

# Political Control of Bureaucracies as an Incentive for Political Party Behavior

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## **Abstract**

This paper examines theoretically and empirically the institutional conditions relevant to political linkage strategies between voters and parties. More specifically, we analyze whether and the extent to which the public administration is politically controlled affects political parties' linkage strategies, whether clientelistic or programmatic. Political parties and their leaders are of crucial importance in democratic polities, and their choices of linkage strategies can have substantial implications for the functioning of democracy and the ability of a government to provide goods and services. The paper first unpacks the theorized link between political control of the administration and parties' strategies in seeking electoral support. Previous explanations of the prevalence of clientelism point to factors such as economic development, ethnic cleavages and party competition. Following the logic of Shefter (1994), we propose that the administrative structures constitute a key component of the incentive structure for political party leaders. A politicized bureaucracy greatly expands parties' and individual politicians' opportunity to use public resources to reward constituents. Party leaders then face a collective action dilemma and risk losing voters if they abandon clientelistic strategies. The analyses employ data on bureaucratic structures from the Quality of Government expert survey and recently published data on clientelism from Kitschelt's Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project.

Recent decades have seen renewed interest in the pervasive social systems of patronage and clientelism, in which voters make voting decisions more based on short term payoffs or expected payoffs, than on conviction or confidence in a candidate. In this chapter we argue that the institutional arrangements structuring the interface between input (policy making) and output (policy implementing) institutions in the political system may affect the strategy choices of electoral contenders. The relationship between the political and the administrative spheres of the state, we argue, constitutes a key element of the incentive structure that informs the logic of action of parties. This institutional interface is in some countries highly porous while in others, it is characterized by safeguards and restrictions aimed at maintaining a clear division of roles and jurisdictions.

The bulk of research on clientelism probes the inner workings of clientelistic exchanges, or explores the economic conditions that constitute more or less fertile soil for clientelism (Hicken 2013). This paper instead revisits Martin Shefter's 1994 work exploring the emergence of programmatic parties in the United States. Shefter's thesis has attracted little attention in the interim, but has recently become the subject of renewed debate (Hicken 2013; Keefer 2013). To our knowledge, this paper represents the first test of Shefter's theoretical contribution on a broader sample of countries. The link between the organizational status of the bureaucracy and clientelism represents one of few efforts to understand the institutional conditions that either allow clientelism to flourish or keep it in check.

The paper uses data from the Quality of Government expert survey and Kitschelt's Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project. The analyses support Shefter's claims regarding the importance of a professional bureaucracy.

### **Explanans and explanandum: Conceptual distinctions?**

The theoretical contention under investigation in this chapter regards the relationship between a politicized bureaucracy and clientelism. A core aspect of a politicized bureaucracy is that civil service jobs are assigned with partisan considerations in mind. A core element of clientelism is rewarding political supporters with, among other things, public sector jobs.

Politicians, if elected through free and fair elections, provide the best approximation of the aggregate of citizens' preferences, and must in any meaningfully democratic system exert control over the means, ways and aims of the bureaucracy. All states, in order to control bureaucracies, use a mix of various instruments, ranging from organizational (such as budget allocation and objective-based governing) to individual ones (such as civil service codes and personnel policies). In all but a tiny minority of countries (read: Denmark), the civil service

corps contains a mix of politically appointments and professionals hired exclusively based on merit and irrespective of political leaning. In fact, one of the means used to ensure an obedient civil service corps is to control staff policy through political appointments (Weber 1978; Wilson 1887; Lewis 2008). Civil servants appointed by incumbent politicians are more loyal to the party in power, and presumably also more committed to the policy agenda incumbents wish to implement. While heads of agencies are very often politically appointed, countries, but also agencies, or subnational governments, vary considerably in terms of the proportion of political appointees in the bureaucracy, as well as down to which organizational depth political appointees can be found (Gingerich 2013; Dahlström et al. 2012).

Clientelistic allocation of public goods and services, as distinct from programmatic policy implementation, is not governed by formalized and public rules outlining criteria for entitlement and distribution, and is instead based on a non-programmatic (individualized) distribution in exchange for political support (Stokes et al. 2013, 6–13). One means of creating space for clientelism is therefore to fail to stipulate criteria that define eligibility for public programs. Unlike other forms of corruption, clientelism often entails iteration. While paying a bribe may be a one-shot transaction, members of the electorate must have some grounds for believing in benefits promised by electoral challengers, and candidates need some basis for believing that a promised vote will translate into an actual vote.

