

Rules for Public Office and Electoral Selection

Felix Hartmann* Heike Klüver † Jan Stuckatz‡ Kai Uwe Schnapp§

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Abstract

How do rules for political office affect who decides to run for office? We explore how different types of potential citizen candidates (pro-social vs. rent motivated) value and trade off public office rules dimensions and how it influences the quality of the candidate pool. We use a factorial experiment across 10 developed and developing countries and randomly vary hypothetical rules for actual local public office and study their effects on the desire of respondents to run. We find that both higher wages and spending transparency increase individual willingness to run for local office. In contrast, stricter disclosure rules and longer working hours do not deter citizens from running. Moreover, local office rules do not affect candidate quality or representation gaps between respondents who are willing to run and those who are not. Our results have implications for the design of political institutions, political representation, and the micro-foundations for political selection.

Keywords: political economy; political disclosure; political selection; electoral selection; political representation

*Copenhagen Business School, Department of International Economics, Government, and Business. Email: feha.egb@cbs.dk.[¶]

†Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Institute for Social Sciences, Chair of Comparative Political Behavior. Email: heike.kluever@hu-berlin.de.[¶]

‡Copenhagen Business School, Department of International Economics, Government, and Business. Email: js.egb@cbs.dk.^{**}

§Universität Hamburg, Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences, Chair of Political Science, Especially Methods. Email: kai-uwe.schnapp@uni-hamburg.de.^{††}

1 Introduction

There are large documented inequalities in descriptive representation. People who choose to run for public office tend to have higher income and wealth, and are less likely to be female or from the working class (Dal Bó et al., 2017; Carnes and Lupu, 2023). But what are the drivers of these inequalities? In this paper, we ask *how do institutions affect selection into office, and how do individuals trade off costs and benefits?*

Whether and how the “rules of the game” affect electoral selection matters. Office rules, such as disclosure or transparency laws, are meant to increase accountability for elected officials (Avis et al., 2018). For example, these rules may force politicians to disclose their income from side jobs to discourage conflicts of interest between public office and private interests of elected officials (Djankov et al., 2010; Weschle, 2022). Other rules might limit the fiscal discretion of individual officials (Decarolis et al., 2020) or make decisions regarding public spending transparent and available to the public (Gamalerio and Trombetta, 2021; Carril et al., 2021). Observational studies find that local institutions such as fiscal discretion, transparency disclosure can have profound effects on political selections (Fisman et al., 2019; Gamalerio and Trombetta, 2021; Szakonyi, 2020), but their direction is mixed and the effects on the propensity of potential candidates to run for office or the quality of candidates remains ambiguous.

We contribute to filling this gap in three ways. First, we develop a theory about how potential candidates trade off costs and benefits of public office, such as the trade-off between tighter disclosure laws and other institutional characteristics, like discretion or wages paid in public office. In particular, we argue that individuals with intrinsic (personal) or extrinsic (social) motivations might value and trade off different institutional office rules differently (Bénabou and Tirole, 2003). While we expect that higher wages and more discretion have a positive effect on the desire of citizens to run for office, we suggest that the effects might depend on the *motivation* of potential candidates. While more discretion can enable politicians to react to shocks, socially motivated candidates may use discretion for public benefit by increasing the efficiency of policy adoption and implementation. However, they might prefer tighter disclosure laws and more transparency because it reduces the probability of theft. Personally motivated candidates may by contrast use higher discretion as an opportunity for career development and personal material gains.

Second, we analyze the empirical implications of our model and study how institutional rules

affect who decides to run for local public office using comparative survey experiments across 10 low, middle and high-income democracies. We confront individuals with a hypothetical situation in which they are encouraged to run for an actual local political office in their country. In the experiment, we then vary the institutional rules of this local office, such as wages, transparency rules, and sanctions for non-compliance with disclosure rules. Thus, we are able to investigate how precisely individuals trade off benefits (wages) and costs (transparency, sanctions) of running for political offices, and how this affects the propensity to run for office. In addition, we explore how individuals trade off wages and disclosure using a pre-registered formal model (Hartmann et al., 2022).

Finally, we study the relationship between office rules, candidate quality, and descriptive representation. We divide our sample into two groups: respondents who indicate willingness to run and those who are not willing to run. We then calculate marginal means (Leeper et al., 2020) of a wide range of socio-demographic variables (age, education, gender), occupational variables (income, private sector, public sector, and self-employment), and previous political experience. This allows us to show the probability that a respondent with particular characteristics would choose to run for office, given particular office and disclosure rules. This allows us to draw conclusions on the implications of local political institutions for descriptive representation.

Our analysis reveals four major findings. First, we show that both higher wages and spending transparency increase the probability for individuals to run for local public office. In contrast, neither longer working hours nor stricter disclosure rules or sanctions for compliance with these rules affect individual propensity to run. We also demonstrate large baseline differences in the propensity to run for public office across developed and developing countries. Second, we find little evidence of a trade-off between monetary benefits of public office and costs in the form of transparency or disclosure. Differences between personally motivated and socially-motivated individuals are largely in line with our theoretical expectations. Socially motivated individuals are more positively impacted by disclosure, sanctions, and transparency, and prefer less spending discretion. However, the differences between the types remain modest. Finally, we document representation gaps between respondents who would run for office and those who would not. Individuals who are willing to run for public office are more educated and more likely to have previous political experience. In contrast, they are less likely to be female and tend to be younger, on average. However, we find close to

no differences in income or occupations. Hence, while some of our findings (regarding education, gender, and political experience) are in line with the literature on political selection at the *national* level (Dal Bó et al., 2017; Gulzar, 2021), we do not find the same over-representation of the affluent for individuals willing to run for office at the *local* level. Lastly, our results show little differences in candidate quality or socio-demographic variables across different office and disclosure rules. Thus, at least at the local level, transparency and disclosure do not seem to affect candidate quality or representation.

The results are robust across both developed and developing countries, and show that transparency- and accountability-increasing mechanisms do *not deter* individuals from running for local public office, and have no measurable effect on the quality of candidates or representation. Our findings have implications for the design of public institutions, the work on descriptive representation, and adds to our understanding of the micro-foundations of political selection.

2 Theory: Institutional determinants of entry.

Previous research studied the effect of several institutional features of political offices on electoral selection. Some research suggests that more *transparency* can improve accountability in the political process and even reduce corruption (Avis et al., 2018). In that vein, Ferraz and Finan (2008) show that the release of the audit information in Brazil had a significant impact on the electoral performance of incumbents, especially where local media was present to spread the information on audit results. Moreover, disclosure of lobbying activity via the 1995 Lobbying Disclosure Act in the U.S. have enabled researchers and the public to systematically investigate the impact of lobbying on public policy, and shed light on the interaction between organized interests and politicians (Bombardini and Trebbi, 2020; de Figueiredo and Richter, 2014; Kim, 2018). However, transparency might also induce inefficiency and lead to adverse selection of capable candidates into office. For example, theoretical work by Izzo (2020) suggests that high quality candidates might not run for office in times of crisis because they anticipate a higher level of public scrutiny on their performance. Studying audits in public procurement, Gerardino et al. (2022) show that increasing transparency through audits can increase the length of the policy process and reduced supplier competition.

