.

The paper starts with a sketch of intra-party democracy, with a focus on the consequences of inclusivity on the composition and consequently representativeness of the candidate list. Hypotheses are developed from the literature on preferential voting and candidate evaluation; we expect that party members vote for candidates who are similar to them regarding sociodemographic characteristics. Also, a hypothesis based on classic collective action problems about whether the party or the individual interest prevails will be tested. Subsequently, the methods section describes the selection and relevance of the Dutch case and the research design, i.e. a conjoint rank experiment. I present the results and in the conclusion and discussion section, I discuss the findings and their main implications.

2. Democratizing candidate selection and its consequences

Candidate selection procedures are complex multi-staged processes (Tuttnauer & Rahat, 2021) containing two relevant dimensions: the centralization and the inclusivity of the selectorate (Rahat and Hazan 2001). The inclusivity dimension concerns the actor or actors who play a main role: is the party leader (almost) solely in charge of selection (exclusive) or do ordinary individual party members or even non-members have influence too (inclusive)? The democratization trend within political parties in many advanced Western democracies is in the direction of candidate selection processes becoming inclusive: more and more people have a direct say in who is selected as a candidate at general elections (Bille, 2001; Pennings & Hazan, 2001; Voerman, 2005).

This trend of broadening the so-called selectorate impacts the behaviour of politicians (e.g. Sozzi, 2021), the participation of party members (e.g. Cross and Pruysers 2019; Rahat and Hazan 2007), but also the representativeness of the list of selected candidates. There seems to be a democratic trade-off between inclusiveness and representativeness. Rahat et al. (2008) empirically tested this

relation between inclusiveness and representation and showed that, in Israel, exclusive candidate selection procedures were indeed *more* beneficial for women than inclusive procedures. This intriguing finding inspired other scholars. Vandeleene (2014) examined Belgian parties and concluded that the most exclusive parties only gave 'average chances to women on its lists' (2014, p. 342). For Iceland, Indriðason and Kristinsson (2015) showed that women were disadvantaged by primaries (i.e., the most inclusive procedure) for competitive seats. However, there was an overall positive effect of inclusiveness on the number of women winning seats in the legislature. Gauja and Cross (2015) studied the Australian case and found that inclusiveness has a negative effect on representativeness for a single party, with no effect for the other parties. They suggested that representativeness might not be influenced by the inclusiveness of candidate selection procedures per se but by the culture of and within respective parties.

For the European Parliament elections of 2009, the results were also mixed. Luhiste (2015) found that inclusiveness did not have a statistically significant effect on the number of women on candidate lists. However, Fortin-Rittberger and Rittberger (2015) came to a different conclusion for the same elections: in the initial nomination stage, inclusiveness positively affected the representativeness of the candidate list, but in the final stage they did not find any effect. Pruysers et al. (2017) showed a negative relationship between highly inclusive selectorates and the number of women, but when they controlled for system-level variables, this effect disappeared. Lastly, in Italy, a country where primaries have been frequently used, various studies found positive effects of inclusiveness on representativeness (Regalia & Valbruzzi, 2016; Seddone & Rombi, 2018).

Overall, the empirical results are mixed and suggest complicating but understudied factors as regards the effect of inclusiveness. First, most candidate selection procedures are complex multi-stage processes in which different selectorates play a role (Tuttnauer & Rahat, 2021). There may also be a time dimension or sequence effect: Fortin-Rittberger and Rittberger (2015) show that the effect of inclusiveness differs per stage. Therefore, in analysing this relationship, one needs to be careful and very specific about the stage and its particular selectorate that is being studied. Secondly, the relationship between inclusiveness and representatives seems to be conditional on the 'will of the party' or culture of and within a party to achieve gender equality (Gauja & Cross, 2015; Kenny & Verge, 2015).

The question is how we, in our research design, can do justice to the complex multi-stage character and party ideology and culture. The above-mentioned studies often test the relationship between inclusiveness and representativeness, building on the mechanisms behind this relation. However, the mechanisms themselves have not been extensively studied, at least in the context of candidate selection procedures. It could be the case that the mechanisms do not hold in every context. Therefore, we need to more comprehensively think through and empirically test the mechanisms that

may explain the link between inclusiveness and representativeness, i.e., the representation problem and the coordination problem.

3. Mechanisms behind the effect of inclusivity

3.1 The coordination mechanism

The coordination problem is arguably the main reason for inclusive selectorates producing unrepresentative lists. This can be explained by two differing characteristics concerning coordination between inclusive and exclusive selectorates: 1) deliberation versus voting; and 2) the party interest versus the individual interest.

As regards deliberation versus voting, in an exclusive selectorate decisions are most likely made after deliberation in small groups or committees, while in inclusive selectorates, decisions are often made by many more persons involved, as rule via anonymous ballots (Rahat, Hazan, and Katz 2008). Both the size of the group of decision-makers (small versus large) and, more importantly, the way of deciding (open deliberation versus anonymous voting) matters. First, there is no communication between all or the majority of party members when they need to vote, which makes it difficult to create an effective 'package deal' or compromise, such as a balanced list in terms of gender or expertise. Secondly, even if a compromise is made by most of the people, the anonymity of the secret ballot decision makes it impossible to enforce compliance which creates the opportunity to defect easily and without any sanctions. Thirdly, the nature of a membership ballot means that there are few signals 'as the process unfolds' – most often the first public result is at the same time the final result - based on which a candidate can adjust their voting behaviour or reliably predict the outcome (Rahat, Hazan, and Katz 2008).

The second major difference, and the focus of this paper, concerns the nature of the task: a small committee has the task of creating a list for the party as a collective body, while party members are asked about their *individual* preferences. In the first case, the overall result seems to structure the decision-making process, while in the latter the individual motives and preferences may be more dominant. These differences were recently found in German parties: party delegates were more concerned about the 'external environment' of the party, compared to ordinary individual party members (Rehmert, 2020). This may also indicate that party members higher up in the 'party hierarchy' may care more about the collective party interest than the rank-and-file members do. Since a gender-balanced list can prevent a loss of votes (Kittilson, 2006), it would be in the party's general and collective interest to create a gender-balanced list.

Another reason why exclusive selectorates may be more prone to create a gender-balanced list is that they can much more easily be held accountable for creating an unrepresentative or otherwise flawed candidate list (Caul, 1999). The composition of an exclusive selectorate may be known to others,

and the members of this selectorate are aware of this. Also, when there is an exclusive selectorate, actors within or outside the party have a well-defined central target to lobby for more gender representation (Matland and Studlar 1996).