The types of payoffs to voters tend to be private and excludable, such as scholarships, utility connections (water, electricity, telephone), groceries, kerosene, inclusion in welfare programs, but also public sector employment. Excludability is a crucial distinguishing feature of clientelistic payoffs, as a campaign promise targeted toward a specific group of citizens but from which no individual citizen can be excluded provided they meet the criteria of eligibility, cannot be used to reward electoral support (Hicken 2013, 294). On the other hand, community level payoffs in the form of schools, sports facilities, or infrastructure may also be a reward for political support, though some definitions consider this to fall in the closely related category of pork rather than clientelism (Stokes et al. 2013).

Employment in the public sector granted in exchange for political support thus clearly qualifies as a clientelistic exchange, and thus potentially overlaps with politicization of the bureaucracy empirically (c.f. Stokes et al. 2013). The distinction lies in the level of the bureaucracy involved. The political control of the bureaucracy is determined by the extent to which positions at the upper echelons of the organization are politically appointed, i.e. positions with discretionary power. It is precisely the discretionary power that makes

positions relevant for political appointment. Employment granted in exchange for political support, *patronage*, is, on the other hand, more characterized by transferability (easily withdrawn and reassigned); such positions are more likely to be low-skilled and therefore transferrable to a broader set of potential voters or party loyalists.<sup>1</sup>

### **Organizational firewalls within the state**

The virtuousness of a firewall separating politicians and bureaucrats has been noted by public administration scholars, from classical authors such as Woodrow Wilson and Max Weber to contemporary researchers (Weber 1978; Wilson 1887; Lewis 2008), but has received less attention in the literature exploring democratization and parties' use of clientelistic linkage strategies. We contend that a stronger division between the political and administrative sectors of the government, functioning as a firewall around the processes of political contestation, may contribute to lengthening the time horizons of policymaking and tip the calculus of political action away from certain strategies considered less consistent with well-functioning democracy, such as wooing voters with promises of private goods.

Institutions set the normative frameworks for actors' behavior, inform what is allowed and appropriate, but also constitute the incentive structure for choices in a broad range of strategies not specifically stipulated in rules and procedures. In a state, what matters are not only structures of each institution per se, but also the relations among them (e.g. the legislature and executive), as many institutions can be principal and agent at the same time. In textbook definitions of democracy, however, institutions of preference aggregation and policy formation are construed as principals while bureaucratic institutions act as agents. Concerning the relationship between political and administrative spheres of the state, a balance must be struck between control and stimulus, but they should also be appreciably separate in order to allow for effective oversight and corrective action. This trade-off accounts for the vast across-state and within-state variation in the degree to which political institutions control administrative institutions.

The strength and effectiveness of a firewall between the political and bureaucratic spheres of the state potentially constitutes an important component of the incentive structure for both politicians and bureaucrats. For politicians, extensive control over the bureaucracy, and in particular over careers of individual bureaucrats, allows much greater opportunities to engage

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<sup>1</sup> Simeon Nichter and colleagues also point out that clientelism may be used not only to influence vote choice, but also electoral participation and even abstention (Gans-Morse et al. 2014; Nichter 2014). These distinctions, while relevant to the larger investigative efforts to understand when different clientelistic strategies are used and to what end, are less relevant in the context of this analysis.

in discretionary allocation of public goods and services to reward party supporters or curry favor with undecided voters. Control of the bureaucracy thus allows incumbents to use government resources to strengthen their own chances of reelection. Access to social welfare programs such as access to subsidized housing or cash transfers may easily be allocated along partisan lines if politicians have extensive opportunities to intervene in the administration of public programs (see Stokes et al 2013, 15-17 for examples). Also, brokers, mediating between the political party leaders and the voters, are essential for a clientelistic distribution of goods. Survey data from Argentina show in fact that brokers often are public employees (Stokes et al. 2013, 99). It would be hard for political party leaders to employ brokers if they would not have the possibility to use public resources for appointing them.

This is not to say that political appointments under all circumstances result in increased selective apportionment of public goods and resources, but merely that the opportunities for such partisan use of state resources increase with the scope of politicization of the bureaucracy. Once a ruling party opts for short term clientelistic strategies, it may create further incentives for other politicians and parties to follow suit if they have the ability to do so. Autonomous bureaucracies, on the other hand, restrain politicians from interfering in policy implementation and channeling the flow of goods and resources.

