

The rise of authoritarian multiparty governments

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While multiparty government is associated with democracy, we use a new dataset to show that autocracies increasingly include multiple parties in government: In 2016, almost 50% of dictatorships did so. The existing literature does not account for this, and instead considers granting outsiders access to the ministerial cabinet a risky and costly strategy. We argue that authoritarian multiparty government (AMG) emerges when the autocrat must co-opt outsiders to prevent a unified opposition from arising. Existing research would suggest that most AMGs are arrangements where multiple parties are included in the cabinet, but only the ruler's party matters. However, we demonstrate that coalition partners often have real influence, and that AMGs positively correlate with social divides, civil war and “democratic” institutions. Results suggest that AMG is an overlooked survival strategy, and highlight the need to adopt a broader perspective on parties – rather than the party – in dictatorships.

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Research on authoritarianism usually assumes that when there is a ruling party, it governs alone. This is encapsulated by terms such as “single-party” regimes and “one-party rule”. It is further reflected in the fact that scholars typically focus on *the* governing party (Geddes 1999; Geddes, Wright and Frantz 2014; Magaloni and Kricheli 2010; Miller 2020). Research focusing on the existence of multiple parties in dictatorships consider the phenomenon through the prism of constitutional rules, legislatures, and elections (Hadenius and Teorell 2007; Magaloni, Chu and Min 2013); but does not consider partaking in executive power an option for other parties than the ruling party. By contrast, we show that many autocrats also include multiple parties in their *government*: In 2016, this was true in almost half of the world’s autocracies, from Rwanda to Mali, Iran, and Malaysia. This is what we define as authoritarian multiparty government (AMG hereafter).

Autocrats adopt regime-sanctioned parties to foster stability (Blaydes 2010; Geddes 1999; Slater 2010), mitigate threats from below (Magaloni 2006), manage intra-elite conflict, and solve inter-temporal power-sharing dilemmas (Boix and Svobik 2013; Reuter 2017; Svobik 2012). Dictators thus retain and consolidate power by offering rents to their supporters – first among which are party members. Such rents often come in the form of appointments to key positions within the regime, in particular ministerial portfolios. Recent work has highlighted the importance of ministerial cabinets in autocracies specifically as policy-making and power-sharing institutions which shape how constrained the ruler is (Kroeger 2020; Meng 2019a).¹ In this light, it is puzzling that autocrats would appoint cabinet members openly affiliated with parties other than their own, since it opens up an alternative source of revenue and influence, which may ultimately undermine their own rule (Lee and Schuler 2020). How can we then explain the prevalence of AMGs worldwide?

Building on recent studies which suggest that ruling parties in autocracies are generally weaker institutions than we take them to be, we argue that AMGs are power-sharing arrangements between parties that represent different groups in society (Arriola, DeVaro and Meng 2021; Meng 2019b;

¹We use the terms “ministerial cabinet”, “cabinet” and “government” indifferently throughout the article to refer to the body of individuals appointed by the ruler and which together makes up the executive power.

Van De Walle 2006). These groups can be defined along, for example, pre-existing ethnic, political, or economic cleavages. One or several of them decide that they are better off entering into a governing coalition than competing with each other, or challenging the incumbent. We depart from the existing literature by considering the possibility that upon entering the cabinet, co-opted individuals may retain their affiliation with different parties, so that multiple parties are ruling together. This arrangement is beneficial for autocrats: By co-opting a select part of the opposition without subsuming it under the ruling party's umbrella, they prevent a strong, unified opposition able to credibly threaten the regime from emerging (Arriola, DeVaro and Meng 2021; Slater 2018). This is also advantageous for the coalition parties, who benefit from the financial and non-financial perks of being in office without compromising their status as distinct from the ruling party. Co-opted parties thus maintain some nominal independence. When entering this mutual agreement, both sides are better off than under full democracy, where they risk losing control of government to outsider parties.

Yet, these power-sharing agreements are not all the same: They vary in the extent to which coalition parties exert real influence over policy-making. At one end of the continuum, AMGs can be purely *pro-forma* arrangements, in which the ruler fully controls his/her coalition partners. Still, the coalition partners are not formally subsumed under the ruling party's umbrella, because they do not pose a significant threat to the ruler. Instead, they continue to exist as legacy parties, as was the case in Poland and Bulgaria in the communist era, and in Rwanda today. *Pro-forma* multiparty government can be advantageous for the incumbent as it grants a veneer of democratic institutions to the regime – thereby avoiding the reputational, economic, and diplomatic costs associated with being an old-school one-party regime – while simultaneously maintaining the ruler's grip on power.

The commonly held idea that the ruling party governs alone in autocracies would suggest the vast majority of AMGs are *pro-forma* arrangements in which autocratic leaders only ever engage “for the show”. To the contrary, we argue that many of these governments exhibit features of what we call *bona fide* power-sharing, meaning that the coalition partners are separate entities with independent party structures and their own political agenda. A necessary condition for *bona fide*

power-sharing is that there is some degree of continuing threat of the opposition coalescing against the ruler. Granting cabinet positions to other parties thus contributes to the ruler's survival strategy. Such appointments serve as buy-offs, entrenching the co-opted opposition in dependence toward the ruling party while preventing the emergence of a united opposition front.

We do not expect AMG's to be randomly distributed among the pool of autocracies. Instead, they should be particularly likely to emerge where there are strong and salient underlying societal divides, such as those inherited from past civil wars or a history of social and cultural cleavages, which make it more difficult for the ruler to overtake outright the ruling coalition. Power-sharing is also more likely where there are other nominally democratic institutions in place, allowing members of coalition parties to organize and compete outside of the ruling coalition, and creating a persistent threat to the incumbent.

We proceed to explore the rise of AMG's empirically. To do so, we rely on a new, global dataset on government composition, *WhoGov* (Nyrup and Bramwell 2020). *WhoGov* contains individual-level data, including party affiliation, for all cabinet members in every country with more than 400,000 citizens in the period 1966-2016. Since party affiliation in *WhoGov* is coded on a person-by-person basis, we are able to identify cabinet members representing parties other than the that of the regime leader. We also have information on the position and portfolio held by each minister, which we use to measure the extent and depth of multiparty power-sharing.

We exploit this incomparably rich data, and show first that multiparty government has become increasingly common amongst authoritarian countries. Both the average number of parties in government and the share of regimes with more than one party included in the cabinet have increased steadily since the 1970s. In 2016, almost 50% of countries classified as autocracies in Boix, Miller and Rosato (2013) have more than one party in their government, against less than 25% forty years earlier. The distribution of the number of parties in government also looks increasingly similar between democracies and autocracies, the closer we get to the present day. This provides proof of concept that AMG's are an empirical reality and warrant further investigation.

Next, we explore which autocratic regimes have adopted AMG's. We show that, in line with

our theoretical expectations, the phenomenon correlates positively with social and cultural cleavages, prior civil wars, as well as with the presence of nominally democratic institutions. These findings bolster our claim that AMGs are not *pro-forma* arrangements across the board: If such were the case, then we should be no more likely to observe multiple parties ruling together in an authoritarian setting with a history of civil conflict, higher levels of fractionalization, and more nominally democratic institutions than in contexts that lack these historical and institutional features. The fact that the AMGs correlate with stark societal divides which make it harder for the ruling party to overtake coalition partners, and the presence of other institutions which make the threat of opposition coalescing more credible, therefore suggests that there is real power-sharing.

At last, we investigate the internal dynamics of AMG, and show that while the dictator's party is – in almost all cases – the most powerful in terms of share and importance of cabinet positions, there are in many cases signs of real power sharing between the autocrat's party and the coalition parties. In particular, we build a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of party concentration in government, weighted by the importance of ministerial portfolios. Results indicate that *bona fide* multiparty governments are more common amongst AMGs than existing research would suggest.

The article advances the study of contemporary authoritarian regimes in several ways. First, we show that modern authoritarian regimes do not only adopt democratic institutions such as elections and parliaments, but also share the spoils of governing with other parties without becoming full democracies. This is a novel finding in a literature which has thus far envisaged the co-existence of multiple parties in autocracies mostly through the prism of imperfect electoral competition, instead of considering it as a viable system of government. Our second main contribution is the use of individual-level data on the composition of cabinets in autocracies around the world. This allows for a fine-grained *and* global analysis of co-optation and intra-elite dynamics in authoritarian regimes, when existing studies typically face a trade-off between data quality and coverage. Exploiting data on cabinet members and ministerial portfolios in all autocracies worldwide, we are able to show that AMGs vary along a spectrum which goes from total dominance in all but name of the regime-sanctioned party, to genuine power-sharing between frenemies. Taken together, our

empirical results – while explorative – suggest that the field would benefit from adopting a broader and more nuanced perspective on the role of parties – rather than *the party* – in autocracies.

