

# **Building Climate Policy Coalitions: An Analysis of the EU Agencies' Twitter Activity**

Sandra Eckert, Aarhus Institute of Advanced Studies (AIAS), Aarhus University

Kristin Olofsson, Oklahoma State University

Karina Shyrokykh, Stockholm University

## **Abstract**

Climate change has become one of the most salient issues across Europe, and climate policy is one of the few areas where the European Union (EU) over the past two decades has been highly active in proposing new activities and regulation. The role of EU agencies in climate policy, by contrast, is an understudied field, although their relevance in the EU policy process has been widely acknowledged and studied extensively in other policy areas. To learn more about the role of EU agencies in building climate policy coalitions, we ask: *Why do some agencies engage in climate policy coalition building more than others?* To address this question, we collect data on public communication of 37 EU agencies from their official Twitter accounts. Using time-series cross-sectional regression models, we test relationships between agency characteristics and their engagement in climate policy coalition building. We find that the agency's policy mandate as well as their resources are significantly related to engagement in climate policy coalition building. We contribute to existing research on EU agencies and a literature on agencies' public communication by shedding light on some of the factors that shape climate policy coalitions.

**Keywords:** climate policy, agencies, coalition-building, social media

## Introduction

Climate policy has come to the top of the EU's policy agenda over the past two decades and has resulted in intensified policy activity, especially in association with the EU's Green Deal agenda. The European Commission in particular has engaged in agenda-setting activity and has attracted significant attention in the scholarly debate (Eckert; Oberthür and Dupont, 2021). The role of the more than 30 EU agencies in climate policy, by contrast, is an understudied field. This is surprising given that the agencies' relevance in the EU policy process has been widely acknowledged and studied extensively (Simoncini, 2018; Trondal, et al., 2012). EU agencies play a significant role in manifold areas of policy-making and regulation that are more or less directly related to climate change issues, such as chemicals, energy, health issues, financial markets, migration or security. At the same time, EU agencies engage with climate policy to varying extent. In this article, we intend to address this variance across agencies. We therefore can expect EU agencies to engage with climate related issues, also with a view to expand their mandate.

Moreover, whereas the role of public communication and social media activity has become a decisive policy tool in international climate policy (Pearce, et al., 2019; Schäfer, 2012; Williams, et al., 2015), relatively little attention has been dedicated to social media activities of EU agencies. Yet such activity is important in order to reach a wider audience (Askanus and Uldam, 2011), generate legitimacy (Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer, 2015) and interact with other stakeholders (Manetti, et al., 2016). The public communication of independent authorities is an emerging field of study (Busuioc and Rimkutė, 2020; Maor, 2020; Rimkutė, 2020a; b; Wood, 2018) to which we contribute. In this paper, we focus on the role of EU agencies as a growing community of non-majoritarian supranational bodies that cultivates internal horizontal links. More specifically, we study how public communication of individual EU agencies make use of social media communication in order to proactively seek to build coalitions with their counterparts on issues related to climate policy by addressing the following research question:

*Why do some agencies engage in climate policy coalition building more than others?*

In this article, we study coalition building between EU agencies. To that end, we operationalize coalition building using agencies' social media activity on Twitter. While we do not claim that the process of coalition building happens exclusively on such platforms, we argue that the

process of coalition building is reflected in online communication. This is to say, we expect agencies to engage in climate-related debates outside social networks but the results of such negotiations are likely to be reflected in how agencies communicate online with one another. This operationalization, however, assumes that EU agencies are strategic in their communication and that their communication is transparent (i.e., it reflects the actual events happening and a timely manner).

We collected tweets posted by 37 EU agencies between 2009 and 2020, yielding 20,335 tweets about climate during that time period. We conducted time-series cross-sectional analysis to test hypotheses about agency characteristics derived from the literature. The article contributes to the already rich and growing body of literature on agency governance. By now we have a good understanding of regulatory agencies' independence from the political arena (Gilardi, 2007; Wonka and Rittberger, 2010a; b) and their accountability and reputation (Bianculli, et al., 2014; Busuioc and Rimkutė, 2019; Koop, 2011; Scott, 2000). While the role of public communication by agencies is covered to some extent in the existing literature (Busuioc and Rimkutė, 2020; Maor, 2020; Rimkutė, 2020a; b; Wood, 2018), the determinants of activity in coalition building remain underexplored.

The paper is structured as follows: it first reviews existing literature on EU agencies in order to situate our contribution and derive our hypotheses, then presents our research design and case selection before moving on to the empirical analysis. Finally, we discuss our findings and offer some conclusions as well as suggestions for future research.

## **EU agencies and coalition building**

We have seen a significant expansion of EU agencies over the last few decades (Levi-Faur, 2011; Wonka and Rittberger, 2010a; b) both in terms of policy fields covered and competencies. EU agencies are typically created by EU secondary law, are entrusted with specified tasks and dispose of some degree of autonomy (Kelemen, 2005, p. 175). Going beyond this minimum definition, the universe of EU agency comprises a wide variety of bodies that differ with respect to their age, their tasks, the policy fields they cover and the resources at their disposal (Christensen and Nielsen, 2010; Simoncini, 2018; Wonka and Rittberger, 2010b). EU agencies have become more than facilitators of transnational regulatory networks and arenas for the exchange of information on 'best practice'. Some EU agencies engage exclusively in tasks such

as information gathering or implementation (Christensen and Nielsen, 2010; Wonka and Rittberger, 2010b), but several EU agencies have regulatory functions such as adopting (or preparing for the Commission) individual decisions, issuing guidelines on the application of EU law at the national level, engaging in national agencies' handling of single cases, and developing new EU legislation (Egeberg and Trondal, 2011; Ongaro, et al., 2015). EU agencies often play a key role in the EU policy process by providing expert input to policy-makers and facilitating policy implementation.

The role of EU agencies has been studied from multiple perspectives. Most attention has been dedicated to the relationship between EU agencies and the political arena, both at the European and national levels. Agencies have been described as supranational (Majone, 2005) as well as inter-governmental organization (Christensen and Nielsen, 2010; Keleman, 2002; Kelemen and Tarrant, 2011). Less attention, by contrast, has been paid to the interaction between EU agencies (but Chiu, 2016). Existing research examines how agencies transfer knowledge to member states and their national agencies, as well as to the European Commission (Jevnaker and Saerbeck, 2019) and there is also an emerging literature on the communication activities of EU agencies (Busuioc and Rimkutė, 2020; Maor, 2020; Rimkutė, 2020a; b; Wood, 2018), yet relatively little attention has been dedicated to their social media activities. This is a research gap in view of the growing importance of social media. The rise of social media has provided new opportunities for communication, networking and idea sharing (Darling, et al., 2013; Thaler, et al., 2012); such technologies are regularly been used to share knowledge among diverse groups of stakeholders (e.g. Ogden, 2013). EU agencies are not an exemption. We can expect that they strategically use social media and other means of communication to enhance their own legitimacy, communicate with key stakeholders and express policy positions.

Moreover, we do not know a lot about how they exchange information and communicate between themselves and to what effect, more precisely – whether and if so, how agencies form coalitions on specific policy issues. We contribute to this research by studying intra-agency communication and information sharing as a reflection of coalition-building activity. We expect agencies to engage in climate-related debates outside social networks but the results of such interactions are likely to be reflected in how agencies communicate online with one another.

Coalitions are built for many different purposes with varying levels of intentionality behind coordination (Ansell and Gash, 2007; Provan and Kenis, 2007). As Agranoff noted, it would be

inappropriate to treat all networks the same (2007); individuals coalesce for a variety of reasons around issues (Hecló, 1978), values (Cairney, et al., 2016; Fischer, et al., 2012), resources (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, 2010), power (Ingold, 2011), and most relevant to this study, information (Chalmers, 2013; Fischer, et al., 2017). There is an ongoing debate in policy process literature regarding the level of coordination required to qualify as a coalition; some scholars argue that recognition as a coalition requires high levels of intentional coordination while other scholars adopt a less-restrictive conception of coordination, particularly in the absence of a pluralistic democracy (Nohrstedt and Olofsson, 2016). This study tends towards the latter and builds on work that focuses on online connections as a reflection of coalition-building activity (Yi and Scholz, 2016). To operationalize policy coalition building, we draw from Caudle's work on netcentric bureaucracy (2010). Caudle's work emphasizes the importance of knowledge sharing between public-sector organizations, noting that the primary purpose of policy coalitions in this context is disseminating information across agency boundaries. Given EU agencies' role as conduits of information in the EU system, we recognize policy coalitions in this research as clusters of organizations who actively seek linkages with other organizations based on information-sharing goals.