If bureaucrats are politically recruited, loyalty to the incumbent and the ruling party rather than to the agency may be the most rational strategy in terms of career advancement (McCarty 2004; Lewis 2008; Gingerich 2013). In other words, bureaucrats may have incentives to carry out the will of the appointing politicians, even when such actions are incongruous with the spirit of the law or the stated aims and performance objectives of the agency in which they are employed. Such effects would of course be more intense in settings where politicians not only have the power to appoint, but also to dismiss (or demote or sideline). In such arrangements, obedience is synonymous with bureaucrats' continued employment.

An early study by Martin Shefter (1994) argues not only that bureaucratic autonomy is likely to affect the use of patronage as a strategy for electoral success, but that it is a precondition that is, if not necessary at least highly conducive, to the emergence of programmatic parties. Shefter traces the emergence of such programmatic parties in the United States as well as in the Great Britain, Italy, and Germany. Based on these cases, Shefter observes that the use of patronage politics is strongly related to whether a professionalized bureaucracy existed at the time of male suffrage. Very much along the lines of the argument presented above, Shefter points out that absent a professional and autonomous bureaucracy—with a stake in remaining

professional and autonomous—mass enfranchisement tends to induce a competitive frenzy among elites who use public resources to the extent they are able to win popular support.

### **Chicken or egg?**

That a professional and autonomous bureaucracy limits parties' and politicians' opportunity to channel access to public goods and services along partisan lines is theoretically plausible. To claim a neat story of single cause and inevitable and unconditional effect would, however, be folly. The direction of causation is plausibly to some extent the inverse of what is implied above. Cruz and Keefer (2013) argue this point and contend that politicians and parties abstain from bureaucratic reform precisely because the use of clientelistic strategies brings political gains. Parties and individual electoral contenders whose support rests heavily or entirely on rewards or commitments to deliver private goods have a stake in the maintenance of a politically controlled bureaucracy, but also a bureaucracy with weak mechanisms of control and oversight. Moreover, parties or politicians inclined to sympathize with and promote reform find themselves in a collective action dilemma, in which working toward systemic rule change may entail short-term losses if broad-based collaboration among parties is absent. The coordination problem remains until a time in which programmatic parties emerge and begin to enjoy widespread electoral success, at which point parties' incentives to reform outweighs the gains of employing clientelistic linkage strategies. As parties begin issuing policy promises that target a large sector of the population, their incentives to strengthen the capacity of the bureaucracy – a necessary condition for the provision of public goods – increases.

The will to make and follow through on a broad policy package is, however, only meaningful if the party has an internal organizational structure that allows it to make programmatic promises in a credible manner. Individual politicians have incentives to belong to programmatic parties, which may be larger and better known, but still engage in clientelistic behavior. As the authors succinctly put it: “Since the party program is a collective good, individual members have an incentive to shirk on it; since the private interests of leaders are rarely perfectly aligned with the interests of the party, they also have incentives to deviate from the program” (Cruz and Keefer 2013, 12). Assuring party discipline requires an internal structure that punishes free-riding on a party's reputation while undermining that same reputation for individual gains.

Cruz and Keefer (2013) find support for these causal claims in evaluations of the success of World Bank programs targeting precisely bureaucratic professionalization (see also Keefer

2011). Controlling for a number of factors related to the political institutions in place in a country, for the level of bureaucratic quality in a country, a number of country characteristics such as the size of the population and area, but also project-specific characteristics such as duration and funding amount, the authors find that countries in which a greater share of parties that can be rated as programmatic has a strong and robust effect on the success of the program (as evaluated by independent evaluators).<sup>2</sup>

That programmatic parties are more likely to push for reforms to professionalize the bureaucracy (a component of which is strengthening meritocratic recruitment), seems highly theoretically plausible, and Cruz and Keefer's analysis provides compelling evidence substantiating these claims. Cruz and Keefer do not, however, provide any clues as to the conditions that may induce parties to overcome the internal collective action dilemma inherent in forming a more highly disciplined political party. Moreover, in an earlier piece, Keefer (2007) argues convincingly that the state of the bureaucracy is a component of what parties credibly can promise to accomplish if elected. Absent a professionalized and sufficiently well-functioning bureaucracy, the electorate will hardly find campaign promises relating to large-scale policy programs persuasive.

We argue that a reciprocal interplay between parties' linkage strategies and the structure of the bureaucracy to be the most plausible theoretical account at this juncture, i.e. that a singular and deterministic direction of causation is unlikely. The current state of the relationship between politicians and the administrative arm of government, along with past electoral strategies of other parties, provide the two most salient considerations for a party in developing their own electoral strategy. The full range of factors that might prompt parties to strive to become more programmatic is beyond the scope of this paper, as is developing a comprehensive account of the factors driving the emergence of a professionalized bureaucracy. Confirming an association between these two that is independent of other possible determinants of clientelism will help to focus the scholarly work in this line of inquiry, however, laying the groundwork for future investigations of the conditions under which one or the other of these developments occurs, as well as the conditions under which they survive or, alternatively, are reversed.