(Re-)thinking about parties in autocracies

Political parties and authoritarian rule

Political parties are viewed as one of the pillars of modern authoritarian rule (Blaydes 2010; Brownlee 2007; Geddes 1999; Magaloni 2006; Reuter 2017; Svobik 2012). The so-called “third wave of democratization” also saw the rise of autocracies organized politically and institutionally around the existence of a ruling party (Huntington 1991). These regimes are often referred to as “single-party” states – in the sense that no party other than that sanctioned by the regime are allowed (Geddes 1999) – or “dominant-party” regimes – meaning that other parties are legalized and can compete to various degrees through elections in a “competitive authoritarian” system (Levitsky and Way 2010).²

Some scholars have gone further in distinguishing between different kinds of authoritarian party-based regimes, looking at constitutional rules, the composition of the legislature, and the holding of competitive elections. Hadenius and Teorell (2007) and Magaloni, Chu and Min (2013, 8) talk about “multiparty regimes” to designate those cases in which the ruling party allows the creation of parties by opposition groups, who then participate in elections and the legislature. This definition, which puts the emphasis on formal rules and electoral competition, is close to that of “electoral democracies” (Diamond 2002; Linz 2000; Schedler 2002) or “competitive authoritarian” regimes (Howard and Roessler 2006; Levitsky and Way 2002, 2010). Studies that emphasize the presence of specific nominally democratic institutions to characterize the type of autocratic regime have accordingly paid less attention to the diversification in the types of authoritarian government arrangements that have emerged in the meantime.

As a consequence, research has focused on understanding why dictators create regime-sanctioned

²In their extensive review of the literature on one-party rule, Magaloni and Kricheli (2010) underscore this tendency: “[d]espite the important differences between single-party and dominant-party regimes, we often refer to them together – as one-party regimes – and highlight this distinction only when it is relevant to our argument” (2010, p.123).

political parties. Ruling authoritarian parties have thus been shown to serve intertwined roles which ultimately foster better regime outcomes, including durability (Geddes, Wright and Frantz 2014; Magaloni 2008), resilience to internal challenges such as coups and insurgencies (Cox 2009; Keefer 2007), and economic growth (Gehlbach and Keefer 2011, 2012; Wright 2008). The first function is to mobilize mass support (Magaloni and Kricheli 2010, p.125). The party machine can be used as a tool to control the masses and gather information, but also to foment support and entrench the dependence of the masses who develop an interest in the regime's survival (Díaz Cayeros, Magaloni and Weingast 2003; Magaloni 2006).

The second – and most interesting to us – is a bargaining and co-opting function. The ruling party allows the ruler to manage threats coming from regime elites, and intra-elite conflicts. The literature has mainly focused on the granting of rents and spoils *within* the ruler's own support coalition as a means to enhance elite cohesion, and deter potential challengers. Gerschewski (2013) defines co-optation as “the capacity to tie strategically-relevant actors (or a group of actors) to the regime elite” (2013, p.22). It therefore serves an “inclusionary” purpose: the maintenance of intra-elite cohesion goes hand in hand with the channelling of oppositional demands, with the ultimate aim of preventing any strong, charismatic opposition figure from emerging (*ibid.*). In the words of O'Donnell (1979), through co-optation, autocrats “encapsulat[e]” some sectors of the opposition to maintain themselves in power (1979:51, 91, cited by Gandhi and Przeworski 2006).

Co-optation dynamics and ruling parties in autocracies

Studies of authoritarian rule point to several reasons why autocrats may choose to include selected parts of the opposition into cabinet. One answer may lie in the fact that authoritarian ruling parties are rarely as strong as we take them to be, as suggested by Meng (2019b). Leaders of parties that lack the key condition for institutional strength, namely organizational autonomy, may find themselves pressured into incorporating part of the opposition into the ruling coalition. Institutions such as ruling parties can thus be used by the autocrat to selectively co-opt potential rivals by distributing rents. Scholars of African politics in particular have emphasized that the prevalence of patronage politics can result in a broadening of the winning coalition beyond party lines to facilitate

the distribution of rents (Arriola 2009; Van De Walle 2007). Frantz and Kendall-Taylor (2014) further argue that allowing for multiple opposition parties to exist and participate in elections is a rational co-optation strategy on the ruler's part, "enabling a wider range of the opposition to choose the degree to which they wish to associate with the regime" (2014, p.335). However, this strategy can easily turn against the ruler, as rivals can use these transfers to organize collectively against him/her, especially if he/she lacks means of exerting formal control over them. This makes that approach both costly and risky for the ruler.

Others have suggested that the co-optation of select outsider fringes can facilitate bargaining between the ruler and the opposition in the form of targeted policy concessions (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007, p.17). This presents the added advantage of increasing coordination costs among the leader's opponents (Lust-Okar 2006; Magaloni 2006; Slater 2018): Once a former opposition group has been subsumed into the leader's party, it makes it harder for the rest of the opposition to unite. In this vein, Arriola, DeVaro and Meng (2021) demonstrate formally and empirically that presidential incumbents can strategically use cabinet appointments with the twofold aim of buying off rivals *and* inducing opposition fragmentation. Using cabinet data in African dictatorships, they find that co-opted opposition figures are subsequently more likely to run as independents in the following presidential elections. This "divide-and-conquer" strategy satisfies the ruler's key objective: preventing the emergence of a strong, unified opposition under a single party umbrella (Van De Walle 2006). Following Arriola, DeVaro and Meng (2021)'s logic, once included in government, these individuals no longer identify with opposition parties: They relinquish their label to benefit fully from the spoils of being in the cabinet. In this view, it follows that power-sharing between different parties in government should remain virtually nonexistent if the ruler is successful in his/her selective co-optation strategy.

We depart from existing theories by considering the case of governments in which co-opted oppositions fringes retain their respective party labels as viable survival strategies for both the leader's party and its coalition members. From the ruler's perspective, allowing them to keep their party label and some independence hinders the opposition from uniting by creating a third

option within autocratic politics. Political actors can choose to be affiliated to the ruling party, the opposition outside of government, or the opposition in government. This, in turn, raises the bar of how difficult it is for non-regime parties to coalesce and unite against the leader's party (Magaloni and Kricheli 2010); and buys the ruler some time to adjust his/her survival strategy to opposition threats (Bratton 2016, on the Zimbabwean case). From the perspective of opposition parties, there is a two-edged sword to entering government. On the one hand, retaining their party label ensures that they are not fully conflated with the ruling party, while being in government allows them to gain access to resources and power they would otherwise not benefit from (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009). On the other, this can be seen as a betrayal from the rest of the opposition and make it harder for them to maintain a credible image as regime challengers. The ruler compromises his/herself less than the co-opted opposition in this respect.

Varieties of authoritarian multiparty governments

The presence of multiple parties in government does not imply that power is in practice shared between different groups with an effective say in policy-making. As Magaloni and Kricheli (2010, 126) underscore, "[t]he mere existence of parties [...] does not necessarily mean that office-holders in these institutions have power and influence over policy outcomes", since the dictator can renege on his/her promises and banish the dissenting opinions. Because of the costs and risks associated of out-party co-optation, one may expect rational autocrats to refrain from granting the opposition in government any meaningful role. In other words, we should only observe *pro-forma* multiparty governments, wherein the inclusion of several parties in government is done in a purely perfunctory manner, and does not entail actual power-sharing between groups of different ideological, political or economic strands pursuing various and sometimes opposite policy goals.

Pro-forma multiparty governments are characterized by the dominance of the leader's party. Typically, either the coalition parties are satellite organizations under the dictator's control to begin with, or the ruler gradually manages to take over his/her coalition partners and fully control them. This offers several advantages for the incumbent: By granting a veneer of democratic institutions to the regime, it limits the reputational, diplomatic, and economic costs associated with being

an old-school authoritarian one-party state. Meanwhile, the parties that made the choice to enter the government coalition do so to enjoy the spoils of being in power, but ultimately have little say in actual decision-making. In these cases, typically, the real opposition parties are banned. Examples of such systems include former communist countries such as Poland from 1947 to 1989 and Bulgaria until 1989, but also cases like North Korea.³ Any observed rise in the number of parties in government in autocracies may therefore reflect cases where the leader's party actually has complete control, and other parties are bestowed cabinet positions "for the show".

However, granting of cabinet positions to members of other parties can also serve as a strategy on the ruler's part to consolidate his/her grip on power, so that ultimately – and counter-intuitively – we expect most cases of autocratic multiparty governments to not be purely *pro-forma*. In particular, we argue that out-party cabinet appointments serve two complementary functions. First, as the neo-patrimonial authoritarianism literature suggests, cabinet appointments serve as buy-offs (Arriola 2009; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Van De Walle 2007). They entrench newly co-opted opposition members into economic dependence by offering them more than they would get through any outside option. Second, cabinet posts are high-level political positions. As such, they come with a political clout and public visibility, which are non-monetary rewards that also work toward fostering dependence on the incumbent. Crucially, *some* cabinet positions also come with an important role in decision-making (e.g. Minister of Defense or Minister of Finance), so that giving them to outsiders entails a higher degree of trust and power-sharing than less consequential portfolios (e.g. Minister of Culture or Minister of Social Affairs). By granting important cabinet positions to members of other parties, the ruler works toward preventing a strong and unified opposition from emerging and posing a serious challenge to his/her rule (Arriola, DeVaro and Meng 2021). Arguably, extending this cabinet-based co-optation logic outside of the ruler's partisan inner-circle is expensive for the ruler. As Arriola, DeVaro and Meng (2021, p.10) note, "offering a cabinet position to an opposition candidate is also costly for the incumbent because it prevents him

³Officially, there are multiple parties in North Korea, who collectively form the Democratic Front for the Reunification of Korea (DFRF). However, it is extremely difficult to identify these partisan sub-units, for they are integrated in all but name to the ruling party.

from being able to offer that position to someone from his own party or existing ruling coalition”. Furthermore, it is also risky for the autocrat: Non-co-partisan individuals do not necessarily share the ruler’s ideological and political agenda, nor do they display the obvious sign of loyalty that is affiliation to the ruling party (Aaskoven et al. 2020). Precisely because of the costs and risk associated with out-party cabinet co-optation, we expect that rulers would not engage in it unless they were in a position where power-sharing with other parties is optimal for their survival.