Considering these differences between exclusive and inclusive selectorates and the effects they have on individual behaviour, we expect that if a party member is asked to individually create the candidate list for the party, they will let the party interest prevail. However, if a party member needs to compile and vote for a candidate list as a member of a much larger group, the party members will be led by their individual interests, resulting in a less balanced list. The hypothesis is therefore as follows:

> *H1: Party members create a more gender-balanced list if they have the sole responsibility to compile a candidate list, compared to party members who anonymously vote for the candidate list.*

3.2 Representational mechanism

Recently attention has increased for the role of party members in candidate selection procedures (see e.g., Berz & Jankowski, 2022; Jankowski & Rehmert, 2022; Rehmert, 2020; Schindler, 2020), but we still do not fully understand the electoral calculus of party members at internal electoral processes. Research on preferential voting is a source of inspiration for understanding of how voters choose between candidates of the same party (see e.g., Nagtzaam 2019; Van Erkel 2019; Wauters, Thijssen, and Van Erkel 2020). In this literature, different models explaining preference voting are suggested. The identity model is promising. This identity model assumes that voters are inclined to cast a preference vote for candidates who are similar to them on characteristics such as, for example, gender or age (Van Erkel 2019). Two reasons may explain this phenomenon, that are based on social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). First, voters could vote for a certain candidate based on solidarity or loyalty towards candidates from their 'in-group'. Second, voters might expect that candidates who are similar to them, will share the same experiences and, consequently, represent their interests in a better way (Erzeel & Caluwaerts, 2015).

Although voters and not party members are central in the social identity model, there are good reasons to expect that this model is also applicable to an intraparty context. Especially in the situation of candidate selection, we expect that sociodemographic characteristics are an important explanatory factor. First, when party members are asked to rank candidates on a candidate list, they must rank a large number of candidates – in the Netherlands, this can be 80 –, making it impossible to collect full information about all candidates. As a result, identity characteristics may be more salient and can be used as proxies; more generally, in a low information context voters often rely on candidate

characteristics, such as gender (Sanbonmatsu, 2002). Secondly, an important predictor for vote choice in general elections is ideology. However, research on preference voting indicates that ideology does not play any major role in deciding on which candidate a voter will cast their preference vote (P. Van Erkel, 2017). And although candidate primaries are sometimes a way used to solve internal disputes (Astudillo & Detterbeck, 2020), there is much more reason to believe that ideology is not dominant or even prevalent in candidate selection processes (in the Netherlands). Moreover, previous research indicated that there were no clear-cut ideological disputes or factions within Dutch parties (Van Holsteyn et al., 2017). This creates "a pick-and-mix with something for everyone" resulting in "remarkably high levels of unanimity on issues and in ideological terms within Dutch parties" (Van Holsteyn et al., 2017, p. 480).

The potential effect of 'descriptive likeness' has already been found among German party leaders when they select candidates, although it did not matter 'a great deal' regarding similarity in age and education (Berz & Jankowski, 2022). Concerning gender, the effect was clearly visible: women party leaders were more favourable towards women as candidates. Based on the social identity model, our hypothesis is as follows:

> *H2a[1]: Party members will place candidates that are similar with regard to gender higher on the list.*

Political reality, however, may be more complicated. Rehmert (2020), for example, found that German delegates as selectors did follow cues of resemblance on dimensions such as age and education, but for gender; he found that women candidates were preferred by both women and men (Rehmert, 2020). Also, Austrian party elites showed a preference for all women candidates, but this effect was stronger for women party elites (Jankowski & Rehmert, 2022). This concurs with research on candidate evaluations showing that female politicians are evaluated more positively than male politicians by voters (Schwarz & Coppock, 2019; Teele et al., 2018; for the Dutch case, see Van Dijk & Van Holsteyn, 2022). If this is also true for the evaluation of candidates in intra-party membership ballots, we should expect to find that women are preferred in general. Besides this positivity bias, it is found that there may also be a gender bonus, meaning that women are even more positive towards other women than men. Since women are historically a disadvantaged group, women will be more aware of their group membership and as a consequence will be more likely to vote for women (Erzeel & Caluwaerts, 2015). Therefore, we expect the following:

[1] In the pre-registration these hypotheses are numbered as H1a, H1b and H1c of study 2.

H2b: All party members will place women candidates higher on the list.

H2c: All party members will place women candidates higher on the list, but this effect is stronger for women members than for men members.

3.3 General Candidate Selection Premises

For the understanding of the relation between inclusiveness and representation, it is important to factor in two important predictors for a candidate's ballot position: political experience and party experience. In earlier studies, the explanatory value of these factors has been established (Rehmert, 2020; Schwindt-Bayer, 2005; van Dijk, 2023; Verge & Claveria, 2018). Party members favour candidates with political experience since this is a cue that this person is capable of being a politician. Having political experience signals to party members that a candidate has the right qualities to be a politician. However, research indicates that this advantage is not the same for men and women candidates (Verge & Wiesehomeier, 2019); for voters, women sometimes need to have more qualifications than men (Mo, 2015). Because of these 'double standards' (Teele et al., 2018), I expect that the positive effect of political experience is less strong for women than for men candidates.

H3a: Party members will rank candidates with more political experience higher than candidates with less political experience.

H3b: Party members will rank candidates with more political experience higher than candidates with less political experience, but this effect will be stronger for male candidates than for female candidates.

A similar logic applies to candidates having internal party experience, meaning that they have 'served' the party and gained relevant experience in a party-political organizational context. This is a different quality than having political experience since it concerns activities within the party. Candidates who have been active party members signal that they have experience in for instance campaigns or that they are committed and loyal to the party and party goals (Rehmert, 2020). Verge and Claveria (2018) found that having served the party resulted in a higher list position, but this effect was less strong for women than for men. 'These resources are not only more accessible to men but also more valued in men' (Verge & Claveria, 2018, p. 545). Therefore, we expect that the positive effect of having party experience will be stronger for men than for women.

H4a: Party members will rank candidates with more party experience higher than candidates with less party experience.

H4b: Party members will rank candidates with more party experience higher than candidates with less party experience, but this effect will be stronger for male candidates than for female candidates.

4. Methodology

4.1 Case description: The Netherlands

The Netherlands is a multi-party representative democratic system with, after the elections of 2021, 17 parties elected in parliament.[2] Women have never been equally represented. After the 2021 elections of the *Tweede Kamer* (Second Chamber of Dutch Parliament), 40.7 per cent of the MPs are women (IPU, 2022). This underrepresentation of women is intriguing since the electoral rules should be beneficial for women: the highly proportional system (Rule, 1987), the simple opportunity to cast preference votes (Golder et al., 2017), and the existence of a large multi-member district of 150 seats, are theoretically in favour of women candidates (Matland, 2005). Moreover, women do not seem to be particularly harmed during elections: they actually receive more preference votes than men (Nagtzaam, 2021) and Dutch citizens do not show a particular dislike against women politicians (Van Dijk & Van Holsteyn, 2022).

Since the underrepresentation of women is likely not the result of the elections per se but is probably constituted in a preceding stage, i.e., the creation and composition of the candidate lists, it is crucial to focus on political parties and their internal procedures. Dutch political parties are to a large extent free to decide how they design their procedures (Hazan & Voerman, 2006), since there are only a few simple national rules[3] regarding candidate selection and there is no legislated gender quota. Parties may enlist 50 to 80 names on the ballot (Kiesraad, n.d.).[4] Although there is the option to cast preference votes, the electoral system is rather closed because of the height of the electoral quota. The order of the candidate list proposed by the party is of utmost importance for candidates to get elected; in 2021, about 28 percent of all voters casted a preference vote, but only three (women) candidates were able to get elected purely as an effective result of these preferences votes.

Only one of the currently (2021) seventeen elected parties has a voluntary gender quota: Volt pursues gender parity by alternating men and women (or non-binary persons) (Volt, 2021). If they cannot comply with these rules, the party will not participate in the elections. The Greens (GroenLinks)

[2] For the upcoming general elections of November 22, 2023, 26 parties are on the ballot.