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<sup>2</sup> The measure of programmatic parties builds on the Database of Political Institutions, which provides a yearly rating of parties as right, left, center, or none of these. The country rating is the share of parties with some form of ideological rating (as opposed to none). The measure does not take party size into consideration.

### **Alternative explanations to clientelism – Economic development, political competition and electoral systems**

The most widely cited determinant of clientelism highlights the demand side of the equation and is therefore neither institutional nor political, but rather economic and sociological: industrialization and the proportion of the electorate living in a state of deprivation. Poverty affects the logic of interactions between voters and parties in a number of ways. First, it substantially shortens the time horizons of voters. Absent basic material security and access to sanitation, and lacking education, voters are less likely to support or even grasp the value of proposals for longer-term and programmatic policy reform (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007a). A willingness to think in terms of a collective good that extends beyond the family or immediate community may be appreciably undermined by the immediate needs of one's own circumstances. Short time horizons will further be reinforced if candidates and brokers present voters with the campaign promises that are largely or entirely related to short term individual rewards, i.e. if the supply of clientelism is more readily available, and more credible, than programmatic policy promises (Keefer and Vlaicu 2008).

Poverty also induces clientelism as it, to put it bluntly, makes it affordable. As Allen Hicken puts it, "...as income rises, the marginal utility to a recipient of a given material benefit decreases. Because of this diminished marginal utility of income, candidates can get more bang for their clientelistic buck by targeting the poor" (2013, 299). Individuals or communities at higher levels of material well-being may require a larger payoff in exchange for partisan support, while buying the vote (or electoral participation, or electoral abstention) of an individual living in poverty simply requires less party resources. Thus both voters' preferences but also the calculus of vote buying change dramatically as material well-being in a society increases.

Political competition, and in particular the degree of meaningful contest in elections, has also been pointed to as a factor which may contribute to the prevalence of clientelism, though conclusions in this literature diverge sharply. Several authors argue that "robust competition provides a check against clientelism" (Hicken 2013, 297), provided that parties have a minimally programmatic platform to start with. The existence of viable challengers pushes incumbent parties to show results to as large a portion of the electorate as possible, which may induce not only abstaining from clientelistic practices, but even large scale bureaucratic reform (Geddes 1991). Somewhat similarly, Keefer (2006; Keefer and Vlaicu 2008) argue that once one party shifts to a programmatic strategy, other parties will have an incentive to follow suit, given that meaningful competition exists. A number of other studies instead find



that political competition is associated with a *greater* prevalence of clientelistic exchanges (Lindberg and Morrison 2008).

While seemingly contradictory, these findings taken together suggest that political competition may mitigate or alternatively intensify the use of clientelistic exchanges depending on the circumstances, either crucial attributes of the parties themselves, as Keefer and Geddes imply, or other contextual conditions. Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro (2013) advances and empirically substantiates a highly plausible argument that the degree of political competition plays out differently depending precisely on the level of poverty in the setting. The cost of using clientelistic payouts as a strategy for winning votes is, as noted above, contingent to a very large extent upon the material well-being of the electorate. In a situation in which political competition is low, an incumbent may withhold clientelistic payouts in order to conserve resources, and if the electorate enjoys a higher standard of living, then clientelism threatens to scare away middle class voters that are more hostile towards these practices both out of self-interest and on normative grounds. If on the other hand, viable challengers threaten incumbents' likelihood of re-election, *and* the populous is largely composed of low-income individuals, then clientelism, Weitz-Shapiro argues, can be expected to be more prevalent. This line of reasoning may also explain the divergent findings in previous research, i.e. why Lindberg and Morrison (2008) find a positive association between political competition and clientelism, while others find that competition curbs the use of clientelism. Comparing municipalities in Argentina, Weitz-Shapiro indeed finds that close electoral contests in municipalities with comparatively large proportions of poor voters are much more likely to show evidence of clientelism, whereas political competition has exactly the opposite effect in richer municipalities, instead lowering the incidence of clientelistic behavior.

