Keeping Your Enemies Close
Opposition Co-Optation and Coup Risk in Autocracies

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Word count: XXXX

Abstract

The literature on co-optation in autocracies argues that sharing power with opponents can increase autocratic regime durability. However, this paper argues that such a strategy has a downside. Specifically, the paper argues that while opposition co-optation is beneficial in terms of regime survival, it is harmful in terms of the survival of individual autocratic leaders. To make this argument, the paper distinguishes between "regime-change coups" and "leader-reshuffling coups". Regime-change coups change the political regime of a country, while leader-reshuffling coups only change the chief executive of a country while leaving the political regime intact. Accordingly, successful regime change coups result in the breakdown of autocratic regimes, while successful leader-reshuffling coups only result in the removal of individual autocratic leaders. Co-opting opposition actors empowers them politically but also gives them a stake in the survival of the regime. Consequently, the paper argues that opposition co-optation lowers the probability of regime-change coups while at the same time increasing the probability of leader-reshuffling coups, thereby increasing the durability of autocratic regimes while shortening the reign of individual dictators. This proposition is corroborated in a time-series cross-sectional analysis using a global sample of autocratic regimes for the period 1970-2010.

Keywords: autocracy; co-optation; coup d'état; leader exit; opposition; regime breakdown

Introduction

Why would a dictator agree to share power and spoils with his opponents rather than keeping it all for himself and his loyal cronies? The answer to this question, it is argued, is that 'co-opting' the opposition in this way has a stabilizing effect on the dictatorial regime, as it gives the co-opted opposition members a stake in the regime's survival rather than an incentive to attempt to overthrow it (Gandhi, 2008; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007). While this is likely to be the case, it is also the case that the greatest threat to a dictator's survival comes from within the ranks of his regime rather than from outside of it (Roessler, 2011; Svolik, 2012). Hence, while co-opting opponents from the opposition into the regime may induce them to work for the continued survival of the regime, it also increases their political resources and incorporates them into the group of elite actors who are most likely to be able to mount a successful challenge against the dictator.

This exposes an inherent trade-off in opposition co-optation: While co-opting the opposition may be a way to safeguard an autocratic regime, this strategy entails a potential risk in terms of the dictator's own political survival. In this paper, I will argue that opposition co-optation increases the longevity of autocratic regimes, while reducing the longevity of individual dictators within these regimes. While autocratic regimes can break down, and individual dictators can be removed, in many ways, the most common proximate cause of both are coups d'état (Geddes, Wright, & Frantz, 2014; Svolik, 2012). Accordingly, in this paper I will explore the disparate effects of opposition co-optation by investigating its effects on the likelihood that coups are carried out.

To disentangle co-optation's effects on regime and leader survival, respectively, I distinguish between two different types of coups: "regime-change coups" and "leader-reshuffling coups". This distinction was originally introduced by Aksoy, Carter, and Wright (2015) and refers to

coups that change the political regime[1] of a country (regime-change coups) and coups that change the chief executive of a country while leaving the political regime intact (leader-reshuffling coups). Based on this distinction, I argue that opposition co-optation lowers the likelihood that regime-change coups are carried out while increasing the likelihood that leader-reshuffling coups are carried out. In other words, while co-opting the opposition does indeed stabilize the regime overall, it also exacerbates the struggle for power taking place within the regime. These theoretical expectations are tested in a time-series cross-sectional analysis using a global sample of autocratic regimes for the period 1970-2010.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: The next section presents the theoretical argument of the paper in more detail. The following section presents the data and research design used to test the theoretical propositions. The subsequent section presents and discusses the results of the analysis. The final section concludes.

The argument [incomplete]

Why would a group of actors attempt to carry out a coup? While there may be multiple motives behind such an act, the most obvious motivation—especially in an autocratic setting—is to get gain policy influence and material resources (Geddes, Wright, & Frantz, 2018; Svolik, 2012). In an autocracy, access to policy and resources is limited to a relatively narrow ruling coalition rather than the population at large (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2003; Geddes, 1999; Geddes et al., 2014). Consequently, if your group is not included in this ruling coalition, one way to gain access is to remove the current coalition and replace it with a new coalition in which your group is included, in the process bringing about a regime change (Geddes et al., 2014). However, even if you are included in the ruling coalition, you may still be able to increase your policy influence and material resources by ousting the current dictator

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[1] A political regime if defined, following Geddes et al. (2014), as the set of formal and informal rules that regulate access to positions of political power and as well as to influence over policy decisions.

in favor of a challenger from inside the regime, if this challenger either is a member of your own group, or if he promises to increase the benefits of you and your group in return for your support in the internal power struggle (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Svolik, 2012). Thus, while members of the ruling coalition have few incentives to attempt to overthrow the current regime, as they benefit from the current institutional arrangement,[2] they may have strong incentives to overthrow the sitting dictator if this can increase the benefits they receive under this institutional arrangement.