[3] You need to be 18 or older to get elected and you need to have Dutch citizenship (Kieswet, 2020). There are also rules regarding the lists, new parties or parties that have 15 seats or less can propose a list of 50 candidates, a party that has 16 seats or more, can submit a list of 80 candidates (Kiesraad, n.d.)

[4] In total, there are 20 electoral districts, which creates the possibility for parties to present different ballot lists in each district. However, most parties present either the same list in each district.

and the Labor Party (PvdA) do have strong informal norms to achieve a gender-balanced list (van Dijk, 2023).

Most Dutch parties have a multi-staged candidate selection procedure (Hazan & Voerman, 2006; van Dijk, 2023), following roughly the same sequential stages. First, a party executive appoints a candidate selection committee. Party members can apply to become a candidate; in some parties, it is possible to nominate candidates. The committee interviews potential candidates and ranks the candidates on the list (either on their own or in collaboration with the party executive). Afterwards, party members can change the draft candidate list by voting at a party conference or in a referendum (Louwerse & van Vonno, 2021; van Dijk, 2023). The involvement of party members in the candidate selection procedure did get a boost in the early 2000s when several Dutch parties democratized their internal procedures (Voerman & Van Schuur, 2011). An overview of the inclusivity score of each Dutch political party in 2017 and 2021 can be found in Figure A1 in the appendix.

As is the case in many other countries (Van Biezen et al., 2012) Dutch party members make up a relatively small percentage (about 2.3%) of the electorate (Den Ridder et al., 2019; Van Biezen et al., 2012). Dutch party members are predominantly male, highly educated, and relatively old (Den Ridder et al., 2019). All Dutch parties show a major or minor gender gap, i.e., there are more male than female party members, compared to their electorate (Den Ridder, Koole, and Van Holsteyn 2019).

4.2 Experimental design

To test the hypotheses a rank conjoint survey experiment has been conducted.[5] The first experimental layer deals with the coordination problem. Respondents have to rank ten different candidates in two different scenarios. In one scenario (the "party leader scenario") they are told that they need to rank the candidates in their hypothetical capacity of party leader. This list would be the final list that the party would use on the ballot. In the second scenario, respondents are told that they must rank the candidates as if it were a party referendum: all individual party members have the right to vote, and all these votes pooled together would determine the final list order (the "party member scenario"). The exact wording of the instructions and the question wording of the ranking task can be found in the appendix.

After the ranking task, respondents were asked in a multiple-choice question in which role they had to rank the candidates. 267 respondents (18%) failed to recognize the right treatment condition and were therefore excluded from the analysis.

[5] The experiment has been approved by the Ethical Committee of the University of Antwerp and has been pre-registered on the OSF platform: https://osf.io/2tb6s.

The second layer of the experiment is the conjoint design. Conjoint experiments have become increasingly popular in political science to test the causal effects of multiple attributes on choices or evaluations (Bansak et al., 2021). Most experiments are forced-choice conjoint experiments where respondents choose between two candidates. However, this forced choice between only two candidates does not resemble how party members vote for the candidate list in a PR system (Jankowski & Rehmert, 2022). To (partly) overcome this limitation, respondents rank 10 candidates. Adding extra information increases the complexity of the task, but previous studies show that respondents tend to reduce their cognitive processing costs by ignoring information they deem less relevant (Jenke et al., 2021). I present my respondents with information about the number of safe seats. Respondents will be told that in the most recent poll, the party was estimated to get 5-7 seats.[6] This way, respondents will understand that the top 5 seats will be more or less safe, position 6 and 7 are rather uncertain, while candidates in position 8 to 10 will likely not be elected.

All candidates are described using four attributes: gender (2), age (3), experience within the party (2), political experience (3), media experience (2), migration background (2) and policy expertise (6). The attributes are summarized in Table 1. In the appendix Figure A2 shows that the randomization of the attributes was indeed random.

[6] In the Dutch case many media nowadays use the poll-of-polls Peilingwijzer, that presents the results for parties in these between x and y seats format.

Table 1. List of random treatments in the conjoint experiment

Dimensions	Attributes
Gender	Woman
	Man
Age	18-40
	41-65
	65+
Party experience	Active party member
	Not active party member
Political experience	Incumbent
	Local politician
	No experience
Media experience	Yes
	No
Migration background	Migration background
	No migration background
Policy expertise	Law
	Education
	Health care
	Defence
	Climate
	Economy

4.3 Operationalization

To test the first hypothesis concerning the coordination challenge, a measure that captures a 'gender-balanced list' is necessary. I will use two pre-registered measures. The first measure is the median position of the women candidate. The second measure is the difference between the mean list position of men and women. A low score indicates that the list position of men and women is (close to being) gender-balanced, and a high score indicates that the list is not ranked in a gender-balanced way. The absolute difference score can be calculated as follows:

$$Difference = |ALP_{women} - ALP_{men}|$$

Where the list position (ALP_{woman}) is calculated by the following formula:

$$ALP_{woman} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n}(Rank_i + \ ... + \ Rank_n)}{n}$$

An example of these calculations is presented in Table A1 in the appendix.

4.4 Sample

I contacted all parties that were elected in the Second Chamber of Dutch Parliament in 2021 to participate in this study, excluding the PVV since this party does not have individual party members except for party leader Geert Wilders. Eight parties agreed to participate and to distribute the survey among a sample of their party members; however, the procedure of the survey distribution varied slightly (see Table A2). Parties randomly selected a sample in Excel based on a guided manual from the researcher. Only VOLT did not opt for a sample but distributed the survey link in their newsletter to party members and on their internal member platform. The other parties distributed the survey in a separate email. In total, the gross sample size is 15,678. The response rate is relatively low, as is to be expected with such a survey in the Netherlands: 998 respondents finished the conjoint experiment and the stimulus check and 932 members finished the complete survey (see Figure A2). A complete overview of the response rate and a comparison of the party members in our dataset with the population of party members, can be found in the appendix (see table A3 in the appendix).

5. Results

5.1 The coordination mechanism

To test the first hypothesis, whether party members would create less gender-balanced lists than party leaders, I use two pre-registered dependent variables: the median list position of women and the difference between the average list positions of men and women. The mean median position of women is 4.7 and the mean median position of men is 5.2. This indicates that women candidates get a slightly higher/better list position since a lower score means a better position on the list. The mean difference score is 1.5, indicating that women get a slightly higher average list position than men.

These descriptive statistics are informative and relevant, but do not yet distinguish the different scenarios in which respondents had to create lists. If we make the distinction between the two treatment conditions, i.e. (1) as the party leader and (2) as an individual party member, we can see in Figure 1 that both the difference score and the median rank of women candidates are not very different between the two treatments, which is not in line with the hypothesis. A simple t-test confirmed that the difference between the two groups in the difference score ($t(569.54) = 0.40$, $p = 0.6866$) and the median list position ($t(578.69) = -0.07$ $p = .95$) was statistically not significant.



Figure 1. Density plots displaying the two dependent variables of hypothesis 1 – difference score and median rank – for each treatment.