With a conception of what constitutes a policy coalition in this research, we now turn to explanations for drivers of coalition-building activities. Previous research indicates that coalition building activities may be influenced by mission and/or structural factors. We expect that agencies are more likely to reach out to agencies which are active in the same policy field, hold a similar mandate on climate-related issues, or perform similar tasks. Moreover, the universe of EU agencies has frequently been clustered in accordance with different policy fields and tasks. In terms of policy fields, we follow the official EU categories that differentiate between nine policy fields. With respect to tasks, existing research draws a main line between agencies with or without a regulatory mandate – for instance by differentiating between regulatory agencies as opposed to agencies entrusted with information gathering or implementation tasks (Wonka and Rittberger, 2010a; Wood, 2018). Significant past empirical work in network analysis has demonstrated that similarity in beliefs or mandate are powerful in driving coalition-building activity, known as the homophily effect (Calanni, et al., 2014; McPherson, et al., 2001). We thus formulate the following three hypotheses related to mission:

*H1a Climate mandate: An agency is more likely to engage in climate policy coalition building when the agency has an official climate mandate than an agency without a climate mandate.*

*H1b Policy field: An agency is more likely to engage in climate policy coalition building with other agencies operating in the same policy field than with agencies operating in distinct policy fields.*

*H1c Task: An agency is more likely to engage in climate policy coalition building with agencies performing the same type of tasks than with agencies performing distinct tasks.*

We also expect structural factors such as age and resources to influence coalition-building activities. The varying age of EU agencies is an established theme in the existing literature, which has examined the various waves of agencification in the EU polity (Dehousse, 1997; Levi-Faur, 2011). More generally, old age and legacy of an institutions are typically perceived as sources of authority and legitimacy (Arras and Braun, 2018), generating hypothesis 2a.

*H2a Age: Older agencies are more likely to engage in climate policy coalition building than younger agencies.*

The assumption that institutions disposing of significant financial and human resources are more active than less well-resourced institutions is a straightforward assumption in rationalist institutionalist theorising (Arras and Braun, 2018; Hanretty and Koop, 2013). The degree of resources agencies dispose of has been studied extensively in existing research, in particular as a determinant of their de facto independence (Eckert, 2010; Maggetti, 2007). More recent contributions to the growing EU agency literature have paid increasing attention to communication activities (Busuioc and Rimkutė, 2020; Maor, 2020; Rimkutė, 2020a; b; Wood, 2018), of which Twitter activities studied in this paper is one example. Wood, for example, studied ‘entrepreneurship’ with regards to the media communication activities of 33 EU agencies in 2014. He mapped the universe of EU agencies into four populations, namely technical-functional, insulating, network-seeking and politicised, based on tasks and resources as explanatory factors (Wood, 2018, p. 410). Drawing on the work of Knill et al. on international organisations (Knill, et al., 2017), Wood expects technical-functional entrepreneurial methods for information-gathering agencies drawing on few resources that operate in a context of low political salience; insulating entrepreneurial methods for well-resourced regulatory agencies operating in a context of low political salience; network-seeking entrepreneurial methods for information gathering agencies disposing of a medium level of resources and operating in an

environment with high political salience; and politicised entrepreneurial methods in the case of well-resourced regulatory agencies operating in an environment with high political salience.

Of particular relevance to our work is Wood's differentiation between insulating and networking agencies. As he stresses, the insulating strategy matches the standard argument that non-majoritarian institutions are output-oriented and tend to keep a low profile based on the assumption that if they do their job well, there is no need for other types of activities including public communication (Cukierman, et al., 1992; Gilardi, 2002; Majone, 2001). The networking type of agency, by contrast, is often less well resourced than the insulating type and does not dispose of a regulatory mandate. It may operate in crowded policy areas where various actors compete to set the policy agenda. The key goal of reaching and become integrated in relevant networks for the networking type of agency is to strengthen its status and competencies (Knill, et al., 2017, p. 67; Wood, 2018, pp. 411-2).

From previous work on the link between resources and agency activity, we generate two competing hypotheses 2b and 2c: the more intuitive version which directly links the level of available resources to the level of activity (2a); and Wood's more sophisticated argument that well-resourced agencies are less dependent on communication activity and will thus be less active in coalition building.

*H2b Resources (positive): Well-resourced agencies are more likely to engage in climate policy coalition building than less-resourced agencies.*

*H2c Resources (negative): Less well-resourced agencies are more likely to engage in climate policy coalition building than well-resourced agencies.*

## **Research design**

We use Twitter data to capture policy coalition building activity. Twitter data is suitable for this research due to two reasons. First, unlike annual reports, tweets are posted instantly as reaction to the latest events or developments. Dynamic processes of coalition building can be captured using this data. Second, Twitter data captures which agencies in their communication refer to which other agencies (via using the mention symbol, i.e. @). This feature of Twitter data allows us to detect the extent to which agencies engage in coalition building on climate policy through this social media platform.

We operationalize coalition-building activity via mentions (captured via the @ symbol in tweets known as the username or handle). To obtain Twitter data, we used the academic track Twitter API. We collected tweets posted by 37 EU agencies between 2009 (when most of the accounts have been created) and 2019. In total, we obtained 164,543 tweets. Appendix Table 1 lists the number of tweets obtained from each organization. After having collected the data, we filtered the data to keep only tweets that refer to climate-related topics. To do that, we built a list of keywords (see Appendix Table 2). If a tweet contained one or more keywords, we retained the tweet and the corresponding metadata about the tweet for further analysis. After filtering the data, we obtained 20,335 tweets in total about climate. Appendix Table 3 lists the number of tweets about climate by each EU agency.

Since we are interested in climate policy coalitions, we further cleaned the data to keep only tweets that contain references to one or more EU agencies (excluding self-reference). As a result, we obtained 3,077 tweets. Then, we aggregated the data by year. As a result, we obtained a time-series cross-sectional dataset where an observation is agency-year. The final dataset consists of repeated observations of 37 agencies over eleven years (2009-2019). The six hypotheses developed in the section above are tested using this data on EU agencies' public Twitter communication on climate.

The dependent variable in the study is *policy coalition building activity*. The variable reflects whether an agency makes rhetoric links to other agencies in its public communication about climate (mentions the @ username/handle). It is operationalized by the log of the total number of mentions of *other* EU agencies in official communication by each of the agencies. We exclude self-mentions.

We used a set of independent variables to capture agencies' characteristics that can predict agencies' engagement in policy coalition building and conditions under which such coalitions are more likely to be built. To test H1a, we created a variable that captures whether an agency has an official mandate in climate governance (where 1 = mandate in climate and 0 = no mandate in climate). The mandate has been coded based on the relevant EU secondary law acts that specify agencies' mandates.

To test H1b, we create a set of binary variables that capture a *policy field* of each of the agencies. We distinguish between nine broad policy fields: freedom, security and justice (Frontex, eu-LISA, EASO, EMCDDA, CEPOL, Europol, FRA, and Eurojust), supervision of financial systems (EBA, ESMA, EIOPA), security and defence (EDA, EASA, GSA, EUISS, and

SatCentre), digital connectivity (BEREC, GSA, and ENISA), energy (ACER), innovation (Cedefop, CPVO, EIT, EUIPO, GSA and ETF), transport (GSA, EASA, EMSA, and ERA), citizens' protection (CdT, Cedefop, ECDC, ECHA, EEA, EFCA, EFSA, EMA, Eurofound, and EU-OSHA), education and skills development (Cedefop and ETF). We coded whether each of the agencies belongs to each of the policy fields following the official EU classification of EU agencies.<sup>1</sup> An agency can be coded as contributing to more than one policy field.

MORE TO COME LATER REGARDING MEASUREMENT OF TASK VARIABLES (H1c).

To test H2a, we constructed an independent variable reflecting the *age of an agency*, measured as the total number of years since the agency has been established. Lastly, to test hypotheses H2b and H2c, we capture resources via *agencies' total annual budget*. For robustness check, we use two alternative operationalizations of resources. First, we collected data on the number of *permanent staff members*. Second, we collected data on the *financial resources* of the agencies. All three variables capturing the resources are coded using official annual reports on revenues of agencies (available through EURLEX), but also annual reports published by the European Court of Auditors (see Appendix Table 5 for details). For some missing data, we have requested and received information from the agencies directly.

DATA ANALYSIS ON TASKS IS WORK IN PROGRESS

We also include a few control variables into the models. We control for *the total number of tweets (log)* posted by each EU agency each year because agencies that are active online are more likely to have references to other agencies, too. We also control for *the popularity of an agency* because an agency that is mentioned frequently in a discussion might be more likely to mention other agencies in return. The variable captures how frequently each agency is referred to (i.e., it captures the number of the incoming links).

To test the six hypotheses specified in the previous section, we use time-series cross-sectional ordinary least square (OLS) models with time fixed effects clustered at the level of panels. We add time fixed effects to control for time-specific exogenous shocks. We estimate the models clustered at the level of panels to fix for the presence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity (for more, see Drukker (2003)).