This logic is what drives the incentives of opposition members and groups who are co-opted by the regime. By being included in the ruling coalition in this way, their incentives to attempt to overthrow the regime are reduced significantly. However, they are unlikely to be satisfied with just being included in the coalition and gaining some access to benefits. Co-opted opposition members often get junior roles in government. As a result, they tend to get fewer benefits than other coalition members, who are closer to the center of power, do, which provides them with incentives to attempt to increase their share of the benefits. However, qua their positions as junior coalition partners, they are often not likely to be able to install themselves in power. Nevertheless, government roles give the opposition access to important organizational and material resources (Roessler, 2011; Roessler & Ohls, 2018), which they can mobilize against the dictator in order to, potentially, tip the scales in favor of a high-level regime challenger who is more sympathetic towards them (or, perhaps more likely, who offers to buy their support for more than the current incumbent does). Consequently, co-opted opposition members can make the dictator's ouster more likely, which in turn would lead to a shift in the balance of power within the confines of the existing regime institutions, but his ouster under these circumstances is unlikely to alter the regime fundamentally.

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[2] Institutional arrangement is used here in an informal sense to refer to the rules that characterize the current regime, as per the regime definition by Geddes et al. (2014).

In the above section, I discussed how opposition co-optation affects opposition members' incentives and ability to carry out regime-change and leader-reshuffling coups, respectively. When discussing coups, it is important to distinguish between coup attempts in general and successful coups, as the causes may vary between the two (Powell, 2012). This distinction mirrors the distinction between incentives and ability, where incentives speak to whether coups are attempted and ability speaks to whether the coup attempts succeed (Thyne, 2010). While opposition co-optation may affect both the probability of the two coup types being attempted, and the probability that they succeed if they are attempted, especially the probabilities of the coup types succeeding are likely to be affected by opposition co-optation.

Actors within the regime will always have incentives to attempt to increase their share of power, and actors outside of the regime will always have incentives to attempt to overthrow it—and both these things are true whether opposition members are being co-opted or not. However, opposition co-optation is very likely to affect the likelihood that both types of coups succeed. On the one hand, the strategic rationale behind co-opting opposition members is to bring potentially dangerous opponents into the fold and give them a vested interest in the regime's perpetuation (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007). Hence, autocratic regimes are likely to attempt to co-opt the most capable opposition members (Svolik, 2012), which in turn is likely to render opposition challenges, including regime-change coup attempts, less effective. On the other hand, as discussed above, by bringing these capable opposition members into the regime, and by further increasing their resources through positions in the government apparatus, new players—with a strong interest in increasing their own benefits—are created in the regime's internal power struggles, who can potentially play a pivotal role if mobilized by an elite challenger against the dictator. Accordingly, opposition co-optation is also likely to increase the effectiveness of leader-reshuffling coup attempts.

In sum, while opposition co-optation may potentially affect the probability that the two coup types are attempted, this need not be the case given the above discussion. However, the discussion does provide clear expectations with regard to opposition co-optation's effects on the probability of the two coup types succeeding, with co-optation being expected to lower and increase these probabilities, respectively.

The discussion gives rise to the following hypotheses:

H1: Higher levels of opposition co-optation increase the probability that leader-reshuffling coups are carried out.

H2: Higher levels of opposition co-optation decrease the probability that regime-change coups are carried out.

The following section describes and discusses the research design and the data that will be used to test the hypotheses.

Methods and data

The hypotheses are tested using a large-N time-series cross-sectional design. The analysis employs a global sample of autocratic country-years for the period 1970-2010.[3] I estimate all models using country-fixed effects in order to control for unobservable, time-invariant factors. As the outcomes of interest (different types of coup events) are dichotomous, I employ linear probability models in the analysis. Such models have been shown to be suitable as substitutes for generalized linear models (GLMs) such as logit or probit (Hellevik, 2009), and they have the important benefit of not dropping country-panels with constant values on the dependent variable from the analysis, which GLMs do when fixed effects are employed.