Gingerich (2013) builds on Shefter's early work but posits that a politically controlled bureaucracy in and of itself will not necessarily lead to wide spread plundering of public coffers for partisan advantages. Instead, he points to electoral systems with proportional representation and closed lists as the most important component in an institutional landscape that, in combination with a politicized bureaucracy, incentivizes and creates opportunities for clientelism. In contrast to open list PR systems, closed list creates incentives, he argues, to "steal for the team". On the whole, his primary theoretical focus is on the implications of the design of the electoral system, and political appointments are, in his model a condition that follows from closed list system, but also intensifies the effect of the electoral system on

clientelism. In a comparison between Bolivia, which has a closed list system, and Chile and Brazil, he finds that the Bolivian bureaucracy is much more heavily politicized, and bureaucrats report directing the allocation of resources along partisan lines to a much stronger extent than in the other two cases.

A number of other alternative explanations also need mention. First, a number of authors emphasize, for example, the learning aspect of democratic development, and that well developed parties with stable ideological platforms quite simply require a prolonged iterative process in which voters gradually gain confidence in parties' campaign promises, and parties incrementally come to understand that voters are willing to endorse larger policy programs (Kitschelt and Kselman 2012). Secondly, theories of societal accountability predict that non-state actors may contribute to holding government to better standards of behavior (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006), but only if it is equipped to do so. The extent to which citizens have access to information about the goings on in the political sphere has been shown to be one such enabling condition (Grimes 2013). The empirical analyses take these factors into account.

### **Data and measurement**

We employ a measure of bureaucratic professionalism from the Quality of Government survey of public administration experts (Teorell et al. 2011). This index builds on experts' evaluations of four aspects of the civil service: 1) the extent to which skills and merit determine selection of applicants to public sector employment; or whether conversely 2) political connections decide who gets the job; 3) whether politicians decide who hires and fires senior public officials; and 4) whether senior public officials are recruited from within the ranks of the public sector. While the first two are broader and refer to public sector employees more generally (and may therefore be tapping into both the prevalence of political appointments but also patronage), the latter two refer specifically to *senior* public officials. The four questions, each answered on a scale from "hardly ever" to "almost always." The second and third questions are reversed and then the four questions are averaged first for each responding expert, and then across experts for each country (Teorell et al. 2011; Teorell et al. 2013).

We use a measure of clientelistic parties from the survey of the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (Kitschelt 2014). This broad measure of clientelism builds on expert evaluations of whether parties or candidates of these parties give or promise to give four types of rewards for citizens' votes: b1) "citizens consumer goods (e.g., food or liquor, clothes,

cookware, appliances, medicines, building materials etc.);” b2) “material advantages in public social policy schemes (e.g., preferential access to subsidized prescription drugs, public scholarships, public housing, better police protection etc.);” b3) employment in the public sector or in the publicly regulated private sector (e.g., post office, janitorial services, maintenance work, jobs at various skill levels in state owned enterprises or in large private enterprises with government contracts and subsidies, etc.);” and b4) to either citizens and businesses “preferential access to government contracts or procurement opportunities (e.g., public works/construction projects, military procurement projects without competitive bidding to companies whose employees support the awarding party).” In addition to these four components, the clientelism index also comprises experts’ evaluations of a statement regarding whether citizens and businesses may get special favors in the form of lenient application of regulatory rules in exchange for votes (b5). All of these items are evaluated on a response scale from “a negligible effort” to “a major effort.” The country score combines each party’s scores in a given country, weighted by party size (Kitschelt 2014).

In terms of control variables, the analyses use Vanhanen’s measure of political competition, which captures the “electoral success of smaller parties, that is, the percentage of votes gained by smaller parties in parliamentary and/or presidential elections” (Teorell et al. 2013, 141). Higher values indicate more competition; a value of zero would indicate a single-party dominance, while a value of 100 would indicate that each voter voted for a different party.

The measure of closed list proportional representation codes countries as 1 if such a system exists, i.e. if voters cannot express a preference for candidates within a party, and 0 otherwise. Codings are taken from the Database of Political Institutions. Democratic experience is measured as the number of years between 1930 and 1995 for which a country was rated as a 6 or higher on Beck et al.’s democracy scale, which rates countries based on electoral competitiveness for executive office (Teorell et al. 2013, 188).

Economic development is measured using GDP per capita from the World Development Indicators (WDI). Alternative model specifications also included the natural log of GDP per capita; the main results remained unchanged. The theoretical argument suggests that a more appropriate measure would be the percentage of the population living in relative deprivation. The WDI publishes a measure of percent living below the national poverty line, but this measure is only available for a small number of countries, drastically reducing the power of the analyses. The models also include Freedom House’s measure of press freedom (2001-

2011), as well as a variable capturing the number of newspapers in a country per 1000 inhabitants (Teorell et al. 2013).