---

<sup>1</sup> For more see <https://euagencies.eu/> (last access 17 October 2021).

## Results

Figure 1 illustrates the climate policy coalitions of EU agencies captured via Twitter activity. The figure demonstrates which agencies mention other agencies when they talk about climate (establishing a tie) and the frequency of mentions (tie weight). The thickness of the ties between the nodes indicates the frequency of mentions. In other words, the more frequently Agency A mentions Agency B, the thicker the tie (or edge weight). Outgoing ties – a tie created when Agency A mentions Agency B – comprise our dependent variable. The directionality of mentions is illustrated as an arrow indicating which agencies mention what other agencies. The size of the nodes indicates the relative number of overall mention activity (i.e., who mentions other agencies the most frequently). The location of the nodes and the distance between the nodes is optimized for visualization convenience only.

The figure illustrates that ECHA, European GNSS Agency (@EU4Space) and EMA are the most active in the policy coalition building. Their mandates include chemicals (ECHA), medicine (EMA), as well as climate change data collection and monitoring (i.e., European GNSS Agency). Interestingly, coalition building takes place by mentioning the EEA – the thickest links are directed to the EEA (@EUEnvironment) (Figure 1).

We also detect that there are two additional and rather separate policy communities. One community includes EBA, ESMA, and EIOPA, which are the financial agencies of the EU; the second community is populated by security and defence agencies (i.e., EDA, EUISS and SatCen). This suggests that policy coalition building happens between agencies with similar policy foci.



What is interesting in terms of policy fields is that we find very different levels of activity. The agencies in charge of energy and transport, namely ACER, ERA, and EASA are strikingly inactive on twitter. One possible explanation is that these agencies regulate emission-intensive sectors and are thus less vocal on climate-related issues. Another interpretation could be that they focus on their core mission rather than engaging in communicative activities, in line with previous findings (Wood, 2018). Finally, in the energy policy field the choice of the energy mix remains a national prerogative, which means that the national agencies represented inside ACER incorporate very different viewpoints on energy sources such as coal, gas or nuclear. It is therefore a “safe” option for the EU agency not to be vocal on highly controversial issues that may be linked to the climate debate. Compared to energy and transport agencies those operating in the policy fields of security and defence, as well as in the policy field of digital connectivity, are more engaged in coalition building. Here a possible interpretation is that these agencies seek to establish new policies around climate change such as environmental crime or the nexus between the digital and green transition. This solicits further research.

Regarding hypothesis 1c on agency tasks...DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS ON TASKS IS WORK IN PROGRESS

The effects of agencies’ age on the extent of engagement in coalition building suggest that agencies do not become more engaged in coalition building with time. Therefore, Hypothesis 2a must be rejected. Lastly, in contrast to earlier findings (e.g. Wood, 2018) resourcefulness is positively associated with engagement in coalition building. We can thus corroborate hypothesis 2b and reject hypothesis 2c. To be sure, the positive effects of the annual budget are not supported by models where resourcefulness is operationalized via the number of permanent employees in each of the agencies.<sup>2</sup>

The results of our analysis suggest that climate policy coalitions form between agencies that operate in the same policy fields (Figure 1). The results of regression analysis further shed light on the role of policy fields and suggest that agencies that operate in security and defence, as well as in digital connectivity policy fields engage more actively in policy coalition building.

---

<sup>2</sup> We have conducted robustness checks by adding additional control variables to the model on which we report in the Appendix in Table 6.

**Table 1. Results of the inferential time-series cross-sectional analysis**

	Model 1 b/se
<b>Age:</b>	
Age (in years)	0.003 (0.01)
<b>Resources:</b>	
Annual budget (log)	<b>0.068**</b> (0.02)
<b>Mandate:</b>	
Climate mandate	<b>0.532<sup>+</sup></b> (0.32)
<b>Policy field:</b>	
Freedom, security and justice (FSJ)	0.049 (0.21)
Finance	-0.080 (0.32)
Security and defence	<b>0.561*</b> (0.23)
Digital connectivity	<b>0.701**</b> (0.23)
Energy	<b>-1.227***</b> (0.16)
Innovation	-0.043 (0.37)
Transport	-0.329 (0.21)
Social wellbeing	0.087 (0.31)
Education and skills development	0.803 (0.50)
Total number of tweets	<b>0.006**</b> (0.00)
Constant	0.685 (0.65)
Time FE	Yes
R2	0.5981
N	254

<sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ . Standard errors in parentheses.

The model is estimated using panel OLS model with time fixed effects clustered at the level of panels to fix for the presence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.

## Conclusions

EU agencies have become leaders in climate policy, and the communication of those agencies is an important reflection of the climate values that bind together agencies in their climate policy work. We know that coalitions serve to foster an agenda and promote policy, but we know less about how online social media platforms, like Twitter, can be used to capture the behind-the-scenes activity of a group of supranational organizations. The research presented here fills that gap by first establishing some empirically-driven expectations for patterns of activity in online communication, then testing those expectations.

We found that similarity in policy field was the most compelling driver of coalition-building activity among EU agencies, a result that is not perhaps surprising but is still useful nonetheless. It is also insightful to see that some of the EU agencies are by far more active in communicating on climate-related issues than others. The relative inactivity of the agencies with a mandate in the area of energy and transport, for instance, solicits further research, as does the finding that a formal climate mandate is in itself not a predictor for activity. Some of our findings regarding structural factors challenge previous arguments about whether or not agencies engage in a networking, as opposed to insulating communication strategy. We find that well-resourced agencies are more active than agencies with fewer resources.

These findings are relevant because it is valuable that we understand what drives connection through communication in a contentious policy space. Twitter is the democratization of information; we do not make claims that Twitter is the ultimate reflection of the established climate policy coalitions within the EU. However, Twitter – and other social media sources – are oftentimes the most public-facing source of information and communication, and what happens on those platforms can be highly visible as well as influential on public opinion. Future research could explore just how reflective Twitter coalitions are of other types of coalitions, using comparative design within the same policy issues.

## References:

- Agranoff, R. (2007) *Managing Within Networks: Adding Value to Public Organizations* (Georgetown: Georgetown University Press).
- Ansell, C. and Gash, A. (2007) 'Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice'. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 543-71.
- Arras, S. and Braun, C. (2018) 'Stakeholders wanted! Why and how European Union agencies involve non-state stakeholders'. *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 25, No. 9, pp. 1257-75.
- Askanius, T. and Uldam, J. (2011) 'Online social media for radical politics: climate change activism on YouTube'. *International Journal of Electronic Governance*, Vol. 4, No. 1-2, pp. 69-84.
- Bianculli, A.C., Fernández-i-Marín, X. and Jordana, J. (eds.) (2014) *Accountability and Regulatory Governance. Audiences, Controls and Responsibilities in the Politics of Regulation* (London: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Busuioc, M. and Rimkutė, D. (2019) 'The promise of bureaucratic reputation approaches for the EU regulatory state'. *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 27, No. 8, pp. 1256-69.
- Busuioc, M. and Rimkutė, D. (2020) 'Meeting expectations in the EU regulatory state? Regulatory communications amid conflicting institutional demands'. *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 547-68.
- Cairney, P., Ingold, K. and Fisher, M. (2016) 'Fracking in the UK and Switzerland: Why Differences in Policymaking Systems Don't Always Produce Different Outputs and Outcomes.'. *Policy & Politics*, pp. 1-25.
- Calanni, J.C., Siddiki, S.N., Weible, C.M. and Leach, W.D. (2014) 'Explaining Coordination in Collaborative Partnerships and Clarifying the Scope of the Belief Homophily Hypothesis'. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 901-27.
- Caudle, S.L. (2010) 'Promises, Perils, and Performance of Netcentric Bureaucracy'. In Durant, R.F. (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of American Bureaucracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 472-96.
- Chalmers, A.W. (2013) 'With a lot of help from their friends: Explaining the social logic of informational lobbying in the European Union'. *European Union Politics*, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 475-96.
- Chiu, I.H. (2016) 'Power and Accountability in the EU Financial Regulatory Architecture: Examining Inter-Agency Relations, Agency Independence and Accountability'. In Andenas, M. and Deipenbrock, G. (eds.) *Regulating and Supervising European Financial Markets* (Cham: Springer).
- Christensen, J.r.G.n. and Nielsen, V.L. (2010) 'Administrative capacity, structural choice and the creation of EU agencies'. *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 176-204.
- Cukierman, A., Webb, S.B. and Neyapti, B. (1992) 'Measuring the independence of central banks and its effects on policy outcomes'. *World Bank Economic Review*, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 353-98.
- Darling, E.S., Shiffman, D., Côté, I.M. and Drew, J.A. (2013) 'The role of Twitter in the life cycle of a scientific publication'. *Ideas in Ecology and Evolution*, Vol. 6, No. 1.
- Dehousse, R. (1997) 'Regulation by Networks in the European Community: The Role of European Agencies'. *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 4, No. 2.
- Drukker, D.M. (2003) 'Testing for serial correlation in linear panel-data models'. *Stata Journal*, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 168-77.