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[3] Autocratic country-years are identified using the classification by Geddes et al. (2014).

In addition to the country-fixed effects, year dummies are included in all models in order to guard against potential time trends as well as various yearly 'shocks'. Moreover, all models include cubic polynomials of the number of years since the country last experienced the outcome (a coup event of the given type) to account for potential time dependence in the data (Carter & Signorino, 2010). Last, all models are estimated using robust standard errors clustered on country to account for dependence between observations from the same country.

Dependent variable

The dependent variables, leader-reshuffling coups and regime-change coups, are measured using the dataset constructed by Aksoy et al. (2015). In total, I create six different dependent variables using this dataset: Overall, I distinguish between "coup attempts", which comprises all coups that are attempted—that is, both successful and failed coup attempts—and "successful coups", which is limited to only those coup attempts that succeed in their objective (i.e., either just removing the dictator or removing the whole autocratic regime). This distinction is made for both leader-reshuffling coups and regime-change coups. Additionally, I also create a pooled coup measure that comprises both coup types, for which I also distinguish between coup attempts and successful coups. The disaggregated measures for the two coup types are used to investigate the paper's two hypotheses, whereas the pooled measures are included to highlight the necessity of distinguishing between different coup types when investigating the effect of opposition co-optation in autocracies. All the coup measures are coded dichotomously such that the measure takes on the value "1" if one or more of the relevant coup events take places in a country-year, and "0" otherwise.

Independent variable

The independent variable, opposition co-optation, is a highly elusive concept. Accordingly, rather than a direct measure of the concept, I employ two different proxies that capture different

aspects of the underlying concept, one as the main analysis and one as a robustness test. The two proxies are described in turn below.

Main independent variable

The proxy for opposition co-optation used in the main analysis is the level of ethnic inclusivity of the autocratic regime. Specifically, higher levels of representation of different ethnic groups in an autocratic government is used as an indication that the dictator has co-opted members of rival ethnic groups with government positions rather than only filling these positions with members of his own ethnic group. As members of the dictator's own ethnic group are expected to be more loyal, and sharing power with other ethnic groups poses a risk to the dictator's survival in power (Roessler, 2011), ethnic power-sharing is a costly strategy for the dictator and his close supporters. Accordingly, a higher level of ethnic inclusivity of an autocratic regime reflects a deliberate choice on the part of the regime elites where they accept the cost of sharing power with rival ethnic groups in return for some potential benefit, for instance, regime stability. And since at least moderate ethnic divisions are prevalent throughout the developing world (Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, & Wacziarg, 2003), where most modern autocracies are located (Møller & Skaaning, 2013), ethnic inclusivity should be are reasonable proxy for opposition co-optation more generally in autocracies.

To measure autocratic regimes' level of ethnic inclusivity, I rely on the country-level version of the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset (Vogt et al., 2015). I construct a continuous measure of ethnic inclusivity by dividing the number of "ethnic groups in power" (EGIPs) by the number of "politically relevant ethnic groups" (PREGs).[4] This yields a measure of the share of

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[4] "+1" is added to both count variables. This is done in order to avoid dividing by zero when there is PREGs but also avoiding false "0"-values (i.e., maximum ethnic exclusivity), which would be caused by only adding "+1" to the PREG-count.

PREGs[5] in a country that are coded as being in power, which means that they occupy at least junior roles in the government coalition. Accordingly, the measure takes on the value "1" if all PREGs are included politically, and it approaches "0" the higher the number of PREGs that are excluded from power.

Robustness independent variable

The proxy for opposition co-optation used in the robustness test is the level of government nonmilitary spending (i.e., government spending less military spending). Higher levels of government nonmilitary spending is used as an indication that the autocratic regime is spending public resources with the aim of buying the support (or at least the quiescence) of groups outside the regime. Government spending can be an effective tool for buying the support of groups who would otherwise support the opposition (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Escribà-Folch, 2012). However, government spending can also be targeted more narrowly at regime elites in order to maintain their loyalty (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Gerschewski, 2013), which does not constitute opposition co-optation. Consequently, the total level of public spending is not appropriate as a proxy for opposition-cooptation, as spending on spoils for regime elites needs to be filtered out.