Another set of studies explored the effects of *fiscal discretion* Gamalerio and Trombetta (2021) find a negative effect of less fiscal discretion on mayoral candidates' education. Carril et al. (2021)

studies discretion in the context of US federal procurement and finds that the benefits from waste prevention due to more scrutiny are modest relative to the size of the compliance costs introduced by regulation. [Decarolis et al. \(2020\)](#) study bureaucracies and find that discretion can lead to greater efficiency as well as more opportunities for theft.

Another line of research studied the effect of *wages* on electoral selection. ([Deserranno, 2019](#)) finds that higher wages might discourage candidates with high pro-social motivation to run for office . On the other hand, [Gamalerio and Trombetta \(2021\)](#) speculate that one way to compensate for the negative selection effect of tighter fiscal rules might be to combine them with higher wages for politicians.

Lastly, a recent set of studies used within country variation to explore the effect of *disclosure rules* on electoral selection and turnover. ([Szakonyi, 2020](#)) while other studies found null effects on incumbent turnover ([Fisman et al., 2021](#)). In sum, while we have empirical findings on the positive and negative effects of political disclosure and transparency, we lack comparative evidence across countries and evidence on how citizens value and trade-off these different dimensions.

2.1 A simple model of self selection

To fill this gap, we use a simple framework of individual selection into public office where individuals weigh the costs for running and being in office against the potential benefits of being in office ([Black, 1972](#)).¹ We focus on the supply side of candidates and abstract away from the demand side factors such as party screening of candidates or primary elections. The model features only one period: individuals decide whether or not to enter into politics. Citizens utility is simply modeled as:

$$u = PB - C \tag{1}$$

where P is the "*candidate's estimate of the probability that [they] can obtain an office should [they] attempt to seek it*" ([Black, 1972](#), p.146), B represents the benefit that accrue from winning office, and C is the cost of running for office. We can think of P as ones latent probability to enter politics their political ambition ([Gulzar, 2021](#)). Note also that our analysis is focused on how differences in institutions influence the perceived costs and benefits for running for office. The model does not

¹See [Besley \(2005\)](#); [Dal Bó et al. \(2006\)](#); [Dal Bó and Finan \(2018\)](#); [Gulzar \(2021\)](#) for reviews on electoral selection.

include losses from taking office in terms of current occupation. Since local office is a part-time occupation, entering politics does not entail leaving one's private occupation. The basics of the model correspond with the reality of municipal or local politics in many countries.

2.2 The Role of Political Institutions

First, we define the institutional variables that might influence the potential costs and benefits of running for office. Public offices differ in their compensation (high or low wages W paid while in office), transparency of the budgetary process, discretion in spending, disclosure, and sanctions for non-compliance with disclosure. For simplicity, we differentiate between no wage, the status quo wage for a given office, and double the amount of the status quo. Second, the budgetary process can be either transparent or not. Third, policy makers may have discretion in allocation of the budget or not. Fourth, there might be disclosure rules in place that force incumbents to disclose their income for side jobs or not. Fifth, individuals might be required to provide information about their financial interests in companies or personal stock investments. Lastly, transgressions of disclosure rules might be punishable or not.

Overall, we expect higher compensation and discretion in the exercise of public office to have a positive affect on individuals' desire to run for local public office.

- **H1a:** *High wages have positive effect on the desire of individuals to run for local public office.*
- **H1b:** *More discretion has a positive effect on the desire of individuals to run for local public office.*

2.3 The Moderating Role of Motivation

Individuals might differ along their motivation for office M . In particular, candidates may have intrinsic motivation M_i (pro-social motivation) or extrinsic motivation M_e (personal motivation). *Personal motivations* could include career concerns, rent extraction, either legally through high wages or illegally through corruption. Therefore, individuals who have a personal should be particularly receptive to those types of institutional incentives. Second, previous theoretical work argued other motivations might substitute or complement monetary returns from office (Bénabou and Tirole, 2003). Therefore, we model *social motivation* a utility kick from spending time in politics. This might include utility that politicians receive from implementing their preferred policy (ideology) or

utility from doing service to the community (pro-social motivation).

We predict that the effect of tighter disclosure rules will depend on the *motivation of individuals*. On the one hand, we expect personally motivated candidates to value high wages and high discretion. Moreover, personally motivated individuals also prefer low disclosure because it increases the opportunity for rent extraction. On the other hand, socially motivated candidates are indifferent about wages, but value discretion because they place more importance on being able to implement their preferred policy. In addition, they value tighter disclosure rules because this decreases opportunities for rent extraction and favors community welfare.

- **H2a:** *Tighter disclosure/transparency rules have a negative effect on the desire to run for respondents with personal motivation.*
- **H2b:** *Tighter disclosure/transparency rules have a null/positive effect on the desire to run for respondents with social motivation.*

Second, we expect that the effect of tighter disclosure on the desire to run for office depends on individual *ability and income*. We define ability in terms of income, education, and previous political experience. Tighter disclosure rules should have a larger effect on respondents with higher ability because those respondents are more likely to have occupations or financial assets for which disclosure would be more relevant. Therefore, we formulate the following hypotheses:

- **H3a:** *Tighter disclosure rules have a negative effect on the desire to run for respondents with higher ability.*
- **H3b:** *More discretion has a positive effect on the desire to run for respondents with higher ability.*

3 Research Design

To study the effect of different institutional arrangements on the decision of individuals to run for local political offices, we run a survey experiment in ten low, middle and high income countries. We rely on a $3 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 3$ full factorial design. The design allows us to study the hypothetical selection for local public office under different institutional rules. To keep the experiment as realistic as possible, we use actual local offices present in these ten countries. Table 1 below depicts the ten countries and the respective local offices.

Country	Local Office	Status Quo Wage	Status Quo Sanction	CPI
Germany	Gemeinderat/Stadtrat	EUR 400	EUR 2400	80
UK	local councillor	GBP 1000	GBP 6000	78
US	municipal councilor	USD 1700	USD 10200	67
Spain	concejales municipales	EUR 1250	EUR 7500	61
Italy	Consigliere comunale	EUR 600	EUR 3600	56
South Africa	Ward Councillor	ZAR 15000	ZAR 90000	44
Colombia	concejales municipales	COP 1300000	COP 7800000	39
Peru	regidor	PEN 5000	PEN 30000	36
Philippines	councilor	PHP 15000	PHP 90000	33
Mexico	regidor	MXN 27000	MXN 162000	31

Table 1: Countries Sampled, Local Offices, Wages, and Sanctions: the table shows the 10 countries surveyed during the experiment, as well as the local offices used for the experiment. We also show the average status quo wages for the respective country, the sanctions for breaking disclosure rules for local offices, as well as the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for each country. Where no such sanctions exist, we use three times of the doubled status quo wage.

3.1 Country Selection

When selecting countries for the study, we were guided by parameters that could influence voter preferences for disclosure laws and political selection. Therefore, we use the perceived level of corruption (Corruption Perception Index, CPI, proxy for corruption in lobbying, data from Transparency International)² and existing lobbying disclosure regulation (qualitative judgment by screening the existing law) as parameters for country selection. We aimed at selecting local offices that are similar across countries with regard to institutional powers. More specifically, we chose the position of a municipal councilor in the US as a benchmark and identified similar political offices in the other countries. In order to compare effects across countries, we first determine the average status quo wage for a given local office, using several sources.³ To calculate sanctions for non-compliance with disclosure rules, we use three times of doubled status quo wage in a given country.