From the perspective of opposition parties, entering the cabinet while retaining their label can be more beneficial than jumping ship and joining the ruling party: It allows them to gain access to resources and power while maintaining a degree of nominal and organizational independence. As Frantz and Kendall-Taylor (2014) argue, they are attracted by “the lure of a greater (albeit limited) policy influence and a means of advancing their political careers” (2014, p.335). Entering government without disowning their party label also maintains their public image as an alternative distinct from the regime-sanctioned party, while enhancing their credibility as political organizations qualified to (partly) hold the reins of government. Retaining their party label thus prevents opposition parties from being alienated by their activist base when they enter government, when Buckles (2019) shows this is one of the main risks that co-opted opposition parties face. In addition, it increases their bargaining power in future negotiations, since they still maintain an independent party structure, dealing them a stronger hand than if they had merged with the ruling party.

When some parties manage to get an actual voice in government and their party organization has not been taken over outright by the ruler’s party, there is what we call *bona fide* power-sharing between the ruling party and coalition parties. A pre-condition, following Magaloni and Kricheli (2010) is that “non-regime-sponsored parties must be able to retain some means to threaten the dictator’s survival when he reneges on his promises by, for example, mobilizing voters in great numbers to the streets” (2010, p.126). When such is the case, the threat of opposition coalescing persists – for instance because semi-competitive elections allow for some opposition parties to mobilize voters and form alliances against the ruling party. The leader is then pressured into sharing power “in good faith”, which translates into the allocation of cabinet positions to co-opted

parties. This argument is in line with new research which suggests that ruling parties are not as strong as we typically pit them to be (Meng 2019b). The higher the share of non-ruling parties in government, the wider power is shared beyond the ruling party; and the more important the cabinet posts they are granted, the deeper power-sharing is. *Bona fide* multiparty governments can be the result of tacit deals between parties representing specific groups in society whose interests and values are opposed, but who agree to share the spoils of government or unite against a common enemy in order not to lose their grip on power. Alternatively, it can result from a failure of the opposition to unite and form a united front. Importantly, upon entering the cabinet, these groups more often than not retain their affiliation with different parties and some degree of independence – for the above-mentioned reasons – so that multiple parties are *de facto* ruling together.

Ultimately therefore, we expect that not all multiparty government systems entail the same level of power-sharing between the ruling party and other parties. However, where the existing literature stresses that the inclusion of multiple parties in government in dictatorships should not be taken at face value, we contend that multiparty government in autocracies can in fact reflect *bona fide* power-sharing between the ruling party and opposition parties; and that both the number of parties included in government and the positions they hold matter in determining whether the coalition partners exert any real influence.

Correlates of AMGs

The above arguments suggest that AMGs may not emerge randomly among autocracies, and point to several factors that should encourage the rise of opposition groups which the autocrat may co-opt beyond partisan lines. We outline three factors of particular relevance.

First, we expect that social and cultural cleavages should contribute to how feasible and necessary power-sharing across party lines is. Indeed, the allocation of power across party lines is not independent from the composition of each party's respective base. Since extending cabinet positions outside of the ruling party aims at ensuring the support of segments of society needed for regime survival, we expect the existence of underlying social and cultural cleavages – typically along linguistic and/or ethnic lines – to make it easier to identify and reward specific support

groups by granting their representatives ministerial portfolios. This is in line with Arriola, DeVaro and Meng (2021), who find that ethnic fractionalization is positively and significantly associated with the number of presidential candidates in Africa (see also Arriola 2012).

Second, in some cases, such cleavages can result in civil war (Denny and Walter 2014; Reynal-Querol 2002). The aftermath of civil war is also more likely to see governments including former opposing factions – or at least a diversity of interest groups – emerge as institutional compromises aimed at ensuring regime stability. Ishiyama and Widmeier (2013) show that the electoral performance of former rebel political parties is partly determined by their level of control over specific constituencies during the war. We extend this argument, and expect that where rebel groups successfully transform into political parties post-conflict – and in particular where rebel-to-party clauses are included in internally-sponsored peace agreements (Kovacs and Hatz 2016) – this should favour post-war governments that include several parties.

Third, we expect that AMG is associated with nominally democratic institutions in autocracies, such as legislatures and/or the holding of elections. Even though these institutions do not ensure democracy, they allow coalition parties to organize and compete outside of the ruling coalition (Bunce and Wolchik 2011; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006), and “provides some means for advancement into political office and limited policy influence” for them (Magaloni and Kricheli 2010, , p.126). In addition, elections are focal points that expands opportunities for mobilization and lessen constraints on collective action amongst opponents of the regime (Bunce and Wolchik 2011). This has the effect of creating a threat to the incumbent, which in turn makes genuine power-sharing the best strategy for the ruler. Because not all outside parties can be co-opted (Buckles 2019), collusion between governmental and parts of the non-governmental opposition serves the purpose of dismembering and fracturing the opposition by making it harder to coordinate.

Measuring multiparty government in autocracies

To investigate the rise of multiparty government in autocracies, we exploit a new and comprehensive dataset, WhoGov (Nyrup and Bramwell 2020). The dataset contains information on cabinet

members in 177 countries in the period 1966-2016, including most of the world's autocracies, based on the "Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments" directory compiled by the CIA. Since the data has been gathered by CIA-affiliated personnel with country insight, we trust it is accurate even for highly autocratic countries with little transparency. The data contains individual-level information including the name, gender, and age of ministers, as well as their portfolio and – most importantly with respect to this article – party affiliation.

The party variable was coded in several steps. First, extensive historical accounts of each country and existing databases were explored to determine whether there were more than one party in government at any point – including the *Political Handbook of the World*, Miller (2020), the DPI (Beck et al. 2001), and Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) updated by Bjørnskov and Rode (2018). In some cases, it is easy to rule out the existence of multiparty governments. Some autocracies, such as Saudi Arabia and Swaziland, have a blanket ban on political parties. In other cases, one can safely assume that all members of government belonged to the same party. For instance, Zaire (1967-1992) mandated that all adult citizens were members of the ruling party.

For the remaining cases, each minister's party label was coded individually, using thousands of sources.⁴ A number of coding decisions are of relevance for this article. First, when deciding what counts as party affiliation, *WhoGov* tries to only code "card carrying" members of the party, such as those who run for office on behalf of the party. Often, politicians will have a relationship with, openly sympathize with, or be nominated by a party, all the while not being member of said party. Second, parties often form electoral coalitions gathering several parties. *WhoGov* codes politicians as belonging to the smallest possible unit. Third, in some countries, parties exist but play a minor role, so that party affiliation is often absent from ministers' biographical information. Similarly, in a handful of countries, data is very sparse but historical documents confirm that multiple parties are often represented in government. In these cases, the party affiliation of all ministers could not

⁴For most countries, the primary sources are the *Political Handbook of the World*, *Europa Regional Surveys of the World*, Bétoa (2020), The Presidential Cabinets Project (Camerlo and Martinez-Gallardom 2020), Wikileaks, LinkedIn, Historical Dictionaries for various countries, and Wikipedia. For a detailed, country-by-country description of the coding process, we kindly refer the reader to Appendix F of Nyrup and Bramwell (2020).

be recorded. Fourth, the coding of party affiliation is time-variant, which takes into account cases when members of the government switch to another party.

The end product is a list of members of the cabinet including their party affiliation, for all years in the period 1966-2016 in any given country. By focusing on individual cabinet members, we are better able to detect when coalition parties are included in the cabinet than the predominant approach whereby researchers focus on the regime as a whole or only look at elections. Yet, we acknowledge that there may be imprecise data points in cases where there was insufficient historical information.⁵ This being said, we are confident that *WhoGov* presents the best existing data for examining the rise of multiparty governments in autocracies.⁶

For each year and every country, we create 1) a binary measure of whether more than one party is represented in the cabinet, 2) a variable measuring the number of parties represented in the cabinet, and 3) the share of government posts granted to members of coalition parties.

Furthermore, to measure the depth of power sharing, we construct 4) a measure of concentration of power in government using a weighted Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (H-H), with more important posts receiving a higher weight, accounting for the fact that not all ministerial posts entail the same amount of prestige and responsibilities. The index ranges from 0 to 1, where 1 indicates that one party that controls all "points" - or all cabinet positions at once. By contrast, a low score on this scale indicates that many parties are controlling few posts each.⁷ To assign weights, we divide all cabinet positions into three categories; high, medium, and low prestige. The minister of defense, finance, foreign affairs, home/interior, the deputy prime minister, and, in presidential systems, the prime minister are categorized as high prestige. Ministries that controls significant resources, but has lesser status, are classified as medium prestige. These are, for example, agriculture, education, and transportation. At last, low-prestige positions are characterized by

⁵In total, party affiliation is coded for 94 percent of all cabinet members.