- Eckert, S. 'The European Green Deal and the EU's Regulatory Power in Times of Crisis'. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. n/a, No. n/a.
- Eckert, S. (2010) 'Between Commitment and Control: Varieties of Delegation in the European Postal Sector'. *Journal of European Public Policy* Vol. 17, No. 8, pp. 1231-52.
- Egeberg, M. and Trondal, J. (2011) 'EU-level agencies: new executive centre formation or vehicles for national control?'. *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 18, No. 6, pp. 868-87.
- Fischer, M., Ingold, K. and Ivanova, S. (2017) 'Information exchange under uncertainty: The case of unconventional gas development in the United Kingdom'. *Land Use Policy*, Vol. 67, pp. 200-11.
- Fischer, M., Ingold, K., Sciarini, P. and Varone, F. (2012) 'Impacts of Market Liberalization on Regulatory Network: A Longitudinal Analysis of the Swiss Telecommunications Sector'. *Policy Studies Journal*, Vol. 40, No. 3, pp. 435-57.
- Gilardi, F. (2002) 'Policy credibility and delegation to independent regulatory agencies: a comparative empirical analysis'. *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 9, No. 6, pp. 873-93.
- Gilardi, F. (2007) 'The Same, But Different: Central Banks, Regulatory Agencies, and the Politics of Delegation to Independent Authorities'. *Comparative European Politics*, Vol. 5, pp. 303-27.
- Grimmelikhuisen, S.G. and Meijer, A.J. (2015) 'Does Twitter Increase Perceived Police Legitimacy?'. *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 75, No. 4, pp. 598-607.
- Hafner-Burton, E. and Montgomery, A. (2010) 'Centrality in Politics: How Networks Confer Influence'. *Human Rights*, pp. 1-21.
- Hanretty, C. and Koop, C. (2013) 'Shall the law set them free? The formal and actual independence of regulatory agencies'. *Regulation & Governance*, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 195-214.
- Heclo, H. (1978) *Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment* (The New American Political System).
- Ingold, K. (2011) 'Network Structures within Policy Processes: Coalitions, Power, and Brokerage in Swiss Climate Policy'. *Policy Studies Journal*, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 435-59.
- Jevnaker, T. and Saerbeck, B. (2019) 'EU Agencies and the Energy Union: Providing Useful Information to the Commission?'. *Politics and Governance*, Vol. 7, pp. 2183-463.
- Keleman, D.R. (2002) 'The Politics of 'Eurocratic' Structure and the New European Agencies'. *West European Politics*, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 93-118.
- Kelemen, R. (2005) 'The Politics of Eurocracy: Building a New European State?'. In Jabko, N. and Parsons, C. (eds.) *The State of the European Union: With US or Against US? European Trends in American Perspective* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Kelemen, R. and Tarrant, A.D. (2011) 'The Political Foundations of the Eurocracy'. *West European Politics*, Vol. 34, No. 5, pp. 922-47.
- Knill, C., Enkler, J., Schmidt, S., Eckhard, S. and Grohs, S. (2017) 'Administrative styles of international organizations: Can we find them, do they matter?'. In Bauer, M.W., Knill, C. and Eckhard, S. (eds.) *International bureaucracy: Challenges and lessons for public administration research* (Palgrave: Basingstoke), pp. 43-71.
- Koop, C. (2011) 'Explaining the Accountability of Independent Agencies: The Importance of Political Salience'. *Journal of Public Policy*, Vol. 31, No. 02, pp. 209-34.
- Levi-Faur, D. (2011) 'Regulatory networks and regulatory agencification: towards a Single European Regulatory Space'. *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 18, No. 6, pp. 810-29.
- Maggetti, M. (2007) 'De facto Independence after Delegation: a fuzzy-set analysis'. *Regulation & Governance*, Vol. 1, pp. 271-94.

- Majone, G. (2001) 'Nonmajoritarian Institutions and the Limits of Democratic Governance: A Political Transaction-Cost Approach'. *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, Vol. 157, pp. 57-78.
- Majone, G. (2005) *Understanding regulatory growth in the European Community* (London: Routledge).
- Manetti, G., Bellucci, M. and Bagnoli, L. (2016) 'Stakeholder Engagement and Public Information Through Social Media: A Study of Canadian and American Public Transportation Agencies'. *The American Review of Public Administration*, Vol. 47, No. 8, pp. 991-1009.
- Maor, M. (2020) 'Strategic communication by regulatory agencies as a form of reputation management: A strategic agenda'. *Public Administration*, Vol. 98, No. 4, pp. 1044-55.
- McPherson, M., Smith-Lovin, L. and Cook, J.M. (2001) 'Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks'. *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 415-44.
- Nohrstedt, D. and Olofsson, K. (2016) 'A Review of Applications of the Advocacy Coalition Framework in Swedish Policy Processes'. *European Policy Analysis*, Vol. 2.
- Oberthür, S. and Dupont, C. (2021) 'The European Union's international climate leadership: towards a grand climate strategy?'. *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 28, No. 7, pp. 1095-114.
- Ogden, L.E. (2013) 'Tags, Blogs, Tweets: Social Media as Science Tool?'. *BioScience*, Vol. 63, No. 2, pp. 148.
- Ongaro, E., Barbieri, D., Bellé, N. and Fedele, P. (2015) 'EU Agencies and the European Multi-Level Administrative System'. *Multi-Level Governance: The Missing Linkages* (Emerald Group Publishing Limited), pp. 87-123.
- Pearce, W., Niederer, S., Özkula, S.M. and Sánchez Querubín, N. (2019) 'The social media life of climate change: Platforms, publics, and future imaginaries'. *WIREs Climate Change*, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. e569.
- Provan, K.G. and Kenis, P. (2007) 'Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Management, and Effectiveness'. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 229-52.
- Rimkutė, D. (2020a) 'Building organizational reputation in the European regulatory state: An analysis of EU agencies' communications'. *Governance*, Vol. 33, No. 2, pp. 385-406.
- Rimkutė, D. (2020b) 'Strategic silence or regulatory talk? Regulatory agency responses to public allegations amidst the glyphosate controversy'. *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 27, No. 11, pp. 1636-56.
- Schäfer, M.S. (2012) 'Online communication on climate change and climate politics: a literature review'. *WIREs Climate Change*, Vol. 3, No. 6, pp. 527-43.
- Scott, C. (2000) 'Accountability in the Regulatory State'. *Journal of Law and Society*, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 38-60.
- Simoncini, M. (2018) *Administrative Regulation Beyond the Non-Delegation Doctrine: A Study on EU Agencies* (Bloomsbury Publishing).
- Thaler, A.D., Zelnio, K.A., Freitag, A., MacPherson, R., Shiffman, D., Bik, H., Goldstein, M.C. and McClain, C. (2012) 'Digital environmentalism: tools and strategies for the evolving online ecosystem'. In Rigling Gallagher, D. (ed.) *Environmental Leadership: a Reference Handbook* (California, USA: Sage Thousand Oaks), pp. 364-73.
- Trondal, J., Busuioac, M. and Groenleer, M. (eds.) (2012) *The Agency Phenomenon in the European Union* (Manchester, New York: Manchester University Press).
- Williams, H.T.P., McMurray, J.R., Kurz, T. and Hugo Lambert, F. (2015) 'Network analysis reveals open forums and echo chambers in social media discussions of climate change'. *Global Environmental Change*, Vol. 32, pp. 126-38.

- Wonka, A. and Rittberger, B. (2010a) 'Credibility, Complexity and Uncertainty: Explaining the Institutional Independence of 29 EU Agencies'. *West European Politics*, Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 730-52.
- Wonka, A. and Rittberger, B. (2010b) 'Paths to independence: Determinants of institutional independence of twenty-nine EU agencies'. *West European Politics*, Vol. 33, No. 4.
- Wood, M. (2018) 'Mapping EU agencies as political entrepreneurs'. *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 57, No. 2, pp. 404-26.
- Yi, H. and Scholz, J.T. (2016) 'Policy Networks in Complex Governance Subsystems: Observing and Comparing Hyperlink, Media, and Partnership Networks'. *Policy Studies Journal*, Vol. 44, No. 3, pp. 248-79.

## **Acknowledgements**

Sandra Eckert is holding a COFUND-AIAS fellowship (European Union Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement no. 754513 and Aarhus University Research Foundation, October 2019-October 2022) awarded by the Aarhus Institute of Advanced Studies (AIAS) at Aarhus Universitet. We would like to thank Henry Hempel for invaluable research assistance.