3.2 Sampling Strategy

We rely on a sample which was drawn with the help of the online-access panel provider Respondi. For each country we sample roughly 1500 citizens. For Germany, UK, and the US we have a representative sample according to age and gender. For the other countries we rely on a convenience

²See https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/CPI2021_Mapindex_EN.pdf

³For details see Appendix D.

sample. The total sample consists of $N = 16,720$ respondents across 10 countries.⁴

3.3 Survey Experiment

In the survey experiment, we vary the *local office rules* and the *rules of conduct*. Table 2 below summarizes the factors and the levels. First, we vary financial returns to office in terms of wages or financial compensation provided to the local politicians. We use three categories: 50% of the status quo wage for the local office in the respective country, the status quo wage for the local office in a given country, and double the status quo wage. Column 3 in Table 1 depicts the status quo wages across countries. Second, we vary whether the rules of the local office grant discretion in the allocation of the local budget or not. Third, we vary whether the budgetary process is publicly disclosed or not. Fourth, we vary whether local politicians need to disclose the income from side jobs while holding the public office. These side jobs can create conflicts of interest, but are also necessary, since local offices are in most cases part-time jobs with a relatively modest financial compensation. Fifth, we vary the disclosure of outside income from company holdings and stocks. Finally, we vary the existence and the extent of sanctions for non-compliance with the disclosure rules. There can be no sanctions, status quo sanctions, or two times status quo sanctions. Column 4 in Table 1 depicts the status quo sanctions across countries.

We display these factors in a *vignette text*. Since we do not model the party selection stage, we further provide information before the vignette. In order to lower the threshold for individuals to at least consider running for office, we ask individuals to imagine a scenario in which they are encouraged to run for public office, and in which a local party would assist in the application and financial costs. Moreover, we clarify that there are no educational requirements and that the local office is performed part-time. The vignette reads as follows:

*There are local political offices that citizens can run for, for example [LOCAL OFFICE]. Local politicians play an important role in improving the quality of government services. There is **no education requirement** in order to run for office. Imagine a **local party leader** approached you and **encouraged you to run**. The local party would also **take care of the application and finance the campaign**. The job would be **part-time**.*

⁴See Appendix B for summary statistics.

Factor	Level
Local Office Rules	
<i>Wage</i>	50% cut / status quo / 2 x status quo
<i>Working Hours</i>	4-5 hours / 8-10 hours
<i>Fiscal discretion</i>	Official decides alone / Official decides in group
<i>Fiscal transparency</i>	publicly disclosed / not publicly disclosed
Local Rules of Conduct	
<i>Disclosure of income from side jobs</i>	No / Yes
<i>Disclosure of company holdings and stocks</i>	No / Yes
<i>Sanctions for non-compliance</i>	No Sanctions / status quo / 2 x status quo

Table 2: Experimental Design, Factors and Levels: the table shows the factors and levels for local office and disclosure rules varied in the $3 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 3$ factorial design.

We then ask individuals: "*Considering the following rules for local political offices, could you imagine running for local office now or in the future?*". We ask individuals both whether they would be willing to run (Yes/No), as well as how likely they would be to run on an 7-point Likert-scale. First, we estimate the average marginal component effect using an OLS regression:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{wage} + \beta_2 \text{discretion} + \beta_3 \text{transparancy} + \beta_4 \text{disclosureincome} + \beta_5 \text{disclosurestocks} + \beta_6 \text{sanctions} + \beta_7 \text{hours} + \epsilon \quad (2)$$

where Y is binary outcome measure where 0 indicates that an individual would not run for local office and 1 indicates that an an individual would run. Additionally, we compute marginal means for each factor level. Marginal means describe the level of support toward an institutional profile that has a particular factor level, ignoring all other factors. Since we have a simply factorial design marginal means range from 0 to 1 (Leeper et al., 2020).

4 Results

4.1 Effects of Office Rules and Disclosure on Selection into Office

First, we analyze the direct effects of office rules and stringency of disclosure on the propensity of individuals to consider running for office. We show the results in Figure 1 below, separated by country, as well as pooled results. The point estimates are Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) with 95% confidence intervals. We also show both baseline categories for each of the local office and disclosure rules.




Figure 1: Effects of Office and Disclosure Rules on Selection into Local Office: OLS estimates of Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCE's) with 95% confidence intervals. The AMCEs show the effects of office and disclosure rules on the propensity of individuals to indicate willingness to run for local public office. The first panel (top left) shows the pooled results across all countries, and the remaining panels show the results for each country.

Overall, we find that especially higher wages and higher significantly boost the propensity to run for local office, by between 5 and 6 percentage points, on average. Doubling the status quo wage only increases the propensity to run by about 1 percentage point, compared to the status quo wage. In comparison, increasing the number of working hours does not seem to affect the propensity to run. Moreover, we find positive effects of spending transparency of about 2 percentage points, as well as small negative effects of spending discretion, of 1 percentage point. As expected, sanctions have a slightly negative effect, but it is not significantly different from zero. Finally, we estimate precise null effects of individual-level disclosure rules. Neither disclosure of outside income and stocks seem to have no discernible effect on the likelihood of individuals to run for public office.

We also find some interesting differences between countries. First, the effect of *wages* is always positive, but varies widely, between 2.5 percentage points in Germany and close to 10 percentage points in Spain. Also, while the differences between the status quo wage and the doubled status quo wage are not large in most cases, there are three countries for which the status quo wage does not reach conventional levels of significance, but the doubled status quo wage does: Germany, Italy, and Colombia. One possible reason for this is the low status quo wage in these countries, compared to other countries at a similar overall income level.⁵ Moreover, only in the United States there is no significant effect of wages on the probability to run for local office. Second, higher *working hours* neither motivate nor dissuade respondents from wanting to run for public office. Only in the United States do working hours have a positive and significant effect. Third, *deciding on spending alone* mostly has a negative effect on the probability to run, compared to deciding in group, but the negative effect is only significant for Spain and Colombia. Fourth, spending transparency has a small and positive effect, but this is only significantly different from zero for South Africa. Fifth, we find more mixed effects for *income and asset disclosure*, for which effects are positive in some countries, but negative in others. Only in Germany does asset disclosure have a significant and negative effect on propensity to run. Finally, *sanctions* for non-compliance with disclosure rules dissuade respondents in some countries (US, South Africa, Germany, Italy), but have small positive effects in others (Colombia, Peru, Mexico, Philippines). However, the country-level estimates are not significantly different from zero.

⁵Wages for local councillors is EUR 400 in Germany and EUR 600 in Italy, significantly lower than wages in other developed countries such as Spain, Italy, or the United States. Contrast also the Colombian status quo wage (COP 1,300,000 ~ USD 300) with those in Peru (PEN 5,000 ~ USD 1,300), or Mexico (MXN 27,000 ~ USD 1,500).

In addition, we show the marginal means across all appearances of a particular conjoint level, averaged across all other factors in Figure 2. This allows us to show more directly the probability that a respondent would choose to run for office, given a particular factor and level (Leeper et al., 2020). The pooled probability to be willing to run for public office is quite high, about 0.45 across all countries, but there are large differences between countries. Overall, the likelihood to run seems to be larger in the sample of developing countries than in the sample of developed countries. More specifically, probabilities range from approximately 0.4 in Germany or the UK over 0.5 in the Philippines to close to 0.6 in South Africa. The figure also illustrates the variation across factors, which is largest for the wage factor, followed by spending transparency and discretion, but much lower for the remaining factors.