As pre-registered, a linear regression model is run with the supply of women candidates available and the experimental treatment explaining the median rank position of women and the difference score. As an explorative extra control variable, parties are included in the analysis. In Figure 2 the coefficients are plotted with the party variable as control; an anova test showed that including this variable significantly improved the fit of the model (for the full models see Table A4 in appendix). As expected, based on the descriptive statistics and the t-tests, the effect of the treatment variable does not have an effect. The supply of women does influence the median list position: when there are more women available, the median rank position of women increases. There do not seem to be large party differences, except for members of the SGP. Being a member of this party results in a higher median rank position for women. This is not surprising, given the fact that the SGP has never had any women on the national candidate list.

Since we have information about the functions of the respondents within the party, it is possible to see whether there are differences between respondents that have served in candidate selection committees before or had a function within the party (as part of the local, regional or national party board) and to what extent the treatment worked differently for them. There are no significant differences here as well (see appendix table A5 and Figure A3), indicating that both on the experimental data and observational data, we do not find differences in how party members create candidate lists. In short, based on these data, we cannot find evidence that supports hypothesis 1: in the party leader scenario respondents do not create a more gender-balanced list compared to the party member scenario.



Figure 2. Coefficient plot showing the models testing hypothesis 1. Full model presented in Table A4 in appendix.

5.2 The representational mechanism

The other hypotheses focus on the representational mechanism and revolve around the descriptive characteristics of both the respondent and the candidates. The rank variable is not a linear variable but consists of 10 different categories, one category for each rank. Therefore, we use multinomial regression analysis to estimate the effects of the conjoint attribute levels. In the appendix the classic estimation strategies for conjoint experiments are presented, which are Average Marginal Component Effects and Marginal Means, both are based on OLS linear regression. The outcomes of these estimation strategies overlap with the effects found in the multinominal regression analysis.

We first have a look at the full multinominal logistic regression model as plotted in Figure 3 (Table A6 in appendix), and we see that the gender of the candidate is only significantly positive for the first five positions, i.e. the seats that were indicated as 'safe' seats. This means that being a woman results in a higher probability of being ranked on that position compared to male candidates. This finding empirically supports hypothesis 2b, which stated that women, in general, are ranked higher than men.



Figure 3. Coefficient plot of the multinominal regression models. Full model shown in appendix.

To test hypothesis 2a, we include an interaction effect of the candidate's gender and the respondent's gender. Both the main effect of the respondent's gender and the interaction effect are statistically insignificant (see Table A2 in the appendix). The effect of the candidate's gender remains similar to the previous model. As shown in Figure 4, the predicted probabilities show that there is no clear relationship between the candidate's gender and the respondent's gender. Therefore, based on this data we can conclude that women candidates are favoured for higher positions on the list compared to men. Moreover, we do not see an effect of gender similarity voting: both men and women

favour women candidates more. Since the preference for women candidates is not significantly stronger with women party members, we reject hypothesis 2c.

Hypothesis 3a and 3b are about a) the effect of having political experience and b) whether this is gendered, i.e., whether the effect of having political experience is different for men and women. To



Figure 4. Graphs displaying predicted probabilities of the interaction between the candidate's gender and the respondent's gender for each rank. Full model shown in appendix.

test the effect of having political experience, we look at the base model in Figure 3. We indeed see that, compared to having no experience, some experience as an incumbent or a local politician does have a significant positive effect. We thus find support for hypothesis 3a: having political experience (either at the national or the local level) has a positive effect on the list position.

The question then is whether this effect is gendered, i.e., whether the effect is less positive for women than for men, as hypothesized in H3b. To test this, we interact the candidate's gender and political experience. None of the interaction effects are statistically significant (see Figure 5).



Figure 5. Graphs displaying predicted probabilities of the interaction between the candidate's gender and the candidate's political experience for each rank. Full model shown in appendix.

Finally, the fourth model is about having (internal) party experience as a candidate. Again, we can use the base model in Figure 3 and see that compared to being a non-active party member, being an active party member has a significant positive effect for almost all positions except for rank 9. We thus find evidence in our data in support of hypothesis 4a. To test whether this effect is gendered, we repeat the same estimation strategy as for hypothesis 3b. The effects are plotted below in Figure 6. As can been seen in Figure 6 and in Table A2, there is no significant interaction effect. Based on this data, we thus find no support for hypothesis 4b.



Figure 6. Graphs displaying predicted probabilities of the interaction between the candidate's gender and the candidate's party experience for each rank. Full model shown in appendix.

Conclusion and discussion

This paper aimed to empirically test two important mechanisms underlying the relation of inclusivity of candidate selection procedures and the representativeness of the candidate list. First, the coordination mechanism suggests that the decrease in representativeness results from individual party members who vote according to their personal interest rather than the party's interest, which would lead to a less gender-balanced list. However, in this paper, we do not find empirical support for this expectation. Regardless of whether respondents are positioned in the role of party member or party leader, they created a gender-balanced list with even a slight preference for women candidates.

The second mechanism, i.e. the representational mechanism, revolves around the idea that by increasing the selectorate to include all party members, the selectorate itself becomes less representative. Consequently, it is argued that this unrepresentative selectorate will produce unrepresentative lists because people tend to vote for people that they are similar to: unrepresentativeness breeds unrepresentativeness. However, for this mechanism, we do not find empirical support. Interestingly, both men and women showed a preference for women candidates. Moreover, respondents valued criteria such as party activism and political experience and they did not evaluate these traits differently in women and men candidates.

In sum, the findings of this study do not provide strong evidence for the theorized mechanisms underlying the relation between inclusivity and representativeness. Nevertheless, this paper does bring three important contributions to the field. Firstly, it addresses a gap in the existing literature by examining the decision-making processes of party members in candidate selection, particularly in the context of complex PR systems. It shows that Dutch party members prefer criteria such as having political experience and experience within the party.

Secondly, this article shows that, although gender bias might at first glance be absent, it is in fact present but more subtle. Interestingly, and contrary to the hypotheses, women candidates are preferred and not evaluated differently than men. Party members thus do not seem to directly discriminate or use double standards, i.e., using the same criteria differently for men and women. However, it is important to note that it could be more challenging for women candidates to obtain these political resources in the first place. So, the importance of party and political experience can be understood as a 'double bind' (Teele et al., 2018). Women, for example, often still have the main caring responsibility and have therefore less time to spend their time as an active party member.

Lastly, another contribution of this study is the use of a relatively new methodological approach to test decision-making of party members by a rank-conjoint design. The experiment served as an imperfect but valuable step forward in discovering how we measure and operationalize the theoretical mechanisms in party members' decision-making. We learned that ranking ten candidates was a

complex task, which resulted in a significant drop-out of respondents. Future studies considering ranked conjoint experiments should take this into account.

A sceptic scholar can argue that this paper predominantly consists of null findings., Still, the more optimistic scholar may argue that it can and will bring the literature forward. For example, it allows us to theorize about what did not work and what should be done differently. One potential explanation for the null findings regarding the coordination mechanism might be found in the way it was operationalized and measured. In this study the coordination mechanism revolved solely around the difference between the party interest and the individual interest, assuming that respondents would know that a representative list would be an electoral advantage. However, it could have been that individual party members would take this into account as well. It would thus be interesting to study the distinction between individual party members' interests and the party elite's interests. A future study should also look into the deliberative versus voting component of the coordination mechanism. In the scope of this survey, it was not possible to simulate a deliberative component. Therefore, we focused predominantly on the difference between the personal interest and the party interest. It could thus be the case that the coordination mechanism holds, but that it is mainly driven by the distinction between voting and deliberation and not the individual and the party interest. This could be an intriguing and promising avenue for further research.