⁶In particular, we proceeded to an extensive double-checking of the partisan composition of all governments classified as AMGs in 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010 and 2016.

⁷Mathematically the index is constructed as $H = \sum_{i=1}^N m_i^2$ where m_i is the share of scores belonging to party m and N is the number of parties. Hence if there are two parties in government and they each have half of the cabinet positions, $H = 0.5^2 + 0.5^2 = 0.5$.

few resources and refers to ministries like youth, culture, and sports. We make some exceptions to these classification rules to account for country and region specificity. For example, the minister of natural resources is considered of high prestige in OPEC countries. For more details on the coding, see Appendix C. If the same person controls multiple portfolios or ministries, we only take into account the most prestigious position. Then we assign a score of 3 to high prestige positions, while medium prestige positions are assigned a score of 2, and low prestige gets a score of 1. We then add all the scores together for each party and use those to calculate the H-H index.

We also triangulate our results using The Database of Political Institutions 2020 (DPI) (Cruz, Keefer and Scartascini 2020) as an alternative data source in Appendix E. DPI records information about parties represented in parliament that are aligned with the government. Thus, contrary to WhoGov, DPI focuses on parliamentary representation and not on the government itself which may create some inconsistencies.

To distinguish autocracies from democracies we rely on the binary measure provided by Boix, Miller and Rosato (2013). The latter classify a country as democratic if key executive offices are filled via free and fair elections, with at least half of all men enfranchised. This relatively minimalistic definition presents a twofold advantage. First, it does not conflate aspects of the government with features of democracy itself, meaning that the number of parties in itself has no direct influence on the classification, and second, contrary to the DD-index (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 2010) this index does not require a peaceful transition of power for a country to be classified as democratic. Thereby, we avoid including democratic multiparty governments where one dominant party has remained in power since democratization. In Appendix D, we replicate our findings using the DD index (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 2010), and results indicate that the choice of democracy indicator is actually of little consequence here.

For further information on both the variables mentioned here and other variables used throughout the analyses we refer to Appendix A.

The rise of authoritarian multiparty government

This section provides empirical evidence on the dynamics behind AMGs, relying on quantitative data and illustrative cases. First, to motivate our research, we show that AMGs are indeed on the rise, and are becoming the norm in authoritarian politics. Next, we demonstrate that the adoption of AMG as form of government is not random. In line with the arguments presented above, we present evidence that autocracies that are more culturally fractionalized, have experienced civil war, and/or have adopted nominally democratic institutions are more likely to include multiple parties in government. At last, we argue and show that many coalition parties exert real influence in government, and they are therefore not just puppet coalition partners.

Figure 1 shows the rise of AMGs using three distinct measures. The top plot shows that the share of countries with more than one party in government has risen sharply and consistently in autocracies. In the 1960s and 1970s, multiparty governments were a rarity in the autocratic world (in 1966 it was 12 percent), whereas after the end of the Cold War, AMGs became increasingly common, and in 2016 they constituted around 50 percent of all autocracies. In the same period, we have seen a slight increase in the number of democracies with multiple parties in government (in 1966 53 percent of democracies had multiparty government, while it increased to 73 percent in 2016).

Unsurprisingly, we find a similar pattern when looking at the average number of parties in government. Autocracies, on average, had around one party represented in government before the end of the Cold War. When interpreting this graph it should be noted that some autocracies have banned parties altogether and therefore have no parties in government. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the number of parties went up dramatically, and today autocracies on average have 2.5 parties in government. Interestingly, we see that the number of parties also increase in democracies, particularly after 1990, indicating that governing systems also becomes more complex in democracies in the post-Cold War period.⁸

⁸In 1966 democracies on average had 2.0 parties represented in government. This increased to 3.1 in 2016.

The bottom panel displays the share of cabinet positions awarded to members of parties other than the party of the ruler. We find that the share of cabinet posts awarded to coalition partners was very low in autocracies in the period 1960-1990. Only around 3-6 percent of cabinet posts were controlled by coalition partners then. Yet, similarly to the other two measures, we witness a substantial increase after the Cold War, with the share of cabinet posts going to coalition partners increasing to almost 20 percent in autocracies.

Figure 2 further uses ridge plots for the first year in every decade to show the distribution of the average number of parties in government. Again, we see that autocracies increasingly have government coalitions similar to those in democracies – indicating that this is not driven by a few isolated cases.

Taken together, these patterns show first that AMGs have become more and more common since the 1970s, and that this is especially the case after the end of the Cold War. Second, this evolution seems to mirror that of democracies, but the latter see a slower increase in both the number of parties represented in government and the share of ministers from coalition parties in government – so that the gap between the two regime types, while still present, is considerably smaller today than it was 50 years ago. We confirm these trends using DPI as an alternative data source in Appendix E.

Which countries adopt AMG?

We provide an oversight of authoritarian countries with more than one party in government in 2016 in Figure 3 below. We also show the same figure for the year 1970 in Appendix F. A table showing the list of AMGs for the years 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010 respectively is presented in Appendix B. The figure shows, for autocracies with multiple parties in government, the distribution of cabinet positions by parties. The list is ranked by the share of portfolios belonging to the largest party, starting with the smallest. For instance, Iraq, despite being classified as autocratic, has a fragile governing coalition consisting of 13 different parties that each provide the support of a different section of society. At the bottom of the figure we have South Sudan. Here, all ministerial




Figure 1: Evolution of (a) the share of countries with more than one governing party, (b) the number of parties in government, and (c) the share of ministers from parties other than the leader's party by regime type (while only including regimes where parties are not banned).




Figure 2: Distribution of the number of parties in government by regime type and decade

positions but one belonged to the leader’s party – the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement. The South Sudan Democratic Forum, founded in 2001 by Sudanese civil society organizations, held one portfolio, the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs. It should be noted that in some autocracies, the ruler is independent yet still one or more parties are represented in the cabinet.⁹ This is for example the case in Morocco, where the king is nominally independent of party politics, but several parties are represented in cabinet.

Are all authoritarian regimes equally likely to integrate several political parties in government? Our theoretical argument has highlighted a range of factors that we suspect may influence the type of governing arrangement most likely to emerge and be sustainable over time. In particular, we expect contexts with deep historical and societal divides and/or experiences with civil war and those where nominally democratic institutions exist to be fertile grounds for cross-party authoritarian power-sharing.

⁹As mentioned in the data section, we do not count independents as a separate party, but remove these throughout the analyses.




Figure 3: Distribution of cabinet positions by party in multiparty government autocracies ranked by the size of the largest party in 2016. Uzbekistan has been removed from the graph in 2016 due to insufficient data.

In table 1, we correlate whether a country has multiple parties in government in a given year with the three factors outlined previously, namely social and cultural cleavages, past instances of civil war, and democratic institutions. We do so using simple linear probability models. All of the models include 1) time trends to take into account the general rise in AMGs, 2) region fixed effects to assure that the association is not driven by one region, and 3) standard errors clustered by country, since the model errors very likely are correlated within a country over time. It should also be noted that we constrain the sample to include only autocracies with existing parties, since our objective is to identify which countries are more likely to adopt AMG among those that have parties, rather than identifying whether parties exist at all in a given country.

For the first model we investigate how social and cultural cleavages relate to AMG using the cultural diversity index from Fearon (2003). The index uses the structural distance between languages as a proxy for the cultural distance between groups in a country, and thereby combine elements of both ethnic and lingual fractionalization. The score reflect the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a given country will not share a certain characteristic, the higher the number the less probability of the two sharing that characteristic.

We find that countries with multiparty governments are significantly more fractionalized on the cultural dimension. An autocracy with very little cultural resemblance amongst inhabitants (score close to 1) is 25 percent more likely to have AMG than a country that has high cultural resemblance (score close to 0). This provides some support for our argument that pre-existing cultural and demographic factors matter for the emergence of AMG. Yet, it should also be noted that while the association substantively is large, it is only weakly statistically significant. Still, this association is confirmed in Appendix H where we use alternative measures of cultural and demographic cleavages.

An example of this phenomena is Malaysia, where the United Malays National Organization (UNMO) uninterruptedly dominated political life from independence in 1957 until the 2018 elections (Pepinsky 2009). The exclusively-Malay party headed the Alliance Party (*Parti Perikatan*), which became the National Front (*Barisan Nasional*, or BN) coalition in 1973. The latter included

several coalition partners, the main being the Malaysian-Chinese Association and the Malaysian Indian Congress (which were both part of the Alliance Party), the United Bumiputera Heritage Party (PBB), and formed an extended governmental coalition with the Sabah's People United Front (also known as Berjaya) and many other small opposition parties over the years – with each member retaining their own party labels both in elections and in government. Meanwhile, the main opposition parties – the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), the Chinese-dominated Democratic Action Party (DAP), and the multi-ethnic People's Justice Party (PKR) – were excluded from the ruling coalition, and struggled to coalesce into an organized opposition front.¹⁰ As Pepinsky (2007) notes, it became clear over the years that "each opposition party [had] more in common with BN than it [did] with other opposition parties" (2007, p.124) – and yet they were unable to form a coalition because the ruling UNMO had selectively used co-opted along ethnic lines the parties that could potentially have tipped the electoral scales in favour of the opposition.¹¹ Nonetheless, as we explain later on, the overwhelming domination of the UNMO is reflected in the allocation of government posts.