In sum, the pooled and cross-country analysis shows that wages have the largest marginal effect on the probability that respondents indicate their willingness to run for local public office. In comparison, other office rules and disclosure rules have much smaller effects and are, for the most part, not significantly different from zero. We also find large differences in the baseline probability to be willing to run for office, which tends to be larger in our sample of developing countries, compared to developed countries.

4.2 Selection into Office by Type of Motivation

Second, to distinguish *social* (intrinsic) or *personal* (extrinsic) motivations of potential candidates we compare stated motivation to run for office. We classify respondents depending on their support to the following statements on 7 scale: *A: People who are elected to the office of a local office will be given an excellent opportunity to do their part for the development of the area.* or *B: People who are elected to the office of a local office will be given an excellent opportunity to move forward in politics, and gain respect and influence in the area..* If A is larger than B, we classify a respondents as primarily motivated by *social* benefits. If B is larger than A, we classify a respondents as primarily motivated by *personal* benefits. If both are ranked equally, we classify a respondents as indifferent.

We display our findings in Figure 3 below. We show the marginal means for each office and disclosure rule, pooled across all countries.⁶ For the most part, the rules affect probability to run

⁶For comparison, the AMCEs pooled across all countries are in Figure 11 in the appendix. We also show the marginal across both types of motivation by country in Figure 13 in the appendix.




Figure 2: Effects of Office and Disclosure Rules on Selection into Local Office: Marginal means with 95% confidence intervals. Marginal means represent the mean outcome (stated preferences to run for local office) across all appearances of a particular conjoint feature level, averaging across all other features. The first panel (top left) shows the pooled results across all countries, and the remaining panels show the results for each country

across the two types as expected. Socially oriented individuals prefer disclosure rules for stocks and income by about 2 and 4 percentage points, on average, compared to personally motivated individuals. Socially motivated respondents also have a stronger preference for deciding spending in group, compared to personally motivated respondents. One possible explanation for this pattern could be that respondents perceive the work as more burdensome if they have to make decisions alone. Interestingly, double sanctions have a positive effect only on socially motivated individuals while both groups have the same propensity to run for status quo sanctions. Transparency of spending also matters more for socially oriented individuals, as does more working hours for local office. The latter could be explained by the desire of socially oriented respondents to put in more work for their local community. Finally, we find some unexpected results regarding the relationship between motivation and wages. Higher wages have a much larger effect on socially-motivated individuals than for personally motivated ones (by about 4.5 percentage points).⁷




Figure 3: Effects of Office and Disclosure Rules on Selection into Local Office, by Type of Motivation, Pooled: Marginal means with 95% confidence intervals, pooled across all countries. Marginal means represent the mean outcome (stated preferences to run for local office) across all appearances of a particular conjoint feature level, averaging across all other feature.

⁷One possible explanation for this might be lower salaries of socially-motivated respondents. We will investigate this mechanism in the next iteration of the paper.

	Ranking	Choice
wage	0.03*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)
discretion	-0.01** (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)
transparency	0.01** (0.00)	0.04*** (0.01)
disclosure	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)
wage \times discretion	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
wage \times transparency	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
wage \times disclosure	-0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)
R ²	0.01	0.01
Adj. R ²	0.01	0.01
Num. obs.	16719	16719
RMSE	0.30	0.50

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; $\cdot p < 0.1$

Table 3: Interaction Effects between Wages, Discretion, Transparency, and Disclosure: The table shows the results from a linear regression with the interactions $wage \times discretion$, $wage \times transparency$, and $wage \times disclosure$. The outcome is a binary measure of the intention to run for office, where 0 is no and 1 is yes.

These results thus largely confirm our expectations: socially motivated individuals are more positively impacted by disclosure, sanctions, and transparency. They are negatively impacted by more spending discretion (deciding alone). However, they are also more likely to run for local office when faced with more working hours, and they are more affected by higher wages, compared to personally motivated individuals.

4.3 Interactions and Trade-offs

Finally, we explore the *interactions and trade-offs* between dimensions. For example, the interactions $wages \times disclosure$, $wages \times discretion$, and $wages \times transparency$ capture the extent to which respondents put more weight on disclosure, discretion, and transparency as a function of wages. As we can see in Table 3 none of the interaction is statistically significant.

Next, we explore ideal points and trade-offs across the wage and disclosure dimensions using the setup described in Hartmann et al. (2022). We assume a utility function of linear terms, quadratic terms, and two-way interactions of attributes:

$$u(z) = a + \sum_j \left(q_j z_j - r_{j,j} z_j^2 - \sum_{k \neq j} r_{j,k} z_j z_k \right). \quad (3)$$

Figure 4 presents the estimated ideal points and indifference curves for the representative citizen. These are generated by calculating fitted values for all office rules profiles using Equation (3). Note that, following our assumption of continuous preferences over the policy space, we fit on a continuous space but estimates are derived from responses to the $3^3 = 27$ points in this space.




Figure 4: Ideal Points and Trade-Offs between Wages and Disclosure, Pooled: Blue points mark the ideal policy and contours indicate utility loss with distance from ideal points. Contours can be interpreted as indifference curves. Any disclosure refers to either income or stocks. Ideal points are calculated using Equation 3.

Looking at the *ideal points and indifference curves*, we see first that preferences of personally motivated and socially motivated citizens are different. Personally motivated citizens have a strong preference for high wages. While socially motivated citizens also strongly value high wages, the indifference curves suggest that they are willing to trade-off low wages with high levels of disclosure. Indifferent respondents only value higher wages, but not tighter disclosure rules.⁸

4.4 Descriptive Representation and Quality of Candidates

To study the effect of the different institutions on the quality of candidates and descriptive representation, we first differentiate between two respondent groups: those who indicated they would run for office, and the ones who would not run. Then, we look at the distribution of different variables

⁸Note that the implied weighting matrix is not positive semi-definite, implying that preferences are not Euclidean. However, this does not preclude the representation of preferences via the general linear quadratic model in equation. While we still have indifference curves, and ideal points (now on the edge of the policy space), the utility is not guaranteed to decline monotonically with distance from ideals.

with importance for candidate quality and representation, using again marginal means for each of these characteristics across those who would run for local public office, and those who would not. This provides us with some descriptive evidence for (1) who selects into local public office, and (2) how does willingness to run for office differ along office and disclosure rules across these groups. We show the results in Figure 5 below, which depicts the marginal means of each *individual-level characteristic* across respondents who would run, or who would not run, as well as the office and disclosure rules. The interpretation here is descriptive, not causal. Two major findings stand out.