Unfortunately, figures on government spending only provide information on the overall categories that money is being spent on, which usually does not allow us to assess whether the spending is targeted at groups outside of the regime or narrowly at regime elites. An important exception to this general rule is military spending. In autocracies, the military is the unparalleled maker and breaker of regimes (Svolik, 2012). Accordingly, dictators need to keep the military happy if they want to keep their political lives. For this reason, military spending is a

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[5] "An ethnic group [that resides in the country] is considered politically relevant if at least one political organization has claimed to represent its interests at the national level or if its members are subjected to state-led political discrimination." (Vogt et al., 2015).

government expenditure item in autocracies that predominantly is targeted at regime elites. Therefore, by subtracting military expenditures from overall government expenditures, we get a cleaner measure of government spending aimed at co-opting non-regime groups.

In order to attain this measure, I subtract government military expenditures as a percentage of GDP from overall government spending as a percentage of GDP, thereby arriving at a measure of government nonmilitary spending as a percentage of GDP. Both figures are obtained from the World Bank World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2019).

Control variables

The models also include a number of time-varying factors as controls in order to further mitigate the risk of bias in the estimated effects.

First, the models control for countries' GDP per capita, which have been associated with both the probability of coups (Powell, 2012) and institutionalized power-sharing in autocracies (Svolik, 2012). Data on countries' GDP, originally from the Maddison Project Database, is obtained from the 'Varieties of Democracy' (V-Dem) dataset (Coppedge et al., 2019).

Second, the models control for the per capita value of countries' oil production, as revenues from natural resources—particularly oil wealth—have been associated with both autocratic durability (Ross, 2015) and the likelihood of opposition co-optation (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007). Data on countries' oil production value is obtained from the 'Oil and Gas Data, 1932-2011' dataset (Ross & Mahdavi, 2015).

Third, the models control both for the total size of a country's population, as populations size has been associated with both the probability of coups (Aksoy et al., 2015) and institutionalized power-sharing in autocracies (Svolik, 2012). Data on population size, originally from the World Bank World Development Indicators and the CIA World Factbook, is obtained from Ross and Mahdavi (2015).

All independent and control variables are lagged one year in order to ensure that their values are determined before those of the dependent variable. The variables for GDP per capita, oil production value per capita, and population size are all log transformed in order to reduce their skewness and to reduce the influence of outliers.

Table 1 below provides summary statistics for the included variables.

[Table 1 about here]

Having presented the research design and the data, in the following section, I present the results of both the main analysis as well as the robustness test.

Results

The results of the main analysis are reported in tables 2 and 3 below. Table 2 reports results for the main analysis using the ethnic inclusivity proxy, while Table 3 reports results for the robustness test using the nonmilitary government spending proxy. I present and discuss the results for the two analyses in turn.

Main analysis

Looking at Table 2 first, models 1 and 2 report the results for the pooled coup variables, with Model 1 reporting results for all coup attempts and Model 2 reporting results for successful coups only. As can be seen from the table, the ethnic inclusivity proxy has no discernible effect on either of the pooled coup variables. Hence, based on this test, opposition co-optation does not seem to affect the probability of coups in general.

However, when disaggregating the two coup types, the results are quite different. Looking first at models 3 and 4 that report results for leader-reshuffling coups (again, coup attempts and successful coups, respectively), we see that the ethnic inclusivity proxy is positively associated with the probability of both attempted and successful leader-reshuffling coups, although this association only is statistically significant in the case of successful coups. Accordingly, this test provides support for Hypothesis 1.

Looking next at models 5 and 6 that report results for attempted and successful regime-change coups, respectively, the picture is the exact opposite. As can be seen from the table, the ethnic inclusivity proxy is negatively associated with the probability of regime-change coup attempts and successful regime-change coups, although, again, only the association with successful coups is statistically significant. This test therefore provides support for Hypothesis 2. Furthermore, both tests support the expectation that opposition co-optation primarily affects the likelihood that coups are successfully carried out—and not the overall likelihood of them being attempted—with opposition co-optation exerting oppositely directed effects on the two coup types. This also explains why no effect of the ethnic inclusivity proxy was found when using the pooled coup measures.

[Table 2 about here]

Robustness test

Having discussed the results of the main analysis, we now turn to the results of the robustness test, which are presented in Table 3. In general, the results of the robustness test follow the

same pattern as the results from the main analysis, although with much higher statistical uncertainty owing, among other things, to a substantially lower data coverage for the nonmilitary government spending measure (see Table 1).