In the second model, we create a variable equal to the cumulative sum of all the years a country has experienced a civil war since 1946 to the given year using the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002). We find that autocracies with a history of intra-state violence are significantly more likely to adopt AMG. In fact, one additional year of civil war in the past is associated with 1 percent increase in the likelihood of an autocracy having multiple parties in government.

This is in line with our theoretical expectations, since we hypothesised that regimes experiencing civil war would be more likely to adopt multiparty government as part of their conflict resolution effort. This may contribute to explaining why countries such as Iraq, the Central African Republic, or Rwanda have adopted multiparty governments despite not being fully democratic.

¹⁰Their attempt to do so in 1999 with the formation of the Barisan Alternatif (BA) broke up only a couple of years later.

¹¹In particular, according to Pepinsky, "The leaders of the DAP have realized that their strategic alliance with PAS was simply unacceptable to a large share of their core ethnic-Chinese constituency, which will never vote for a party allied with PAS as long as PAS hews to its explicit goal of implementing shari'a (Islamic law) in Malaysia. The PAS, meanwhile, clings to this stance, which is virtually all that sets it apart from UMNO." (2007, p.124)

A typical example of a setting where a civil war left a strong imprint on the system of non-democratic government is Lebanon: The Taef agreement that was designed to end the two-decades long war in 1989 specified a sectarian distribution of parliamentary seats and public office appointments (Salamey 2014). The latter were to be apportioned equally between Christian and Muslim political groups, when the pre-war ratio – which had been enshrined in the so-called "National Pact" gentlemen's agreement of 1943 – favoured Christians (Bogaards 2004). An unwritten convention born at the end of the war further states that the president, who is the head of state and is elected by a two-thirds majority of the National Assembly, must be a Maronite Christian. He/she then consults the Speaker of the Assembly – a Shiia Muslim – and they invite a Sunni Muslim to form a cabinet as Prime Minister. The allocation of portfolios between cabinet members is then organized so as to reflect the sectarian balance. Because political parties in Lebanon – as in many other countries with stark religious divides – are based largely on sectarian adherence, this results in a government where portfolios are consistently split between parties, and there is power-sharing between the different groups. This informal power-sharing arrangement is not static: it was reformed in 2008 with the Doha agreement, following almost two years of political deadlock.¹² Under the new agreement, the opposition – Hezbollah at the time – was allocated enough cabinet positions to veto decisions made by the new cabinet of national unity. This gives further credence to our argument that power-sharing arrangements between different parties that are at a great distance ideologically can help sustain non-democratic systems of government, and that a history of civil conflict may facilitate the creation of such coalitions.¹³

In model 3 of table 1, we correlate AGM with the Polyarchy measure from V-Dem (Teorell et al. 2019), which captures the core “institutional guarantees” identified in (Dahl 1971). We find that autocracies with some semblance of democratic institutions are much more likely to adopt multiparty governments, and this difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. Thus, even imperfect democratic institutions can work as a catalyst for power-sharing in autocracies. This

¹²<https://www.refworld.org/docid/49913b61c.html>

¹³There were no parliamentary elections in Lebanon between 2009 and 2018.

finding is robust to the use of alternative measures for democratic institutions which focus solely on the electoral component, as shown in Appendix H.

A good illustration is Zimbabwe, where the only time when power was shared between different parties in government was following a contested presidential election in 2008. Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) ruled as the only party in the game – and in government – from independence until 2008. Morgan Tsvangirai, the head of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T), won the first round of the presidential election, but withdrew from the second round amidst threats of electoral violence. The opposition refused to acknowledge Mugabe's victory in the one-man second round, resulting in political deadlock. Both the international community and African leaders pushed for a power-sharing deal, mediated through South African President Thabo Mbeki on behalf of the Southern African Development Community. Talks stalled for several weeks, because of mutual distrust, rivalry between the two factions of the MDC – that led by Tsvangirai and that led by Arthur Mutambara – and disagreements over the sharing of offices (in particular, the MDC initially refused to leave the highest executive office to Mugabe). After weeks of political stand-off, and following the opposition's victory in the parliamentary elections held in August, a deal was reached on September 11, 2008 between the ZANU-PF and both MDC factions. While historical, the deal was largely political in nature (Bratton 2016). The existence of (largely imperfect) democratic institutions made AMG the only viable governing arrangement for both the ruling party and the co-opted opposition at the time.

At last, we in column 4 include the three measures at once. Here, we find that the measure of civil wars and democracy both remain positive and statistically significant, while the coefficient for cultural diversity decreases in size and becomes insignificant. This suggests that cultural heterogeneity may be a driver of AMG, but that groups excluded from power either needs a non-violent way (democratic institutions) or a violent way (civil war) to gain access to the government, making these mediating variables.

In the Online Appendix we provide further analyses on the correlates of AMG. In Appendix

Table 1: Correlates of AMGs

	Social cleavages	Civil War	Democratic institutions	Multivariate model
Cultural diversity	0.26 (0.14)*			0.14 (0.13)
Past years with civil wars (count)		0.01 (0.00)**		0.01 (0.00)**
Polyarchy			0.71 (0.28)**	0.81 (0.26)**
Year	0.01 (0.00)***	0.01 (0.00)***	0.01 (0.00)***	0.01 (0.00)***
Estimation method: Within region	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	3104	3287	3197	3018
R ² (full model)	0.14	0.16	0.17	0.20
R ² (proj model)	0.13	0.15	0.15	0.18

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$. Dependent variable: Authoritarian Multiparty Government. The comparison group is all other autocracies conditional on having at least one party in government. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

If we use alternative measures of social and cultural cleavages, civil war, and democracy to show that the results are consistent independent of the measure. We also refer to Appendix H for a larger discussion of how the various ways of measuring these three concepts are expected to relate to AMG. Although the core of our theory is about the adoption of AMG, we also run the same analysis using three alternative measures as dependent variables: The number of parties, the share of cabinet positions, and the weighted Herfindahl index as the dependent variable. Results are presented in Appendix G, and show that our findings are generally comparable when we use these alternative, non-binary outcome variables.

If the above analysis provides strong evidence that multiparty governing is a feature of modern-day autocracies, this does not imply that coalition partners are granted any real influence in government. In the next section, we show that the coalition parties, at least to some degree, have real influence – meaning that power-sharing is not purely *pro-forma*.

Do authoritarian coalition parties have any real influence?

We first take a descriptive look at the positions granted to coalition parties in democracies and autocracies respectively. The top panel in figure 4 plots the share of the various cabinet portfolios given to parties other than that of the leader throughout the period 1966 to 2016. As expected, this share is higher in democracies than in autocracies for all portfolios (20.8 % to 26.5% in democracies *versus* 6.7% to 13.1% in autocracies). There is some interesting variation across portfolios: the shares of Ministries of Security & Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Communications & Information granted to coalition parties respectively are the lowest in autocracies. This makes sense if one think of these portfolios as entailing access to strategic resources and responsibilities – such as control over the armed forces, access to diplomatic clout, and control of the government’s information channels. Still, it is telling that on average, 7-8% of these ministries are controlled by individuals who do not belong to the ruler’s party.

The bottom panel in Figure 4 classifies positions by importance rather than by portfolio. Rather unsurprisingly, autocracies allocate fewer of the most important positions to coalition partners compared to their democratic counterparts. Nevertheless, it is striking that almost 8% of the most powerful positions in government are given out to individuals outside of the ruling party. Taken together, these descriptive results suggest that autocrats allocate positions of power within the government to outsiders to a higher extent than we would expect if there were no real power-sharing across party lines. Still, these figures may conceal substantial variation in intra-governmental power dynamics, which we proceed to investigate below.

In many cases, even when power is shared between the ruling party and coalition parties, the allocation of cabinet posts helps maintain and entrench the dominance of the former. In Malaysia for instance, the ascendancy of the UNMO is reflected in the allocation of government posts: while the coalition parties taken together hold up to one third of cabinet positions between 1966 and 2016, the posts are split between parties in such a way that no co-opted party holds more than four portfolios in any given year. Furthermore, the most important cabinet posts – Finance, Defense, Internal Security, Home Affairs, and Foreign Affairs – systematically go to UNMO members. Pepinsky




Figure 4: Share of positions given to coalition parties in democracies and autocracies, by portfolio and prestige

(2007) further notes that "[t]he president and deputy president of UMNO always hold the offices of prime minister and deputy prime minister, and every finance minister since 1974 has belonged to the party." (2007, p.115).