First, we find five major representation gaps, visible in the baseline differences between respondents who would run for office and those who would not. Respondents who indicate willingness to run are, on average, more educated, less likely to be female, and are more likely to have previous political experience and perceive high levels of corruption in local public offices. Respondents who intent to run are 9 percentage points more likely to be female and about 0.3 points more education (on a 6-point scale). Those differences are substantively large considering the scale of each variable (see caption of Figure 5), and confirm previous findings that people who self-select into being a politician are less likely to be female and more educated than the general population (Dal Bó et al., 2017). Moreover, those who would run have about twice the political experience than those would not run. Surprisingly, those who want to run for office (40 years, on average) are approximately 3 years younger than those who would not run (43 years, on average). This runs counter to findings from the U.S. and some developing countries, but is not far off the average age of first-time elected members of Congress and in the U.S., which is between 35 and 40 (Gulzar, 2021, p.265). Finally, respondents who are willing to run for office are 6 to 7 percentage points more likely to perceive high levels of corruption in local public offices, compared to individuals who do not intend to run. One possible explanation for this result is that individuals who perceive high corruption in public offices are more motivated to change politics, on average. In contrast, we find no large differences in income and occupational variables, such as private or public sector employment, or self-employment, between those willing and those who are not willing to run. Previous work finds that future politicians grew up in households with higher average income than the population in the case of the U.S. and Tanzania, but selection across the entire income distribution in Denmark and Sweden (Gulzar, 2021, pp.270-271).

Second, we document mostly no descriptive representation differences along different rules for




Figure 5: Representation and Quality of Candidates, by Office and Disclosure Rules, Marginal Means: Average level of individual characteristics by intention to run for office. The outcomes are the level of education (ordinal scale, 1-6), level if income (ordinal scale, 1-13), and female representation (binary, 0/1 where 1 indicates a female respondent), level or perceived corruption in for local offices (binary, 0/1 where 1 indicates high levels of percieved corruption), a job in the private sector (binary, 0/1 where 1 indicates a job in the private sector), job in the public sector (binary, 0/1 where 1 indicates a job in the public sector), self-employed (binary, 0/1 where 1 indicates self-employment), and previous political experience (binary, 0/1 where 1 indicates any previous or current experience with holding political office).

office and disclosure, for almost all of the eight variables examined in Figure 5. Interestingly, individuals who are willing to run have higher income under *no* disclosure of stocks than those willing to run under disclosure of stocks and assets. However, this flips around for disclosure of income. Moreover, those willing to run are less likely to be females under both income and asset disclosure, compared to no disclosure. Also, average education levels tend to be slightly lower for those willing to run under less discretion, which corresponds to findings from Italy, which show a negative effect on stricter fiscal rules on education of mayoral candidates (Gamalerio and Trombetta, 2021). Overall, variation in descriptive representation across office and disclosure rules are small, though. These findings provides evidence that office and disclosure rules have, if at all, minimal effects on representation. We also find no lower quality of candidates under stricter disclosure or transparency rules, as proxied by education.

5 Conclusion

In this paper, we investigate the impact of political office and disclosure rules on political selection into local public office. While much work focuses on national-level legislatures (Gulzar, 2021), we focus on local offices that regular citizens are much more likely to run for. Our findings have implications for the institutional design of public offices, the work on descriptive representation, and the micro-foundations of political selection.

First, we find that office wages motivate individuals to run for local public office. In contrast, stricter transparency and discretion rules have very small impact on the propensity to run, and are, for the most part, not significantly different from zero. Moreover, while we document some trade-off between higher wages and more disclosure for different types of individuals (socially motivated individuals vs. personally motivated individuals), more stringent rules on disclosure and transparency do not prevent individuals from running for local office. For the design of local political institutions, this means that individual citizens can indeed be mobilized to run for office, and but that this does not require to compromising accountability mechanisms such as fiscal transparency and disclosure of financial assets or income.

Second, we find large descriptive differences between individuals who are willing to run for local office and those who are not willing to run. People indicate to run are, on average, more educated, less likely to be female, and more politically experienced, which is in line with existing

research on political selection (Gulzar, 2021; Dal Bó et al., 2017). Moreover, individuals who are willing to run are also more likely to perceive high levels of corruption in public offices. However, we find no differences in income or occupational variables, and find that those willing to run are younger, on average. This runs counter the empirical work on representation which shows that across developed and developing countries, there is a tendency for more affluent to be more likely to run for national political office (Carnes and Lupu, 2023). Hence, the economic inequalities in descriptive representation documented at the *national* level might not hold at the *local* level.

Finally, we find very few differences in descriptive representation across both office and disclosure rule. This provides tentative evidence that the impact of these rules on representation is minimal. It also indicates that arguments of lower quality of political candidates due to stricter transparency rules or stricter disclosure rules (Mattozzi and Merlo, 2007) are likely to be overblown.⁹ While disclosure and transparency might still have adverse consequences for policy-making (Prat, 2005; Gavazza and Lizzeri, 2009), they do not seem to affect quality of candidates or descriptive representation.

⁹Mattozzi and Merlo (2007, p.312) argue that transparency and disclosure rules make political skills of potential candidates more visible for private market employers, and thus, raise their market wages. Thus, under lower transparency and disclosure, political parties can recruit higher quality candidates at lower wages, because the candidates' market wages are lower than what they would be under more disclosure and transparency. Thus, "enhancing the transparency of politics may not be a desirable thing to do" (Mattozzi and Merlo, 2007, p.315).

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A Appendix

B Descriptive Statistics

Table 4: Pooled Sample

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Pctl. 25	Pctl. 75	Max
duration	16719	11	7.9	-0.017	6.8	13	149
age	16719	41	14	18	30	52	69
gender	16719	1.5	0.51	1	1	2	3
female	16719	0.5	0.5	0	0	1	1
experience	16719	0.12	0.45	0	0	0	2
experience_bin	16719	0.075	0.26	0	0	0	1
run_office1	15472	0.23	0.42	0	0	0	1
run_office2	7067	0	0	0	0	0	0
ideology	15748	5.8	2.3	1	5	7	10
orga_union	16719	1.7	0.61	0	2	2	2
orga_company	16719	1.7	0.6	0	2	2	2
orga_professional	16719	1.6	0.62	0	1	2	2
orga_farmer	16719	1.8	0.59	0	2	2	2
orga_religious	16719	1.6	0.6	0	1	2	2
orga_sports	16719	1.6	0.63	0	1	2	2
orga_environment	16719	1.7	0.61	0	2	2	2
orga_party	16505	1.5	0.78	0	1	2	2
education	16324	3.7	0.88	1	3	4	6
employment_status	16719	2.9	2.6	1	1	6	8
hh_income	15526	6	3.2	1	3	9	13
private_sector	13520	0.52	0.5	0	0	1	1
public_sector	13520	0.21	0.41	0	0	0	1
self_employed	13520	0.18	0.38	0	0	0	1
social_benefit_2	16719	3.7	1.2	0	3	4	7
personal_benefit_2	16719	3.3	1.2	0	3	4	7
run_choice	16719	0.53	0.5	0	0	1	1
run_ranking	16719	0.48	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.7	1
scenario_realistic	16719	2.2	1.1	1	1	3	5

Figure 6: Age Distribution by Country.




Figure 7: Education Distribution by Country..




Figure 8: Gender Distribution by Country.





Figure 9: Income Distribution by Country.