**Appendix Table 1. The number of tweets retrieved from each agencies' official Twitter accounts.**

	Official agency name	Agencies' abbreviation	Official account name	Total number of tweets
1	European Medicines Agency	EMA	EMA_News	19491
2	European GNSS Agency	EUSPA/GSA	EU4Space	9994
3	European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training	Cedefop	Cedefop	9746
4	Fundamental Rights Agency	FRA	EURightsAgency	9432
5	European Training Foundation	ETF	etfeuropa	8483
6	European Agency for Safety and Health at Work	OSHA	EU_OSHA	7889
7	European Environment Agency	EEA	EUEnvironment	7681
8	European Network and Information Security Agency	ENISA	enisa_eu	7639
9	European Chemicals Agency	ECHA	EU_ECHA	7164
10	European Union Intellectual Property Office	EUIPO	EU_IPO	6999
11	European Institute of Innovation and Technology	EIT	EITeu	6463
12	European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control	ECDC	ECDC_EU	6418
13	European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions	EUROFOUND	eurofound	5996
14	European Food Safety Authority	EFSA	EFSA_EU	5834
15	European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction	EMCDDA	EMCDDA	4970
16	European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation	EUROPOL	Europol	4765
17	European Institute for Gender Equality	EIGE	eurogender	4500
18	European Defence Agency	EDA	EUDefenceAgency	4049
19	European Institute for Security Studies	EUISS	EU_ISS	3263
20	European Asylum Support Office	EASO	EASO	3034
21	European Securities and Markets Authority	ESMA	ESMAComms	2963
22	Body of European Regulators of Electronic Communications	BERECe	BERECeuropaeu	2155
23	European Border and Coast Guard Agency	Frontex	Frontex	1921
24	European Maritime Safety Agency	EMSA	EMSA_LISBON	1767
25	European Banking Authority	EBA	EBA_News	1660
26	The European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training	CEPOL	EU_CEPOL	1565
27	European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority	EIOPA	eiopa_europa_eu	1482
28	European Railway Agency	ERA	ERA_railways	1429
29	European Fisheries Control Agency	EFCA	EFCA_EU	1404
30	European Aviation Safety Agency	EASA	EASA	1300
31	Community Plant Variety Office	CPVO	CPVOTweets	1204

32	European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT Systems in the area of freedom, security and justice	eu-LISA	EULISA_agency	713
33	European body for the enhancement of judicial co-operation	Eurojust	Eurojust	617
34	European Union Satellite Centre	SatCen	eusatcen	202
35	Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators	ACER	eu_acer	170
36	Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union	CdT	EU_CdT	106
37	European Labour Authority	ELA	EU_ELA	75

**Appendix Table 2. The list of climate-related keywords (dictionary).**

Climate	green	decarbonization	land use
environment	GHG	carbon	MRV
biodiversity	CO2	renewable	footprint
Paris agreement	emissions	clean energy	green deal
COP	carbon dioxide	reforestation	adaptation
global warming	greenhouse gas	alternative power	mitigation
circular economy	circularity	energy efficiency	ecosystem
sustainability	pollution	IPPC	habitat
ozone layer	emission trading	air	transition risks
net zero	ETS	club of Rome	sustainable
transition risk	just transition	healthy	alternative fuels
effort sharing	JTM	energy	fuels
FitFor55	just transition mechanism	ESG	sustainable finance
climate neutral	restore nature	environmental social and corporate governance	sustainable economy
neutrality	limits to growth	circular	ESG risks
ESG agenda	healthy planet	circularity	carbon border adjustment mechanism
ESG reporting	air quality	clean transport	CBAM
energy efficiency	air pollution	renewable electricity	carbon footprint
energy transition	deforestation	renewable energy	carbon neutral

**Appendix Table 3. The number of tweets about climate by EU agency.**

	Official agency name	Official account name	Total number of tweets about climate
1	European Environment Agency	EUEnvironment	447
2	European Institute of Innovation and Technology	EITeu	281
3	European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions	eurofound	277
4	European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training	Cedefop	228
5	European Defence Agency	EUDefenceAgency	165
6	European Chemicals Agency	EU_ECHA	153
7	European Agency for Safety and Health at Work	EU_OSHA	141
8	Body of European Regulators of Electronic Communications	BERECEuropaeu	119
9	European Medicines Agency	EMA_News	97
10	European Institute for Security Studies	EU_ISS	89
11	European Asylum Support Office	EASO	88
12	European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction	EMCDDA	83
13	European Securities and Markets Authority	ESMAComms	81
14	European Food Safety Authority	EFSA_EU	73
15	European Training Foundation	etfeuropa	65
16	European Network and Information Security Agency	enisa_eu	60
17	European Banking Authority	EBA_News	57
18	European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control	ECDC_EU	52
19	European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation	Europol	51
20	European Aviation Safety Agency	EASA	49
21	Fundamental Rights Agency	EURightsAgency	48
22	European Maritime Safety Agency	EMSA_LISBON	47
23	European GNSS Agency	EU4Space	45
24	The European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training	EU_CEPOL	42
25	European body for the enhancement of judicial co-operation	Eurojust	40
26	European Institute for Gender Equality	eurogender	34
27	European Railway Agency	ERA_railways	29
28	European Border and Coast Guard Agency	Frontex	28
29	European Fisheries Control Agency	EFCA_EU	26
30	European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority	eiopa_europa_eu	25
31	European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT Systems in the area of freedom, security and justice	EULISA_agency	16

32	European Union Intellectual Property Office	EU_IPO	14
33	Community Plant Variety Office	CPVOTweets	10
34	Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators	eu_acer	8
35	European Union Satellite Centre	eusatcen	7
36	Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union	EU_CdT	1
37	European Labour Authority	EU_ELA	1

**Appendix Table 4. Correlation matrix (Pearson's r).**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
(1) Age	1.0000															
(2) Budget (log)	-0.1739	1.0000														
(3) Budget EU (log)	-0.1283	0.4411	1.0000													
(4) Staff	-0.0754	0.7427	0.3105	1.0000												
(5) Climate mandate	-0.2232	0.4243	0.1320	0.1731	1.0000											
(6) FSJ	-0.2008	-0.0425	0.1030	0.0306	-0.1825	1.0000										
(7) Finance	-0.2793	-0.0227	-0.0561	-0.0841	-0.0943	-0.1711	1.0000									
(8) Security and defence	-0.0754	0.1535	0.0474	0.3187	0.0347	-0.1711	-0.0884	1.0000								
(9) Digital connectivity	-0.1649	-0.4034	-0.1092	-0.2212	-0.0843	-0.1529	-0.0790	-0.0790	1.0000							
(10) Energy	-0.1017	-0.1097	-0.0185	-0.0799	0.1044	-0.0716	-0.0370	-0.0370	-0.0331	1.0000						
(11) Innovation	0.3126	-0.0081	-0.2706	-0.2649	0.2579	-0.2439	-0.1260	-0.1260	-0.1127	-0.0527	1.0000					
(12) Transport	-0.0516	0.1798	0.0437	0.3885	0.0666	-0.1465	-0.0757	0.4681	-0.0677	-0.0317	-0.1079	1.0000				
(13) Social wellbeing	0.4968	0.1263	0.1431	0.1357	0.0292	-0.4178	-0.2159	-0.2159	-0.1930	-0.0903	-0.0700	-0.1849	1.0000			
(14) Education and skills	0.4687	-0.1850	-0.0085	-0.1610	-0.1006	-0.1825	-0.0943	-0.0943	-0.0843	-0.0394	0.7482	-0.0808	0.0662	1.0000		
(15) Total N. tweets	0.1323	0.1987	0.1470	-0.0261	0.1284	-0.1971	-0.0359	-0.0104	-0.0741	-0.0738	-0.0017	-0.0845	0.2932	-0.0924	1.0000	
(16) Popularity	0.2895	0.1072	0.1468	-0.0885	0.1451	-0.1848	-0.0791	-0.0090	-0.0307	-0.0811	0.0748	-0.0962	0.2812	-0.0028	0.7302	1.0000