Similarly, in Zimbabwe, a key point of contention during the negotiations following the 2008 presidential election was the allocation of cabinet posts, in particular the overall balance between parties, and control over the police and security forces. According to the final agreement, Mugabe would be President and chair of the cabinet, Tsvangirai the Prime Minister and head of the council of ministers in control of the implementation of government policies, and Mutambara deputy prime minister. The resulting government was made up of 19 ZANU-PF ministers, 15 MDC-T members, and 3 MDC-M ones. Importantly, Mugabe retained control of the defense and security forces as chair of the National Security Council.¹⁴ Bratton (2016) underscores the shortcomings of the "Global Political Agreement" stemming from the September 2008 talks, saying it was "externally driven, internally unbalanced, and short on incentives for at least one side to eschew violence" – as the ZANU-PF retained full control of the military and security forces through the Joint Operations Command, and was therefore able to use threats of violence and intimidation against his opponents, both in and outside of government.

Overall, figure 4 shows that real power-sharing is less frequent in autocracies relative to democracies. Hence, while dictators are willing to enter into coalitions with other parties to co-opt selected parts of the opposition and avoid threats to the regime, they rarely give away the most important posts. Yet, at the same time, we also find substantial variation. In some cases the leader must engage in real power-sharing agreements to survive in office. In Lebanon for instance, the country was only able to exit the political crisis it had been in for over 18 months through a new, formal agreement (the Doha agreement) specifying new power-sharing terms which weakened the position of the leader's sectarian party, namely the Maronite Christians, to the benefit of the opposition Hezbollah. In particular, the new national unity cabinet that was agreed upon following

¹⁴"Mugabe keeps the lion's share", *Business Day*, Johannesburg, September 13, 2008; "Details of power sharing deal revealed", Agence France-Presse, September 15, 2008.

a peace conference for national reconciliation arbitrated by the Arab League of Nations in June of 2008 specified that: "A Government of national unity will be formed with 30 ministers to be allocated as follows: 16 to the majority, 11 to the opposition, and three to the President".¹⁵ *De facto*, this gave Hezbollah enough seats in cabinet to veto government initiatives, thus making for real power struggles within the government.

Lastly, we explore power distribution across AMGs over time in Figure 5. The figure displays the proportion of AMGs by degree of power sharing, using the weighted H-H index presented previously. Countries with a H-H index of 0.75-1 are classified as having a low degree of power sharing, those with between 0.5 and 0.75 have medium power sharing, while those with a score lower than 0.5 are classified as having a high degree of power sharing. Interestingly, AMGs seem to engage in less power sharing during the period 1970-1990 than after the end of the Cold War. Most importantly, we see that AMGs, throughout the period, generally display a higher degree of power sharing than what we would expect if they were solely *pro-forma* arrangements. Hence it is not the case that coalition partners solely get few and minor cabinet portfolios. Instead, they typically get multiple, somewhat important positions.

Taken together, the analyses above show that there are cases where autocrats allocate positions of importance to members of coalition parties. An important caveat is that the data does not allow us to investigate whether coalition partners are actually able to influence policies and pressure the autocrat to deviate from his/her preferences. Nevertheless, looking at the distribution of ministerial portfolios across regimes and over time provides strong evidence in favour of our argument that autocratic power-sharing across party lines is not just for the show, but that *bona fide* multiparty governments are surprisingly common in autocratic regimes.

Conclusion and discussion

This article challenges the assumption that authoritarian ruling parties govern alone. We show that authoritarian regimes often adopt multiparty governments, where members of several parties

¹⁵See the [letter](#) from the Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations addressed to the President of the UN Security Council.




Figure 5: Proportion of AMGs by degree of power sharing. AMGs with high power sharing have a weighted Herfindahl-index between 0 and 0.5, those with medium have a score between 0.5 and 0.75, while those with low have a score between 0.75 and 1.

are granted access to the highest civilian decision-making institution: The ministerial cabinet. We present novel descriptive evidence on the increasing frequency of this phenomenon over time, and demonstrate that this form of government does not emerge randomly among autocracies, but instead correlates with underlying social and historical cleavages, a history of civil wars, and political institutions. Furthermore, fine-grained measures of power allocation in government suggest that coalition parties in many cases obtain real influence. Hence, these governments are not just *pro-forma*: Instead, many are what we call *bona fide* multiparty governments. We argue and show that this puzzling finding can be at least partially explained by underlying societal divides and institutional contexts wherein the autocrat finds it beneficial to co-opt opposition parties in order to avoid challenges and prevent an unified opposition from arising.

In this paper, we set out to uncover and begin to explain the phenomenon of authoritarian multiparty governments. By introducing a novel conceptual category and presenting strong evidence of its empirical relevance, we also open up fruitful new avenues for research. An obvious one would

be to investigate the external factors that fostered the rise of AMG worldwide from the 1980s onward. Two concomitant trends may be of particular relevance. First, after the end of the Cold War, civil conflicts become more frequent, but engaging in civil war has become increasingly expensive both for the autocrat and the opposition (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010). This makes the adoption of multiparty government potentially more attractive to both sides. Second, more authoritarian regimes are adopting democratic institutions such as parliaments and elections after the Cold War, partly due to the rising diplomatic and economic costs of being an “old-school” one-party state. This gives the opposition better opportunities to organize and compete, which may ultimately result in outsiders gaining access to government for the reasons we have outlined. While we identify correlates of AMG, it is outside the scope of this paper to causally identify the determinants of this phenomenon using more advanced statistical methods.

In addition, the article does not delve into the consequences of AMGs. As recent research has shown, ministerial cabinets are an important institution in authoritarian regimes, and their composition shapes the constraints that weigh on the autocrat (Meng 2019a). There is therefore good reason to think that the coalitional make-up of authoritarian governments ultimately bears implications for relevant policy and regime outcomes. In particular, one may ask: How does multiparty governments impact economic outcomes such as growth and redistribution? In light of the findings of Arriola, DeVaro and Meng (2021), one may also ask: To what extent does this system of government affect the survival prospects of authoritarian states? These are new avenues of research that are well worth exploring, and our research aims at providing a useful analytical framework on which to build further empirical analyses of these questions.

Lastly, our findings also relate to the literature on democratization, democratic backsliding, and how we think of “hybrid regimes”. In many autocracies, we look to the “democratic” opposition as the force that eventually will bring democracy to the country. However, this article shows that AMGs are alternative arrangements that benefit both the autocrat and select parts of the opposition, possibly making democratization less likely rather than more. Identifying this type of governing arrangement is a first step towards understanding its implications.

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Appendix: For Online Publication

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A Description of variables and coding decisions

The analyses rely both on variables for measuring AMG and on background variables to investigate the correlates of AMG. The descriptive statistics for all variables are found in Table A1, while we discuss coding decisions and sources in the following sections. We exclude data on democracies from the descriptive statistics.

Table A1: Descriptive statistics

	Observations	Mean	Median	SD	Min	Max
Number of parties	4414	1.43	1.00	1.83	0.00	17.00
AMG (binary)	4414	0.22	0.00	0.42	0.00	1.00
Coalition parties' share of cabinet positions	4414	0.09	0.00	0.20	0.00	1.00
Weighted Herfindahl Index	3386	0.87	1.00	0.23	0.09	1.00
Cultural Diversity Index	3996	0.34	0.36	0.22	0.00	0.73
Past years with civil wars (count)	4326	5.28	1.00	9.45	0.00	69.00
Polyarchy	4202	0.22	0.19	0.13	0.01	0.76

Variables for measuring AMG

Throughout the analyses we rely on several measures of AMG. In this appendix we provide further information on the coding decisions for the different variables.

Number of Parties We use the variable *n_party* from Nyrup and Bramwell (2020), which is a score for the number of parties represented in cabinet in a given year. The variable is calculated by counting the number of distinct parties amongst cabinet members using the *party* variable from the individual-level dataset. It should be noted that WhoGov only includes full-ranking ministers, deputy prime ministers, and the prime minister when counting the number of parties. Thus, junior ministers, presidents, and other people for whom WhoGov includes data, such as royals or advisors, are excluded. Cabinet members coded as independent and unknown are excluded.

Binary measure of AMG We code a binary measure of whether a country has AMG in a given year. The variable takes the score 1 if the variable *n_party* from WhoGov is 2 or larger, meaning that a country has more than one party represented in a

given year. Thus, regimes with one party or zero parties in government gets the score 0.

Coalition Parties' Share of Cabinet Positions We calculate the share of cabinet members belonging to coalition parties in the government by creating a binary variable for each minister that shows whether a person belongs to the same party as the leader or another party. Then we create a sum for both the total number of ministers and the number of ministers belonging to coalition parties, and find the share belonging to coalition parties. To identify the leader's party, we use the *leader* variable found in WhoGov. We include cabinet members coded as independent in count of total number of cabinet members, while those coded whose party is set to unknown are excluded. We include the same subset of cabinet members as for number of parties.