Regarding the outcomes of the representational mechanism, these concur with electoral literature that indicates that women are evaluated not more negatively but more positively than men (Schwarz & Coppock, 2019; Teele et al., 2018). It could still be that the survey was subjected to social desirability biases, although a recent study shows that complete randomization in conjoint experiments could mitigate social desirability (Horiuchi et al., 2022). Nevertheless, we must be cautious to be overly optimistic. A way to circumvent this bias would be to analyse actual intra-party voting behaviour for candidate lists. Such a method allows us to corroborate the findings from previous experimental studies.

To conclude, this research shows that party members in general favour women candidates for high and safe ranks on the candidate lists. Since party members are not the ones that make the first selection and can most often only rank the already evaluated and pre-selected candidates on the draft list of candidates, this is something that the party leadership, in an earlier stage, could tailor to. Moreover, political parties should be aware that resources that are valued in candidate selection, such as political and party experience, are harder to obtain for some sub-groups within the party. Political parties have very long been and still are gendered organizations, that continue to contain and reflect male norms, making it difficult for outsiders to be active (Lovenduski, 1998). And in the political world of the 2020s, in many Western advanced democracies women can still be considered outsiders.

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Appendix

Figure A1. Inclusivity score and the proportion of women on the candidate lists in the 2017 and 2021 elections.



Pearson's R is .46. Black parties are included in the analysis of this paper, grey parties are not. FvD and JA21 are missing, because of missing information about their candidate selection procedures. The proportion of women candidates on the list is calculated by looking at the list that was used in all electoral districts ('gelijkluidende lijsten'). If multiple lists were used, the list from the first electoral district (Groningen) was used. For the inclusivity score the statutes were coded to identify which actor could ratify the candidate lists (1 = party leader, 2 = party board, 3 = party delegates, 4 = party members at convention, 5 = all party members).

Experimental treatments

Party member scenario

First, a question about the elections. In the run-up to the elections for the Tweede Kamer, each party compiles a list of candidates. In the following question, you will be asked to create your own list of ten people as a **party member** by ranking ten candidates.

Your party currently holds 5-7 seats in the Polling Aggregator, which provides an overview of party preferences at this moment. The candidate selection committee has selected the following ten candidates. However, the candidates have not been ranked yet. All **party members** - including you - are asked to establish their own ranking in a **party referendum**. All preferences are then combined, and the result will be the final list of candidates for the elections. How would you order the candidates if you, **as a party member**, participate in such a members' referendum? Your vote, along with those of other members, will determine the ultimate order on the list

[--- page break ---]

Your party currently holds **5-7 seats** in the Polling Aggregator. How would you order the candidates if you, **as a party member**, participate in such a members' referendum? Your vote, along with those of other members, will determine the final order on the list.

	Kandidaat A	Kandidaat B	Kandidaat C	Kandidaat D	Kandidaat E
Beleidsexpertise	Klimaat	Gezondheidszorg	Gezondheidszorg	Defensie	Gezondheidszorg
Media-ervaring	Ja	Nee	Ja	Ja	Ja
Leeftijd	18-40	41-65	66+	18-40	66+
Partij-activisme	Geen actief partijlid	Actief partijlid	Geen actief partijlid	Actief partijlid	Actief partijlid
Gender	Vrouw	Man	Man	Vrouw	Man
Migratie-achtergrond	Geen migratie-achtergrond	Geen migratie-achtergrond	Geen migratie-achtergrond	Geen migratie-achtergrond	Migratie-achtergrond
Politieke ervaring	Lokale politicus	Tweede Kamerlid	Tweede Kamerlid	Geen politieke ervaring	Tweede Kamerlid
	Kandidaat F	**Kandidaat G**	**Kandidaat H**	**Kandidaat I**	**Kandidaat J**
Beleidsexpertise	Rechten	Onderwijs	Klimaat	Rechten	Klimaat
Media-ervaring	Ja	Nee	Ja	Nee	Ja
Leeftijd	18-40	66+	66+	18-40	66+
Partij-activisme	Actief partijlid	Geen actief partijlid	Actief partijlid	Actief partijlid	Geen actief partijlid
Gender	Man	Man	Vrouw	Vrouw	Man
Migratie-achtergrond	Migratie-achtergrond	Migratie-achtergrond	Migratie-achtergrond	Migratie-achtergrond	Geen migratie-achtergrond
Politieke ervaring	Lokale politicus	Lokale politicus	Lokale politicus	Geen politieke ervaring	Lokale politicus

The above table is an example. Each respondent had a different version, since both the traits and the order of characteristics was completely randomized.

Party leader scenario

First, a question about the elections. In the run-up to the elections for the Tweede Kamer, each party compiles a list of candidates. In the following question, you will be asked, as **the party leader**, create a list of ten individuals by ranking ten candidates.

Your party currently holds **5-7 seats** in the Polling Aggregator, which provides an overview of party preferences at this moment. The candidate selection committee has selected the following ten candidates. However, the candidates have not been ranked yet. Imagine that you are **the party leader**. How would you order the candidates if you were **the party leader**? Keep in mind that your preferred order will determine the final result.

[--- page break ---]

Your party currently holds **5-7 seats** in the Polling Aggregator. How would you order the candidates if you were the **party leader**? Remember that your preferred order will determine the final outcome.

	Kandidaat A	**Kandidaat B**	**Kandidaat C**	**Kandidaat D**	**Kandidaat E**
Beleidsexpertise	Klimaat	Gezondheidszorg	Gezondheidszorg	Defensie	Gezondheidszorg
Media-ervaring	Ja	Nee	Ja	Ja	Ja
Leeftijd	18-40	41-65	66+	18-40	66+
Partij-activisme	Geen actief partijlid	Actief partijlid	Geen actief partijlid	Actief partijlid	Actief partijlid
Gender	Vrouw	Man	Man	Vrouw	Man
Migratie-achtergrond	Geen migratie-achtergrond	Geen migratie-achtergrond	Geen migratie-achtergrond	Geen migratie-achtergrond	Migratie-achtergrond
Politieke ervaring	Lokale politicus	Tweede Kamerlid	Tweede Kamerlid	Geen politieke ervaring	Tweede Kamerlid
	Kandidaat F	**Kandidaat G**	**Kandidaat H**	**Kandidaat I**	**Kandidaat J**
Beleidsexpertise	Rechten	Onderwijs	Klimaat	Rechten	Klimaat
Media-ervaring	Ja	Nee	Ja	Nee	Ja
Leeftijd	18-40	66+	66+	18-40	66+
Partij-activisme	Actief partijlid	Geen actief partijlid	Actief partijlid	Actief partijlid	Geen actief partijlid
Gender	Man	Man	Vrouw	Vrouw	Man
Migratie-achtergrond	Migratie-achtergrond	Migratie-achtergrond	Migratie-achtergrond	Migratie-achtergrond	Geen migratie-achtergrond
Politieke ervaring	Lokale politicus	Lokale politicus	Lokale politicus	Geen politieke ervaring	Lokale politicus

The above table is an example. Each respondent had a different version, since both the traits and the order of characteristics was completely randomized.