Looking first at the results for all coup types, reported in models 1 and 2, we again see no discernible effect of opposition co-optation, here proxied using nonmilitary government spending instead of ethnic inclusivity. Looking then at the results for leader-reshuffling coups, reported in models 3 and 4, the nonmilitary government spending proxy is positively associated with both coup attempts and successful coups, although neither association is statistically significant when using this proxy. Likewise, when we look at the results for regime-change coups, which are reported in models 5 and 6, we see that the nonmilitary government spending proxy is negatively associated with both coup attempts and successful coups, but again is neither association statistically significant when using this proxy.

Overall, while the robustness test by no means provides conclusive evidence in support of either hypothesis, the overall pattern conforms to the one found in the main analysis, thereby providing at least tentative support for the theoretical expectations. However, in order to be able to carry out a more conclusive test using this proxy, a measure of government nonmilitary spending with significantly better empirical coverage would be needed.

In sum, the analyses strongly suggest that opposition co-optation in autocracies increases the likelihood that leader-reshuffling coups are carried out successfully while lowering the likelihood that regime-change coups are carried out successfully.

[Table 3 about here]

Conclusion

Co-opting the opposition is argued to be an effective strategy in terms of stabilizing an autocratic regime (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007). This paper provides support for this argument but also shows that this strategy comes with a potential cost for individual dictators. For while opposition co-optation does seem to reduce the likelihood that autocratic *regimes* are overthrown via coups, it also seems to increase the likelihood that autocratic *leaders* are overthrown via coups. For while vesting potential opponents with political power does reduce their incentives to seek to overthrow the current regime, it also provides them with increased political resources. These resources, in turn, can be employed by the co-opted opposition members to tip the scales in favor of a challenger against the dictator from within the regime, who can promise to increase their share of the spoils in return for their support.

This begs the question, why would dictators acquiesce to a strategy of opposition co-optation, yet alone why would they pursue such a strategy on their own initiative? Some dictators may of course be sufficiently constrained by their elite supporters that they have no choice but to comply with the supporters' demands (Svolik, 2012). And this is not an unlikely demand for the supporters to make, as many regime elites may find this to be an attractive strategy, since it increases the durability of the regime and thereby prolongs their access to spoils—although it should be noted that the strategy also has a flipside for regime elites, since widening the circle of actors with whom the spoils of office are shared will dilute the amount of spoils that the regime elites receive (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).

However, even if the dictator is not forced by his supporters to implement a co-optation strategy, it is also important to bear in mind that his choice is not necessarily between co-opting and being overthrown or not co-opting and surviving in power. Rather, both a leader-reshuffling coup and a regime-change coup result in the incumbent dictator being removed from

power, with the important difference being whether the regime also changes in the process. Whether it does so or not is likely to have significant ramifications for the expected post-exit fate of the dictator. Dictators whose ouster coincides with their regimes' collapsing have historically had a high risk of experiencing 'bad' post-exit fates (Geddes et al., 2014). And as dictators' actions while in power are affected by their expectations about which type of fate they are likely to experience if they are removed from power (Escribà-Folch, 2013), this may give them an incentive to accept a higher risk of leader-reshuffling coups if this in turn means a lower risk of regime-change coups, as it may result in a 'milder' post-exit fate.

This, of course, raises another question: Why, then, do not all dictators pursue a strategy of opposition co-optation? At least two explanations can be given for why a dictator would decide against such a strategy: 1) The dictator may perceive the risk of regime collapse to be sufficiently low that he is willing to risk a worse post-exit fate if the regime were to collapse anyway in order to reduce the risk of being overthrown by a challenger from inside the regime. 2) There may be structural conditions that either render opposition co-optation unfeasible or at least make the costs of such a strategy prohibitively high. When dictators are likely to be convinced that the risk of regime collapse is sufficiently low, and what structural conditions this could be, are questions outside the scope of the present paper but both questions constitute fruitful avenues for further research.