**Appendix Table 5. References for staff expenditures, funding from the EU and the number of staff**

	Official agency name	Sources
1	European Medicines Agency	<p>Staff expenditures, funding from the EU, total budget, and the number of staff between 2009 and 2020 were retrieved from the annually published <i>statement of revenue and expenditure for the financial year</i> from 2010 to 2021. The source of these statements is <i>EUR-Lex</i>.</p> <p><u>Statement of revenue and expenditure 2021:</u>  <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2805%29">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2805%29</a></p>
2	European GNSS Agency	<p>Staff expenditures, funding from the EU, total budget, and the number of staff between 2009 and 2020 were retrieved from the annually published <i>statement of revenue and expenditure for the financial year</i> from 2010 to 2021. The source of these statements is <i>EUR-Lex</i>.</p> <p><u>Statement of revenue and expenditure 2021:</u>  <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2819%29&amp;qid=1634548062690">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2819%29&amp;qid=1634548062690</a></p>
3	European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training	<p>Staff expenditures, funding from the EU, total budget, and the number of staff between 2009 and 2020 were retrieved from the annually published <i>statement of revenue and expenditure for the financial year</i> from 2010 to 2021. The source of these statements is <i>EUR-Lex</i>.</p> <p><u>Statement of revenue and expenditure 2021:</u>  <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2807%29&amp;qid=1634548172418">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2807%29&amp;qid=1634548172418</a></p>
4	Fundamental Rights Agency	<p>Staff expenditures, funding from the EU, the total budget between 2009 and 2020 as well as the number of staff in 2009 were retrieved from the annually published <i>statement of revenue and expenditure for the financial year</i> from 2010 to 2021. The source of these statements is <i>EUR-Lex</i>.</p> <p>The number of staff from 2010 to 2020 was retrieved from the <i>FRA Annual Activity Report 2020</i> (p. 72). The source of this report is <i>FRA's website</i>.</p> <p><u>Annual Activity Report 2020:</u>  <a href="https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2021-annual-activity-report-2020_en.pdf">https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2021-annual-activity-report-2020_en.pdf</a>.</p> <p><u>Statement of revenue and expenditure 2021:</u>  <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2811%29&amp;qid=1634548253681">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2811%29&amp;qid=1634548253681</a></p>
5	European Training Foundation	<p>Staff expenditures, funding from the EU, total budget, and the number of staff between 2009 and 2020 were retrieved from the annually published <i>statement of revenue and expenditure for the financial year</i> from 2010 to 2021. The source of these statements is <i>EUR-Lex</i>.</p> <p><u>Statement of revenue and expenditure 2021:</u></p>

		<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2804%29&amp;qid=1634549372694">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2804%29&amp;qid=1634549372694</a>
6	European Agency for Safety and Health at Work	<p>Staff expenditures, funding from the EU, total budget, and the number of staff between 2009 and 2020 were retrieved from the annually published <i>statement of revenue and expenditure for the financial year</i> from 2010 to 2021. The source of these statements is <i>EUR-Lex</i>.</p> <p><u>Statement of revenue and expenditure 2021:</u>  <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/AUTO/?uri=CELEX:32021B0331(14)&amp;qid=1634549494283&amp;rid=1">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/AUTO/?uri=CELEX:32021B0331(14)&amp;qid=1634549494283&amp;rid=1</a></p>
7	European Environment Agency	<p>Staff expenditures, funding from the EU, total budget, and the number of staff between 2009 and 2020 were retrieved from the annually published <i>statement of revenue and expenditure for the financial year</i> from 2010 to 2021. The source of these statements is <i>EUR-Lex</i>.</p> <p><u>Statement of revenue and expenditure 2021:</u>  <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2803%29&amp;qid=1634549694970">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2803%29&amp;qid=1634549694970</a></p>
8	European Network and Information Security Agency	<p>Staff expenditures, funding from the EU, total budget, and the number of staff between 2009 and 2020 were retrieved from the annually published <i>statement of revenue and expenditure for the financial year</i> from 2010 to 2021. The source of these statements is <i>EUR-Lex</i>.</p> <p><u>Statement of revenue and expenditure 2021:</u>  <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2815%29&amp;qid=1634549868663">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2815%29&amp;qid=1634549868663</a></p>
9	European Chemicals Agency	<p>Staff expenditures, funding from the EU, total budget, and the number of staff between 2009 and 2020 were retrieved from the annually published <i>statement of revenue and expenditure for the financial year</i> from 2010 to 2021. The source of these statements is <i>EUR-Lex</i>.</p> <p><u>Statement of revenue and expenditure 2021:</u>  <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2822%29&amp;qid=1634550021497">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2822%29&amp;qid=1634550021497</a></p>
10	European Union Intellectual Property Office	<p>Staff expenditures, the total budget, and the number of staff between 2015 and 2020 were retrieved from the annually published <i>statement of revenue and expenditure for the financial year</i> from 2015 to 2021. The source of these statements is <i>EUR-Lex</i>.</p> <p>The number of staff between 2009 to 2014 was retrieved from the respective <i>Annual Report</i> of the former <i>Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market</i>. The source of these reports is <i>EUIPO's website</i>. Link: <a href="https://euipo.europa.eu/ohimportal/en/annual-report">https://euipo.europa.eu/ohimportal/en/annual-report</a></p> <p>Concerning funding from the EU, the EUIPO is entirely self-financing. All its operations are paid for through registration fees. Therefore, no EU budget occurs within the financial reports, Source: <a href="https://euipo.europa.eu/ohimportal/en/transparency-portal/economic">https://euipo.europa.eu/ohimportal/en/transparency-portal/economic</a></p> <p><u>Statement of revenue and expenditure 2021:</u></p>

		<p><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2838%29&amp;qid=1634727926875">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2838%29&amp;qid=1634727926875</a></p> <p>Annual Report 2009-2014: <a href="https://euipo.europa.eu/ohimportal/en/annual-report">https://euipo.europa.eu/ohimportal/en/annual-report</a></p>
11	European Institute of Innovation and Technology	<p>Staff expenditures, funding from the EU, total budget, and the number of staff between 2012 and 2020 were retrieved from the annually published <i>statement of revenue and expenditure for the financial year</i> from 2012 to 2021. The source of these statements is <i>EUR-Lex</i>.</p> <p>The EIT became financially autonomous in June 2011. Thus, no financial reference figure is available for 2010 and 2011. Source: <a href="https://eit.europa.eu/sites/default/files/20111213_EIT_Establishment_plan_2012.pdf">https://eit.europa.eu/sites/default/files/20111213_EIT_Establishment_plan_2012.pdf</a></p> <p>Statement of revenue and expenditure 2021: <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2834%29&amp;qid=1634550811533">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2834%29&amp;qid=1634550811533</a></p>
12	European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control	<p>Staff expenditures, funding from the EU, total budget, and the number of staff between 2009 and 2020 were retrieved from the annually published <i>statement of revenue and expenditure for the financial year</i> from 2010 to 2021. The source of these statements is <i>EUR-Lex</i>.</p> <p>Statement of revenue and expenditure 2021: <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2807%29&amp;qid=1634550997960">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2807%29&amp;qid=1634550997960</a></p>
13	European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions	<p>Staff expenditures, funding from the EU, total budget, and the number of staff between 2009 and 2020 were retrieved from the annually published <i>statement of revenue and expenditure for the financial year</i> from 2010 to 2021. The source of these statements is <i>EUR-Lex</i>.</p> <p>Statement of revenue and expenditure 2021: <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2808%29&amp;qid=1634551456747">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2808%29&amp;qid=1634551456747</a></p>
14	European Food Safety Authority	<p>Staff expenditures, funding from the EU, total budget, and the number of staff between 2009 and 2020 were retrieved from the annually published <i>statement of revenue and expenditure for the financial year</i> from 2010 to 2021. The source of these statements is <i>EUR-Lex</i>.</p> <p>Statement of revenue and expenditure 2021: <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2812%29&amp;qid=1634551518219">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2812%29&amp;qid=1634551518219</a></p>
15	European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction	<p>Staff expenditures, funding from the EU, total budget, and the number of staff between 2009 and 2020 were retrieved from the annually published <i>statement of revenue and expenditure for the financial year</i> from 2010 to 2021. The source of these statements is <i>EUR-Lex</i>.</p> <p>Statement of revenue and expenditure 2021: <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2806%29&amp;qid=1634551581375">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2806%29&amp;qid=1634551581375</a></p>