Table A1. Example of four list combinations and accompanying calculations

Rank		**List A**	**List B**	**List C**	**List D**
1	*Safe*	Woman	Woman	Man	Woman
2	*Safe*	Man	Woman	Man	Man
3	*Safe*	Woman	Woman	Man	Man
4	*Safe*	Man	Man	Man	Woman
5	*Safe*	Woman	Man	Man	Woman
6	*Uncertain*	Man	Woman	Woman	Man
7	*Uncertain*	Woman	Woman	Woman	Woman
8	*Unsafe*	Man	Man	Woman	Man
9	*Unsafe*	Woman	Man	Woman	Man
10	*Unsafe*	Man	Man	Woman	Woman
Median position woman		5	3	8	5
Median position man		6	8	3	6
Average list position woman		5	3.8	8	5.4
Average list position man		6	7.2	3	5.6
Difference score		1	3.4	5	0.2

Table A2. Information about sample size, response rate and distribution method of the survey

Party name	**Sample size**	**Response (100% finished)**	**Response rate**	**Distribution**
VOLT		223 (130)		Newsletter to all members and distributed on internal platform
ChristenUnie	3978	521 (255)	13.1%	Specific email to sample
D66	3000	453 (221)	15.1%	Specific email to sample
CDA	3000	203 (95)	6.8%	Specific email sent to sample (no reminder)
PvdA	2700	254 (141)	9.4%	First invitation in newsletter and second reminder to sample online
SGP	3000	222 (90)	7.4%	Specific email to sample (no reminder)
Total	15678	1876	10.5% (excl. Volt)	
GroenLinks	*Not fielded yet. Will be distributed after elections in November.*			
BIJ1	*Not fielded yet. Will be distributed after elections in November.*			

Table A3. Comparison party members sample and population

	Sample		**Population**	
	M / W / NB / NA	Age	M / W / NB / NA	Age
VOLT	69 / 27 / 2 / 3	37.9	75 / 23 / 2	42,75
ChristenUnie	76 / 22 / 0 / 2	44.6	67 / 33	57,7
CDA	82 / 9 / 0 / 9	49.2		49
D66	78 / 19 / 0 / 2	43.5	45 / 19 / 37	48
PvdA	65 / 33 / 0 / 2	50.4		
SGP	84 / 11 / 0 / 4	42.8		

Population data retrieved by the party. Sample data retrieved from respondents that filled in the survey completely.

Figure A2. Histogram of survey progress.



Note: dashed line is the cut-off point of 38%. Respondents that are included in the analysis have filled in the survey at least 38%.

Table A4. Models testing hypothesis 1.

	Pre-registered model explaining difference score	**Exploratory model explaining difference score**	**Pre-registered model explaining median list position**	**Exploratory model explaining list position**
(Intercept)	1.67***	1.73***	2.60***	2.44***
	(0.14)	(0.23)	(0.16)	(0.26)
Party member scenario (ref. party leader scenario)	-0.04	-0.06	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Number of women	-0.02	-0.01	0.46***	0.47***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Political party (ref. = CDA)				
ChristenUnie		-0.24		0.19
		(0.20)		(0.22)
D66		-0.03		-0.20
		(0.20)		(0.22)
PvdA		-0.02		0.08
		(0.22)		(0.24)
SGP		0.45		1.20***
		(0.25)		(0.28)
VOLT		-0.13		-0.03
		(0.22)		(0.24)
R^2	0.00	0.02	0.28	0.33
Adj. R^2	-0.00	0.01	0.28	0.32
Num. obs.	610	610	610	610

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Table A5. Robustness checks for experimental condition

	Difference score	**Median list position**	**Difference score**	**Median list position**
(Intercept)	1.77***	2.55***	1.72***	2.43***
	(0.25)	(0.28)	(0.24)	(0.26)
Function within party (ref. no function)	0.05	-0.16		
	(0.15)	(0.17)		
Previous experience in candidate selection committee (ref. no experience)			0.12	0.02
			(0.20)	(0.22)
Party member scenario (ref. party leader scenario)	0.04	-0.14	0.02	-0.04
	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Number of women	-0.02	0.47***	-0.01	0.47***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Political party (ref. = CDA)				
ChristenUnie	-0.26	0.20	-0.28	0.21
	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.22)
D66	-0.03	-0.21	-0.05	-0.19
	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.22)
PvdA	-0.04	0.08	-0.04	0.08
	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.24)
SGP	0.34	1.17***	0.44	1.20***
	(0.25)	(0.28)	(0.25)	(0.28)
VOLT	-0.14	-0.08	-0.16	-0.02
	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.24)
Function within party x party member scenario	-0.25	0.22		
	(0.20)	(0.22)		
Previous experience in candidate selection committee x party member scenario			-0.45	0.13
			(0.26)	(0.29)
R^2	0.02	0.33	0.03	0.33
Adj. R^2	0.01	0.31	0.02	0.32
Num. obs.	592	592	610	610

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Figure A3. Robustness checks for experimental condition



Table A5. Multinominal logistic regression models

	Base model	**Int. gender resp x gender candidate**	**Int. gender candidate x political experience**	**Int. gender candidate x party experience**
Pos. 1 Intercept	-2.42***	-2.36***	-2.07***	-2.43***
	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.37)	(0.36)
Pos. 1 Gender = Woman	0.72***	0.68***	0.05	0.73**
	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.35)	(0.26)
Pos. 1 Age = 41-65	-0.14	-0.15	-0.15	-0.14
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Pos. 1 Age = 66+	-2.30***	-2.30***	-2.30***	-2.29***
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Pos. 1 Political experience = Incumbent	3.24***	3.25***	2.84***	3.24***
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.32)	(0.24)
Pos. 1 Political experience = Local politician	1.84***	1.85***	1.27***	1.84***
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.34)	(0.24)
Pos. 1 Party experience = Active party member	1.84***	1.84***	1.84***	1.83***
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.26)
Pos. 1 Media experience = Yes	0.55**	0.55**	0.56**	0.55**
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Pos. 1 Policy experience = Law	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Pos. 1 Policy experience = Health care	0.16	0.16	0.17	0.15
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)
Pos. 1 Policy experience = Climate	0.39	0.39	0.37	0.39
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Pos. 1 Policy experience = Economy	0.27	0.26	0.26	0.27
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)
Pos. 1 Policy experience = Defense	-0.47	-0.47	-0.47	-0.47
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)
Pos. 1 Migration background = Yes	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Pos. 2 Intercept	-1.13***	-1.13***	-1.14***	-1.13***
	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.34)	(0.33)
Pos. 2 Gender = Woman	0.49**	0.55**	0.49	0.49*
	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.29)	(0.22)
Pos. 2 Age = 41-65	-0.22	-0.22	-0.23	-0.22
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Pos. 2 Age = 66+	-1.60***	-1.60***	-1.60***	-1.59***
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Pos. 2 Political experience = Incumbent	2.36***	2.37***	2.32***	2.36***
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.31)	(0.22)
Pos. 2 Political experience = Local politician	1.56***	1.56***	1.53***	1.56***
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.30)	(0.21)