We perform cross-sectional analyses with countries as our units of analysis. We include all countries for which we have data on the relevant variables (see list of countries in the Appendix, table A1). Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1.

[Table 1 here]

## **Results**

The results generally confirm the main theoretical contention outlined above: a professionalized bureaucracy exhibits a relationship with clientelism, independent of other institutional, historical and economic factors. Figure 1 illustrates the bivariate relationship between a professionalized bureaucracy and clientelism.

Beginning with the main results, the first and second models in Table 2 yield evidence that parties opt for clientelistic exchanges to woo voters to a much greater extent in countries with a more politically controlled bureaucracy and, conversely, abstain from doing so when the bureaucracy is more professionalized. As the measure of professionalized bureaucracy varies between 2 and 6.3 (see Table 1 for descriptives), the expected difference in the prevalence of clientelism between a country with the least (Venezuela) and most (Ireland) professionalized bureaucracy is 3.9 on the clientelism measure (which has a 12 point range in countries included in the analysis). The strength of the association is independent of other factors (though diminishes slightly), including the level of economic well-being in a country (model 2). If the natural log of GDP per capita is used instead (not shown), the wealth estimate is not significant and the main result remains unchanged.

Wealth itself has, as predicted by ample investigative work, a very strong association with the prevalence of clientelism in a country. The difference in levels of clientelism among the poorest countries in the sample (e.g. Mozambique) and the richest (Norway) is 6.5, a full half of the range of the clientelism measure in the countries studied. Among the other controls, model 1 suggests that almost all exhibit the expected effects. Political competition is negatively associated with clientelism, though the estimate is not statistically significant ( $p=.16$ ). The number of years a country has been a democracy is negatively associated with the prevalence of clientelism, as are the number of newspapers in relation to the populous (though  $p=.11$ ) and the level of press freedom in the country. That said, years of democracy

and press freedom become insignificant when GDP per capita is entered into the model (Table 2, model 2).

[Table 2 here]

Table 2, model 3 examine the contentions inferred from Gingerich's comparison of Bolivia, Brazil, and Chile, that closed list PR systems are more likely to increase clientelism as incumbents will be more inclined to 'steal for the team'. In order for such activity to transpire, Gingerich points out that incumbents must be able to direct the flow of public goods to reward the electorate along partisan lines. The estimate in model 3 does not, however, corroborate these contentions. Moreover, professionalized bureaucracy also loses its significance. However, the number of observations drops considerably (from 74 to 57) when the control for closed list PR system is introduced. The differences in results may therefore be due to different sample sizes. It should be noted that professionalized bureaucracy loses its significance also when the base model is run with the smaller sample size (not reported here).

Table 2, models 4–6 report the results for similar models but in which the professionalized bureaucracy index has been replaced by one of its components, political appointments. We can see that the results support our theoretical contention. Political appointments are positively correlated with clientelistic practices among parties. Similar to the previous models these results are not robust to the smaller sample model with the inclusion of the closed list PR variable. If we instead run analyses with the variable for meritocratic appointments the results mirror the ones reported here. Meritocratic appointments are negatively correlated with clientelistic practices among parties. Analyses with the variable indicating to what extent "senior public officials are recruited from within the ranks of the public sector" show similar results. Though, the fourth component of the index indicating to what extent the top political leadership hires and fires senior public officials is not significantly related to clientelistic practices (not reported here).

#### *Different clientelistic strategies*

As indicated, the index employed above contains five different different types of clientelistic strategies that the parties can use to build clientelistic linkages. The two first exchange mechanisms are direct benefits to citizens; consumer goods (b1) and preferential public benefits (b2). The fourth and fifth mechanisms are different since they include preferential benefits that are related to organizations that compete for public contracts and could benefit from certain regulations, e.g., businesses, civil society organizations and in some cases private citizens (mainly businessmen); government contracts or procurement opportunities (b4) and

favorable regulations (b5). The third mechanism is employment opportunities (b3) and it is potentially close to our dependent variable, although, as stated above, the level of employments in the bureaucratic hierarchy is likely to be different. To ascertain that this indicator is not the only one driving the results it is therefore important to also perform analyses without this type of exchange mechanism. Moreover, given the different orientations of these exchange mechanisms, citizens or more business and civil society organization oriented, and their different degrees of sophistication, they may be used to varying degrees by the political party leaders. We therefore run analyses where we separate three different groups of clientelistic strategies, strategies directly oriented towards ordinary citizens (b1 and b2), strategies oriented towards business, civil society organizations, and citizens (b4 and b5), and strategies involving employment opportunities (b3). We have aggregated the indicators, including weights according to party size, in a manner similar to the one employed when building the clientelism index.