16	European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation	<p>Staff expenditures, funding from the EU, total budget, and the number of staff between 2009 and 2020 were retrieved from the annually published <i>statement of revenue and expenditure for the financial year</i> from 2010 to 2021. The source of these statements is <i>EUR-Lex</i>.</p> <p>Statement of revenue and expenditure 2021:  <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2828%29&amp;qid=1634551699195">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2828%29&amp;qid=1634551699195</a></p>
17	European Institute for Gender Equality	<p>Staff expenditures, funding from the EU, total budget, and the number of staff between 2009 and 2020 were retrieved from the annually published <i>statement of revenue and expenditure for the financial year</i> from 2010 to 2021. The source of these statements is <i>EUR-Lex</i>.</p> <p>Statement of revenue and expenditure 2021:  <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2824%29&amp;qid=1634551759555">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2824%29&amp;qid=1634551759555</a></p>
18	European Defence Agency	<p>Staff expenditures, funding from the EU and the total budget in the period of 2009 to 2020 were retrieved from EDA's <i>financial report</i> (2011-2015) and EDA's <i>Annual Account</i> (2016-2020). The source of these reports is <i>EDA's website</i>.</p> <p>The number of staff from 2011 to 2020 was retrieved from "Staff present" in the respective annual account. The number of staff in 2010 was retrieved from the <i>EDA Annual Report 2011</i>, p. 22. The number of staff in 2009 received from the <i>EDA Annual Report 2009</i>, p. 38. The source of these reports is <i>EDA's website</i>.</p> <p><u>Annual Accounts (2016-2020):</u>  <a href="https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/finance-documents/eda-general-annual-accounts-2020_final.pdf">https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/finance-documents/eda-general-annual-accounts-2020_final.pdf</a>  <a href="https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/finance-documents/eda-2019-annual-accounts.pdf">https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/finance-documents/eda-2019-annual-accounts.pdf</a>  <a href="https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/finance-documents/eda-2018-final-annual-accounts.pdf">https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/finance-documents/eda-2018-final-annual-accounts.pdf</a>  <a href="https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/finance-documents/2017-annual-accounts-signed.pdf">https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/finance-documents/2017-annual-accounts-signed.pdf</a>  <a href="https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/finance-documents/eda-2016-annual-accounts.pdf">https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/finance-documents/eda-2016-annual-accounts.pdf</a></p> <p><u>Financial reports 2011-2015:</u>  <a href="https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/finance-documents/eda-2015-financial-report---signed.pdf">https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/finance-documents/eda-2015-financial-report---signed.pdf</a>  <a href="https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/finance-documents/eda-2014-financial-report-audited.pdf">https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/finance-documents/eda-2014-financial-report-audited.pdf</a>  <a href="https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/finance-documents/2013-financial-report-audited.pdf">https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/finance-documents/2013-financial-report-audited.pdf</a>  <a href="https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/documents/2012-financial-report.pdf">https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/documents/2012-financial-report.pdf</a>  <a href="http://eda.europa.eu/docs/finance-documents/2011-financial-report.pdf?sfvrsn=0">http://eda.europa.eu/docs/finance-documents/2011-financial-report.pdf?sfvrsn=0</a></p> <p><u>Annual reports:</u>  <a href="https://eda.europa.eu/publications-and-data/all-publications">https://eda.europa.eu/publications-and-data/all-publications</a></p>

19	European Institute for Security Studies	<p>Staff expenditures and the total budget in the period of 2017 to 2020 were retrieved from the <i>Annual Report</i> of 2019 and 2020. The source of these reports is <i>EUISS's website</i>.</p> <p><u>Annual reports 2019-2020:</u>  <a href="https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/2020-annual-report">https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/2020-annual-report</a>  <a href="https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/2019-annual-report">https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/2019-annual-report</a></p> <p>Upon request, EUSC <i>Events and Communications Assistant</i> Rada Youssef provided the residual figures relevant to the dataset.</p>
20	European Asylum Support Office	<p>Staff expenditures, funding from the EU, total budget, and the number of staff between 2009 and 2020 were retrieved from the annually published <i>statement of revenue and expenditure for the financial year</i> from 2010 to 2021. The source of these statements is <i>EUR-Lex</i>.</p> <p><u>Statement of revenue and expenditure 2021:</u>  <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2814%29&amp;qid=1634561332254">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2814%29&amp;qid=1634561332254</a></p>
21	European Securities and Markets Authority	<p>Staff expenditures, funding from the EU, total budget, and the number of staff between 2011 and 2020 were retrieved from the annually published <i>statement of revenue and expenditure for the financial year</i> from 2011 to 2021. The source of these statements is <i>EUR-Lex</i>.</p> <p>ESMA was founded in 2010 and operates since 2011. Therefore, no earlier data available.</p> <p><u>Statement of revenue and expenditure 2021:</u>  <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2814%29&amp;qid=1634561332254">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2814%29&amp;qid=1634561332254</a></p>
22	Body of European Regulators of Electronic Communications	<p>Staff expenditures, funding from the EU, total budget, and the number of staff between 2009 and 2020 were retrieved from the annually published <i>statement of revenue and expenditure for the financial year</i> from 2010 to 2021. The source of these statements is <i>EUR-Lex</i>.</p> <p><u>Statement of revenue and expenditure 2021:</u>  <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2831%29&amp;qid=1634562636034">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2831%29&amp;qid=1634562636034</a></p>
23	European Border and Coast Guard Agency	<p>Staff expenditures, funding from the EU, total budget, and the number of staff between 2009 and 2020 were retrieved from the annually published <i>statement of revenue and expenditure for the financial year</i> from 2010 to 2021. The source of these statements is <i>EUR-Lex</i>.</p> <p><u>Statement of revenue and expenditure 2021:</u>  <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2821%29&amp;qid=1634562709973">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2821%29&amp;qid=1634562709973</a></p>
24	European Maritime Safety Agency	<p>Staff expenditures, funding from the EU, total budget, and the number of staff between 2009 and 2020 were retrieved from the annually published <i>statement of revenue and expenditure for the financial year</i> from 2010 to 2021. The source of these statements is <i>EUR-Lex</i>.</p> <p><u>Statement of revenue and expenditure 2021:</u></p>

		<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2813%29&amp;qid=1634562805065">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2813%29&amp;qid=1634562805065</a>
25	European Banking Authority	<p>Staff expenditures, funding from the EU, total budget, and the number of staff between 2011 and 2020 were retrieved from the annually published <i>statement of revenue and expenditure for the financial year</i> from 2011 to 2021. The source of these statements is <i>EUR-Lex</i>.</p> <p>EBA was founded in 2010 and operates since 2011. Therefore, no earlier data available.</p> <p><u>Statement of revenue and expenditure 2021:</u>  <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32020B0513%2803%29&amp;qid=1634563173854">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32020B0513%2803%29&amp;qid=1634563173854</a></p>
26	The European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training	<p>Staff expenditures, funding from the EU, total budget, and the number of staff between 2009 and 2020 were retrieved from the annually published <i>statement of revenue and expenditure for the financial year</i> from 2010 to 2021. The source of these statements is <i>EUR-Lex</i>.</p> <p><u>Statement of revenue and expenditure 2021:</u>  <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2820%29&amp;qid=1634563412667">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2820%29&amp;qid=1634563412667</a></p>
27	European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority	<p>Staff expenditures, funding from the EU, total budget, and the number of staff between 2009 and 2020 were retrieved from the annually published <i>statement of revenue and expenditure for the financial year</i> from 2010 to 2021. The source of these statements is <i>EUR-Lex</i>.</p> <p><u>Statement of revenue and expenditure 2021:</u>  <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2829%29&amp;qid=1634563584781">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2829%29&amp;qid=1634563584781</a></p>
28	European Railway Agency	<p>Staff expenditures, funding from the EU, total budget, and the number of staff between 2009 and 2020 were retrieved from the annually published <i>statement of revenue and expenditure for the financial year</i> from 2010 to 2021. The source of these statements is <i>EUR-Lex</i>.</p> <p><u>Statement of revenue and expenditure 2021:</u>  <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2816%29&amp;qid=1634563679366">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2816%29&amp;qid=1634563679366</a></p>
29	European Fisheries Control Agency	<p>Staff expenditures, funding from the EU, total budget, and the number of staff between 2009 and 2020 were retrieved from the annually published <i>statement of revenue and expenditure for the financial year</i> from 2010 to 2021. The source of these statements is <i>EUR-Lex</i>.</p> <p><u>Statement of revenue and expenditure 2021:</u>  <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2826%29&amp;qid=1634563965245">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2826%29&amp;qid=1634563965245</a></p>
30	European Aviation Safety Agency	<p>Staff expenditures, funding from the EU, total budget, and the number of staff between 2009 and 2020 were retrieved from the annually published <i>statement of revenue and expenditure for the financial year</i> from 2010 to 2021. The source of these statements is <i>EUR-Lex</i>.</p>