Weighted Herfindahl Index We construct a measure of concentration of power in government using a weighted Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (H-H), with more important posts receiving a higher weight, accounting for the fact that not all ministerial posts entail the same amount of prestige and responsibilities. The index ranges from 0 to 1, where 1 indicates that one party that controls all "points" - or all cabinet positions at once. By contrast, a low score on this scale indicates that many parties are controlling few posts each. Mathematically the index is constructed as $H = \sum_{i=1}^N m_i^2$ where m_i is the share of scores belonging to party m and N is the number of parties. Hence if there are two parties in government and they each have half of the cabinet positions, $H = 0.5^2 + 0.5^2 = 0.5$. To assign weights, we divide all cabinet positions into three categories; high, medium, and low prestige. The minister of defense, finance, foreign affairs, home/interior, the deputy prime minister, and, in presidential systems, the prime minister are categorized as high prestige. Ministries that controls significant resources, but has lesser status, are classified as medium prestige. These are, for example, agriculture, education, and transportation. At last, low-prestige positions are characterized by few resources and refers to ministries like youth, culture, and sports. We make some exceptions. For example, the minister of natural resources is considered of high prestige in OPEC countries. For more details on the coding, see Appendix C. If the same person controls multiple portfolios or ministries, we only take into account the most prestigious position. Then we assign a score of 3 to high prestige positions, while medium prestige positions are assigned a score of 2, while low prestige gets a

score of 1. We then add all the scores together for each party, and use those to calculate the H-H index. We include the same subset of cabinet members as for number of parties.

Correlates of AMG

We correlate AMG with three factors that should be predictive of AMG, namely social and cultural cleavages, civil war, and democratic institutions. Below we discuss the main measures of these factors used in the paper.

Cultural diversity The variable is a measure of cultural diversity originating from Fearon (2003) and is constant for all years for the same country. It is a modified version of the measure of ethnic fractionalization, also from Fearon (2003), which takes into account the cultural distances between groups, measured as the structural distance between languages spoken by different groups in a country. If the groups in a country speak structurally unrelated languages, their cultural diversity index will be the same as their score on the level of ethnic fractionalization. However, the more similar are the languages spoken by different ethnic groups, the more will this measure be reduced below the measure of ethnic fractionalization (Teorell et al. 2020). the level of ethnic fractionalization for that country.

Past years with civil wars (count) The measure is a count of how many years prior to the given year a country has an intrastate war. The count starts in 1946, which is the earliest year with available data. We rely on data on the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002).

Polyarchy The $v2x_polyarchy$ index. The index is formed by taking the average of, on the one hand, the sum of the indices measuring freedom of association (thick) ($v2x_frassoc_thick$), suffrage ($v2x_suffr$), clean elections ($v2xel_frefair$), elected executive (de jure) ($v2x_accex$) and freedom of expression ($v2x_freexp_thick$); and, on the other, the five-way interaction between those indices. Source: V-Dem (Teorell et al. 2019).

B Autocracies with multiple parties in the government

In the table below we list all AMGs in WhoGov the first year of every decade and in 2016, which is the last year in WhoGov. We have proceeded to individual checks of the party affiliation for each minister in each of the country and years listed in the table.

	1970	Parties	1980	Parties	1990	Parties	2000	Parties	2010	Parties	2016	Parties
1	Indonesia	5	Malaysia	9	Malaysia	7	Malaysia	9	Iraq	16	Iraq	12
2	Lebanon	5	Morocco	5	Iran	6	Algeria	8	Sri Lanka	9	Congo - Kinshasa	10
3	Malaysia	5	Poland	3	Uganda	5	Congo - Brazzaville	8	Chad	8	Congo - Brazzaville	10
4	Bulgaria	2	Thailand	3	Bangladesh	4	Iran	7	CIvoire	8	Lebanon	8
5	Laos	2	Bulgaria	2	Gabon	4	Morocco	5	Lebanon	8	Malaysia	8
6	Morocco	2	Nicaragua	2	Lebanon	4	Uganda	5	Malaysia	8	Iran	7
7	Poland	2	Sri Lanka	2	Morocco	4	Fiji	4	Congo - Kinshasa	7	Mali	7
8	Tanzania	2	Suriname	2	Cambodia	3	Russia	4	Haiti	7	Central African Republic	6
9					Comoros	3	Rwanda	4	Congo - Brazzaville	7	Sri Lanka	6
10					Yemen	3	Cameroon	3	Morocco	6	Haiti	5
11					Senegal	2	Chad	3	Afghanistan	5	Morocco	5
12					Sri Lanka	2	Ecuador	3	Thailand	5	Yemen	5
13							Gabon	3	Algeria	4	Bangladesh	4
14							Lebanon	3	Central African Republic	4	Equatorial Guinea	4
15							Liberia	3	Gabon	4	Guinea-Bissau	4
16							Serbia	3	Iran	4	CIvoire	4
17							Sierra Leone	3	Kyrgyzstan	4	Kyrgyzstan	4
18							Angola	2	Niger	4	Maldives	4
19							Armenia	2	Sudan	4	Afghanistan	3
20							Burundi	2	Armenia	3	Algeria	3
21							Cambodia	2	Cameroon	3	Gabon	3
22							Congo - Kinshasa	2	Equatorial Guinea	3	Madagascar	3
23							Georgia	2	Mauritania	3	Myanmar (Burma)	3
24							Guinea-Bissau	2	Rwanda	3	Rwanda	3
25							Jordan	2	Zimbabwe	3	Togo	3
26							Paraguay	2	Cambodia	2	Armenia	2
27							Tajikistan	2	Djibouti	2	Burkina Faso	2
28									Nigeria	2	Burundi	2
29									Togo	2	Cambodia	2
30									Uzbekistan	2	Cameroon	2
31									Yemen	2	Chad	2
32											Djibouti	2
33											Mauritania	2
34											Russia	2
35											South Sudan	2
36											Sudan	2

Table B1: Autocracies with more than one party in government over time

C Classification of importance

Below we list the various portfolios existing in WhoGov, their classification in terms of importance, and their classification in terms of prestige. Following Krook and O'Brien (2012) we make two exceptions, namely 1) we consider any ministry having to do with natural resources, oil, or energy to be high prestige for OPEC members, and 2) we consider ministers of religious affairs to be a high-prestige positions in Iran, Afghanistan, Mauritania and Pakistan. We use these to construct Figure 4 and the Weighted Herfindahl Index.

¹There can be several ministers in charge of, for example, defense. We only include the highest ranked minister as high prestige, while the rest are downgraded to medium prestige.

Table C1: Oversight over classification of importance

Leader (1)

Leader

Prime minister/President (not leader) (2)

President, chief of state, prime minister, who is not the leader

Vice-president, deputy prime minister, and top minister (3)

Vice-president, deputy prime minister, deputy chief of state

Full ranking minister of high prestige portfolio

Medium-ranking minister (4)

Full ranking minister of medium prestige portfolio

Attorney general, chief justice, or legal official

Governor (Military)

Member, royal family

Member, ruling group

Low-ranking minister(5)

Full-ranking minister of low prestige portfolio

Director of government agency

Government spokesperson

Governor (Regional)

Junior minister or other low-ranking post (6)

Junior minister (independent of prestige)

Advisor

Ambassador to the United States

Assistant advisor

Chief of staff

Deputy director of government agency

Governor (Central Bank)

Representative to the United Nations

Table C2: List of Portfolios: Individual-level results

Portfolio	Prestige	Portfolio	Prestige
Defense, Military & National Security ¹	High	Foreign Relations ¹	High
Government, Interior & Home Affairs	High	Finance, Budget & Treasury ¹	High
Agriculture, Food, Fisheries & Livestock	Medium	Audit, Oversight & Internal Affairs	Medium
Civil Service	Medium	Communications & Information	Medium
Construction & Public Works	Medium	Correctional Services & Police	Medium
Culture & Heritage	Medium	Education, Training & Skills	Medium
Energy	Medium	Enterprises, Companies & Business	Medium
Environment	Medium	Executive & Legislative Relations	Medium
Foreign Economic Relations	Medium	General Economic Affairs	Medium
Health & Social Welfare	Medium	Housing	Medium
Industry & Commerce	Medium	Justice & Legal Affairs	Medium
Labor, Employment & Social Security	Medium	Local Government	Medium
Natural Resources	Medium	Planning & Development	Medium
Political Reform	Medium	Properties & Buildings	Medium
Religion	Medium	Regional	Medium
Tax, Revenue & Fiscal Policy	Medium	Transport	Medium
Ageing & Elderly	Low	Children & Family	Low
Immigration & Emigration	Low	Minorities	Low
Science, Technology & Research	Low	Sports	Low
Tourism	Low	Veterans	Low
Without Portfolio	Low	Women	Low
Youth	Low		
Other	Low		

D Repeating the analysis with alternative measure of democracy

In this appendix we replicate some of the main results using the DD index (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 2010) to show that our findings are independent of the choice of democracy indicator to distinguish democracies from autocracies.




Figure D1: Evolution of (a) the number of parties in government, (b) the share of countries with more than one governing party, and (c) the share of ministers from parties other than the leader's party by regime type (while only including regimes where parties are not banned). We use the DD index (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 2010) to measure democracy.