	Pooled	Motivation: Personal	Motivation: Social
Intercept	0.43*** (0.01)	0.43*** (0.02)	0.42*** (0.02)
wage: status quo	0.05*** (0.01)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.01)
wage: double status quo	0.06*** (0.01)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.01)
discretion: decides on spending alone	-0.01*** (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)
transparency: spending is publicly disclosed	0.01*** (0.00)	0.03** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
disclosure: income	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
disclosure: property, stocks	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
sanctions:status quo	-0.01 (0.01)	0.04*** (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)
sanctions:double status quo	0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03** (0.01)
workinghours: 8-10	0.00 (0.00)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
R ²	0.01	0.02	0.02
Adj. R ²	0.01	0.01	0.02
Num. obs.	16719	6588	10131
RMSE	0.30	0.50	0.49

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 5: Main Results: OLS regression with confidence intervals

C Further results

C.1 Heterogeneous Effects

Figure 10: Effects of Office Rules and Disclosure on Selection into Office, Pooled, by Type of Motivation




Figure 11: Notes: OLS estimates of AMCE's with 95% confidence intervals, Pooled: AMCEs of office and disclosure rules on the probability to run for local public office, for respondents who are personally motivate (in red) and those who are socially motivated (in blue), pooled across all countries.




Figure 12: Effects of Office and Disclosure Rules on Selection into Local Office, by Country: Marginal Means with 95% confidence intervals, for respondents who are personally motivate (in red) and those who are socially motivated (in blue), separated for each country.



Figure 13: Effects of Office and Disclosure Rules on Selection into Local Office, by Country and Type of Motivation: Marginal means with 95% confidence intervals with personally motivated respondents as the baseline.

C.2 Descriptive Representation and Quality




Figure 14: Representation and Quality of Candidates, by Office and Disclosure Rules, Marginal Means: Average level of individual characteristics by intention to run for office.




Figure 15: Representation and Quality of Candidates, by Office and Disclosure Rules, Marginal Means: Average level of individual characteristics by intention to run for office.




Figure 16: Representation and Quality of Candidates, by Office and Disclosure Rules, Marginal Means: Average level of individual characteristics by intention to run for office.

D Country Selection

1. The Philippines

- Office: municipal councilors
- Responsibilities: Elected or regular members of the Sangguniang Bayan must at least be 18 years old on election day; the first-past-the-post voting system is used to elect these members. They are elected for a three-year term and may serve up to three consecutive terms. Elections are held simultaneously with the general elections held every three years since 1992. The term begins at noon of June 30 following election day, and ends at noon of June 30 of the third year. For the ex officio members, the term starts after their election of the municipal chapter of the organization (Sangguniang Kabataan or Liga ng mga Barangay), and ends on when their term as officer ends; Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sangguniang_Bayan
- Vote: Majority
- Wage: Php 15,000
- Wage source: https://www.glassdoor.ca/Salaries/philippines-elected-barangay-kagawad-salary-IL.0,11_IN204_K012,36.html, <https://www.dbm.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/BB-5.pdf>
- Full/Part Time:
- Hours per week:

2. Germany

- Office: Gemeinderat/Stadtrat
- Responsibilities:
- Vote:
- Wage: The wage varies depending on the size of the municipality between 230 and 630 Euro per month. We use a rough average of 400 Euro as out status-quo amount.
- Wage source: https://recht.nrw.de/lmi/owa/br_bes_detail?bes_id=27086&aufgehoben=N&det_id=543736&anw_nr=2&menu=1&sg=0

- Full/Part Time: part
- Hours per week:

3. Mexico

- Office: Regidor
- Responsibilities: They are the people in charge of representing the citizens in the city council, both in the cabildo and in the commissions assigned to them. Being a popularly elected position [...], the regidores(as) have the main responsibility to comply with and enforce the law. City councils are generally composed of the regidores(as), one or multiple síndicos(as) (trustees), and the municipal president. All three together represent the highest authority in the municipality, and it is up to them to define the general policies of the municipal administration, aimed at providing solutions to the needs of the municipality. Source: <https://regidores.planjuarez.org/que-es-un-regidor/>
- Vote:
- Wage: MXN 27 278
- Wage source: https://www.glassdoor.com.mx/Sueldos/regidor-sueldo-SRCH_K00,7.htm
- Full/Part Time:
- Hours per week:

4. Colombia

- Office: Concejal
- Responsibilities: The executive power is vested in a Mayor, who has been elected by popular vote since 1988, and who serves for a 4-year term starting in 2004. The mayor appoints a cabinet composed of his secretaries. There is also a collegiate co-administrative body called the Municipal Council. This is a public corporation in charge of issuing Municipal Agreements, which authorize actions of the Municipal Mayor or regulate matters authorized by national laws. It should be clarified that this is an administrative and not a legislative body, since the legislative function in Colombia is centralized in the Congress of the Republic, and the agreements issued by the Council are Administrative Acts.

- Vote: The Municipal Council is elected by popular vote for the same period as the Mayor. The Councils have between 7 and 21 councilmen according to the population of the municipality.

- Wage: 1300,000

- Wage source: "Unlike the mayors and governors of the country, councilmen do not receive a fixed monthly salary. In fact, Law 2075 of 2021 modified the table with which the fees of councilmen of fourth, fifth and sixth category municipalities are paid, so that in no case they receive less than one minimum monthly salary. It should be recalled that the municipalities are classified from highest to lowest population in seven categories that allow placing the municipalities in the special category and in the first to sixth categories. Thus, the fees per session are as follows: (1) 516,604; (2) 437,723; (3) 316,394; (4) 253,797; (5) 212,312, (6) 212,312; (7) 212,312. These fees will be increased each year by percentage equivalent to the variation of the CPI of the immediately preceding year. In addition, it was established that: In special, first and second category municipalities, 150 ordinary sessions and up to 40 extraordinary sessions per year will be paid annually. In the third to sixth category municipalities, 70 ordinary sessions and up to 20 extraordinary sessions per year will be paid annually. In addition, councilmen will be entitled to contribute to pension, health, ARL and family compensation fund, charged to the budget of the municipal administration, without this implying an employment relationship with the territorial entity. All councilmen will receive the payment within the first five days of the month following the month in which these fees were caused." Source: <https://www.eltiempo.com/cultura/gente/yeferson-cossio-regreso-de-japon-para-sorprender-a-jenn-muriel-707742>

Given the distribution of population sizes across municipalities, we compute the average yearly allowance per session: $(516,604 * 9) + (437,723 * 51) + (316394 * 60) + (253797 * 107) + (212312 * 134) + (212312 * 317) + (212312 * 441) / 1119 = 234,580$. Since the vast majority of municipalities are small (category 6,7), we See: https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Classification-of-Colombian-municipality-according-to-population-size_tbl1_286456883 In terms of sessions: "The aforementioned subsection states that in municipalities from third to sixth category, fees may be paid for each year up to

seventy ordinary sessions and up to 12 extraordinary sessions and then for these municipalities it states that no fees may be paid for other extraordinary sessions or extensions." Source: [https://www.consejodeestado.gov.co/documentos/boletines/PDF/25000-23-15-000-2006-02573-01\(PI\).pdf](https://www.consejodeestado.gov.co/documentos/boletines/PDF/25000-23-15-000-2006-02573-01(PI).pdf) Therefore, we count 70 session per year: $234,580 * 70 = 16420600$. Accordingly, we derive at a monthly salary of: 1300,000 of Colombian Peso which corresponds roughly to 300 Euro.