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Tables and figures

Table 1. Summary statistics

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Coup attempt, any type	3,235	0.042	0.200	0	1
Successful coup, any type	3,235	0.023	0.151	0	1
Coup attempt, reshuffling	3,235	0.019	0.137	0	1
Successful coup, reshuffling	3,235	0.012	0.108	0	1
Coup attempt, regime-change	3,235	0.023	0.150	0	1
Successful coup, regime-change	3,235	0.012	0.108	0	1
EGIPs/PREGs	3,232	0.630	0.275	0.050	1
Gov. expenditures, nonmil. (% of GDP)	2,077	10.986	5.359	-41.128	54.038
GDP/PC (ln)	3,084	8.103	1.012	5.817	11.647
Oil value/PC (ln)	3,189	2.472	3.090	0	11.272
Population size (ln)	3,213	16.112	1.357	12.600	21.014

Note: Calculated based on the population of autocratic regimes for the period 1970-2010. EGIP = ethnic groups in power, PREG = politically relevant ethnic groups.

Table 2. Ethnic inclusivity of autocratic regimes and coup probabilities, 1970-2010

	Model 1 Coup attempt, any type	Model 2 Successful coup, any type	Model 3 Coup attempt, reshuffling	Model 4 Successful coup, reshuffling	Model 5 Coup attempt, regime-change	Model 6 Successful coup, regime-change
EGIPs/PREGs	0.0129	0.0148	0.0598	0.0707*	-0.0497	-0.0554†
	(0.0505)	(0.0397)	(0.0436)	(0.0298)	(0.0460)	(0.0295)
GDP/PC (ln)	-0.00813	-0.00541	-0.0179*	-0.00729	0.00535	-0.00291
	(0.0103)	(0.00639)	(0.00752)	(0.00453)	(0.00860)	(0.00451)
Oil value/PC (ln)	-0.0130	-0.00494	-0.00379	0.000243	-0.00878	-0.00461
	(0.00840)	(0.00417)	(0.00499)	(0.00303)	(0.00539)	(0.00307)
Population size (ln)	-0.0283	-0.0269	-0.0374*	-0.0293†	-0.00768	-0.00958
	(0.0331)	(0.0278)	(0.0189)	(0.0168)	(0.0298)	(0.0216)
Constant	0.602	0.506	0.726*	0.503†	0.176	0.228
	(0.514)	(0.429)	(0.291)	(0.264)	(0.462)	(0.337)
N (n)	3053 (111)	3053 (111)	3053 (111)	3053 (111)	3053 (111)	3053 (111)
Adjusted R^2	0.002	0.007	0.007	0.003	0.002	0.012

*Note: † $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. N = country-years, n = countries. Fixed effects linear regression. Unstandardized regression coefficients with robust standard errors (clustered on country) in parentheses. All models include year dummies as well as cubic polynomials of time since last coup event. Included variables are lagged one year. EGIPs = ethnic groups in power, PREGs = politically relevant ethnic groups.*

Table 3. Nonmilitary government expenditures of autocratic regimes and coup probabilities, 1970-2010

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	Coup attempt, any type	Successful coup, any type	Coup attempt, reshuffling	Successful coup, reshuffling	Coup attempt, regime-change	Successful coup, regime-change
Gov. expenditures, nonmil. (% of GDP)	0.0000821 (0.00190)	-0.000766 (0.00133)	0.000657 (0.000890)	0.000313 (0.000697)	-0.000326 (0.00146)	-0.000739 (0.000899)
GDP/PC (ln)	-0.0142 (0.0196)	-0.0225 (0.0150)	-0.0222 (0.0135)	-0.0160 (0.0121)	0.00495 (0.0124)	-0.00892 (0.00795)
Oil value/PC (ln)	-0.00636 (0.00935)	-0.00298 (0.00541)	-0.00195 (0.00762)	0.00216 (0.00434)	-0.00386 (0.00703)	-0.00459 (0.00417)
Population size (ln)	-0.0750 (0.0702)	-0.0916 (0.0569)	-0.0684 (0.0493)	-0.0524 (0.0454)	-0.0222 (0.0460)	-0.0503 (0.0329)
Constant	1.352 (1.161)	1.678[†] (0.921)	1.297 (0.818)	0.999 (0.749)	0.321 (0.758)	0.869 (0.538)
N (n)	1976 (100)	1976 (100)	1976 (100)	1976 (100)	1976 (100)	1976 (100)
Adjusted R^2	0.004	0.010	0.012	0.006	0.008	0.015

*Note: † $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. N = country-years, n = countries. Fixed effects linear regression. Unstandardized regression coefficients with robust standard errors (clustered on country) in parentheses. All models include year dummies as well as cubic polynomials of time since last coup event. Included variables are lagged one year.*