Table D1: Correlates of AMGs

	Social cleavages	Civil War	Democratic institutions	Multivariate model
Cultural diversity	0.29 (0.14)**			0.16 (0.13)
Past years with civil wars (count)		0.01 (0.00)**		0.01 (0.00)**
Polyarchy			0.65 (0.25)***	0.68 (0.22)***
Year	0.01 (0.00)***	0.01 (0.00)***	0.01 (0.00)***	0.01 (0.00)***
Estimation method: Within region	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	3077	3258	3178	2989
R ² (full model)	0.15	0.18	0.18	0.21
R ² (proj model)	0.13	0.17	0.17	0.20

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$. Dependent variable: Authoritarian Multiparty Government. The comparison group is all other autocracies conditional on having at least one party in government. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. We use DD-index to separate democracies and autocracies.

E Repeating the analysis with DPI

In this appendix we replicate some of the main findings from the manuscript using the The Database of Political Institutions 2020 (DPI) (Cruz, Keefer and Scartascini 2020). DPI records information about parties represented in parliament that are aligned with the government. Thus, DPI focuses on parliamentary representation and not on the government itself. This is in contrast to WhoGov which focuses on the cabinet members. As a result, we do not expect the two measures to be perfectly consistent.




Figure E1: Evolution of (a) the number of parties in government and (b) the share of countries with more than one governing party. We use the data from the DPI (Cruz, Keefer and Scartascini 2020) to construct our measure.

Using DPI, we construct a measure of AMG, where a country is classified as AMG if there is more than one party listed as aligned with the government. Again, we rely on Boix, Miller and Rosato (2013) to distinguish democracies from autocracies. In figure E1 we replicate Figure 1, and find that we also see an increase in AMGs over time when using this alternative measure. This is the case both when looking at share of countries with AMG and at the average number of parties.

Thus, this trend is not only found in WhoGov.

In addition, we correlate the measure of AMG from DPI with the three correlates of AMG in table E1. We find that both cultural diversity and Polyarchy are significantly correlated with AMG, while past years with civil wars is positive, but not significant. Again, it should be noted that DPI is distinct from WhoGov, causing us to not expect to fully replicate the results.

Table E1: Correlates of AMGs (Measure from DPI)

	Social cleavages	Civil War	Democratic institutions	Multivariate model
Cultural diversity	0.23 (0.11)**			0.13 (0.12)
Past years with civil wars (count)		0.00 (0.00)		0.01 (0.00)**
Polyarchy			0.47 (0.24)*	0.53 (0.25)**
Year	0.01 (0.00)***	0.01 (0.00)***	0.01 (0.00)***	0.01 (0.00)***
Estimation method: Within region	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	2400	2565	2476	2318
R ² (full model)	0.11	0.10	0.11	0.14
R ² (proj model)	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.12

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$. Dependent variable: Authoritarian Multiparty Government measured using DPI. The comparison group is all other autocracies conditional on having at least one party in government. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

F Figure 3 for 1970

Figure F1 shows AMGs in 1970 in a similar way to figure 3.




Figure F1: Distribution of cabinet positions by party in multiparty government autocracies ranked by the size of the largest party in 1970

G Table 1 using alternative measures of AMG

In the main text we correlate the three factors with the binary measure of AMG. However, as discussed in appendix A we also construct alternative measures of AMG. In this appendix we correlate these alternative measures with cultural diversity, past years with civil wars, and Polyarchy. We find many of the same patterns, and all coefficients are in the expected direction, although they are not all significant. Nonetheless, the theory focuses on whether countries adopt AMG; not the number of parties, coalition parties' share of cabinet positions nor the Weighted Herfindahl Index. Instead, we hope future research will look into predictors of these variables.

Table G1: Correlates of AMGs (number of parties)

	Social cleavages	Civil War	Democratic institutions	Multivariate model
Cultural diversity	1.49 (0.70)**			0.86 (0.70)
Past years with civil wars (count)		0.05 (0.02)**		0.05 (0.02)**
Polyarchy			2.37 (1.15)**	2.85 (1.21)**
Year	0.04 (0.01)***	0.03 (0.01)***	0.03 (0.01)***	0.02 (0.01)***
Estimation method: Within region	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	3104	3287	3197	3018
R ² (full model)	0.14	0.17	0.15	0.21
R ² (proj model)	0.12	0.15	0.12	0.19

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$. Dependent variable: Number of parties. The comparison group is all other autocracies conditional on having at least one party in government. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

Table G2: Correlates of AMGs (Coalition Parties' Share of Cabinet Positions)

	Social cleavages	Civil War	Democratic institutions	Multivariate model
Cultural diversity	0.09 (0.08)			0.06 (0.08)
Past years with civil wars (count)		0.00 (0.00)		0.00 (0.00)
Polyarchy			0.18 (0.11)	0.17 (0.11)
Year	0.00 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)***
Estimation method: Within region	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	3104	3287	3197	3018
R ² (full model)	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.11
R ² (proj model)	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.10

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$. Dependent variable: Coalition Parties' Share of Cabinet Positions. The comparison group is all other autocracies conditional on having at least one party in government. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

Table G3: Correlates of AMGs (Weighted Herfindahl Index)

	Social cleavages	Civil War	Democratic institutions	Multivariate model
Cultural diversity	-0.13 (0.08)*			-0.07 (0.08)
Past years with civil wars (count)		-0.00 (0.00)**		-0.01 (0.00)**
Polyarchy			-0.30 (0.15)**	-0.33 (0.15)**
Year	-0.01 (0.00)***	-0.00 (0.00)***	-0.00 (0.00)***	-0.00 (0.00)***
Estimation method: Within region	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	3103	3286	3196	3017
R ² (full model)	0.14	0.16	0.16	0.20
R ² (proj model)	0.13	0.15	0.14	0.18

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$. Dependent variable: Weighted Herfindahl Index. The comparison group is all other autocracies conditional on having at least one party in government. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

H Table 1 using alternative measures of the independent variables

In this appendix, we present results using alternative measures of the three factors identified as correlates of AMG in the main empirical specification.

In column 1-3, we use three alternative measures of social and cultural cleavages. In column 1 we use Alesina et al. (2003) measure of linguistic fractionalization in the year 2000, while we in column 2 use ethnic fractionalization in the year 2000 from the same dataset. Both measures are associated with a higher likelihood of a country having AMG, albeit neither is statistically significant. This indicates that Fearon (2003)'s measure of cultural diversity, which combines ethnic and linguistic fractionalization better captures our theoretical concept. This is confirmed in column 3, where we use a binary measure on whether there is more than one politically active ethnic group in a country constructed using GROWup (Girardin et al. 2015). Here, we find that autocracies with multiple politically active ethnic groups are significantly more likely to adopt a multiparty government, which confirms our main results.

Next, in column 4-6, we employ three alternative measures of civil war. In column 4, we use a binary measure of whether there is an ongoing civil war in a country using (Gleditsch et al. 2002), and find that countries with AMG are much more likely to experience a civil war. Furthermore, in column 5, we use a measure of whether there is at least one instance of civil war in the past, again based on (Gleditsch et al. 2002), and find that countries with at least one civil war in the past are more likely to adopt AMG. Furthermore, in column 6 we use the number of past years with civil war using the Major Episodes of Political Violence from the Center for Systemic Peace (Marshall 2019), and find that this measure also positively predicts AMG.

At last, we use three alternative measures of democratic institutions in column 7-9. In column 7 we use a continuous measure of democracy, the Polity IV score (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers 2019), and find that the coefficient is also positive and significant. This index captures the level of authoritarianism on a scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). Specifically, the Polity score captures the quality of executive recruitment, constraints on the executive, and political competition. It differs from the V-Dem polyarchy index in its method of aggregation, and in the fact that it is less conservative – in particular its suffrage component is less demanding (Teorell et al. 2016).

Likewise, in column 7 and 8, we use the core civil society index and the electoral component index which both are from V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2020), and find that both are positive and significant. The CCSI index captures the robustness of civil society, and results thus show that a stronger realm of social contestation with the dictatorial regime is positively associated with more parties being included in government. The electoral component index captures, in addition to how freely political and civil society organizations operate, the extent of suffrage, the degree of freedom and fairness of elections, and mode of selection of the chief executive. Taken together,

these continuous measures of democracy are useful theoretical complements to the Polyarchy index used in the main specification.

Overall, we therefore find that AMG also correlates positively and significantly with these alternative measures, strengthening our confidence that the three correlates of AMG identified in the main analysis are in fact relevant.

Table H1: Correlates of AMGs

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Language Fractionalization (Alesina et. al)	0.16 (0.10)								
Linguistic Fractionalization (Alesina et. al)		0.14 (0.13)							
More than one active ethnic group (EPR)			0.15** (0.07)						
Civil war (in the given year)				0.22*** (0.05)					
Civil war in the past					0.24*** (0.05)				
Past years with civil war (CSP)						0.01** (0.00)			
Polity IV							0.03*** (0.01)		
Core civil society index								0.52*** (0.12)	
Electoral component index									0.57*** (0.14)
Year	0.01*** (0.00)								
Estimation method: Within region	Yes								
Num. obs.	3034	3163	3287	3287	3287	3287	3146	3216	3216
R ² (full model)	0.12	0.12	0.14	0.17	0.18	0.16	0.20	0.20	0.22
R ² (proj model)	0.11	0.11	0.13	0.16	0.17	0.15	0.19	0.18	0.20

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$. Dependent variable: Authoritarian Multiparty Government. The comparison group is all other autocracies conditional on having at least one party in government. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

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