Table 3 reports the results from two different groups of exchange mechanisms. Models 1-3 show no significant relationship between a professionalized bureaucracy and the exchange mechanisms mainly directed to ordinary citizens. However, if we instead examine the exchange mechanisms that are related to businessmen, civil society, and citizens we can see that a professionalized bureaucracy is negatively related to this type of exchange mechanisms (models 4 and 5). One possible explanation for why this is the case is that the two mechanisms related to businesses, civil society, and citizens requires more discretionary power at higher levels in the bureaucracy.

[Table 3 here]

For employment as a clientelistic exchange mechanisms the analyses produce the expected results (table 4, models 1–3). A more professionalized bureaucracy is negatively related to the use of employment opportunities as a clientelistic strategy.

[Table 4 here]

The results for the three different types of exchange mechanisms are similar to the one reported here also in models where the professionalized bureaucracy index is replaced with the two separate components, political appointments and meritocratic recruitment (not reported here). The component indicating whether the top political leadership hires and fires senior public officials is only significant in one model; the one with clientelistic strategies towards businessmen and control for GDP/Capita. The indicator for whether senior public

offices are recruited from within the ranks is significant and negatively related to all three groups of exchange mechanisms (not reported here).

### **Concluding remarks**

The analyses presented here indicate that Shefter's (1994) theoretical contentions, drawn from a handful of cases of established democracies, hold in a broader set of cases that include both young and old democracies, and across regions of the world. The extent to which the bureaucracy in a country is associated with the extent to which parties and candidates opt for clientelistic linkage strategies. Competition is inherent to electoral contests and parties by definition must jockey to curry favor among the electorate. If this competitive dynamic is allowed to spill over into the administrative sphere of the state and influence the flow of public goods and resources, then representation erodes, and private payoffs may come to replace more broad-spectrum attempts to change society. The existence and strength of a firewall between the political and administrative spheres of the state may thus help to keep politicians' sights focused on the longer term issues facing the polity, rather than resorting to payoffs – or promises of payoffs – to voters.

It is, however, important to note that correlation is not causation, and as indicated above, we should be cautious of ascribing a certain causal direction to the results reported in this chapter. Many questions remain, regarding whether a professional bureaucracy has an independent effect on clientelism, or whether both have come about as a result of economic development, the growth of the middle class, and attendant demands for programmatic policies. Future investigative work will need to delve more deeply into the conditions under which bureaucracies professionalize and parties become more programmatic, whether these happen in tandem, and what conditions might sustain or conversely undermine such processes from moving forward.

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
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**Figure**

**Figure 1. Professional public administration and clientelistic linkages**



## Tables

**Table 1. Descriptive statistics**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Obs</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>
Clientelism	74	12.88	3.41	5.79	17.93
Professionalized bureaucracy	74	3.98	1.05	2.06	6.32
Political Competition	74	52.64	12.60	10.4	70
Years of Democracy	74	29.32	24.81	0	70
Papers per 1000 inhabitants	74	150.99	134.87	3	588
Press Freedom 2001-2011 (higher values=less free)	74	36.74	18.27	10	81
GDP per capita 2009	74	16115.94	12019.48	788.26	47174.6
Closed List PR system	57	.75	.43	0	1

**Table 2. Institutional and societal correlates of clientelistic linkage strategies**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Professionalized bureaucracy	-0.952*** (0.305)	-0.801*** (0.286)	0.0356 (0.395)			
Political appointments				0.752*** (0.264)	0.679*** (0.242)	0.119 (0.293)
Political Competition	-0.0311 (0.0217)	-0.0249 (0.0202)	-0.0119 (0.0270)	-0.0300 (0.0220)	-0.0217 (0.0200)	-0.0124 (0.0270)
Years of Democracy	-0.0360*** (0.0116)	-0.0118 (0.0128)	-0.0130 (0.0129)	-0.0378*** (0.0118)	-0.0102 (0.0128)	-0.0119 (0.0130)
Papers per 1000 inhabitants	-0.00380 (0.00233)	0.000361 (0.00247)	-0.00135 (0.00256)	-0.00451* (0.00237)	0.000439 (0.00248)	-0.00101 (0.00257)
Press Freedom	0.0431** (0.0191)	0.0186 (0.0191)	0.0579** (0.0228)	0.0352* (0.0193)	0.0174 (0.0192)	0.0535** (0.0225)
GDP per capita		-0.000140*** (0.0000402)	-0.000164*** (0.0000441)		-0.000142*** (0.0000400)	-0.000161*** (0.0000430)
Closed List PR			-0.112 (0.554)			-0.153 (0.560)
Constant	18.36*** (2.181)	19.25*** (2.038)	15.02*** (2.547)	11.76*** (1.802)	12.99*** (1.771)	14.69*** (2.324)
<i>N</i>	74	74	57	75	74	57
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.716	0.760	0.795	0.702	0.760	0.795
adj. <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.696	0.738	0.765	0.680	0.738	0.766