		<p><u>Statement of revenue and expenditure 2021:</u>  <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/AUTO/?uri=CELEX:32021B0331(14)&amp;qid=1634564268274&amp;rid=1">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/AUTO/?uri=CELEX:32021B0331(14)&amp;qid=1634564268274&amp;rid=1</a></p>
31	Community Plant Variety Office	<p>Staff expenditures, total budget, and the number of staff between 2009 and 2020 were retrieved from the annually published <i>statement of revenue and expenditure for the financial year</i> from 2010 to 2021. The source of these statements is <i>EUR-Lex</i>.</p> <p>Concerning CPVO's non-existing EU funding (except 2010 and 2011), the CPVO does not receive any money from the EU at all. CPVO describes itself as a "self-financed EU agency" (<a href="https://cpvo.europa.eu/en/about-us">https://cpvo.europa.eu/en/about-us</a>). In addition, the 2019 Annual Report (<a href="https://cpvo.europa.eu/annual-report-2019/en/#chapter9">https://cpvo.europa.eu/annual-report-2019/en/#chapter9</a>) shows fees paid by clients applying for CPV Rights and holders of CPV Rights as the primary and only significant source of income. Upon request, CPVO's Véronique Doreau confirmed that the agency does not receive any fund from the EU Budget.</p> <p><u>Statement of revenue and expenditure 2021:</u>  <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.C_.2021.114.01.0048.01.ENG&amp;toc=OJ%3AC%3A2021%3A114%3AFULL">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.C_.2021.114.01.0048.01.ENG&amp;toc=OJ%3AC%3A2021%3A114%3AFULL</a></p>
32	European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT Systems in the area of freedom, security and justice	<p>Staff expenditures, funding from the EU, total budget, and the number of staff between 2013 and 2020 were retrieved from the annually published <i>Annual Accounts</i> from 2013 to 2021. The source of these statements is <i>eU-LISA's</i> website.</p> <p>The Agency was established in 2011 and started its activities in December 2012. Accordingly, there are no earlier figures.</p> <p><u>Annual Accounts 2013-2020:</u>  <a href="https://www.eulisa.europa.eu/About-Us/Finance">https://www.eulisa.europa.eu/About-Us/Finance</a></p>
33	European body for the enhancement of judicial co-operation	<p>Staff expenditures, the budget from the EU, the total budget, and the number of staff in the period of 2009 to 2020 received from the annually published <i>statement of revenue and expenditure for the financial year</i> in 2010 to 2021.</p> <p><u>Statement of revenue and expenditure 2021:</u>  <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0510%2801%29&amp;qid=1634566900535">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0510%2801%29&amp;qid=1634566900535</a></p>
34	European Union Satellite Centre	<p>Staff expenditures, the budget from the EU, the total budget, and the number of staff in the period of 2009 to 2013 were retrieved from the <i>EU SatCen Annual Report</i> of the respective year. The source of these reports is the <i>Publications Office of the European Union</i>. The figures for 2019 were retrieved from the <i>EU SatCen Annual Report 2019</i> and, for 2020, from the <i>SatCen Closing Budget 2020 Report</i>. The source of these two reports is <i>EUSC's</i> website.</p> <p>Upon request, <i>EUSC Communications Officer</i> Theodora Filip wrote that the annual reports from 2014 to 2018 are not public and circulated internally to the board. Filip did not hand over the annual reports for the years mentioned, but she provided the missing figures relevant to the dataset.</p> <p><u>Closing Budget 2020 Report + Annual Report 2019:</u></p>

		<p><a href="https://www.satcen.europa.eu/page/key_documents_and_publications">https://www.satcen.europa.eu/page/key_documents_and_publications</a></p> <p>EU SatCen Annual Report 2009-2013:  <a href="https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/db3ab5cd-e8da-4e2e-890a-4ee6ebffbbf3">https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/db3ab5cd-e8da-4e2e-890a-4ee6ebffbbf3</a>  <a href="https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/0d43af5a-8e0f-4895-8bed-fed4d2f468b4/language-en/format-PDF/source-236693507">https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/0d43af5a-8e0f-4895-8bed-fed4d2f468b4/language-en/format-PDF/source-236693507</a>  <a href="https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/7351a4aa-8034-4180-b75c-029e989a666a/language-en/format-PDF/source-236693561">https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/7351a4aa-8034-4180-b75c-029e989a666a/language-en/format-PDF/source-236693561</a>  <a href="https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/95551a3a-098f-4c2a-ab8f-ca3c62ae7721">https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/95551a3a-098f-4c2a-ab8f-ca3c62ae7721</a>  <a href="https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/1a9d1b58-7e5e-498e-8a41-acc35c468749/language-en/format-PDF/source-236693822">https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/1a9d1b58-7e5e-498e-8a41-acc35c468749/language-en/format-PDF/source-236693822</a></p>
35	Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators	<p>Staff expenditures, funding from the EU, total budget, and the number of staff between 2011 and 2020 were retrieved from the annually published <i>statement of revenue and expenditure for the financial year</i> from 2012 to 2021. The source of these statements is <i>EUR-Lex</i>.</p> <p>ACER was founded in 2009 and became operational in 2011. Therefore, no earlier data available.</p> <p><u>Statement of revenue and expenditure 2021:</u>  <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2833%29&amp;qid=1634567085135">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2833%29&amp;qid=1634567085135</a></p>
36	Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union	<p>Staff expenditures, funding from the EU, total budget, and the number of staff between 2009 and 2020 were retrieved from the annually published <i>statement of revenue and expenditure for the financial year</i> from 2010 to 2021. The source of these statements is <i>EUR-Lex</i>.</p> <p><u>Statement of revenue and expenditure 2021:</u>  <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2810%29&amp;qid=1634567133759">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2810%29&amp;qid=1634567133759</a></p>
37	European Labour Authority	<p>Staff expenditures, the budget from the EU and the total budget in 2020 were retrieved from the <i>statement of revenue and expenditure of the European Labour Authority (ELA) for the financial year 2021</i>. The source of this statement is <i>EUR-Lex</i>.</p> <p>The number of staff in 2020 was retrieved from the ELA Budget Report 2020 (p. 3). The source of this report is <i>ELA's website</i>.</p> <p><u>Budget Report 2020:</u>  <a href="https://www.ela.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2020-12/European_Labour_Authority_Budget_2020.pdf">https://www.ela.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2020-12/European_Labour_Authority_Budget_2020.pdf</a></p> <p><u>Statement of revenue and expenditure 2021:</u>  <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2842%29&amp;qid=1634567763427">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021B0331%2842%29&amp;qid=1634567763427</a></p>

**Appendix Table 6. Robustness check: Controlling for the popularity of an agency.**

	Model 4 b/se
<b>Age:</b>	
Age (in years)	0.005 (0.01)
<b>Resources:</b>	
Annual budget (log)	-0.017 (0.07)
<b>Mandate:</b>	
Climate mandate	<b>0.414<sup>+</sup></b> (0.23)
<b>Policy field:</b>	
Freedom, security and justice (FSJ)	0.011 (0.20)
Finance	-0.036 (0.26)
Security and defence	<b>0.486<sup>**</sup></b> (0.17)
Digital connectivity	0.383 <sup>*</sup> (0.19)
Energy	<b>-1.313<sup>***</sup></b> (0.20)
Innovation	0.107 (0.29)
Transport	<b>-0.387<sup>*</sup></b> (0.17)
Social wellbeing	-0.039 (0.12)
Education and skills development	0.192 (0.35)
Total number of tweets	0.006 <sup>**</sup> (0.00)
Popularity	0.010 <sup>*</sup> (0.00)
Constant	3.963 <sup>***</sup> (1.17)
Time FE	Yes
R2	0.7680
N	201

<sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.10$ , <sup>\*</sup>  $p < 0.05$ , <sup>\*\*</sup>  $p < 0.01$ , <sup>\*\*\*</sup>  $p < 0.001$ . Standard errors in parentheses.

The model is estimated using panel OLS model with time fixed effects clustered at the level of panels to fix for the presence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.

**Appendix Table 7. Robustness check: Alternative operationalization of resources.**

	Model 1b	Model 1c
	b/se	b/se
<b>Age:</b>		
Age (in years)	0.000 (0.02)	0.009 (0.01)
<b>Resources:</b>		
Staff	0.000 (0.00)	
EU contribution (log)		<b>0.087***</b> (0.02)
<b>Mandate:</b>		
Climate mandate	0.555 (0.35)	<b>0.399*</b> (0.20)
<b>Policy field:</b>		
Freedom, security and justice (FSJ)	0.054 (0.22)	-0.165 (0.25)
Finance	-0.080 (0.35)	-0.175 (0.32)
Security and defence	<b>0.554*</b> (0.25)	<b>0.407*</b> (0.18)
Digital connectivity	<b>0.638*</b> (0.27)	<b>0.455*</b> (0.19)
Energy	<b>-1.273***</b> (0.23)	<b>-1.347***</b> (0.17)
Innovation	0.051 (0.41)	0.469 (0.34)
Transport	-0.334 (0.21)	<b>-0.482**</b> (0.16)
Social wellbeing	0.111 (0.33)	-0.131 (0.27)
Education and skills development	0.741 (0.57)	0.068 (0.50)
Total number of tweets	0.006** (0.00)	0.006** (0.00)
Constant	1.804** (0.66)	0.512 (0.57)
Time FE	Yes	Yes
R2	0.5741	0.6246
N	254	249

<sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ . Standard errors in parentheses.

The model is estimated using panel OLS model with time fixed effects clustered at the level of panels to fix for the presence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.