	Base model	**Int. gender resp x gender candidate**	**Int. gender candidate x political experience**	**Int. gender candidate x party experience**
Pos. 2 Party experience = Active party member	1.18***	1.18***	1.18***	1.17***
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.24)
Pos. 2 Media experience = Yes	0.35*	0.35*	0.36*	0.36*
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Pos. 2 Policy experience = Law	-0.09	-0.10	-0.10	-0.10
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Pos. 2 Policy experience = Health care	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Pos. 2 Policy experience = Climate	0.18	0.17	0.17	0.18
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Pos. 2 Policy experience = Economy	0.11	0.12	0.11	0.11
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Pos. 2 Policy experience = Defense	-0.48	-0.48	-0.48	-0.48
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Pos. 2 Migration background = Yes	-0.13	-0.13	-0.13	-0.13
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Pos. 3 Intercept	-0.91**	-0.87**	-1.00**	-0.80*
	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.34)	(0.32)
Pos. 3 Gender = Woman	0.55***	0.52**	0.68*	0.32
	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.27)	(0.23)
Pos. 3 Age = 41-65	-0.14	-0.14	-0.13	-0.14
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Pos. 3 Age = 66+	-1.57***	-1.57***	-1.56***	-1.57***
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Pos. 3 Political experience = Incumbent	1.99***	2.00***	2.06***	1.99***
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.30)	(0.22)
Pos. 3 Political experience = Local politician	1.40***	1.40***	1.46***	1.40***
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.29)	(0.21)
Pos. 3 Party experience = Active party member	1.28***	1.28***	1.28***	1.06***
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.24)
Pos. 3 Media experience = Yes	0.38*	0.38*	0.38*	0.38*
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Pos. 3 Policy experience = Law	-0.27	-0.28	-0.27	-0.27
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Pos. 3 Policy experience = Health care	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Pos. 3 Policy experience = Climate	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.07
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Pos. 3 Policy experience = Economy	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.22
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)

	Base model	**Int. gender resp x gender candidate**	**Int. gender candidate x political experience**	**Int. gender candidate x party experience**
Pos. 3 Policy experience = Defense	-0.53	-0.53	-0.53	-0.53
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Pos. 3 Migration background = Yes	-0.30	-0.30	-0.30	-0.30
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Pos. 4 Intercept	-0.36	-0.33	-0.29	-0.42
	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.31)
Pos. 4 Gender = Woman	0.39*	0.38*	0.25	0.50*
	(0.16)	(0.19)	(0.25)	(0.22)
Pos. 4 Age = 41-65	-0.22	-0.22	-0.22	-0.21
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Pos. 4 Age = 66+	-1.24***	-1.24***	-1.24***	-1.24***
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Pos. 4 Political experience = Incumbent	1.48***	1.49***	1.35***	1.48***
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.29)	(0.21)
Pos. 4 Political experience = Local politician	1.06***	1.06***	0.93***	1.06***
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.27)	(0.20)
Pos. 4 Party experience = Active party member	1.13***	1.13***	1.13***	1.23***
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.23)
Pos. 4 Media experience = Yes	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.04
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Pos. 4 Policy experience = Law	-0.22	-0.23	-0.23	-0.23
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Pos. 4 Policy experience = Health care	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Pos. 4 Policy experience = Climate	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Pos. 4 Policy experience = Economy	-0.28	-0.28	-0.28	-0.29
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Pos. 4 Policy experience = Defense	-0.32	-0.32	-0.32	-0.32
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)
Pos. 4 Migration background = Yes	-0.19	-0.19	-0.19	-0.19
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Pos. 5 Intercept	-0.93**	-0.94**	-0.84*	-0.93**
	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.33)
Pos. 5 Gender = Woman	0.41*	0.45*	0.24	0.41
	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.26)	(0.23)
Pos. 5 Age = 41-65	-0.23	-0.23	-0.23	-0.23
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Pos. 5 Age = 66+	-1.28***	-1.28***	-1.28***	-1.27***
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Pos. 5 Political experience = Incumbent	1.50***	1.50***	1.34***	1.50***
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.30)	(0.22)

	Base model	**Int. gender resp x gender candidate**	**Int. gender candidate x political experience**	**Int. gender candidate x party experience**
Pos. 5 Political experience = Local politician	1.20***	1.19***	1.03***	1.20***
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.28)	(0.20)
Pos. 5 Party experience = Active party member	1.12***	1.12***	1.12***	1.11***
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.24)
Pos. 5 Media experience = Yes	0.22	0.22	0.23	0.22
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Pos. 5 Policy experience = Law	0.28	0.27	0.27	0.28
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Pos. 5 Policy experience = Health care	0.39	0.39	0.40	0.39
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Pos. 5 Policy experience = Climate	0.33	0.33	0.32	0.33
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.30)
Pos. 5 Policy experience = Economy	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)
Pos. 5 Policy experience = Defense	0.21	0.21	0.20	0.20
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Pos. 5 Migration background = Yes	-0.13	-0.13	-0.13	-0.13
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Pos. 6 Intercept	-0.51	-0.47	-0.50	-0.48
	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.32)
Pos. 6 Gender = Woman	0.12	0.06	0.09	0.05
	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.25)	(0.22)
Pos. 6 Age = 41-65	-0.26	-0.27	-0.26	-0.26
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Pos. 6 Age = 66+	-1.19***	-1.19***	-1.19***	-1.19***
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Pos. 6 Political experience = Incumbent	1.16***	1.16***	1.10***	1.16***
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.29)	(0.22)
Pos. 6 Political experience = Local politician	1.00***	1.00***	0.95***	1.00***
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.27)	(0.20)
Pos. 6 Party experience = Active party member	0.90***	0.90***	0.90***	0.83***
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.23)
Pos. 6 Media experience = Yes	0.13	0.13	0.14	0.13
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Pos. 6 Policy experience = Law	0.12	0.11	0.11	0.12
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Pos. 6 Policy experience = Health care	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)
Pos. 6 Policy experience = Climate	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.33
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)

	Base model	**Int. gender resp x gender candidate**	**Int. gender candidate x political experience**	**Int. gender candidate x party experience**
Pos. 6 Policy experience = Economy	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)
Pos. 6 Policy experience = Defense	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Pos. 6 Migration background = Yes	-0.14	-0.14	-0.14	-0.14
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Pos. 7 Intercept	-0.60	-0.62	-0.58	-0.65*
	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.32)
Pos. 7 Gender = Woman	0.33	0.35	0.27	0.41
	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.25)	(0.22)
Pos. 7 Age = 41-65	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Pos. 7 Age = 66+	-0.88***	-0.88***	-0.88***	-0.87***
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Pos. 7 Political experience = Incumbent	1.01***	1.01***	0.88**	1.01***
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.30)	(0.22)
Pos. 7 Political experience = Local politician	0.83***	0.83***	0.82**	0.83***
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.28)	(0.20)
Pos. 7 Party experience = Active party member	0.70***	0.70***	0.70***	0.79***
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.24)
Pos. 7 Media experience = Yes	0.19	0.19	0.20	0.19
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Pos. 7 Policy experience = Law	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Pos. 7 Policy experience = Health care	-0.16	-0.16	-0.16	-0.16
	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)
Pos. 7 Policy experience = Climate	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)
Pos. 7 Policy experience = Economy	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Pos. 7 Policy experience = Defense	-0.13	-0.13	-0.14	-0.13
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Pos. 7 Migration background = Yes	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Pos. 8 Intercept	-0.08	-0.07	-0.01	-0.07
	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.32)
Pos. 8 Gender = Woman	0.24	0.25	0.11	0.23
	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.24)	(0.21)
Pos. 8 Age = 41-65	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Pos. 8 Age = 66+	-0.47*	-0.47*	-0.47*	-0.47*
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)