Note: OLS with Standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

**Table 3. Different clientelistic strategies**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	Ordinary citizens	Ordinary citizens	Ordinary citizens	Businessmen and citizens	Businessmen and citizens	Businessmen and citizens
Professionalized bureaucracy	-0.208	-0.153	0.152	-0.461***	-0.421***	-0.0895
	(0.138)	(0.118)	(0.165)	(0.120)	(0.118)	(0.158)
Political Competition	-0.0177*	-0.0128	-0.00264	-0.0124	-0.0103	-0.00539
	(0.00977)	(0.00833)	(0.0113)	(0.00856)	(0.00835)	(0.0109)
Years of Democracy	-0.0148***	-0.00101	-0.00160	-0.0141***	-0.00669	-0.00576
	(0.00519)	(0.00528)	(0.00539)	(0.00454)	(0.00529)	(0.00517)
Papers per 1000 inhabitants	-0.00152	0.000950	0.000294	-0.00115	0.000140	-0.000486
	(0.00105)	(0.00102)	(0.00107)	(0.000915)	(0.00102)	(0.00103)
Press Freedom	0.0221**	0.0153*	0.0351***	0.0132*	0.00709	0.0204**
	(0.00846)	(0.00789)	(0.00952)	(0.00741)	(0.00790)	(0.00914)
GDP per capita		-0.0000691***	-0.0000738***		-0.0000407**	-0.0000572***
		(0.0000166)	(0.0000184)		(0.0000166)	(0.0000177)
Closed List PR			-0.156			-0.0625
			(0.232)			(0.222)
Constant	6.719***	6.797***	4.778***	7.823***	8.013***	6.513***
	(0.978)	(0.842)	(1.065)	(0.856)	(0.844)	(1.022)
<i>N</i>	75	74	57	75	74	57
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.653	0.749	0.774	0.705	0.730	0.785
adj. <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.628	0.727	0.742	0.684	0.706	0.754

Note: OLS with Standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

**Table 4. Employment as a clientelistic exchange mechanism**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Professionalized bureaucracy	-0.312*** (0.0794)	-0.295*** (0.0778)	-0.160 (0.118)
Political Competition	-0.00815 (0.00564)	-0.00661 (0.00549)	-0.0108 (0.00807)
Years of Democracy	-0.00628** (0.00300)	-0.00193 (0.00348)	-0.00246 (0.00385)
Papers per 1000 inhabitants	-0.000986 (0.000604)	-0.000206 (0.000673)	-0.000575 (0.000763)
Press Freedom	0.00230 (0.00489)	0.000206 (0.00520)	0.00492 (0.00680)
GDP per capita		-0.0000217* (0.0000109)	-0.0000213 (0.0000132)
Closed List PR			-0.00178 (0.165)
Constant	4.483*** (0.565)	4.504*** (0.555)	4.169*** (0.760)
<i>N</i>	75	74	57
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.624	0.654	0.652
adj. <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.597	0.623	0.602

Note: OLS with Standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

**Table A1. Countries included in the analysis**

Albania	Greece	Pakistan
Argentina	Guatemala	Paraguay
Australia	Honduras	Peru
Austria	Hungary	Philippines
Bangladesh	Indonesia	Poland
Belgium	Ireland	Portugal
Bolivia	Israel	Romania
Botswana	Italy	Russia
Brazil	Japan	Slovakia
Bulgaria	Kenya	Slovenia
Canada	South Korea	South Africa
Chile	Lebanon	Spain
Colombia	Latvia	Sweden
Costa Rica	Lithuania	Switzerland
Croatia	Malaysia	Thailand
Czech Republic	Mauritius	Turkey
Denmark	Mexico	Ukraine
Dominican Republic	Moldova	Macedonia
Ecuador	Morocco	Egypt
El Salvador	Mozambique	United Kingdom
Estonia	Netherlands	Tanzania
Finland	New Zealand	United States
France	Nicaragua	Uruguay
Germany	Nigeria	Venezuela
Ghana	Norway	