- Full/Part Time:
- Hours per week:

5. UK

- Office: local councillor
- Responsibilities: A councillor's primary role is to represent their ward or division and the people who live in it. Councillors provide a bridge between the community and the council.
- Vote:
- Wage: GBP 1 000
- Wage source: <https://www.londoncouncils.gov.uk/node/39359>
- Full/Part Time:
- Hours per week:

6. US

- Office: municipal councilor
- Responsibilities: "City councils and town boards generally consist of several (usually somewhere between 5 and 51) elected aldermen or councillors. In the United States, members of city councils are typically called council member, council man, council woman, councilman, or councilwoman, while in Canada they are typically called councillor. In some cities, the mayor is a voting member of the council who serves as chairman; in others, the mayor is the city's independent chief executive (or strong mayor) with veto power over city council legislation. In larger cities the council

may elect other executive positions as well, such as a council president and speaker. The council generally functions as a parliamentary or presidential style legislative body, proposing bills, holding votes, and passing laws to help govern the city. The role of the mayor in the council varies depending on whether or not the city uses council–manager government or mayor–council government, and by the nature of the statutory authority given to it by state law, city charter, or municipal ordinance." Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Municipal_council

- Vote:
- Wage: USD 1700
- Wage source: <https://www.comparably.com/salaries/salaries-for-city-council-member>

7. Italy

- Office: Consigliere comunale
- Responsibilities: Law No. 265 of August 3, 1999, provides that members of the city council are entitled to a function allowance, halved for employees who have not requested leave of absence. The same law states that this allowance is determined by adoption of an interministerial decree (issued by the Ministry of the Interior in consultation with the Minister of the Treasury, Budget and Economic Planning)-after consultation with the State-City and Local Autonomies Conference-in compliance with certain criteria set forth in the same 1999 law. In compliance with the dictates of Law 265/1999, Ministry of the Interior Decree No. 119 of April 4, 2000 was issued. The matter is now regulated by Article 82 of the TUEL. The decree also provides that municipal and provincial councilors are entitled to receive, within the limits set by the decree, an attendance fee for participation in councils and commissions. Regarding the payment of the allowance then, the Ministry of the Interior clarified that, about the halving of the allowance, employees who have not requested to be placed on paid leave and that, therefore, those who cannot avail themselves of this option, such as the self-employed, unemployed, students and pensioners are entitled to the function allowance in its full amount, on the assumption that the current position excludes the existence of an employment relationship. Directors to whom it is paid, no token is due for participation in meetings of the collegiate bodies

of the entity, nor of commissions that constitute internal and external articulations of that body. Source: https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consigliere_comunale

- Vote: The term of office is five years and goes hand in hand with that of the mayor. In municipalities with less than 15,000 inhabitants, 2/3 of the council seats are allocated to the list of the winning mayoral candidate according to the first-past-the-post (dry majoritarian system), while the remainder are allocated according to the proportional system to the lists of other mayoral candidates. In municipalities with more than 15,000 inhabitants, council seats are allocated according to the proportional system corrected by majority prize awarded to the lists of the winning mayoral candidate. If no mayoral candidate receives a majority of validly cast votes, a runoff between the two candidates with the most votes is held after two weeks. Source: https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consigliere_comunale
- Wage: 600 Euro
- Wage source: (Campanari-Talaber and Gruman, 2019)

8. Spain

- Office: concejal
- Responsibilities: Most municipalities are governed by a municipal council (ayuntamiento), the members of which are elected every four years. The number of seats on a council is determined based on the municipality's population size, though a minimum of five councillors is required by law. Small municipalities and minor local entities are governed by so-called 'open-councils' (concejo abierto). The types of services a municipality is expected to provide for its residents depends on the size of its population. Some services, such as waste collection, public cleaning, and a steady supply of drinking water, must be fulfilled by all municipalities.
- https://www.hacienda.gob.es/Documentacion/Publico/SGT/CATALOGO_SEFP/223_Regimen-Local-ING-INTERNET.pdf
- Vote:
- Wage: 1250 Euro

- Wage source: "Javier Collado, professor of the Master in Taxation and Tax Consultancy of the Udima, comments to Newtral.es that the salary of the mayors and councilmen has a maximum established in the law. "The members of the Local Corporations of cities with more than 500,000 inhabitants can charge, at most, the same as a Secretary of State (108,246 euros in 2022) [...] From there, Collado points out, it depends on the population of the municipality. "The less population, the lower that maximum salary, depending on what is established in the new article 75 of the law of sustainability of the Local Administration. Thus, in municipalities of between 1,000 and 5,000 inhabitants, the maximum salary will be 40% of that of the Secretary of State, says the professor, referring to the law. That is, about 43,000 euros.[...] In addition to the part of the salary that is limited according to the population, there is another element that determines the salary of a councilman or mayor: whether or not he or she has exclusive dedication. Collado indicates that the above figures only correspond "if the member of the local corporation has exclusive dedication". In the event that the mayor has partial dedication "his salary will be determined by the maximum limits indicated for this purpose in the General State Budget Law". 23% of the mayors have exclusive dedication, while 55Source: <https://www.newtral.es/alcalde-sueldo-dedicacion-concejales/20220110/> Since the average yearly salary for a part-time mayor is 17,000 Euro, we consider a early salary of 15 000 Euro per year as the status quo for councilors. See also salaries for full-time councilors in Madrid: https://www.eldiario.es/madrid/somos/noticias/cobran-alcalde-concejal-ayuntamiento-madrid_1_8398276.html
- Full/Part Time:
- Hours per week:

9. South Africa

- Office: Ward Councillor
- Responsibilities: Of the 278 municipalities in South Africa, 231 are local. All local municipalities are broken into wards, each of which is represented by a ward councillor. The municipal council is the legislative body on the local level and thus has policy-making responsibilities. The council passes a municipality's annual budget and decides on devel-

opment plans for the municipality. It is also responsible for discharging any services of local interest. Ward councillors are the link between local communities and the municipal council. They represent the interests of their constituencies and monitor the performance of the municipality. Local government officials receive an annual remuneration, the size of which depends on a municipality's wealth and population size.

- Vote: Ward councillors are directly elected by the wards' inhabitants and make up half of the seats on the municipal council. The other half is elected via proportional representation.
- Wage: R15000
- Wage source: Ward Councillors and other part-time members may earn between R112 103 and R238 053 (South African Rand) a year. We take the rough average and derive the monthly allowance. Source: <https://dullahomarinstitute.org.za/multilevel-govt/local-government-bulletin/archives/volume-8-issue-2-may-2006/vol-8-no-2-salaries-scale-upwards.pdf>, <https://www.gov.za/about-government/government-system/local-government>,
- Full/Part Time:
- Hours per week:

10. Peru

- Office: Regidor
- Responsibilities: The 25 regions are subdivided into 180 provinces (provincias) and these are further subdivided into 1747 municipal districts (distritos), each with an elected mayor and council. The municipal councils are composed of between 5 and 15 councilors (except that of the province of Lima, composed of 39 councilors).
- Vote: elected by direct suffrage for a period of four (4) years, in conjunction with the election of the mayor (who presides over the council). Voting is by closed and blocked list. The winning list is assigned the seats according to the d'Hondt method or half plus one, whichever favors it the most.
- Wage: PEN 5,000

- Wage source: "Unlike mayors, who receive a monthly salary, a municipal alderman receives remuneration for attending each session of the municipal council, also called per diem. Thus, the salaries of aldermen in Lima vary between S/. 1,170 and S/. 2,700, depending on the district. It should be added that the ordinary sessions attended by councilors are held between two and four times a month, according to the norm. Thus, the maximum that a councilman could earn in a month is S/ 10,800, in the districts where the per diem is 2,700 soles." Source: <https://larepublica.pe/datos-lr/respuestas/2022/10/03/elecciones-2022-cuanto-gana-un-alcalde-y-un-regidor-municipal-peru-atmp/>
- Full/Part Time:
- Hours per week:

E English Questionnaire

E.1 Pre-Treatment Covariates

- **1.1 Age:** First, we have a couple of question about you. How old are you?
 - ___ years
- **1.2 Gender:** What is your gender?
 - 1 Male
 - 2 Female
 - 3 Other
- **1.3 Postal Code:** What is your postal code?
 - ___
- **1.4 Previous Political Experience:** Have you ever held a political office, for example, that of a local councillor or mayor?
 - 0 No
 - 1 Yes, currently holding office
 - 2 Yes, have held office
- **1.5 Potential Run for Office 1:** Have you ever considered running for a political office, for example, that of a local councillor or mayor?
 - 0 No, never thought about it
 - 1 Yes, have thought about it
- **1.6 Potential Run for Office 2:** How likely is that you run for any local office in the future?
 - 0 Not at all likely
 - 1 Not very likely
 - 2 Somewhat likely
 - 3 Very likely
 - 4 Extremely likely

E.1.1 Ideology

- **1.7 Ideology:** In political matters people talk of “the left” and “the right”. How would you place your views on this scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means “left” and 10 means “right”?
 - 0 left
 - 1
 - 2
 - 3
 - 4
 - 5
 - 6
 - 7
 - 8
 - 9
 - 10 right

E.1.2 Corruption

- **1.8 Corruption:** How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you to say?
 - A Government agencies or departments
 - B Members of Parliament
 - C Local politicians
 - D Audit offices
 - E Judges
 - F Police

 - 0 None
 - 1 Some of them
 - 2 Most of them
 - 3 All of them
 - -99 Don't know/ Haven't heard

E.1.3 Membership in Organisations

- **2.1 Membership Organisations:** Are you a member of one or more of the following organisations?
 - A Union
 - B Company or employer association
 - C Professional association
 - D Farmers' association
 - E Religious groups
 - F Sports club/hobby club
 - G Environmental groups
 - H Political parties. Please provide the party name: _____
- – 1 yes
- 2 no

E.1.4 Motivation

- **2.2 Social vs. Personal Benefits:** Thinking about your own motivation, do you agree with the following statements?
 - A) People who are elected to the office of a **local office** will be given an excellent opportunity to do their part for the development of the area.
 - B) People who are elected to the office of a **local office** will be given an excellent opportunity to move forward in politics, and gain respect and influence in the area.
 - Skala:
 - * 1 Do not agree
 - * 2
 - * 3
 - * 4 partially agree
 - * 5
 - * 6
 - * 7 Fully agree

- **2.3 Social vs. Personal Benefits 2:** Again, consider the two statements. Think about your own motivation.

- A) People who are elected to the office of a **local office** will be given an excellent opportunity to do their part for the development of the area.
- B) People who are elected to the office of a **local office** will be given an excellent opportunity to move forward in politics, and gain respect and influence in the area.

Please allocate 7 points between A and B based on how much you agree with each statement. You can assign any number of points between 0 (do not agree) and 7 (fully agree) to each statement, but the total must be 7.

Warning: Please allocate a total of 7 points between the two statement.

- *PA: Two horizontal “constant sum” scales with each 7 points for each statements. Below a total that adjusts.*

E.1.5 Attention Check

- **Attention Check:** Sometimes surveys are filled out automatically by so-called computer bots. To ensure that this survey is filled out by a human being, please select “partially agree” here.

– Skala:

- * 1 Do not agree
- * 2
- * 3
- * 4 partially agree
- * 5
- * 6
- * 7 Fully agree

E.2 4 Survey Experiment: Selection

E.2.1 4.1 Local Political Selection

- **Infotext 3:** There are local political offices that citizens can run for, for example **local office**. Local politicians play an important role in improving the quality of government services. There

is **no education requirement** in order to run for office.

- Imagine a **local party leader** approached you and **encouraged you** to run. The local party would also **take care of the application and finance the campaign**. The job would be **part-time**.
- **4.1 Forced Choice, Local Political Office:** Considering the following rules for local political offices, could you imagine running for **local office** now or in the future?
 - Yes
 - No
- **4.2 Rating, Local Political Office:** Considering those rules for local political offices, how likely would you run for **local office** now or in the future?"

– Skala:

- * 1 definitely not
- * 2
- * 3
- * 4
- * 5
- * 6
- * 7
- * 8
- * 9
- * 10 definitely yes

E.3 Open question

In your opinion, is the scenario of a local party leader approaching you and encouraging you to run likely? + 0 Not at all likely + 1 Not very likely + 2 Somewhat likely + 3 Very likely + 4 Extremely likely

E.4 5 Post Treatment Covariates

E.4.1 5.1 Education and Employment

- **Text:** In the following, we are interested in some information about your profession and workplace.

- **5.1 Education:** What is the highest level of education you have successfully attained?
 - 1 Did not finish primary school
 - 2 Primary school degree
 - 3 Secondary school degree
 - 4 Bachelor's university degree
 - 5 Master's university degree
 - 6 Ph.D. or doctorate
 - 98 Don't know
 - 99 Don't want to answer the question

- **5.2 Employment Status:** What is your current employment status?
 - 1 Full-time employed
 - 2 Part-time employed
 - 2 In vocational training/apprenticeship
 - 4 On parental leave or other leave of absence
 - 5 Student in higher education
 - 6 Retired
 - 7 Unemployed
 - 8 Other

- **5.3 Occupation:** Which of the following describes your current occupation?
 - 1 Employee in private sector
 - 2 Employee in public sector
 - 3 Legal professional (e.g. lawyer, notary public)
 - 4 Self-employed

- 5 Other
- *AA: Please select the category that comes closest to your industry of employment.*
- **Filter if Employment Status == 1 | 2 | 3 | 4**
- **5.4 Industry, NACE Rev.2:** In which sector of the economy or in which industry is the company or institution primarily active?
- **Filter if Occupation == 4**
- **5.5 Occupation:** How many employees do you employ, approximately?
 - 1 ___ employees
 - 2 Prefer not to say
- *AA: If you don't know the exact amount, please provide an estimate.*
- **5.6 Net Household Income:** What is the total monthly net income of your household? This means the amount that remains after taxes and social security contributions have been deducted.
 - 1 under £500
 - 2 £500 to less than £750
 - 3 £750 to less than £1,000
 - 4 £1,000 to less than £1,250
 - 5 £1,250 to less than £1,500
 - 6 £1,500 to less than £2,000
 - 7 £2,000 to less than £2,500
 - 8 £2,500 to less than £3,000
 - 9 £3,000 to less than £4,000
 - 10 £4,000 to less than £5,000
 - 11 £5,000 to less than £7,500
 - 12 £7,500 to less than £10,000
 - 13 £10,000 and more
 - 98 don't know
 - 99 do not want to answer question

E.5 6 Debriefing

Study: Lobby Register and Political Rules of Conduct We randomly presented all survey participants with different reform proposals for lobby registers, second jobs and codes of conduct for politicians, and local public office. Thus, we aim to understand how different register and rule designs affect participants' support for political transparency, conduct rules, and attitudes towards local office.

If you have any questions or concerns about this study and the research methods used, please feel free to contact us.