	Base model	**Int. gender resp x gender candidate**	**Int. gender candidate x political experience**	**Int. gender candidate x party experience**
Pos. 8 Political experience = Incumbent	0.58*	0.58*	0.44	0.58*
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.31)	(0.23)
Pos. 8 Political experience = Local politician	0.62**	0.62**	0.49	0.62**
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.27)	(0.20)
Pos. 8 Party experience = Active party member	0.36*	0.36*	0.36*	0.35
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.24)
Pos. 8 Media experience = Yes	-0.04	-0.05	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Pos. 8 Policy experience = Law	-0.13	-0.13	-0.13	-0.13
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Pos. 8 Policy experience = Health care	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Pos. 8 Policy experience = Climate	-0.09	-0.09	-0.10	-0.09
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Pos. 8 Policy experience = Economy	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Pos. 8 Policy experience = Defense	-0.32	-0.32	-0.33	-0.32
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Pos. 8 Migration background = Yes	-0.24	-0.24	-0.24	-0.24
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Pos. 9 Intercept	-0.40	-0.33	-0.31	-0.35
	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.32)
Pos. 9 Gender = Woman	0.29	0.17	0.10	0.19
	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.23)	(0.21)
Pos. 9 Age = 41-65	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Pos. 9 Age = 66+	-0.16	-0.16	-0.17	-0.16
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Pos. 9 Political experience = Incumbent	0.42	0.42	0.20	0.42
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.31)	(0.23)
Pos. 9 Political experience = Local politician	0.34	0.34	0.16	0.34
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.28)	(0.20)
Pos. 9 Party experience = Active party member	0.18	0.17	0.18	0.04
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.25)
Pos. 9 Media experience = Yes	0.11	0.10	0.12	0.11
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Pos. 9 Policy experience = Law	0.01	-0.00	0.00	0.01
	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Pos. 9 Policy experience = Health care	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.09
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)

	Base model	**Int. gender resp x gender candidate**	**Int. gender candidate x political experience**	**Int. gender candidate x party experience**
Pos. 9 Policy experience = Climate	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)
Pos. 9 Policy experience = Economy	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)
Pos. 9 Policy experience = Defense	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Pos. 9 Migration background = Yes	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Pos. 1 Respondent gender = woman		-0.30		
		(0.30)		
Pos. 1. Woman candidate x woman respondent		0.21		
		(0.42)		
Pos. 2 Respondent gender = woman		0.03		
		(0.28)		
Pos. 2. Woman candidate x woman respondent		-0.30		
		(0.40)		
Pos. 3 Respondent gender = woman		-0.19		
		(0.29)		
Pos. 3. Woman candidate x woman respondent		0.14		
		(0.40)		
Pos. 4 Respondent gender = woman		-0.11		
		(0.28)		
Pos. 4. Woman candidate x woman respondent		0.04		
		(0.40)		
Pos. 5 Respondent gender = woman		0.04		
		(0.28)		
Pos. 5. Woman candidate x woman respondent		-0.20		
		(0.40)		
Pos. 6 Respondent gender = woman		-0.15		
		(0.28)		
Pos. 6. Woman candidate x woman respondent		0.28		
		(0.41)		
Pos. 7 Respondent gender = woman		0.08		
		(0.28)		
Pos. 7. Woman candidate x woman respondent		-0.10		
		(0.41)		
Pos. 8 Respondent gender = woman		-0.02		

	Base model	Int. gender resp x gender candidate	Int. gender candidate x political experience	Int. gender candidate x party experience
		(0.28)		
Pos. 8 Woman candidate x woman respondent		-0.03		
		(0.41)		
Pos. 9 Respondent gender = woman		-0.32		
		(0.30)		
Pos. 9. Woman candidate x woman respondent		0.56		
		(0.41)		
Pos. 1 Woman candidate x incumbent			0.83	
			(0.48)	
Pos. 1 Woman candidate x local politician			1.08*	
			(0.48)	
Pos. 2 Woman candidate x incumbent			0.13	
			(0.45)	
Pos. 2 Woman candidate x local politician			0.09	
			(0.43)	
Pos. 3 Woman candidate x incumbent			-0.06	
			(0.44)	
Pos. 3 Woman candidate x local politician			-0.06	
			(0.41)	
Pos. 4 Woman candidate x incumbent			0.30	
			(0.43)	
Pos. 4 Woman candidate x local politician			0.28	
			(0.40)	
Pos. 5 Woman candidate x incumbent			0.34	
			(0.44)	
Pos. 5 Woman candidate x local politician			0.34	
			(0.40)	
Pos. 6 Woman candidate x incumbent			0.15	
			(0.45)	
Pos. 6 Woman candidate x local politician			0.10	
			(0.40)	
Pos. 7 Woman candidate x incumbent			0.29	
			(0.45)	
Pos. 7 Woman candidate x local politician			0.06	
			(0.40)	
Pos. 8 Woman candidate x incumbent			0.32	
			(0.46)	

	Base model	**Int. gender resp x gender candidate**	**Int. gender candidate x political experience**	**Int. gender candidate x party experience**
Pos. 8 Woman candidate x local politician			0.28	
			(0.40)	
Pos. 9 Woman candidate x incumbent			0.47	
			(0.45)	
Pos. 9 Woman candidate x local politician			0.37	
			(0.41)	
Pos. 1 Woman candidate x active party member				0.02
				(0.36)
Pos. 2 Woman candidate x active party member				0.02
				(0.34)
Pos. 3 Woman candidate x active party member				0.42
				(0.34)
Pos. 4 Woman candidate x active party member				-0.17
				(0.34)
Pos. 5 Woman candidate x active party member				0.02
				(0.35)
Pos. 6 Woman candidate x active party member				0.16
				(0.35)
Pos. 7 Woman candidate x active party member				-0.17
				(0.35)
Pos. 8 Woman candidate x active party member				0.03
				(0.36)
Pos. 9 Woman candidate x active party member				0.29
				(0.36)
AIC	14329.40	14356.20	14355.72	14341.28
BIC	15096.21	15232.56	15232.08	15162.86
Log Likelihood	-7038.70	-7034.10	-7033.86	-7035.64
Deviance	14077.40	14068.20	14067.72	14071.28
Num. obs.	3248	3248	3248	3248
K	10	10	10	10

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

AMCE's and Marginal Means for each rank position

Average Marginal Component Effect and Marginal Means for list position 1



Average Marginal Component Effect and Marginal Means for list position 2



Average Marginal Component Effect and Marginal Means for list position 3



Average Marginal Component Effect and Marginal Means for list position 4



Average Marginal Component Effect and Marginal Means for list position 5



Average Marginal Component Effect and Marginal Means for list position 6



Average Marginal Component Effect and Marginal Means for list position 7



Average Marginal Component Effect and Marginal Means for list position 8



Average Marginal Component Effect and Marginal Means for list position 9



Average Marginal Component Effect and Marginal Means for list position 10